The Journal of speculative philosophy

PRESENTED

TO

The University of Toronto

liY

CbtLL. f //^t/lA.-C^

THE JOURNAL

0 F

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME XV.

EDITED BY WM. T. HAREIS

NEW YORK:
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY.

ST. LOUIS : George I. Jones and Company ; LONDON : Trfibner and Company.

1881.

Entered, according to Act of Cono;ress, in the year 1881, by

WILLIAM T. HARRIS,
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.

CONTENTS

PAGE

Agnosticism, Thoughts"on the Basis of, W. T. Harris, 113

Albee, John, Archimedes, 198

" " Roman Lovers, 322

" " " Literary Art " (noticed), 329

Alcott, A. Bronson, Philosophemes, 84

Anthropology. See Kant.

Berkeley's Idealism, C. IF. Bradley, 67

Books Received, List of, 102, 105, 33(3, 434

Brain Tissue, Transmigration of, 200

Brooke's Faith and Freedom (noticed), 224

Bulkley, B. R., Spencerian Stanza, "The Saddest of Thoughts," 429

Caird's Philosophy of Religion (noticed), 216

Channing, W. E., Selected Sentences in Prose and Verse, . . T. ., . ,, _. . 189

Chicago, Philosophical Society of, .\ . 195

Collyns-Simon, Dr. T., On Berkeley, the New Materialism and the Diminution of

Light by Distance, '^. 77

Concord School of Philosophy, The, for 1881, 75

" " The, Kant Centennial at, 303

Darwin, Charles, On Infant Education, 206

Education, the Science of (paraphrase of Rosenkranz's Piidagogik als System),

Anna C. Brachett, 35

Emery, S. H., On Lucretius, 198

Griggs, S. C, German Philosophical Classics, Edited hy Morris, 323

Gryzanowsky, Dr. E., Letter toDr. William James, 89

Harms, Friedrich, On the Forms of Ethical Systems (noticed), 201

Hegel, G. W. F., On the Absolute Religion (Tr.), , . . F. Louis Soldan, 9, 132, 395

" compared with Kant, By IF". T. Harris, 241

Hodgson, S. H., Letter from, and Quotations from his "Reflection," 320

James, Dr. Wm., on Great Men, etc., vs. Environment, 88

Kant, Immanuel, Anthropology (Tr.), . . . ■ A. E. Krocger, 62

" Antinomies in the Light of Modern Science, L. F. Ward, 381

" Centennial at Concord, 303

" Centennial, By /. IF. Mcars., 223

iv Contents.

PAGE

Kant an 1 \\.<'^A in tlic History of Philosophy, Dy W. T. Harris, 241

" Kritilv, The Cjntonninl of, at Saratoga, 293

" riiilas^oi^hy in its Relations to Realism, etc., J. Wotson, 337i-

" I'hibsopliy, The Results of, By Julia Ward Howe, 274

" Redita'.ioii of Anselm's Ontological Proof of God, . . . W.T.Harris, 404

*' Relation to MuLlern Philosophic Progress, /. lioi/cc, 360

" Transcendent. 1 Deiiuction of the Categories, . . . .By G. S. Ilorris, 253

Kedney's "The BAiutKul and the Sublime" (noticed), 335

Lucretius, By S. H. Emcri/, 198

Mt ad, Edwin D., On the Century of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 95

Mears, Dr. John W., Circular on the Kant Centennial, 92

" " Address at Concord, 225

Michclct's Die Philosoplde der Geschiehto (noticed), 223

Mulford's Republic of God (noticed), 218

Preyer, Dr. W., On Psychogenesis (Tr.), Marion Talbot, 159

" " Corrifjcnda to his Article on Psychogenesis, 427

Psychogenesis. See Pieyer, Dr. W.

Religion, The Piiilosophy of, By ir 7". Harris, 207

Religion, The Philosophy of. See Hegel.

Roseukrauz, Karl, Analysis of his Pudagotjik ah System, . By W. T. Harris, 52

" " Paraplirase of same, By A. C. Br ackelt, 35

Schelling, F. W. J. von, On Medicine and the Theory of Organic Nature (Tr.),

Ella S. Morgan, 1

" " On the Science of the Fine Arts (Tr.), . Ella S. Morgan, 152
Schopenhauer, Arthur, Select Essays of (noticed),

Translated by C. A. P. HacJisel and Garritt Droppers, 323

Science, The Unification of, Alfred Arnold 121

Social Science, Circular on Infant Education, etc . 99

" " Darwin's Letter, 206

Sully's " Illusions " (review by Burns-Gibson), 325

Taylor, Bayard, "Invocation of Goethe" (Tr.), C. E. Lackland, 98

Watson, John, "Kant and his English Critics " (noticed), 221

" " Essay on Kantian Philosophy, 337

Index to the Contents of the Fifteen Volumes of the Journal of Speculative Phi-
losophy, . 437

THE JOURNAL

OF

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

Vol. XY.] January, 1881. [JSTo. 1.

01^ MEDICmE A^D THE THEORY OF ORGANIC

NATURE.

TRANSLATION OF THE THIRTEENTH LECTURE OF F. W. J. SCHELLING ON " THE METHOD OF
UNIVERSITY STUDY," BY MRS. ELLA S. MORGAN.

As organism, according to the most ancient opinion, is nothing
but nature in the microcosm, and in the most complete self-con-
templation, so the* science of organism must bring together, as
in a focus, all rays of the general knowledge of nature, and make
them one. At almost all times the knowledge of general phjsics
has been considered as, at least, a necessary step and introduction
to the sanctuary of organic life. But what scientific conception
could the organic theory of nature borrow from physics, which,
■itself without the universal idea of nature, could only burden and
distort it with its own hypotheses, as has generally been the case
since the barriers have been more or less broken down which were
believed to separate nature in general from living nature ?

The enthusiasm of the age for chemistry made it the principle
of all organic phenomena, and reduced life itself to a chemical
process. The explanations of the first forms of life by elective
affinity or crystallization and of organic motion, and even the ac-
tivities of the senses, by means of changes of composition and sub-
stitutions, are all excellent enough, except that those who give
XY— 1

2 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

them must nrst explain what electiv^e affinity and cluinges of com-
position are, a question wliicli they doubtless feel able to answer.

It is not answered by merely carryinj^ over and applying one
branch of natuial science to another. Each is absolute in itself,
no one is deducible from another, and all can be truly one only
when in each for itself the particular is comprehended in the
general and from an absolute conformity to law.

Firstly, in order that medicine must become a universal science
of organic nature, of which the separate parts are all branches,
and that it may gain this breadth and internal unity, as well as
give it the rank of a science, the first principles upon which
it rests must be not empirical or hypothetical, but in themselves
certain and philosophic. It is true that for some time this has
been felt and recognized, more generally than has been the case
in regard to other departments of the science of nature. Here
also philosophy should have no other business than to bring an
external, formal unity into the existing multiplicity, and to restore
a reputation to the science of physicians, which has been made
ambiguous by poets and philosophers for many a year. If Brown's
theory were distinguished by nothing more than by the purity
from empirical explanations and hypotheses,. the recognition and
development of the great principle of the merely quantitative
diifereuce in all phenomena, and the consistency with which they
follow from one first principle without the addition of any other,
and without deviating from the scientific method, its originator
would still be eminent in the history of medicine and the creator
of a new world in this realm of knowledge. It is true that he
stops with the idea of excitability, and still has no scientific knowl-
edge of it, but at the same time he refuses all empirical explana-
tion of it, and warns against the uncertain investigation of causes,
which is the ruin of philosophy. Doubtless he did not deny that
there was a higher sphere of knowing in which that idea could
itself be derived and construed from a higher, as he derived that
of forms of disease from it.

The idea of excitability is a mere conception of the understand-
ing, whereby the single organic thing, but not the essence of the
organism, is determined. For the absolute ideal, which mani-
fests itself in it objectively and subjectively at the same time, as
body and soul, is in itself outside of all determination. The single

On Medicine and the Theory of Organic Nature. 3

thing, the organic body, the temple which it builds for itself, is
determinable and necessarily determined bv other and external
things. Since now the absolute ideal watches over the unity of
form and essence in organism, as that in which alone the latter
is the symbol of it, so it is determined — by every determination
from without which affects the form — to a restoration of unity, and
hence to action. Hence it is only indirectly determined, that is,
through change of the external conditions of life, and never in
Itself.

That through which the organism is the expression of the whole
subject-objectivating is this, namely, that matter — which at a
lower point is the opposite of light and manifests itself as sub-
stance— in it is one with light (because both united are related to
each other as attributes of one and the same), and becomes a mere
accident of the essence of organism, and hence becomes pure form.
In the eternal act of transition of subjectivity into objectivity, ob-
jectivity or matter can be only an accident, the opposite of which
is subjectivity as the essence or substance, which, however, in the
antithesis lays aside its absoluteness and appears as mere relative
ideal (in light). Hence it is the organism which presents sub-
stance and accidence as completely one and as in the absolute act
of subject-objectivation.

This principle of matter creating its form not only determines the
knowledge of the being of matter, but determines also that of the
separate functions of the organism, whose type must be the same
as the universal type of living motion, with the difference that
the forms, as before said, are one with matter and pass over into
it. If we review all the attempts of empiricism to explain these
functions in themselves, as well as according to their particular
determinations, we do not find in one of them a trace of the idea
of comprehending them as universal and necessary forms. The
accidental existence of imponderable fluids in nature, for which
in the same accidental way there are in the construction of the
organism certain conditions of attraction, combination, and sepa-
ration, is the last forlorn asylum of ignorance. And even with
such assumptions as these we have reached no explanation for
any organic movement, for instance, of contraction. They do not
even make such movement intelligible from the mechanical side.
It is true that the analogy between these phenomena and those

4 The Journal of Sj)eculative PhUosoj)hy.

of electricity was early noticed ; but, since the latter were known
only as particular, not as general forms, and there was no idea of
"potencies" in nature, the former, instead of being placed on the
same if not on a higher plane with the phenomena of electricity,
were deduced from electricity as mere effects of it. Hence, even
assuming the electric essence as a principle of activity, still other
hypotheses were necessary to explain the peculiar type of their
mutual attraction.

The forms of motion Mdiicli in inorganic nature are expressed
by magnetism, electricity, and chemical process, are universal
forms, which ap])ear in the latter in a special manner. In their
shape as magnetism, etc., they manifest themselves as mere acci-
dents, ditfering from the substance of matter. In the hioher
shape which they attain in organism, they are forms which are at
the same time the essence of matter.

For corporeal things, whose idea is merely the immediate idea
of themselves, the infinite potentiality of all falls outside of them ;
in organism, whose idea is also immediately and at the same time
the idea of other things, the light falls into the thing itself, and
in the same I'elation that matter which was before perceived as
substance is posited as accident.

Kow, either the ideal principle of matter is confined to the
first dimension — in which case matter is only penetrated with
form and is one with it as dimension of the beins-in-itself : the
organic being contains merely the infinite potentiality of itself as
individual or as species — or, light in the other dimension is
united to weight, and consequently matter is posited as accident
for this, which is that of being in other things, and the organic
being contains the infinite potentiality of other things outside
itself. In the first relation, which is that of reproduction, poten-
tiality and reality were confined to the individual, and thus were
themselves one. In the other relation, which is tliat of indepen-
dent motion, the individual passes beyond Ins own circle to other
things. Hence potentiality and actuality cannot here be united
as one and the same, because the other things are posited as ex-
pressly other and outside the individual. But when the two just-
mentioned relations are united in a higher, and the infinite poten-
tiality of other things coincides with the reality, tlien we have
the highest function of the whole organism. Matter is in every

On Medicine and the Theory of Organic Natiire. 6

respect and wholly, accident of being or of the ideal, which is pro-
ductive in itself, but here in connection with a finite thing is, as
ideal, sensuously productive, and hence as sense-perception.

And as universal nature consists only in the divine self-percep-
tion and is the effect of it, so in the living being this eternal self-
creation makes itself recognizable, and becomes objective. No
proof is necessary to show that in this high realm of organic
nature, where it breaks throngh its natural limits, every explana-
tion which rests on tlie ordinary conceptions of matter, as well
as all hypotheses which inadequately account for lower phenom-
ena, is altogether insufficient. For this reason empiricism has
gradually given up this department of science, and withdrawn
partly behind the idea of dualit}^, partly under the shelter of the-
ology.

I^ext to a knowledge of organic functions in the universality
and necessity of their forms, the most important is the knowledge
of the laws according to which their relation among themselves
is determined in the individual as well as in the collective world
of organization.

The individual in this respect is confined within certain limits,
which cannot be transcended without making its existence as
product impossible. Hence it is subject to disease. The con-
struction of this condition is a necessary part of the general the-
ory of organic nature, and inseparable from what is called physi-
ology. In general terms, it may be deduced entirely from the
highest antithesis between potentiality and reality in the organism
and from the disturbance of their equilibrium. But the special
forms and appearances of disease are capable of being known
only from the changed relation of the three fundamental forms
of organic activity. There is a double relation of the organism,
the first of which I prefer to call the natural one, because, as a
.purely quantitative factor of the inner functions of life, it has at
the same time a relation to nature and external things. The oth-
er, which is a relation of both factors with reference to the dimen-
sions, and denotes the perfection in which the organism is an
image of the universe, and in expression of the absolute, this I call
the divine relationship. Brown referred only to the former (the
natural) as the most important for the art of medicine, but did
not therefore positively exclude the latter, whose laws alone teach

6 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

tlie physician the reasons for the forms, the principal seat of the
mahuljustment, which is at the bottom of disease; which direct
him in the choice of remedies, and make intelligible that which
a lack of power in seizing the abstract has called specific in the
effects of the remedies and in the phenomena of disease. Accord-
ing to this view, it is self-evident that the theory of medicinal
remedies is no special science, but is only an element of the uni-
versal science of organic nature.

It would be a mere repetition, of what has been often and well
said, if I should prove that the science of medicine in this sense
presupposes not only a philosophical culture of the mind, but also
the principles of philosophy, and if more beside general reasons
■were necessary to convince intelligent men of this truth, it would
be the following considerations : that, in respect to this subject,
experiment, the only possible mode of construction in empiricism,
is impossible ; that from its very nature all conceivable medical
experience is ambiguous, and can never decide on the value of a
theory, because in each case there is a possibility of its having
been wrongly em}>loyed ; and, finally,- that in this department of
knowing, if anyAvhere, experience is first made possibl}' by theory,
as is proved by the complete change in the aspect of all past ex-
perience, caused by the theory of excitability. It is superfluous
to call attention to the works and productions of those who, with-
out an idea or any scientific knowledge of the first principles,
borne onward by the force of the times, teach the new theory in
books and lectures, in spite of its being unintelligible to them,
making themselves ridiculous even to their pupils, because the}^
attempt to harmonize that which is inharmonious and inconsistent
by treating science as if it were a historical subject, and while
speaking of proofs are still unable to do more than relate fictions.
One would like to apply to these what Galen said of the great
body of physicians of his time : " So unpractised and uncultivated,
and at the same so ready with proofs, although they do not know
"what a proof is ; why should we longer contend with these un-
reasonable creatures, and waste time over their pitiful state ? "

The same laws which determine the metamorphoses of dis-
ease, determine also the universal, abiding transformations which
nature effects in the production of the different species. For
they also depend entirely on the continual repetition of one

On Medicine and the Theory of Organic JSfatwre. 7

and the same fundamental tjj3e under constantly changed condi-
tions, and it is evident that medicine will not completely ascend
into the universal organic theory of nature until it construes the
species of disease of these ideal organisms with the same certainty
with which true natural history construes the species of real or-
ganisms, which must both manifest themselves as necessarily cor-
responding each to the other.

But what else can guide the historical construction of organ-
isms, whicli the active mind pursues through its labyrinth, except
the form of external structure, since, by reason of the eternal law
of the reflection of the subject id and as object, the external in
all nature is the expression and symbol of the internal, and
changes with the same regularity and certaint}'' ?

Tlie monuments of a true history of organically procreating
nature are, therefore, the visible forms of living structures, from
the plant up to the animal, a kiiowledge of which until the pres-
ent time has been called, in a one-sided sense, comparative anat-
omy. It is doubtless true that in this kind of knowing compari-
son is the first guiding principle, but not comparison with any
and every empirical example, least of all with the human struct-
ure, which, as the most perfect in one direction, stands at the
limits of oro;anization. The former restriction of auatomv to the
human body had a very obvious reason in the use which was
made of it in the art of medicine, but it was of no advantage to
science itself, not onlv because the human oro-anization is so
obscure, that in order to perfect its anatomy even to the point it
has now attained was the comparison with other organisms neces-
sary, but also because from its potentialization it distorted the
view of tlie other ora-anisms and rendered it difficult to ascend to
simple and universal insights. The impossibility of giving any
account of the principles of such a complicated structure in par-
ticulars, after themselves having barred the way, led the way to
the separation of anatomy and physiology — which ought to corre-
spond as internal and external — and also brought about that me-
chanical method of exposition which is the common one in most
text-books and universities.

The anatomist who wished to treat his science as naturalist, and
at the same time in the universal spirit, should, above all^ first rec-
ognize that an abstraction, an elevation above the ordinary con-

8 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

eeptioii, is necessary in order to describe the real forms even his-
torically. He must comprehend the symbolic nature of all forms,
and see tliat in the particular there is always a univ^ersal form, as in
the external nn internal tj'pe is expressed. He need not ask wliat
is the use of this or that organ, but rather, how did it originate?
and then show the })ure necessity of its formation. The more
general, and the less the view is directed to the particular case from
which he derives the genesis of forms, the sooner will he attain
to and comprehend the ineffable naivete of nature in so many
of her structures. Least of all, will he exhibit his own want of
wisdom and reason while admiring the wisdom and reason of
God.

He will constantly keep the idea of the unity and inner affinity
of all organizations, the descent from one primal type, whose ob-
jective side only is variable, the subjective side unchangeable, and
will consider it his only true work to present the former (the
unity). Above all, he will search for the law according to which
that variation takes place ; he will recognize that, while the
original type always remains the same, that also which is its ex-
pression can be changeable only as to its form, and that there-
fore an equal sum of reality is consumed in all organizations in
different combinations; that, in the absence of one form, there is
substitution by another, and the equilibrium is thus preserved.
From reason and experience, he will make a schema of all internal
and external dimensions into which the creative impulse can throw
itself, by means of which he will gain for the imagination a proto-
type of all organizations, unchangeable in its external limits, but
capable of the greatest freedom of motion within those limits.

The historical construction of organic nature, complete in itself,
would make the real and objective side of the universal science
of nature the complete expression of ideas in the latter, and
thereby make them truly one.

The Absolute Religion,

THE ABSOLUTE KELIGION.

TRAXSLATED FROM THE THIRD PART OP HEGEL's " PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION," BY F. LOUIS

SOLDAN.

We shall proceed in the following to discuss the realized idea
of religion, or perfect religion, in which the idea has become its
own object [of conterajjlation]. Religion has been defined as self-
consciousness of God ; self -consciousness, as consciousness, has an
object, and is conscious of itself in the same ; this object is also
consciousness, but consciousness as an object, and for this reason,
finite consciousness, a consciousness distinct from God, from the
absolute ; this implies limitation, and therefore finitude. God is
self-consciousness, he knows himself in a consciousness distinct
from himself, which is, in itself, the consciousness of God ; but it
is this also for itself, since it knows its identity with God, which
identity, however, is mediated by the negation of finiteness. This
idea constitutes the content of religion : that it is the nature of
God that he can distinguish himself from himself and be his own
object, and yet remain in this distinction strictly identical with him-
self. He is spirit. This idea is now realized ; consciousness knows
this content, and it knows itself to be intertwined with it. In the
idea which is the process of God, it itself is one of the elements and
phases. Finite consciousness knows God only in so far as God
knows himself in it ; hence, God is spirit, and, more particularly,
the spirit of his church, that is, of those who revere him. This is
perfect religion — the idea that has become objective to itself. In
this it is manifest what God is. He is no longer a something be-
yond, something unknown, for he has made known to man what he
is, not merely in an external historical way, but in his conscious-
ness. We have, therefore, here the religion of the manifestation
of God, since God knows himself in the finite spirit. God is sim-
ply manifest. This is the relation here. The transition was, as
we have seen, that this cognition of God as free spirit was, accord-
ing to its content, still burdened with finitude and immediateness.
This finite element has to be cancelled by the work of spirit ; it is
nugatory. We have seen how its nugatory character has become
manifest to consciousness. Misery and wretchedness, the pain of

10 The Journal of Speculatim Philosoj)hi/.

existence, were the condition, the preparation of the subjective side
for the conci(;>nsness of free spirit, as an absolutely free and there-
by iutinite t^pirit.

(A) y^Q shall first dwell on the general aspect of this sphere.

1. Absolute religion is manifest religion. Keligion is obvious,
manifest only after the idea of religion exists for itself ; or, religion,
its concept, has become an object to itself, not in limited finite ob-
jectivity, but in being an object to itself according to its idea.
This may be more adecpiately expressed thus : Religion, according
to the general idea, is consciousness of the absolute essence. Now,
consciousness distinguishes, and thus we have two : consciousness
and absolute essence. These two are external in their finite rela-
tion, namely, empirical consciousness, and essence in another sense.

They stand in finite relationship to each other, and in this re-
spect they are finite to each other, and so consciousness cognizes
absolute being as something finite only, and not in its truth. God
himself is consciousness, distinction of himself in himself, and, as
consciousness, he gives himself as object for what we call the side
of consciousness.

Thus we have always two things in consciousness, which are
finite, and external to each other. If religion seizes and comj^re-
hends itseK, then the content and the object of religion are them-
selves this totality, which is consciousness related to its own essence,
the coo-nition of itself as essence, and the cognition of essence as
itself ; that is to say, spirit is thus the object of religion. We have
in this way, two : consciousness and its object ; but in religion,
which is filled with itself, which is revealed, which has grasped itself
and comprehends itself — religion itself and its content is the ob-
ject ; this object is the self -cognizing being, is the s]3irit. In this
alone, spirit becomes the object and content of religion, and spirit
exists for spirit only. In thus being content and object, spirit is
self -cognition, self-distinction, and places before itself the other side
of subjective consciousness, which appears finite. This is religion
filled with itself. This is the abstract determination of tliis absolute
idea, or religion is, indeed, the idea. For the absolute idea, in the
philosophical sense, is the idea which has itself for an object, or, in
other words, which has determinate existence, reality, objectivity,
which is no longer merely internal or subjective, but has made
itself objective, and whose objectivity is at the same time a return

The Ahsolute Religion. 11

into itself ; that is to say, in as far as we call the idea the end and
aim, it is the realized completed end and aim, which is hkewise
objective.

Religion has for its object its own existence, namely, the con-
sciousness of its own essence ; it is therein objectified ; it is now in
reality what it was in the first place as mere idea, when it was noth-
ing but an idea, or when it was only our idea. Absolute religion is
the manifest one, it is the religion which has itself for its content
and for its subject-matter. This is the perfect religion, the one
which is the being of spirit or mind for itself, the religion which
has become objective in itself — Christian religion. It contains in-
separably the universal and the individual spirit, the finite and the
infinite ; their absolute identity forms this religion and its content.
This universal power is the substance, which, since it is just as
much subject in-itself, now posits this being-in-itself, and thus
creates a distinction from itself, and makes itself known to cogni-
tion or to the finite spirit ; yet, since this is but a phase (moment)
of universal spu-it itself, the latter remains in itself, and in this
separation or distinction returns to itself insej)arate and entire.

Theology has, commonly speaking, for its aim the cognition of
God as an object, which remains strictly in separation from subjec-
tive consciousness, and as such is an external object like the sun,
sky, etc., an object of consciousness ; in all these the object has
the invariable characteristic of being something else, something
external [a mere relative]. The idea of absolute religion, on the
contrary, may be said to lie, not in the consideration of these exter-
nal elements, but in that of religion itself ; that is to say, the unity
of this representation which we call God, with the subject.

AVe may look upon this as being the standpoint of our present
time, namely, that religion, religious life, piety, are the chief things
after all, and that the object does not matter so much. Men have
different religions, the principal thing is, that they are pious ;
our time thinks that God cannot be known or cognized as an
object, and that, after all, our subjective manner and attitude are
the only things of importance. This is the standpoint which may
be traced in what has been said before. It is the stand j)oint of
our own days, but at the same time an important progress, that
has established the validity of its infinite element, namely, the
consciousness of the subject as an invariable phase. There is the

12 The Jmirnal of Speculative Philosophy.

same content on botli sides, and tliis "l)eiiigin itself" (poten-
tiality) of the two sides is relii>;ion. It is the great attainment of
our time that snbjeetivity lias been cognized as the absolute ele-
ment ; this determination is essential. The main point, however,
is how it is determined.

The following may be said of this great progress : Religion in
the determination of consciousness is so constituted that the con-
tent flees beyond, and thus seemingly remains estranged. AVhat-
ever content religion may have, if this content is seized from the
standpoint of consciousness, it remains something that is beyond ;
and even when the determination of revelation is added to its con-
tent, it is nevertheless something external, something given. The
view set forth above, namely, that the divine content is given
or simply posited, and therefore cannot be cognized, but should
rather be embraced passively by faith, will, on the other hand, also
lead to the subjectivity of feeling, which is the end and result of
divine worshij). The standjjoint of consciousness is therefore not
the only one. The worshipper gives his whole heart, his devotion,
his wnll to his object, and loses himself in it ; in the depth of this
devotion he has cancelled the separation which exists in the stand-
point of consciousness. The standpoint of consciousness arrives at
subjectivity as well, which is non-estrangement, which is the sink-
ing of sj)irit into a depth which is not remote but near and present.

This annulment of separation may, however, be conceived as some-
thing alien, as the grace and mercy of God, as something alien, to
which man must submit, and in relation to which he occupies a
passive attitude. Such separation is controverted by the limita-
tion that religion is the principal thing, or, in other words, that the
main point is the subjective which holds in itself that which God
wills. In the sul)ject there is still the inseparate state of subjec-
tivity and the other, the objectivity. In other words, the subject is
necessary throughout the whole extent as the real relation. This
standpoint, therefore, raises the subject to an essential determina-
tion, and is connected with the freedom of spirit, which it has
restored. There is no standpoint in which spirit is not in itself.
The concept of absolute religion holds for its content that religion
is objective to itself. But only the idea holds this content. The
idea is one thing, the consciousness another.

Thus in absolute religion the idea may have this content in it-

The Absolute Religion. 13

self, biit consciousness is a different matter. Tliis is the side of
Avhich we have become conscious, and which has shown itself in
the characterization set forth above, namely, that it is religion
which is the principal thing. The idea itself is as yet one-sided,
being taken merely as being in itself ; it ajDpears in the same one-
sided form where subjectivity itself is one-sided ; it possesses the
determination of one of the two only ; it is only infinite form, pure
self-consciousness, the pure cognition of itself. In itself it is void
of content, because here religion is taken simply in itself ; it is
religion in tlie still unreal form, since it has not yet objectified
itself nor given itself any content. Kon-objectivity is absence of
content.

It is the privilege of truth that knowledge should possess in
religion its absolute content. Here, however, this content is not
the true one, it is truth crippled or dwarfed in its growth. The
content, of course, is there, but it is contingent, finite, and empiri-
cally limited, and shows a certain resemblance to the. age of the
Romans. The time of the Roman empire has much resemblance
with ours. The subject as it is, as it exists, is conceived as infinite,
but, abstractly taken, it changes into its opposite, and is simply
finite and limited. Freedom in this sense is only one which
allows a world beyond to exist ; it is a longing which negates the
distinctions of consciousness and in this rejects the important ele-
ment and principle of spirit, and therefore is naught but spiritless
subjectivity.

Religion is the spirit's cognition of itself as spirit ; this pure
cognition does not know itself as spirit, and is therefore not sub-
stantial but subjective cognition. But the fact that this knowl-
edge is simply subjective, and therefore limited knowledge, does
not exist for subjectivity in its own shape, that is, as knowledge,
but as its immediate being in itself, which subjectivity finds in
itself ; it finds it in its cognition of itself as of something strictly
infinite in its feeling of its finitude, and involved in this the feel-
ing of infinity as its transcendental being-in-itself opposed to its be-
ing-for-itself, the feeling of longing for the inexplicable beyond.

Absolute religion, on the contrary, contains the category of sub-
jectivity, or of infinite form as identical with substance. We may
give the name of cognition, of pure intelligence, to this subjec-
tivity, this infinite form, this unlimited elasticity of substance

14 The Journal of Speculative Philoi^ojyhy.

Avhich ean dii'einpt itself ami bocome its? own object. The content
remains identical with itself becanse it is the infinitely substantial
subjectivity -which makes an object and content of itself. In this
content the finite snbject is again distinguished from the infinite
object. God as spirit conceived as remaining beyond, or not as a
living spirit in his church, is looked upon in the one-sided limita-
tion of an object.

This is the idea. It is the idea of the absolute idea and of its
perfect realization ; spirit is now the reality Mdiicli exists for
spirit, which has itself for its object, and therefore this religion
is the manifest religion ; God reveals himself. To reveal means
this judgment of infinite form which can determine itself, which
can be for another ; this self-manifestation belongs to the essence
of spirit itself. A spirit that does not manifest itself is not si^irit.
In saying God has created the world, the same is expressed as an
act completed and finished, as something which could be or could
not be ; God might have revealed himself or not ; it is, so to say, an
arbitrary predication w^hich does not belong to the idea of God.
But God as a spirit is essentially this self -revelation ; he creates the
world not once, but is eternally creating ; he is an eternal self-rev-
elation, and an everlasting actus. This is his idea, his definition.

Manifest religion, which manifests spirit to spirit, is as such
the religion of spirit, which does not close itself against another ;
and this other is therefore but temporarily another. God posits
the other and removes the difference in his eternal movement. It
is the essence of spirit to be its own phenomenon ; this is its deed
and its life ; this is its only deed and it itself is but its deed.
What is it that reveals God, if it is not that he is this self-revela-
tion ? What he reveals is the infinite form. Absolute subjectiv-
ity is the activity of determination ; this is the positing of distinc-
tions, the positing of content ; what he reveals in this way is, that
he is the power to create these differences in himself. His being
is, to make these distinctions eternal, to take them back, and in
all these to be in himself. What is revealed is that he is for an-
other. These are the characteristics of revelation.

2. This religion which is manifest to itself is not only the
manifest religion, but also the one which is called revealed relig-
ion ; by this is meant, on one side, that it is revealed by God, that
God has made himself known to man, and, on the other side, that

The Absolute Religion. 15

it is revealed religion, and positive in tlie sense that it was be-
stowed ujDon man, given to him by a power ontside of himself.

On account of this peculiarity connected in our mental view
with the idea of the positive, it will be interesting to us to know
what the positive really is.

Absolute religion is indeed positive, in the sense in which every-
thing that exists for consciousness is something objective for the
latter. All things must come to us in an external way ; in this
sense the sensuous is positive ; for there is notliing so positive as
what presents itself immediately to our senses.

Everything spiritual comes to us in the same way, as finite or
historical spirituality ; this mode of external spirituality, and of all
self-expi'essing spirituality, is just as positive. A higher and purer
spirituality is that in the ethical element, in the laws of liberty.
But according to its nature this is no such external spiritual princi-
ple, not an externality, a contingency, but it is of the nature of pure
spirituality itself ; it comes to us, however, externally, in the first
place as instruction, education, doctrine. In these it is given to us,
and we are shown that it is valid. The civil laws and those of the
state are also positive ; they extend over us, they are for us, they
are valid ; they have existence ; not such existence simply that we
can let them alone, that we can ignore them, but rather in such a
way that in this externality they are for us subjectively some-
thing essential, something which binds us subjectively.

When we comprehend, cognize, the law, that crime should be
punished, and find it rational, it is essential for us not only in the
sense that it is valid for us because it is positive, or because it ex-
ists, but it has also internal validity in our reason as something
essential, since it is internal, rational.

The fact that it is positive does not deprive it in any way of the
characteristic that it is rational and our own. The laws of free-
dom have always a positive side, a side of reality, externality, con-
tingency, in their manifestation. It is necessary to determine
laws ; in the determining of the quality of penalty, and, still more,
in that of the quantity, we have already this external element.

The positive element cannot be omitted in penal laws; it is
quite necessary ; this last determination of the immediate is some-
thing positive, something that is not rational. In pronouncing pen-
alties, for instance, a round number is usually taken ; no reasoning

16 The Journal of Speculative PhiloiiOj)hy.

can tell what mcat^uiv Isi absolutely just. Whatever is positive
accordino; to its nature, is irrational : it ueeds deteriuination in a
way that has nothing rational in it.

This side also is necessary in manifest religion : since there is in
it the historical, the externally manifest element, there is also ne-
cessarily the positive and contingent element in it, which may exist
in this form or any other. So we see that this contingent element
is found also in religion. By virtue of the external, of the phe-
nomenon which is posited with it, the positive always exists.

But we may distinguish the positive as such, the abstractly posi
tive, and the positive in the form and as the law of freedom. The
law of freedom is valid not because it exists, but because it is the
characteristic of our own rationality ; it is no longer something
positive simply, something that happens to prevail, when it has
become known as this characteristic. Religion, too, appears posi-
tive in the whole content of its teaching, but it must not remain
thus a mere matter of memory, a mere coifceptive image in the
mind.

In regard to the verification of religion, the positive element has
the signification that the external must bear testimony of the truth
of a religion, and is to be looked upon as tlie ground of the truth
of a religion. In some instances this verification has the form of
the positive as such. There are miracles and evidences which are
to prove that the character of the individual giving these revela-
tion is divine, and that he has taught this or that doctrine.

Miracles are changes in the natural order of the sensuous world,
which are perceived, and thus perception itself is sensuous, because
it concerns sensuous changes. In regard to these perceptive ele-
ments, these miracles, it has been said that they furnish a verifica-
tion for sensuous man, but it is only the beginning of a verification,
an unspiritual verification by which the spiritual cannot be verified.

The spiritual as such cannot be directly verified by the unspirit-
ual or the sensuous. The main thing of this side of the miracles
is, that they are set aside in this way. Reason may attempt to ex-
plain miracles in the natural way, and may say much that is prob-
able against them, that is, it may dwell on the external, on the
occurrence as such, and reason against them. The main point of
view of the reason in regard to miracles is that the spiritual cannot
be verified externally. • For the spiritual ranks higher than the

The Absolute Religion. lY

external and can be verified only by itself and in itself ; it can
prove itself only in itself and by itself. This is what may be called
the evidences of spirit. This is expressed in the history of religion
itself : Moses performs miracles before Pharaoh ; the Egyptians
did the same with their enchantments ; this certainly means that
no great value is attached to it. The most important thing, how-
ever, is that Christ himself says : " There are many that will say
that they have done many wonderful works in my name, and then
will I profess unto them that I never knew them." Here he him-
self rejects miracles as a true criterion of truth. This is the princi-
pal consideration and we must hold to it ; the verification through
miracles is a sphere that does not concern us ; the evidence of spirit
is the true evidence. This evidence may be manifold. It may be
indefinite, general, as something that satisfies the spirit, and, by
appealing to it, calls forth its silent approval and is in harmony
Avith it. Thus in history the noble, sublime, moral, and divine,
appeal to us ; for these, our spirit bears evidence. This may remain
a kind of general harmony, an approbation given by our inner
nature, our sympathy. But it may also become connected with
our insight and our thinking ; this insight, in so far as it is no-
thing sensuous, belongs directly to thinking ; no matter what it is,
whether it has the form of reasoning, distinctions, etc., it is activity
according to our own determinations of thinking, that is, accord-
ing to the categories. It may be more or less elaborate, it may
form the principal presuj)position of his heart and his spirit in
general — jDresuppositions of general maxims which are valid for
him and accompany him through life. It is not necessary that
these maxims be conscious ones, they may be the mode and man-
ner in which his character is formed, they may be the universal
which has gained firm footing in his spirit ; this then has become
something fixed, something firmly established in his mind ; it will
then rule him.

On such 'a firm basis and presupposition, his reasoning and deter-
mining j^rocess may begin. There are many degrees of culture,
many walks of life, and there are various needs. But the highest
need of the human mind is thinking (which is the evidence of
spirit), in such a way that it does not exist merely in the harmoni-
ous response of a first sympathy, nor in the other manner in which
there are certain firm bases and principles in the mind on whicli
XY— 2

18 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

conclusions and inferences may be hnilt. The evidence of spirit in
its hii>-hest form is philosophy, in which the conception purely as
such develops the truth from itself ; and, developing, we cognize
and see the necessity of this development in and through itself.

Faith has often been contrasted with thinking in the saying,
that there is no conviction about God and religion possible in any
other way, except by thinking ; thus the proofs of the existence of
God have been sometimes considered the only way of knowing
the truth and of arriving at conviction.

But this testimony of spirit may exist in various, different w^ays.
We must not demand that truth shall be apprehended by all men
in the philosophical way. The needs of individuals differ accord-
ing to their education and free development, and, according to these
various stages of development, we find the demand of and the con-
fidence in the belief in authority.

Miracles also find their place here, and it is interesting to see
that they are limited to this minimum. There is therefore the
positive element also in this form of the testimony of spirit. Sym-
pathy, this immediate certitude, is on account of this immediate-
ness something positive, and ratiocination, which starts from some-
thing posited or given, has the same basis. Man alone has relig-
ion, and religion has its ground and seat in thinking activity.
Heart and feeling are not the heart and feeling of the animal, but
the heart of thinking man, thinking heart and feeling ; and what-
ever religion exists in this heart and feeling, exists in the thinking
activity of this heart and feeling. Whenever we begin to infer, to
reason, to state the cause, we do this by thinking.

In so far as the doctrines of Christian religion are contained in
the Bible, they are given in 'a positive manner, and when they
become subjective, when spirit gives its testimony for them, this
may be done quite in the immediate way, so that it strikes the
innermost nature of man, his spirit, his thinking, his reason, and
they are harmonious with him. Thus the Bible is for the Christian
the basis, the main basis, which has this effect upon him, which
harmonizes with his soul, and gives this firmness to his convictions.
But it follows that, because he thinks, he can not stop at these
immediate testimonies and admissions, but must proceed to
thoughts, contemplations, reflections, on this subject. This then
leads to the further development of religion, and in the higher,

The Absolute Religion. 19

most perfect form, it is theology, or scientific religion, when this
content is known, in a scientific way, as the testimony of spirit.

Then the antithesis is presented in the assertion that the Bible is
in itself enough for this purpose, and that we ought not to go be-
yond it. This is in one respect a perfectly correct principle. There
are men that are very religious and do nothing else but read the
Bible and recite its verses, who possess a high degree of piety and
of religiousness ; but they are not theologians, for there is no
science, no theology, in them. Goetze, the Lutheran zealot, had a
famous collection of Bibles. The devil may quote Scripture, but
this alone does not constitute the theologian.

As soon as there is more than the mere reading or repetition of
the verses, as soon as so-called explanations begin or the reasoning
and exegesis in regard to the meaning, man has begun the pro-
cess of ratiocination, refiection, and thinking, and then the princi
pal point is, whether his thinking is correct or not, and how the
thinking is carried on.

It is of no use to say that these inferences or assertions are based
upon the Bible. As soon as they are no longer the words of the Bi-
ble, a logical form is given to this content ; the content receives its
logical form, or, there are certain presuppositions made in this con-
tent, and with these we proceed to the explanation ; they are the
permanent element in the explanation ; we bring with us mental
views which direct our expositions. The expositions of the Bible
show the content of the Bible in the form and mode of the think-
ing of the time when they are made ; the first exposition was quite
different from the present one.

Such presuppositions are, for instance, that man is good by nature,
that God cannot be cognized. What a distorted idea of the Bible
must he have, who harbors such a prejudice in his head ! Man
carries these prejudices with him to his task, although it is very
essential to the Christian religion to cognize God, and in it God
has even revealed himself and shown that he is.

The positive may enter here, however, in another way. It is
therefore important to know whether this content, these notions
and assertions, are true.

For this is no longer the Bible, but words, which the spint con-
ceives internally. If the spirit utters them, they assume a form
which the spirit has given to them, a form of thinking. The form

20 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

given to this eoiiteut is Xo be exaiuined. Tliere the positive ele-
ment enters again. Here it has the meaning that the formal logic
of the syllogism, for instance, the thought-relations of the finite,
are presupposed.

Then, according to the nature of the syllogism, the finite alone
and only "what belongs to the nature of the understanding, can be
grasped ; it is not adequate to the divine content. The content is
thus radically spoiled.

Wherever theology is not merely the quoting of the Bible, but
goes beyond the mere words, wherever it addresses itself to the
feelings and the heart, it uses forms of thinking, it enters into the
province of thinking. If theology uses these forms by chance,
accidentally, as it were, in as much as it has presuppositions, preju-
dices, the process is something contingent and arbitrary, and the
investigation of these forms of thought belongs to philosophy
alone. Theology turning against philosophy is either unconscious
that it uses these forms, that it thinks, and that it is important to
proceed according to the laws of thinking, or this effort is not
meant in earnest, but is a deceit. In that case it wishes to reserve
for itself this arbitrary, contingent thinking, which is here the
positive element.

The cognition of the true nature of thinking will disparage mere
arbitrary thinking. This contingent, arbitrary thinking is the posi-
tive element which enters here. Only the idea for itself frees
itself truly from this positive element ; for in philosophy and in
religion is found this higher freedom which thinking as such is in
itself.

The doctrine, the content likewise, receives the form of the
positive, it is validity, it is valid in human society. All law, all
that is valid, has this form, namely, that it is being and as such it
is for everybody the essential, the valid. But this is only the form
of the positive ; its content must be the true spirit.

The Bible has this form of the positive ; one of its verses says :
"The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life;" here it makes
some difference what spirit we carry in us during the reading, and
what spirit animates the words. It is necessary to know that we
bring with us the concrete spirit, the thinking, reflecting, or feel-
ing spirit, and we must be conscious of this spirit, which is active
and grasps this content.

The Absolute Religion. 21.

Grasping or compreliending is not a passive act of reception. : on
the contrary, when the spirit comprehends, this comjjrehension is
at the same time its activity ; in the mechanical alone one side is
passive in receiving. The spirit comes in contact with the object
to be grasped ; this spirit has its apperceptions, its concepts : it is a
logical being, it is thought-activity, and this activity the spirit
must know. Thinking may proceed in this or that category of
finitude.

It is the spirit which begins in this way with the positive, but
the essential point is, that it be the true, right, and holy spirit
which comprehends and knows this content and the divine as
divine. This is the testimony of spirit which may be more or less
developed.

The main point in regard to the positive is therefore that the
spirit is thinking, that it is an activity in the categories and de-
terminations of thinking, and that the sj)irit is active in all this,
whether it feels or reasons, etc. Some people do not know this, and
are not aware that in receiving they are active.

Many theologians, in their exegetic activity, while they believe
that they are purely receptive, do not realize that they are active in
this, inasmuch as they reflect. If this thinking is thus contin-
gent in its proceeding, it surrenders itself to the categories of fini-
tude, and with this it is rendered incapable of comprehending the
divine element in the content ; it is not the divine but the finite
spirit which proceeds in such categories.

By such finite conceptions of the divine which is in and for
itself, by this finite thinking of the absolute content, it has hap-
pened that the fundamental doctrines of Christianity have, as far
as the greater part is concerned, disappeared from dogmatics.
While philosophy is not the only science that is orthodox, yet it
is at present preeminently so ; the principles which have always
been valid, the fundamental truths of Christianity, have been pre-
served and maintained by it.

In considering this religion we do not proceed historically
after the manner of the spirit that begins externally, but we begin
with the idea. That activity which begins with the external is
receptive on. one side only ; on the other hand, it is activity.
Our mode here is essentially such activity, and, moreover, activity
accompanied by the consciousness of thinking directed towards such

22 The Journal of Speculative Philosojyhy.

activity, towards the course of tlie categories of thinking ; of think-
ing which lias examined and cognized itself, which knows what it
thinks, and knows whieh are the true and which the finite cate-
gories of thinking. That we begin, however, with the positive,
is a pai't of our education and necessary there ; but here we must
leave this mode behind us in order to proceed scientifically.

3. Absolute religion, as it appears from these considerations, is
the religion of truth and freedom. For truth means that we do
not look upon what is objective as upon something strange or alien.
Freedom expresses the same as truth with the limitation of ne-
gation. The spirit is for the spirit, and it is this ; it is therefore
its own presupposition ; we begin with the spirit as subject ; it is
identical witli itself, it is the eternal perception of itself, and it is
therefore at the same time comprehended only as a result, as an
end. It is self-presupposition, and, in the same manner, the result,
and is only as the end. This is the truth, this attribute of being
adequate, this power of being object and subject. That the spirit
is its own object is the reality, it is the idea, the absolute idea, and
this is the truth. In the same way absolute religion is the religion
of freedom. Freedom, abstractly, is the relation to something ob-
jective, as to something which is not strange or alien ; it is the
same as truth, the only difference being that freedom has also in it
the negation of the difference of estrangement, and this appears in
the form of conciliation. The latter begins with this, that there
are different existences standing opposed to each other : God who
has over against himself an estranged world, a world which has
become estranged from its essence. Conciliation is the negation of
this separation, this disunion, and consists in the cognition of each
other, in finding in the other one's self and one's essence. Thus
reconciliation is freedom ; it is neither passive, nor in the state of
Being simply, but it is activity. Each of these, reconciliation,
truth, freedom, is a general process, and can therefore not be ex-
pressed, without onesidedness, in a single sentence. The princi-
pal concei^t is that of the unity of the divine and human natui-e :
God has become man. This unity is, in the first place, only in
itself [or potential], but in the sense that it is eternally created and
actualized ; this creation or actualization is liberation and reconcil-
iation, which is possible only by this potentiality (" durch das an
sich"). It is the substance which is identical with itself, that

The Absolute Religion. 23

forms, as such, the basis ; but as subjectivity it is that which eter-
nally actualizes and creates itself.

The result of all philosophy is that this idea is the absolute
truth ; in its purest form it is logic, but it is just as much the
result of the observation of the concrete world. This is truth:
that nature, life, and spirit are organical throughout, and that each
separate one is but a mirror reflecting this idea, so that it appears
in it as particularized, as a process in it, so that this unity is mani-
fested in the difference.

Natural religion is religion on the standpoint of consciousness
merely ; absolute religion contains this standpoint as well, but it is
only comprised in it as a transitory element ; in natural religion
God is represented as something alien in natural shape, or religion
has only the form of consciousness. The second form was that of
spiritual religion, of spirit which remains limited finitely ; in this
respect it is the religion of self-consciousness of the absolute power,
of the necessity which we have seen ; the One, the power is the
insufficient element because it is only abstract power, and, accord-
ing to its content, is not yet absolute subjectivity ; it is only ab-
stract necessity, abstractly-simple being-by-itself [i. e., undeveloped
being].'

The abstraction in which power and necessity are conceived, as
yet, on that stage, constitutes finitude ; and the special powers,
God's, determined according to spiritual content, constitute the
totality by adding to this abstraction the real content. And, lastly,
the third religion is that of freedom, of self -consciousness which
forms at the same time the consciousness of the comprehensive
reality and determinateness of the eternal idea of God himself, and
in this objectivity is at one with itself. Freedom is the character-
istic of self-consciousness.

THE METAPHYSICAL CONCEPT OF THE IDEA OF GOD.

(B) The metaphysical idea of God means here the pure idea only,
which becomes real through itself. The definition of God in this

' Translator's Note. — This stage has not yet arrived at the insight that there is iden-
tity between the irresistible, external power and the spiritual clement in man ; there is,
therefore, consciousness of this power above, but not yet the self -consciousness of iden-
tity with it.

24: The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

connection is, tliat Ho is the absolute idea, that is to say, tliat He is
spirit. But spirit, the absohite idea, lias the meaning that he is
tlie unity of concept and reality, so that the idea is in and by
itself as in its totality, and in the same way as the reality. This
reality is the revelation, manifestation existent for itself. In so
far as this manifestation has in itself the attribute of difference,
there will be found in it also the determination of finite spirit, of
human nature, which is finite contrasted with that idea ; while we
thus call the absolute idea the divine nature, the idea of spirit is
to be the nnitv of divine and human nature. But the divine na-
ture is nothing but absolute spirit, hence this unity of divine and
human nature is the absolute sjjirit itself. But the truth cannot
be expressed in one proposition or sentence. The two are differ-
ent, the absolute concept and the idea, as the absolute unity of its
reality. Spirit is therefore the living process by which the unity
in itself of the divine and human nature becomes for itself and is
produced.

The abstract definition of this idea is the unity of idea with
reality. In the form of the proof of the existence of God, the
proof is formed by this transition, this mediation, that the exist-
ence of God follows from the idea. It must be remarked here
that in the other proofs we started from finite being which was
the immediate, and from which we reasoned towards the infinite,
towards true being which appeared in the form of infinity, neces-
sity, absolute power, which is at the same time wdsdom having end
and aim in itself. Here, however, we start with the idea, and pass
over to being. Both are necessary, and this unity must necessarily
be shown by starting from one as well as from the other, for the
identity of the two is the truth. The idea as well as being, the
world, the finite, are one-sided determinations, each of which re-
verts into the other and exhibits itself first in the phase of being a
dependent j^art, and secondly in the phase of being able to pro-
duce the other determination which it carries in itself. In the
idea alone they have their truth, i. e., both are posited, neither can
have the exclusive function of remaining a beginning, or original
element, each must present itself rather as the transition into the
other, i, e,, each must be something j^osited. This transition has a
contrary signification, each is represented as a stage in this pro-
cess, i, e,, it is the transition from the immediate to the other, so

The Absolute Religion. 25

that each is something posited ; on the other hand, it has the signi-
fication, that it is something which produces and posits the other.
In this way it represents the one side of the movement as well as
the other.

If we were to show in the idea the transition into being, we
shoidd say first, that the category Being is in itself quite empty
and poor ; it is abstract self-identity ; this last abstraction and aflir-
mation is in its ultimate abstraction entirely indeterminate im-
mediateness. If there were nothing else in the idea, this last
abstraction, at least, would still be attributable to it, namely, the
idea is. Even when determined simply as infinity, or, in a more
concrete signification, as unity of the universal and particular, as
universality which particularizes itself and thereby returns into
itself, we find that this negation of the negative, this relation
to itself, this being, is taken quite abstractly. This identity with
itself, this category, is at the very outset contained essentially in
the idea.

It must be said, however, that the transition from the concept to
being is rich and full, and contains the deepest interest of reason.
The comjDrehension of this relation between concept and being is
an important interest of our time. It requires to be said, why this
transition is of such interest. The appearance of this contrast is
an indication that subjectivity has attained the culmination of its
being for itself, and has arrived at the totality of knowing itself as
infinite and absolute. The essential determination of manifest
religion is the form by which the substance is spirit. One side in
the contrast is the subject itself, that is, the realization of the idea
in its concrete signification. The reason that this contrast appears
so difficult, so infinite, is that this one side of reality, this side of
subjectivity, the finite spirit, has attained to the comprehension of
its infinity. The subject cannot be Being before it is the totality,
before it has attained this freedom ; then, however, it will be true
also that the subject is indifferent to this Being ; and that the sub-
ject is for itself, and that being then stands on the other side as an
alien, other thing. This is the special reason why the contrast may
appear as infinite, and there is therefore at the same time a lively
impulse to cancel this contrast. This demand to cancel the con-
trast lies also in its totality, but this annulment has become infinitely
difficult because the contrast is so infinite, and the alien, the other,

20 The Journal of Speculative PhilosojyJiy.

is so entirely free. It is being that is beyond, tliat is on the other
side.

The greatness of the standpoint of the modern world is this ab-
sorption of the subject in itself, the cognition which the finite has
of itself as the infinite, while the contrast still clings to it, which it
feels compelled to cancel. For thus the infinite stands over against
an infinite, and the infinite posits itself as finite, so that the sub-
ject on account of its infinity is compelled to cancel this contrast
which has deepened itself to its infinity. The contrast or antithe-
sis is : I am subject, free, I am a person for myself, and therefore
I let the other, the alien, go free which is on the other side and
remains there. The ancients never arrived at the consciousness of
this contrast, nor at this dilemma, which only spirit, that is for
itself, can bear. • Spirit itself is only this : to comprehend itself
as infinite in its opposite. The standpoint, as it presents itself
here is, that we have on one side the idea of God, and on the
other side M'e have being, contrasted w^itli this idea ; and the
demand is then to effect the mediation of both, so that the idea
should unfold itself and become being, or that the other, the an-
tithesis, should arise out of being. We must give a brief exposition
of the manner and mode in which this is done, and also of the
form of reasoning.

The form which this mediation has is the ontolcgical proof of
the existence of God, in which the idea is made the starting-
point. Now, w^hat is the idea of God ? It is that of the most
real, it must be grasped afiirmatively only, it is determined in
itself, its content has no limitation, it is the whole of reality, and
only as reality it is without limit, and thus it might be said, there
is nothing beyond this but a dead abstraction, as has been re-
marked before. The possibility of this idea, i. e., its identity
free from contradiction, is shown in the form of the understand-
ing. The second step is, that it is said that being is a reality,
non-being is a negation, and compared Avith it a privation ; the
third is the conclusion : Being is reality, therefore, which belongs
to the idea of God.

What Kant has said against it resulted in the destruction of
this proof, and has become the opinion of the world. Kant says
that, from the concejDt of God, his existence cannot be inferred by
any sophistry or qnibble ; for Being, he says, is something different

The Absolute Religion. 27

from concept ; since we distinguisli them, and the two are op-
posites, and therefore the concept cannot contain being : for it
stands on the other side. He says further : Being is no reality, all
reality is attributed to God, and therefore it is not contained in the
concept of God, namely, because being is no determination of con-
tents but pure form. Whether I imagine a hundred dollars, or
possess them, the money itself is not changed thereby ; it is the
same content whether I have it or not. Kant thus takes the con-
tent to constitute the concept or idea, that being does not belong
to what is contained in the concept. One may indeed say this,
provided one understands by concept the determination of content,
and distinguishes content and form, which comprises the thought,
and these, on the other hand, from being. All content is therefore
on the side of concept, and on the other side remains nothing but
the determination of being. Briefly expressed, this is as follows :
The idea or concept is not being ; they differ. We can cognize
nothing of God ; we can know nothing ; we may form concepts of
him, but this does not show that our concept is correct.

We know well enough, indeed, that anybody can build castles
in the air, which have no existence. It is an appeal to popular
prejudice, and in this way Kant has produced a negative result in
the common judgment, and has gained the multitude over to him-
self.

Anselm of Canterbury, a thoroughly learned theologian, has
presented this proof in the following way : God is the most per-
fect being, the essence of all reality ; now, if God is a mere con-
cept of imagination, a subjective concept or idea. He is not the
most perfect being, for that only we consider perfect which is not
merely an imagined concept, but has at least being. This is quite
correct, and a presupposition which everybody has in himself,
namely, that what is merely an image of conception is imperfect ;
that only is perfect which has also reality, that only is true which
is in the same way in which it is thought. I^ow, God is the most
perfect, therefore He must be in reality and being just as He is in
concept. Even in our own image-concepts we find the truth that
image-concepts and ideas are different ; and we find there further
that whatever is only an image-concept is imperfect, and also that
God is the most perfect being. Kant does not prove the differ-
ence between concept and being, he simply assumes it in a popu-

28 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

Inr way, and it is allowed to stand — but it is only of imperfect
things that common-sense has any image-concept.

Anselm's proof, as well as the form it has received in the onto-
logieal proof, contains the idea that God is the embodiment of all
reality, and therefore he contains also being. This is quite correct.
Being is such a poor and empty determination that it is predica-
ble of the concept immediately. The other is, that being and idea
or concept are also distinct from each other; being and thinking,
ideality and reality, are distinct and opposite, and this contrast is
to be cancelled, and the unity of both determinations is to be so
exhibited that they become the result of the negation of the con-
trast or antithesis. Being is contained in the idea. This reality,
unlimited, yields empty words, emj^ty abstractions only. It must
therefore be shown that the determination of being is contained
affirmatively in the idea, and this would be the unit of idea and
being.

But they are different at the same time, and so their unity is
the negative unity of both, and the imj)ortant step is the cancella-
tion of the difference. The difference must be discussed, and. the
unitv restored after this difference, and exhibited. It is the office
of logic to show this. The logical sequel, namely, that the idea or
concept is just this movement which determines itself as being,
that it is the dialectic, the movement to determine itself into
being, into the opposite of itself, all this is a further develop-
ment which is not given in the ontological proof, and this is its
defect.

As regards the form of the thought of Anselm, it has been re-
marked that the meaning of the content is, that the idea presup-
poses reality, because God is the most perfect being. Here it is
necessary that the idea should objectify itself for itself.

God is thus the most perfect thing, as posited merely in mental
representation or image conception ; but, measured with the most
perfect, the mere concept of God appears deficient. There the
concept is the scale of measurement, and then God, as a mere
concept, as a mere thought, is inadequate to this scale of measure-
ment.

Perfection is but an indefinite mental representation, or image-
concept. And yet, what is perfect ? The determination of j)erfec-
tion we see immediately only in that which is opj)osite to what it

The Absolute Religion. ' 29

is here applied ; namely, it is the thought only of God, and there-
fore the perfect is the iTnity of thonght, or concept, with the
reality, and this unity is therefore here presupposed. When thus
God is posited as the most perfect, He has here no further deter-
mination ; He is only as such, and this is his determination. It
appears from this that the question turns simply on this unity of
concept and of reality. This reality is the determination of per-
fection, and at the same time that of the deity itself, and this is
really also the determination of the idea. More, however, is re-
quired for the determination of God.

In the Anselmian expression of the idea, the presupposition is
in fact the unity of idea and reality ; and, on account of this cir-
cumstance, this proof does not give satisfaction to reason, because
the supposition is just the point in question. The thought that
the idea limits . itself, in .itself, and that it objectifies itself, is a
later insight which results from the nature of the idea, and could
not be there at first. This is the insight into the way in which
the idea itself cancels its one-sidedness.

If we compare this with the opinion of our age, which bases
itself upon Kant's view, we find this : man thinks, perceives, wills,
and his volition exists side by side with the thinking ; he thinks
and also conceives, he is a sensuous-concrete, and at the same time
rational being. The concept of God, the idea, the infinite, the un-
limited, is according to this view a concept only which we form for
ourselves, but we must not forget that it is nothing but a concept
which is in our head. "Why do we say, it is only a concept ? The
concept is something imperfect, since thinking is but one quality,
one activity among many others in man ; e. g., we ineasure this
concept by the scale of reality, which we have before us in con-
crete man. Man, of course, is not only a thinking being, he is
also sensuous, and may have sensuous objects even in his thinking.
This, indeed, is only the subjective side of the concept, we find it
imperfect on account of the scale by which we measure it, because
the latter is concrete man. It may be said that the concept is
taken to be nothing but a concept, the sensuous to be reality, that
what is seen and felt is reality. This may be said, and many hold
this view who recognize nothing as reality but what they feel and
taste ; but let us hope that it is not quite so bad that there are
people who ascribe reahty to the sensuous, but not to the spiritual.

30 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

It is tlie concrete, total subjectivity oi man which is before tlie
mind as the scale of nieasnrenient, and, measured by it, conceiving
is nothing but conceiving.

If we compare them with eacli other, tlie thought of Anselm
and the thought of modern times, we find that both make presuj)-
positions — x^nsehn that of inMnite perfection, the modern view
that of concrete subjectivity of man in general. The idea, when
compared with this perfection, oi", on the other side, with this
empirical presupposition, appears something one-sided and unsat-
isfactory. In the thought of Anselm the attribute of perfection
has, however, the meaning that it is the unity of idea and reality.
In the doctrines of Descartes and Spinoza, God is likewise the first
principle, the absolute unity of thinking and being — cogito, ergo
su7n, the absolute substance. The same is true of the doctrine
of Leibnitz.

What we have on one side is a presupposition — which, in fact,
the concrete is — namely, the unity of subject and object ; and,
measured by this, the idea appears deficient. The modern view
says : Here we must stop and insist that the idea is the idea
only and does not correspond to the concrete.

Ansehn, however, says : We must not maintain that the subjec-
tive idea is fixed and independent. We must, on the contrary,
correct its one-sidedness. Both views have in common that they
have presuppositions. The difl:erence lies in this, that the mod-
ern world takes the concrete for its basis, while Anselm's view,
which is the metaphysical one, builds on the absolute thought, on
the absolute idea, which is unity of idea and reality. This old
view is the higher one, inasmuch as it does not take the concrete
in the sense of empirical man, in the sense of empirical reality,
but as a thought. It ranks higher also in this, that it does not
cling to what is imperfect. In the modern view the contradiction
between the concrete and what is onlv an idea is not cancelled ;
the subjective idea is valid, must be retained as subjective — it is
the real. The older side has here decidedly the advantage, because
it lays the principal stress on the idea. The modern view, in one
respect, is further advanced than it — positing the concrete as the
unity of idea and reality, while the older view stops with the ab-
stract idea of perfection.

Tlie Absolute Religion. 31

C. Division.

The absolute, eternal idea is —

1. God, in and for himself, in his eternity, before the creation
of the world, outside of the world.

2. Creation of the world. This created and alien being dirempts
itself in itself into the two sides of physical nature and finite
spirit. What has thus been created is the other, the alien, some-
thing that is posited in the first place as external to God. But, it
is essential to God that He conciliates with himself this alien and
this particular that has been posited as separated from him, and,
when the idea has direrapted itself and has fallen away from him,
leads it back to his truth.

3. This is the way and the process of conciliation by which the
spirit has united with himself what it had separated from itself in
its diremption and in its self-antithesis, and by which it is the holy
spirit and spirit in its church.

These are, therefore, not distinctions in an external manner
which, we make, but the activity, the developed life of the abso-
lute spirit itself. This is its eternal life, the development and
return of this development into itself.

The further explication of this idea is that it is universal spirit,
and that it posits the totality of all it is ; that it posits itself, de-
velops, realizes itself in its three determinations, and, only in the
end, becomes completely what was at the same time its presuppo-
sition. It is at the beginning as a totality, it presupposes itself,
and is the same also at the end. Spirit must be considered, there-
fore, in the three forms or elements in which it posits itself.

These three forms, as has been said, are : {a) eternal being in
and for itself, or the form of universality ; (b) the form of the
phenomenon, or that of particularization or being for others ; (c)
the form of the return out of the phenomenon into itself, or of
absolute singularity.

In these three forms the divine idea unfolds itself. Spirit is the
divine history, the process of self-distinction, of diremption, of
self -return — it is the divine history and must be considered in each
of the three forms.

In regard to subjective consciousness, the three forms may be
defined as follows : The first form has the element of thought —

32 The Journal of Spectdathe PhUosoploj.

God, in pure tlionght, is as lie is in and for liimself, as lie is mani-
fest, but has not yet become plicnonienon ; God, in his eternal
essence, in himself, but manifest. The second form is that he is in
the element of mental representation or image-concept ; in the ele-
ment of particularization, where consciousness is involved in the
relation to others, to the alien — this is the phenomenon. The third
element is that of subjectivity as such. This subjectivity is partly
immediate as sensibility, mental representation or image-concept,
emotion, partly as subjectivity, as idea, as thinking reason, as the
thinking of the free spirit, which is free only by its return into
itself.

In regard to place or space, the three forms are to be explained
as development and history, which, as it were, proceed in different
places. Thus the first divine history is outside of the world, and,
spaceless, outside of finitude — God as he is in and for himself.
The second is the divine history as real in the world — God in
perfect existence. The third is the internal place, the church
which is in the world, but at the same time lifting itself to heaven,
and, as a church, having already in itself heaven, that is full of
mercy, active in the world, and present.

It is possible to determine these three elements distinctively in
regard to time also. In the first element God is outside of time ;
he is eternal idea in the element of eternity, in eternity as it is
contrasted with time. Thus, time existing in and for itself, un-
folds itself, and spreads out as past, jDresent, and future. Divine
history, secondly, is as phenomenon, as history. It is as existence,
but as existence descended into phenomenality. As phenomenon
it is immediate existence which at the same time is negated, and
this is the past. The divine history is thus as the past, as his-
tory in the proper sense. The third element is the present,
which is limited present only, not the eternal present, but the one
which distinguishes the past and future from itself ; it is the ele-
ment of sensibility, the spiritual now of the immediate subjectiv-
ity. But the present must also be the third: the church lifts
itself to heaven. Thus it is a present which elevates and essen-
tially conciliates itself, which is completed to universality by the
negation of its immediateness, a perfection which, however, does
not yet exist, and is therefore to be conceived as future. A Now
of the present, which has perfection before itself; but this per-

The Ahsolute Religion. 33

fection is distinguished, from this now (which is immediateness),
since it is posited as future.

We have to consider, in general, the idea of God as divine self-
revelation, and this revelation must be taken in the three deter-
minations that have been mentioned.

According to the first, God is for the finite spirit purely as think-
ing. This is the theoretical consciousness in which the thinking
subject is quiet and j^assive and is not yet posited in this relation,
in this process, but lies in the entirely unmoved repose of the
thinking spirit. There God is thought for and by the subject and
through the self-distinction which remains in the pure ideality and
does not attain phenomenal existence, he manifests himself, and
is immediately in himself. This is the first relation, which is for
the thinking subject only, which is filled by the pure content
alone. This is the realm of the Father.

The second determination is the realm of the Son, in which
God is for the image-concept or mental representation, as an ele-
ment of representation — which is the stage of the particular in gen-
eral. In this second standpoint, that which was other than God and
alien, without having this determination, receives the determination
of being other and alien. In the first standpoint, God as the Son
is not distinguished from the Father, and is expressed only in the
mode of emotion. In the second element the Son receives the
determination as the other or alien, and we thus step out of pure
ideality and thinking into image-concept or mental representation.
If, according to the first determination, God there created only the
Son, here he produces nature. Here nature is the other or alien,
and the difference thus receives its due. The alien is nature, is the
world in general, and the spirit which relates to it is the natural
spirit ; what we called subject before enters here as the content —
man is here involved with the content. If man is here related to
nature and is natural himself, he is so only within reHgion : this
is, therefore, the religious view of nature and man. The Son
enters the world, and this is the beginning of faith. "We sj)eak
already in the sense of faith when we speak of the entering of the
Son. God can not properly exist for finite spirit, as such, since, in
so far as he is for it, it is implied immediately that the finite spirit
does not grasp its finitude as being, but that it stands in a relation
to spirit and conciliates itself with God. As finite spirit it is posit-
XY— 3

34 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

cd as departure, as separation from God ; and thus it is a contra-
diction to its object and content, and this contradiction forms the
necessity of its annnhnent. This necessity is the beginning ; the
consequence is that God must assume being for spirit, and that the
divine content presents itself to the latter ; and, since this spirit
exists empirically and iinitely, God's existence will become ap-
parent to him in an empirical manner. But, since in history the
divine element becomes evident to spirit, it loses the character of
being merely external history and becomes divine history, the
manifestation of God himself. This forms the transition of the
realm of the spiiit, and contains the consciousness that man in
himself is conciliated with God, and that conciliation is for man.
The process of conciliation itself is contained in the form of wor-
ship.

It should be observed that we do not distinguish here, as we did
in previous places, between idea, shape, and form of worship, for
we shall see in this treatise how the form of worship has every-
where immediate influence. We may make the following general
observations : The element in which we are is the spirit ; the
meaning of spirit is that it manifests itself, that it is absolutely for
itself, and, as it is conceived, it is never alone, but always with
self-manifestation for another, for its other, e. g., for the side which
is finite spirit. A form of worship is the relation of finite spirit
to the absolute, and therefore we have a form of worshij) in each
of these elements.

"We must distinguish in this how the idea in the several ele-
ments is for the idea, and how it appears in mental representation
and image-conception. Religion is universal, not only for the per-
fect and conceiving thought, for philosophical consciousness, but
the truth of the idea of God is manifest also for the representative
consciousness, and has the necessary determinations which are
inseparable from mental representation or image-concepts.

The Science of Education. 35

THE scie:n^ce of education.

A PARAPHRASE OF DR. KARL ROSENKRANZ'S "PEDAGOGICS AS A SYSTEM," WITH ADDITIONAL

REFLECTIONS. BY ANNA C. BRACKETT.

{Second Part.)
SECOND DIVISION.

INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION OE DIDACTICS.

§ 80. Mens sana in corpore sano is correct as a maxim of ped-
agogies, though often false in the judgment of the empiric, for
we do really sometimes find me7is sana in corjpore insano as well
as mens insana in corjpore sano, and yet all normal activity should
strive to secure a true harmony of soul and body. The develop-
ment of intelligence presupposes physical health. The science of
the art of teaching is what we call didactics. As has already been
said, it is conditioned first of all by orthobiotics ; but, besides this,
it depends in the sphere of mind on psychology and logic. In its
process it must unite a careful consideration for psychology with a
logical method.

EiBST Chapter.
The Psychological Prestipposition.

§ 81. If we would have any sound philosophy on this subject,
we must, before we touch the subject of didactics, have examined
somewhat closely the nature of mind itself, as it is unfolded in
psychology. Any other treatment of the subject would be pre-
mature and ill-considered. We, therefore, take for granted some
knowledge of those subjects on the part of our readers, as it would
be out of place to unfold the entire subject in a treatise on peda-
gogics. We speak then of psychology only so far as is necessary
to substantiate our propositions with regard to the educational
work in hand, which is conditioned by it.

§ 82. The most important conception of all those taken from
psychology is that of attention. Mind is essentially self-activity.

36 The Journal of Speculative Philosoj>hy.

"Wliat it docs not make its own does not exist for it. We often
speak as if sonietliing external did of itself make an impression
on the mind, but this is never really the case. Nothing produces
any effect on the mind, if the mind has not itself rendered itself
receptive to it. Without tliis self-excited activity, the object
produces no impression njion it, and it passes unaffected by it,
because it has not been conscious of it. An illustration mio-ht here
be drawn from medicine. The germs of disease do not affect that
body which from its perfectly healthy activity offers no fruitful
ground for their reception and growth; while the enfeebled or
diseased organism w^elcomes them, and there they take root and
grow. One man passes physically unconscious of danger through
a plague-stricken city, wdiile another is at once attacked because
his body offers a welcoming ground for the all-present germs. It
might also be illustrated in the moral world — one is unconscious of
and untouched by evil, while another drinks it in. Every individ-
ual has his own horizon line of perception, which varies with his
character and cultivation : As no two of us can ever see the same
rainbow, or have precisely the same horizon ; as no two can ever
be conscious of precisely the same thoughts. This illustration may,
however, perhaps mislead, for spirit does not exclude spirit as
matter excludes matter. And, though we do exclude others from
our material horizon, we need not necessarily exclude them from
our spiritual horizon. Attention is the directing of the mind to a
certain object of thought with the purpose of comprehending it in
its unity and in its distinction from other objects. The mind vol-
untarily relinquishes its hold upon other objects for the time, in
order to fix uj)on this one ; and, if this essential, spontaneous ac-
tivity of the mind be lacking, it gains absolutely nothing. All
success in teaching and learning depends upon the clearness and.
strength with which we distinguish objects and thoughts from
each other. If, as the old Latin proverb ' implies, he who does
not distinguish clearly does not teach well, it is as true that he
who cannot draw clear distinctions well cannot learn.

§ 83. Since the art of attention depends on the self-determina-
tion of the person, it can be fostered, and the pupil can be made
attentive by his teacher. Education must accustom him to a

' Bene qui distinguit, bene docet.

The Science of Education. 3Y

sharp, quick, and many-sided attention, so that he shall gain by
his first examination of the object of attention an exact and true
idea of it, and shall not be obliged to make repeated efforts to
acquire this. We must have no patience with that half-attention,
that sort of twilight and. half-light of intelligence in which one is
obliged to correct and re-correct his first ira])ression, because the
attention was not sufficiently awake to make that first impression
correct.

jSTothing is of more vital importance to the teacher than to be
convinced that it is his business to create and to cultivate the
habit of close attention, and to know that, if his pupils are not
attentive, it is his own fault : It is his business to make them so.
That is what his vocation means, and, when he has done, this,
he might almost be said to have done his work. But how often
we hear teachers speaking of their pupils as inattentive in much
the same way as they might say, " Poor boy, he is humpbacked ! "
as if want of attention were a natural deficiency for which al-
lowance was to be made. Make a child thoroughly attentive to
what you say to him at all times, and sbow him where to go for
mental food, and your work is done. All that is then wanting,
time will accomplish. It is the teacher's essential business to
make his pupils attentive, and, if he fail here, he fails as a teacher,
whatever else he may be.

§ 84. We must never forget the principle of psychology, that
the mind does not consist of a bundle of faculties as a collection
of different powers, but that all which it does proceeds from differ-
ent activities of the one and identical subject. They are all a part
of his very nature, so that education must not omit to foster and
strengthen them all. It is quite correct to say, according to the
old principle a potiorijit denomination that man is distinguished
from brutes by his power of thinking, and that in his thinking he
distinguishes several volitions as inclinations ; but we must never
forget that to be a perfect man he must also possess feeling and
imagination. The special directions which the cognizing intelU-
gence may take in its activity are : (1) Perception or Observation ;
(2) Conception or Representation ; (3) Thinking, These are all
interwoven and interdependent, and thus act by and through each
other. Perception does not, however, only rise into conception, or
conception into thinking; but thinking returns into conception,

38 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

and conception into perception. We niio-ht say that in the infant
the perceptive facnlty is most active; in the cliikl the conceptive,
and in the youth the thinking faculty ; and then we miglit with
some reason distinguish here in the development of the youth an
intuitive, an imaginative, and a logical period.

Serious errors arise if we do not carefully observe these differ-
ent elements, and the way in which they are actively related to each
other, and if we confuse the different forms in which they appear
in the different stages of growth. The child thinks, while he per-
ceives, but his thinking is as it were concealed from him, because
it is unconscious ; and when he has acquired perceptions he makes
them into conceptions, and demonstrates to himself his own free-
dom by playing with them ; his play must not be looked upon as
simply enjoyment. The child in play is occupied in trying the
various perceptions which his consciousness has accumulated, by
his own self-determination and by his power of idealizing — i. e.,
he has gathered material for use. Now he takes a pleasure in estab-
lishing the fact that he is the master of this material, and not it of
him. He will do with it what he, the master, pleases ; a board shall
be a ship, the grass the ocean ; anything shall be what he wills it
to be. AYe do not mean that the child consciously tries the validity
of his perception-material as against his will, but he does it never-
theless, and his most enjoyable plays have the most of this element
in them. The stories that children most like are those that have
the most of this element. All these stories transgress the narrow
limits of actuality, and their caprice is not attractive to the ab-
stract understanding, which would rather present to the children
the commonplace tales of "Charitable Ann," "Heedless Fred-
erick," or " Inquisitive Wilhelmina." It praises above all " Rob-
inson Crusoe," which, while it relates curious and uncommon
things, yet contains nothing which is absolutely impossible. But
the desire of the child, wiser than the schools, laughs these to scorn,
and revels in impossibilities — " Jack the Giant-Killer," " Puss in
Boots," the " Arabian Nights," and all sorts of delicious fairy
fancies ; and thus, and only thus, it grows healthily into youth,
where, with the assuming of the earnest duties of life, imagination
grows less vivid, and the understanding and reason come to the
helm.

The Science of Education. 39

I. The Intuitive Ejyoch.

§ 85. Perception, the first act of intellectual culture, is the un-
fettered grasping by the mind of an object which is directly present
to it. According to this definition, education can have nothing to
do with the act, because the act must be entirely uninfluenced from
without, and the mind be left to its own innate power. It can only
render aid so that the grasping may be more easy, i. e., 1. It can iso-
late the object which is to be apprehended. 2. It can facilitate the
transition from one to another. 3. It can call attention to varied
points of interest, so that the return to an object once examined
may not become wearisome or monotonous, but have an ever-fresh
charm. Here, at the very beginning, comes in for the teacher the
principle of repetition which is one of his main tools, and the
necessity of making that necessary repetition so varied in its as-
l^ects as never to weary the pupil by monotony. Lacking the
ingenuity necessary to do this last, any one might as well decide
to embrace some other calling than that of teacher. The way in
which one amuses an infant illustrates the helps which edu-
cation may ofter to the art of perception. We hold up a ball, i. e.,
1. We isolate it from the mass of surrounding objects in which it
was lost ; 2. We transfer the interest from the ball to the string
which holds it, or to its owii motion as we roll or toss it ; 3. We
call attention to its color or size or softness.

§ 86. But direct perception of many things is- impossible from
their extent or distance, and yet it is necessary that we have per-
ception of many things, and, therefore, we make use of pictures
to enlarge the field of the sense of sight. But we cannot have
many objects represented at their actual size, and this implies the
necessity of a reduced scale of measure, and this again implies
some need of care that the representation may not convey to the
mind an idea of too large or too small a real object. To the
picture, then, explanation must be added.

§ 87. The picture is a wonderful aid to the teacher when it is
correct and characteristic. Especially those pictures should be
correct which represent natural objects or historical persons or
scenes. If they are not correct, it is better not to use them, as
they will do no good even if they do not do harm.

4:0 The Joutiial of Speculative Philosophy.

Picture-books seem to have been first used as a means of instruc-
tion in the second half of the seventeenth century, or after the de-
cay of the art of painting, and to liave followed from miniature
painting. Up to that time public life was more giv^en to the pictu-
resque in its arms, furniture, houses, and cliurches, and pco])le were
more weary of actual seeing because they led a constantly wander-
ing life. After this time, when, in the fury of the Thirty Years'
"War, all arts of painting and sculpture and tlie Christian and
Pagan mythology had died out, there began to be felt a need of
picture representations. The Orhis rerum sensualiuon pictus^
M'liich was to be also Janua linguarum reserata, appeared in 1658
and was reprinted in 1805. It has been followed by a mass of
illustrated books on all subjects. The historical illustrated books
were divided into two classes: Biblical and secular. These are in
countless numbers, but most of them very poor. It is deplorable
to see what daubs are put into the hands of children. They are
not wanting in high color but in correctness, to say nothing of
character, they are good for nothing, and the most annoying
thought about them is that for the same money and with the same
labor something quite different could have been produced with a
little application of conscientiousness and scientific knowledge.
The uuiformit}^ in the books offered in our stores is really disgrace-
ful. Everywhere are presented to us the same types, especially in
the ethuogra])hic department. How much better would it be if,
in representing the Hindoo nation, we were shown types of the
four castes which have conditioned the history of the nation ! In-
stead of this, we have perhaps a picture of a dancer. In natural
history we have too often the representations of some imaginative
artist, or the drawing of some miserable specimen. But there are
signs of improvement here. In architectural drawings and in
landscapes much has already been done.

§ 88. Children seem to have a natural desire to collect specimens
— such as plants, butterflies, beetles, shells, skeletons, etc., — and
this desire can be strengthened and directed so that their powers
of perception shall gain in exactness and vividness. They ought
especially to be practised in drawing, so that they can make good
copies from the real objects. Drawing in schools is not to be re-
garded so much as a practice in art as a means of educating the
sight so that the child may judge somewhat correctly of distance,

The Science of Education. 41

size, and color, and if lie can be thus led by carefully graded les-
sons to a knowledo-e of the elementary forms of nature, he will
have gained a power which will, in many ways, both theoretical
and practical, be of great service to him.

Although we should not expect much aesthetic effect from pic-
tures given as illustrations, inasmuch as the child must concentrate
his attention on the distinguishing features of form and color
rather than on the harmony of the whole and the style of execu-
tion, yet we should never omit to give children some idea of what
true art is. If real works of art are to be found in the neighbor-
hood, we can trust to the power which these will exercise over the
child, and we must patiently await their moral and aesthetic effect.
Our American children are greatly at a disadvantage in this mat-
ter in comparison with the children in any European capital, for
we have none of the art treasures either in painting, sculpture, or
architecture, which must have so powerful an influence on the
children brought up in their atmosphere. The art of photography
in its various forms will, in some degree, assist us here. As it is
certainly the study of the human spirit and its manifestations, and
not the study of the works of nature, which has the greatest hu-
manizing and developing effect upon our minds, we should make
every effort to bring the study of art to bear on the child's
mind.

§ 89. Bat the study of pictures may become only a means of
mental dissipation without any gain to the mind if it be not ac-
companied by explanation. Pictures are not instructive in and
by themselves. They must be interpreted by means of human
thought: the mere looking at them is utterly valueless. The
tendency in our time is now to amuse children by looking simply,
and to avoid all real effort of hard thinking. But as Gladstone
remarks : There has as yet been no way found to make attention
and inattention equal in their results. It is not alone the thing in
itself that we want. We must go behind the thing itself for a
knowledge which shall not be merely empty and useless. But
illustrations are the order of the day, and in the place of enjoyable
descriptions we often find only miserable pictures. We can reach
beyond mere things in order to gain a comprehension of their
real nature, only and solely by the power of hard thinking. The
danger of Kindergartens lies exactly here. If they turn out chil-

42 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

dren with an utterlj dissipated habit of mind and with an insatiate
desire to be amused, tliey liave done the chikh-en irretrievable
harm. But in good hands the Kindergarten ma}'' prove the best
means for the correction of thoughtless, misystematic mental ac-
tivitv.

§ 90. The ear as well as the eye must be cultivated. But, while
we must look at music as an educational means, we must not for-
get its ethical influence. Hearing is the most internal of our
senses, and is, therefore, to be treated with the greatest care.
Especially should the child be led to consider speech, not merely
as a means by which he can obtain the gratification of his desires
and make his thouglits known, but as a something from which
real pleasure is to be derived in itself. He should be taught to
speak distinctly and expressively, and this is possible only through
a higher degree of care and deliberation. Nothing is more neg-
lected in English-speaking schools than a proper study of the
mother tono-ue. Matthew Arnold has recorded this in his " Be-
port on the Schools of the Continent " with regard to English
schools, in comparison with those of Germany and France, and
the criticism would have applied to American schools as well.
American voices are not good, therefore they should be treated
with special care. The high and shallow tones should be lowered
and deepened, and this can be done in our schools. And with
regard to the language itself, it should be made an object of spe-
cial exercise and study from the earliest school years. That time
would not be wasted which was given dail}^ to a conversation ex-
ercise in which the pupils should be led to express their own ideas
correctly in their own language ; at any rate, it should be a
teacher's constant duty to demand and enforce the use of pure and
correct English in every word spoken in school.

The Greek nation gave the greatest care to the musical ' educa-
tion of their youth. We find the evidence of this set down with
the greatest clearness in the Bepublic of Plato, and in the last book
of Aristotle's Politics. "With modern nations also, music occupies
a large share of attention, and is a constant element of educa-

1 " Music," with the Greeks, included what we should call belles-lettres — the arts
over which the Bine Muses presided — not only music proper, but rhetoric, poetry,
and the drama and stage presentation.

The Science of Education. 43

tion. Pianoforte playing is very general, and singing is also much
practised ; but the ethical significance of music is sometimes over-
looked. It is too often considered as a means for social display
only, and the selections played are of an exciting or even baccha-
nalian character. This style greatly excites youthful nerves. But
speech, the highest form of personal manifestation of the mind,
was treated with the greatest veneration and respect by the ancient
world. We moderns write and read so much that the art of speak-
ing clearly, correctly, and agreeably has much degenerated, and
we do not gain any compensation for this loss by the art of modern
so-called " declamation." We are left to hope for an improvement
in this respect by means of the greater freedom of speech which
now prevails in our political and religious life.

II, The Imaginative Epoch.

§ 91. Through onr forms of perception, aided by reflection, we
gain mental pictures which the mind has the power of sum-
moning at will at any time, and in the absence of the object which
originally produced them. This power we call imagination. The
mental picture may be (1) exactly like the perception which orig-
inally gave rise to it ; or (2) it may be at its pleasure changed and
combined with other pictures ; or (3) it may be held in the form
of abstract signs or symbols, which the mind invents for it. Thus
we have the powers of (1) the recognition of perceptions ; (2) of
the creative imagination, and (3) memory ; but, for the full develop-
ment of these subjects, we must turn to psychology.

§ 92. (1) The mental picture which we sketch from an object
may be a correct one, or it may be imperfect, or very faulty, ac-
cording as we have observed it without prejudice as it properly
exists ; or as we have beheld it accidentally confused with other
objects, and have thought its qualities to be essential, which were
really only accidental at the time of observation. Education must
form a habit of comparing the observations which we make with
our conceptions, in order to distinguish in the object those quali-
ties which are essential and really belong to it from those which
are accidental, and, therefore, foreign. On this critical examina-
tion depends the correctness of our conceptions.

§ 93. (2) Our conceptions are to an extent limited by the mate-

4-i The Journal of Speculative Philosoph\).

rial found for tliein in our previous perceptions, but we exercise a
perfectly free control over tlie combination or altering of them.
AVe can at our will create out of these elements innumerable pic-
tures, and these we do not recognize as anything presented to us
from outside, but as our own creation. This is a pleasurable action
of the mind, but it is not as a mere pleasure that the science of
education has to consider it. The student of education sees the
reaction which our power of idealizing sets up against the limits
necessarily fixed by our receiving chance impressions from without,
and the conditions under which we can reproduce them by means
of our creative imagination. Thus we do not paint for ourselves
merely the actually existing world, but we create for ourselves and
out of ourselves a new world of our own.

§ 94. This faculty is most surely and most easily cultivated by
means of poetry, which pedagogics must therefore employ as a
valuable means. The imagination must learn to appreciate what
is good taste here by a study of the classical works of the creative
imagination in this field. And for youth the classical works are
those which nations have produced in their early or childish pe-
riods. These works present to the mind of the child the picture
of the world which the human mind in the necessary stages of its
development was forced to sketch out for itself. This is the real
reason why children never tire of the stories of Homer, or of the
Old Testament. Polytheism and the heroism which belongs to
it are as real elements of childish imagination as monotheism
and its prophets and patriarchs. Our view is above and beyond,
both, because it really contains them both as elements, while it
comes to us by means of both of them.

The most genuine stories for children, from seven to fourteen,
are always the same : those which are always to be honored as an
inheritance from the nation and the world. For example, we can
not fail to notice in how many thousand forms the stories of Ulys-
ses have been reproduced as tales for children. Becker's " Tales
-of Ancient Times ; " Gustave Schwab's beautiful " Stories of the
Olden Time;" Karl Grimm's "Old Stories," etc., what were
they if deprived of the legend of the silver-tongued wily favorite
of Pallas and the divine Swineherd ? The stories of the Old
Testament up to the separation of Judah and Israel are equally
inexhaustible. These patriarchs with their wives and daughters,

The Science of Education. 45

these judges and prophets, these kings and priests, are made no-
thing but models of virtue by the slip-shod morality which would
strike out everything hard or uncouth from the books which it
prepares for " our dear children." Precisely because the dark side
of human nature is not wanting, because envy, vanity, evil desire,
ingratitude, craftiness, and deceit are found among the fathers and
leaders of the " chosen people of God " have these stories so great
an educational value, Adam, Cain, Abraham, Joseph, Samson,
and David are as truly world-historical types as Achilles and Pa-
troclus, Agamemnon and Iphigenia, Hector and Andromache,
Ulysses and Penelope.

§ 95. Each nation and people has in the primitive epochs of its
own history enough material for pictures which will fill the imag-
ination of children, and will make familiar to them the character-
istic traits of the past of their own people.

The Germans have a great number of such stories. Such are the
"Horn-covered Siegfried," the " Heymon Children," the " Beauti-
ful Magelone," " Fortunatus," the " Wandering Jew," " Faust,"
the " Adventurous Simplicissimus," the " Schildbiirger," the " Isl-
and of Felsenburg," " Lienhard and Gertrude," etc., etc. Also
the art-works of the great masters which have a national signifi-
cance must be included, as, e. g., the " Don Quixote " of Cer-
vantes. Such books as these should be left where the children will
find them and pick them up. They should not be urged to read
them, but allowed to come on them, as it were by chance. They
will not absorb what in them may be coarse, but they will gain a
somewhat of health and nobleness from them, and a taste for such
food as will make them turn away with disgust from the sensor
tional so-called children's stories of the present day. Of those
which it were desirable for children to read in English, for instance,
are Swift's " Gulliver's Travels," Lamb's "Essays," " Don Quix-
ote," Cooper's novels, Scott's novels, " Arabian Nights," Johnson's
" Yoyage to the Hebrides," etc., etc.. Homer and Yirgil in rhymed
translations. They will not read much of Lamb's " Essays," and
yet, after all, they will get a flavor from them which will be a good
influence for them.

§ 96. The most general form in which the imagination of chil-
dren finds exercise is that of fairy stories. Education must see to
it, however, that these are the genuine stories, the product of a

46 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

nation's thought, and not in the form in whicli modern poets have
sometimes dressed them up, and which are really only frightful
caricatures.

The fairy stories of India are really at the head here, since they
proceed from a nation of children, as it were, who lived almost
wholly in the imagination. As we have them given to us through
the Arabians in the time of the caliphs, they have lost their ex-
clusively Indian character, and have become, in the tales of Sche-
herezade, a book whose fame is as broad as the world, and with
which no local traditions, as, e. g., Grimm's collection of German
stories, though they are indeed admirable, can in any wise compare.

The stories which have been written especially for tlie improve-
ment of children, which are full of moral teachings and hints, are
very repulsive to the liberty-loving imagination of children. They
do not have the true ring in them. "We must acknowledge, how-
ever, that there seems to be some improvement in this respect, since
we have learned the difference between the natural poetry of a
people, which is perfectly artless and not reflective, and poetry which
is conditioned and limited by criticism and an ideal. Even the
picture-books of children show symptoms of improvement. We
do not have so often now those useless books in which the let-
ters of the alphabet, highly colored, form the chief attraction.
But such writers as Hofman, who gave us " Slovenly Peter " have
shown that even seemingly trivial things can be treated with
genius, provided one is blessed with it, and that nothing is more
opposed to the imagination of the child than childishness^ an effort
after which has ruined so many would-be authors of books for chil-
dren. They have attempted to come down with dignity from their
own lofty standpoint, and have fallen into the bottomless pit of
inanity, and the children have spurned their works as they de-
served. We have begun to understand that, when Christ promised
the kingdom of heaven to little children, it was possibly for other
reasons than because they had, as it were, the privilege of being
thoughtless and foolish.

Hans Christian Andersen in our day has given us a perfect
specimen of what genuine children's stories are ; and Lewis Car-
roll has also nearly, but not quite, approached him in his " Alice
in Wonderland," and " Through the Looking-Glass," in which
the unchecked fancy is allowed to run perfectly wild, as it does in

Tke Science of Education. 47

the mind of a healthy cliild. But too many of our " Children's
Magazine " writers fall into the error of supposing that stories
about children are necessarily stories for children.

§ 97. As the child grows towards manhood, the stories given to
him should take on more of the earnest character of real life, and
imagination must yield to reality. We must learn to look on the
world no longer as an aimless play, but as it really is, a genuine
battle. In the place of the entrancing epic poem he must now be
given tragedy, which will, through sensations of fear and pity, pre-
sent to him human destiny with all its darker shadows of sin and
atonement. Biography now becomes of value in the department
of history, such as Plutarch's "Lives" in ancient history, and in
modern, the autobiographies of Augustine, Cellini, Rousseau,
Goethe, Varnhagen, Jung Stilling, Moritz Arndt, etc. In these
autobiographies the youth can see how the individual characters
grew as they came in contact with surrounding circumstances, how
they were influenced by these, and how these in turn influenced
them. These, as well as memoirs and letters of distinguished
men, are of great use to the youth who, by studying the battles of
others, thus learns how he shall best fight his own. He will learn
to know nature and ethnography by means of volumes of trav-
els, which will make him a sharer in the charm and joy of the
fh'st discovery, and this is a much more delightful possession than
the mere general consciousness of the results of the achievements
of the race.

But, while we thus widen the horizon of knowledge of facts
by instructive literature, we must not omit, at the same time, to
secure wider views of the realm of ideas. This we can do best
by what we shall call philosophical literature. Of this there
are only two kinds to be recommended : (1) well- written trea-
tises which endeavor by a thorough treatment to solve the con-
ditions of some single problem, and (2), when the mind is strong
enough, some standard works of philosophy. German litera-
ture is especially rich in works of this kind, as those of Lessing,
Herder, Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Humboldt, and Schiller.
Nothing ruins the mind of a youth more than the study of works
of mediocrity, or those of a still lower grade. Nay, they even
devastate, spoil, and narrow his powers of appreciative feeling by
their empty, hollow, and constrained style. People are apt to say

48 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

that tlin real classical Avorks arc too hard, and tliat the student
must approach these by uieans of those of less depth and difficulty.
This is a wide-spread and most dangerous error, because these so-
called Introductions, Explanatory Essays, Easy Expositions, Com-
prehensive Abstracts, are very mucli more difficult to understand —
for the reason that they lack all originality and all sharply-drawn
distinctions — than the classical works to which they pretend to
open an approach. Education must inspire the youtli with cour-
age to attack the real classics, and must never allow him to think
(as a discretion born of prejudice will often tell him) that he can-
not understand sucli works as Fichte's " Science of Knowledge,"
Aristotle's " Metaphysics," and Hegel's " Phenomenology." ISTo
science suffers so much as philosophy from this false popular opin-
ion, which understands neither itself nor its autliority. The youth
must learn how to learn to tmderstand, and to this end he must
know that all things cannot be understood at first glance, but that
there are ideas so valuable and life-giving as to demand that he
have patience, that he read over and over again, and then that he
think over what he has read.

§ 98. (3) The imagination is always going back into perception
for the materials out of which to create its images. These percep-
tions may have some resemblance to the perception which lies at
the root of the conception, in which case they are more or less sym-
bolic, or they may be only arbitrary creations of the imagination,
and then they are pure signs. The voluntary holding fast of one
of these perceptions created by the imagination, the recalling of
the conceptions denoted by them, we generally call Memory. This
is not a special power which the mind has of recalling things, e.g.,
names or persons or dates. But, properly speaking, memory is as
to its form the stage of annulment of the mental image ; as to its
content, it arises from the interest which we take in a subject.
When we are very much interested in anything, we give it on
that account a very careful attention, and if we give it a careful
attention the reproductive imagination can easily recall it. These
states of the mind being given, the fixing of a name or of a
date which relates to the action in which the mind was so ab-
sorbed presents no difficulty. When the interest and attention
are so vivid, it seems that no effort is needed to impress the
memory. All so-called mnemonic aids only make more instead

The Science of Education. 49

of le^^s difficult the act of memory. This is in itself a double
action, consisting of (1) the fixing of the sign, and (2) of the con-
cej^tion which rests upon it. But a mnemonic sign adds yet an-
other conception by means of which the data about whose mem-
ory we were concerned shall be more firmly held, and since this
is arbitrary we add another stage to memory which is already two-
fold. We must first recall the sign, however arbitrary or arti-
ficial it may be, and then also its relation to the thing we wish to
remember. To be of any real help to the memory, we must not
try to help it at all. We must simply place the object clearly
before the mind in the presence of the infinite power of the self-
determination, which is the prerogative of mind.

It will thus be seen of how immense importance is the cultiva-
tion of the power of attention which has been before spoI<en of.
All the teaching in the world will do no good if the attention
is not vividly excited, if the child has not attained the power of
self-control, self-management, by which he can at once and stead-
ily give his attention to any required subject. And if this power
has been acquired, then the teacher has nothing to do but simply
to place the object in the focus of these rays of attention, and it
will be firmly memorized, even without voluntary effort on the
part of the pupil. The problem of instruction is thus perfectly
simple. First teach the child control over his own mind, and then
simply lay before him what you wish him to make his own.

Lists of names, as, e. g., of the Roman emperors, of the popes,
of the caliphs, of rivers, mountains, authors, cities, etc., also num-
bers, as, 6. g., the multiplication table, the melting-points of min-
erals, the dates of battles, of births and deaths, etc., must be
learned without aid. All indirect means only make the matter
more difficult. We should use them only when the interest or
attention has been weakened, and they should then be invented
by each one for himself.

§ 99. We can fix information in the memory by pronouncing
and writing down the names and dates, and then by constant
repetition. By the first means we can gain exactness, and by
the second, certainty.

There is no artificial contrivance which aids the memory like
writing down what we wish to remember, always provided that
we do not write simply for the purpose of relieving the memory
XY— *

50 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy/.

of its proj^er work. It is, so far as we are concerned, a mere mat-
ter of chance that a name or a nnmber should be thus or so ; we
cannot chang-e it, and must thus learn it as it is, if it is M^orth learn-
inp; at all, but there is no reason in it, and it calls for no exercise
of intelligence.

In science proper, as, e. c;., in philosoi)hy, our reason helps us
to distinguish the meaning by the connection, and the names have
a reason for them, so that we should invent them for ourselves if
they were not already invented.

Ill, The Logical Epoch.

§ 100. In conception the mind attains a sort of universality, for
it is not bounded or limited by any definite present object, and
the accidental detail.5 can be brought into some classification or
schema^ to use Kant's expression. But the necessity of the con-
nection of these details is wanting. To produce this is the work
of the thought which can free itself from all fisjurative forms, and
with its simple determinations transcend the conceptions. This
thought purifies itself in its process of conception and perception ;
notion, judgment, and syllogism, develop into forms which, as
such, have no power of being perceived by the senses. It must
not, however, be understood that the thinking person cannot
pass out of the region of thought and carry it WMtb him back
again into that of conception and perception. Genuine think-
ing activity shuts itself out of no sphere, and deprives itself of
no content. That abstraction which affects a logical purism and
looks scornfully down on the regions of conception and percep-
tion as forms of intelligence quite inferior to itself, is a false
thinking, a sickly error of scholasticism. Education will guard
itself against such an error, in proportion as it has carefully led
the pupil by the established road of intellectual development to
thinking, through the paths of perception and conception. Thus
memorizing is an excellent preparatoiy school for the thinking
activity, as it gives exercise to the intelligence in dealing with
abstract ideas.

§ 101. The surest way of leading the child into the power to
think is carefully from his earliest years to foster the sense of truth.
If we can teach him to give himself up unreservedly and freely
to trnth when it is presented to him, and to loini a habit of dili-

The Science of Edtwatimi. 51

gently hunting out and exposing error and false appearance, we
shall have done the greatest thing toward producing strength of
the reflective powers. He will then not be liable to be deceived
into accepting anything less than the true and genuine connection
and dependence of thought in other ways.

[This is one of the places where Rosencranz touches in a mas-
terly way upon the principle that true intellectual and true moral
instruction cannot be dissevered. The teacher who demands from
his pupils always the exact statement of the facts they have to
give and requires them to seek for and expose the false, who cre-
ates in them the liabit of thoroughness in their intellectual work,
is doing more for them in a moral way, though he never says a
definite word upon the abstract subject of truthfulness, than he
who delivers long lessons upon its necessity while he allows care-
less and superficial work in himself or his pupils, and does not
show himself willing and eager to acknowledge his own errors.
This demand for the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, in lessons, is the most important moral lesson which can be
given to our youth, and will bear the most plentiful harvest.
This is a most fruitful thought for the student who is to be a
teacher.]

An illusion as a pleasing play of the intelligence is quite al-
lowable, but a lie is never to be tolerated. Children like to mys-
tify and to be mystified. They like to pretend to tease and to act
another part than their own. This inclination toward some kind
of illusion is perfectly noritial with them, and, therefore, to be en-
couraged. It gives ground for the glorious kingdom of art and
the poetry of conversation which is jest and wit, and this, although
often stereotyped into prosaic conventional forms, is preferable to
the clumsy honesty which takes everything in its simple, literal
sense. It is easy to discover when children in such play, in the
activitj^ of their joyousness, incline to the side of disorder and
confusion, by their showing a selfish interest in it. Then they
must be stopped, for the delight of harmless artifice degenerates
into crafty premeditation and dissimulation.

§ 102. The study of the logical forms is doubtless a special
pedagogical help in the logical training of the intelligence. Prac-
tice in mathematics is not sufficientj because it presupposes logic.
Mathematics is related to logic in the same way as grammar,

52 The Journal of Speculative Philo^opluj.

physics, etc. But these k)gieal forms must be presentee] in tlieir
pure imlependenee, and not iinplieitly in tlieir objective form as
propositions.

ANALYSIS' AND COMMENTAEY.

BY WILLIAM T. HAURIS.

Education is the development of reason innate in man — theoretical
as intellect, practical as will-power. It is a labor that changes an ideal
into a real, making what is potential into an actual ; transfiguring the
" natural " man, so to speak, into a spiritual man. Education forms
" habits." It develops ideal human nature into real human nature by
means of this formation of habits. (Play differs from Labor in this, that it
does not seek to transform an ideal into a real, but to make a semblance
of contradiction between the ideal and real ; it makes a reality seem to
be what it is not.) There are three special elements in man, each of
which needs education : these are life (bodily organism), cognition
(knowing faculty or intellect), and will. To some extent there is a succes-
sion of periods based on this distinction : (1) the period of nurture, lasting
till the sixth year, or during infancy, in which the education of the body
is more important than the education of the mind; (2) the period of the
school, lasting through childhood — say to fourteen years — in which general
or intellectual education is most important ; (3) the period of youth — from
fourteen to eighteen — in which the most important education is special-
izing the practical application of knowledge and strength to particular
forms of duty, hence will-education. While these periods are thus dis-
tinguished by the relative importance of the three different disciplines, it
is essential that no one of these disciplines shall be neglected in an}^
period.

§ 52. The classification in pedagogics is based on the distinction of
the three elements in man that require education. (1) Physical (correct
livings orthobiotics) ; (2) intellectual (correct perceiving, knowing, and
thinking ■= didactics'^ ; (3) practical (correct action, proper habits = prag-
matics), Esthetic training, or the sense for the appreciation and pro-
duction of the beautiful, falls, in a threefold division, into the second —
into theoretic education. Social, moral, and religious training belong to

' This contains also additional reflections, often substituted in place of analysis
where the text is clear without restatement.

Analysis and Commentary. 53

the third division, as they concern the will and its utterance in deeds.
" Prao-matics " signifies the doctrine of human deeds, and includes the
spheres of ethics, politics, and religion. There may be defined a fivefold
system of education, basing the distinction on the institutions of civiliza-
tion : (a) Nurture = the education of the family ; (b) the school, or educa-
tion into the conventionalities of intelligence ; (c) the art, trade, or pro-
fession that forms the vocation in life = the education of civil society ; (d)
the political education into citizenship, resulting from obedience to laws
and participation in making and sustaining them ; (e) religious education.
These five forms of education depend on (a) the family, (b) the school,
(c) civil society, (d) the State, (e) the Church, The school is properly a
transition between the family and civil society, and forms the institution
of education par excellence. Hence, while education, very properly, is de-
fined so as to include all of human life, there is a period specially char-
acterized as " education " which transpires in the school, a special institu-
tion that partakes of the character of the family on the one hand, and of
civil society on the other. In the school, of course, there should be some
attention paid to all spheres of education, but its main business should be
the acquisition " of the picture of the world such as mature minds through
experience and insight have painted it" (see § 51 near the end), or, in
other words, those conventional items of information, insights into laws
and principles, and the elementary processes of their combination. This
makes the " view of the world " which each civilized human being is sup-
posed to possess. It is important to know the exact province of the
school, and to see that it is only one of the five forms of education that
civilization provides for man. Much of the carping criticism leveled
against schools, in times of financial distress or general social depression,
is based on the assumption that the province of the school is all educa-
tion instead of a small, but very important, fraction of it. The school
may do its share of correct education, but it cannot correct the effects of
neglect of family nurture, nor insure its youth against evil that will fol-
low if civil society furnishes no steady employment, no opportunity for set-
tled industry, and the State no training into consciousness of higher man-
hood by its just laws, and by offering to the citizen a participation in the
political process of legislation and administration, carefully guarding its
forms so that its politics does not furnish a training in corruption. Nor
can the school insure the future of its pupils unless the Church does its
part in the education of the individuals of the community. " The sci-
entific arrangement of these ideas " — i. c, life, intellect, and will — " must
show that the former, as more abstract, constitute the conditions " — i. e.,
life is the condition of intellect, and both intellect and life the conditions of

54 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

will — while "the latter, as more concrete, are the ground of the former"
— i. e., intellect is the ground of life, or, in other words, its final cause,
and so will is the ffround and final cause of intellect. Intellect contains
all that life contains, and much more, namely : While life realizes its
totality of species only in many individuals, and each individual is a par-
tial and special half of the species as male or female, the intellect as con-
sciousness is subject and object in one, and each individual intellect is
potentially the entire species — each thinking being can think all the
thoughts of the greatest thinkers. So, will contains all that intellect con-
tains, and more. For what is potential in intellect (the identity of sub-
ject and object of thought) is real in the will. The will makes objective
its internal subjective forms, and in its highest ethical activity it becomes
conscious freedom.

§ 63. The rules of hygiene are derived from an insight into the two-
fold process of assimilation and elimination which goes on in the living
orsranism with relation to the inorganic substances which it uses.

§ 54. Perpetual change goes on in the living organism, converting
the inorganic into organic tissue and then reconverting it. This alterna-
tion is the basis of the demand for the alternation of productive activity
with rest and recreation in the whole physical system.

§ 55. Fatigue defined. It may oc3ur with the whole organism or
with a part. The idea that total rest is healthy is a misapprehension.
The organism requires alternation of rest and activity, which alternation
itself is activity because it is change. Hence, " true strength arises only
from activity."

§ 56. Physical education treats of (a) the repairing activity or nutri-
tion, (b) the motor or muscular activity, and (c) the nervous activity, as
far as they concern children and youth.

§ 57. Dietetics defined. Details here are trivial.

§§ 58, 59, 60, 61. Food for Infants.

§ 62. Why children need much sleep.

§ 63. Clothing of children should allow free play of the limbs, and not
compress the vital organs. Its clothing should not be a source of anx-
iety to the child, nor the occasion of vanity or of humiliation.

§ 64. Cleanliness means " a place for every thing and every thing in its
place." To take a thing out of its proper relations is to " deprive it of
its proper individuality," and in an " elemental chaos " every thing has
lost its proper relations to other things, and has no longer any use or fit-
ness in its existence.

§ 65. Gymnastics. The voluntary and involuntary muscles distin-
guished— the former depend on the brain direct, while the latter depend

Analysis and Commentary. ' 55

on the spinal cord ; the voluntary nuiseles form the means of communi-
cation with the external world, and also react on the automatic functions
of digestion, sensation, etc. Gymnastics seeks to develop the voluntary
muscles in a normal manner, and through these indirectly to affect favor-
ably the development of the other bodily systems and processes.

§ 66. Gymnastics affected by the national military drill. The ancient
tribes and nations found special bodily training indispensable to success
in war, and even to national preservation. Gunpowder and the improved
arms that use it have almost rendered gymnastics obsolete — the success-
ful army, other things equal, being the one composed of men thoroughly
disciplined in manoeuvres, and possessed individually of tact and versa-
tility necessary to manipulate the destructive fire-arms now used.

§ 67. Gymnastics, therefore, in modern times must aim chiefly at de-
veloping the body for the sake of physical strength and endurance, with
a view to the demands of useful industry and mental culture on the bodily
health and vigor. Health requires harmonious development; the exer-
cises must develop the parts of the body so as not to produce dispropor-
tion. The result of gymnastics is to give the mind control over the body
as a whole — the will interpenetrates, as it were, the various organs, and
by this means the conscious mind can reenforce the automatic functions
of the body ; the will-power can to a certain degree even ward off dis-
ease.

§§ 68-Vl. Gymnastic exercises classified: (1) of the lower extremities:

(a) walking, (b) running, (c) leaping (including varieties and modifications,
such as walking on stilts, skating, dancing, balancing, etc.) ; (2) of the
upper extremities : (a) lifting, (b) swinging, (c) throwing — (including also
the modifications of climbing, carrying, pole and bar exercises, quoits,
ball and nine-pin playing, etc.) ; (3) of the whole body : (a) swimming,

(b) riding, (c) fighting.

§ 72. The gradation of exercises chronologically corresponds in some
degree with their classification — (a) walking, running, leaping, to infancy ;
(b) lifting, swinging, throwing, to childhood ; (c) swimming, riding, bodily
contests, to youth, and to manhood so far as manhood continues athletic
sports. The period of sexual development begins with youth, and needs
special attention at the hand of the educator.

§ 73. Great care must be exercised in the period of youth as to food
— its regularity, and proper quality and amount ; the physical exercise,
too, must be strictly observed. These precautions may prevent a prema-
ture diversion of the nervous power of the body to a manifestation of the
sexual instinct.

8 74. There must be no overstraining of the brain or morbid excite-

56 The Journal of Speculative Philosophu.

ment of the feoliniis in the period of youth, if we would lurve a healthful
development of the sexual instinct. Xovel-readinfj should be carefully
limited as to amount and cliaracter.

§ 80. Education has to note bodily conditions of the mind, and to
prescribe methods of physical training. It has more especially to note
also the nature of mind, or psychology, and prescribe the methods of de-
veloping the several powers of the mind.

§ 81. Psychology, as a science, is unfolded within the philosophy of
spirit as an antecedent presupposition of the science of ethics (which
forms the third part of the science of spirit, see "Analj^sis" § 1, page
88, of this work). Hence pedagogics, which belongs to ethics (or social
science), presupposes psychology, and refers to it as already established.
Pedagogics, in treating of intellectual education, may give only an outline
of it.

§ 82. The conception of attention — the most important one in peda-
gogics. Nothing exists for the mind unless the mind gives attention to
it — i. e., voluntarily entertains it. [Attention is self-activity, not a pas-
sivity of the mind. It is the will acting upon the intellect, and hence a
combination of intellect and will. Out of the infinitely manifold objects
before the senses — and each object is capable of endless subdivision,
there is no part so small that it does not possess variety and the possi-
bility of further subdivision — fAtention selects one special field or prov-
ince, and refuses to be diverted from it. It neglects all else and returns
again and again from the borders of the field of attention, and takes note
of the relation of the surrounding objects to the object of special atten-
tion. It makes it the essential thing, and considers every thing else only
as related to it.]

[It is interesting to note how the higher faculties [so-called " faculties "
— one must not, however, suppose these faculties as isolated " properties "
of the mind, existing side by side, like properties of a thing) all originate
from the process of attention ; they are higher powers or " potencies " of
attention. Isaac Newton ascribed his superiority to other men in intel-
lectual power simply to the greater power of attention. Attention ap-
pears : first, as a mere power of isolating one object from others — a power
of concentration upon it to the exclusion of others ; secondly, it discrimi-
nates distinctions within the object or analyzes it : thus analysis is con-
tinued attention — the second power or potence of attention ; thirdly, it
seizes again upon one of the distinctions found by analysis, and becomes
abstraction ; abstraction might be named the third power or potence of
attention ; fourthly, the attention may be directed to essential relations
of the elements formed by analysis and abstraction — their essential rela-

Analysis and Commentary, 57

tions to each other. This is a process of synthetic thouo;ht, a grasping-
together, a comprehension — a higher activity of mind — a fourth potence
or power of attention. It is the most important matter in psychology, this
process of synthesis, through necessary relation. To find that one ob-
ject of attention, A, involves another, B — possesses essential relation to
it, such that A cannot exist without B — is to find a necessary synthesis.
It is to discover that instead of A by itself, or B by itself, there is one
existence having two phases to it, one phase being A, and the other phase
being B. It is a finding of one instead of two, and is a synthetic act of
mind. The synthesis is not an arbitrary one. It is a discovery of truth
— A and B were really two aspects of one and the same being which we
may call A B, but they seemed to be independent. The process of atten-
tion, up to its fourth power, is thus an ascent from seeming to being. The
perception of dependence (" essential relation " is dependence) is the per-
ception of synthesis, and belongs to the activity of comprehension. Re-
flection, as a mental activity (or "faculty "), is the process of discovering
relations and dependencies among objects — hence it is a stage of synthe-
sis— belonging to what we call here the " fourth power of attention."
The student of educational psychology should follow out this mode of ex-
ploring the mind, and define for himself all of the so-called " faculties "
and mental acts, in terms of attention (see the Outline of Educational
Psychology, especially VI). He must note, too, that the act of atten-
tion is an act of the mind, directed upon itself because it confines its own
activity {i. e., the perception in general) to a special field (?'. e., makes it
perception of a special object to the exclusion of others). This synthesis
is, as just remarked, the most important theme of psychology — it is also
the most wonderful — a veritable fountain of surprise. For the strangest
thing to learn in psychology is that the process of reflection (the direc-
tion of the mind in upon itself) discovers the truth about the objects or
things in the world. The first activity of sense-perception notices objects
as independent of each other, as having no essential relations. Reflection,
or attention in its higher powers, discovers necessary relations, and forms
more adequate ideas of the truth. Isaac Newton saw the sun and planets
as one gravitating whole — a system — and his knowledge certainly came
nearer the truth than did the knowledge of previous astronomers who
merely knew the sun and planets in their separate existence. In going
into the truth of objects the mind goes into itself at the same time. Thus
psychology points backward to the great fact that reason made the world
as well as the human intellect.]

§ 83. Attention (depending as it does upon the voluntary power of
the mind) can be developed or educated. [The fact that the child is

68 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

capable of oxoroisino^ liis will-power on his intellect is tlie fiindaniental
fact that makes all intellectual education possible. There is no intellect,
strictly speaking, until the will has combined with the perception.]

§ 84. (Note what has been said above in § 82). Perception, con-
ception, and thinking are named as the three stages of intellect. [Per-
ception (German word, Anschanen) here refers simply to the contempla-
tion of objects by the senses. Conception (German word, Vorstellen)
makes in the mind a picture of the object, but a (jencral picture — a rep-
resentation of the object in its outlines — a representation that will cor-
respond not only to the particular object, but to all objects of the same
class. Thinking perceives the essential relations of the object, its de-
pendencies on its environment, and the reciprocal action. Education pro-
duces in the pupil the ability to carry back the activity of the higher
fticulties into the low^er ones, as stated in the text. In the presence of
perception tlie mind learns to be able to recall the general representation
of the type or class of objects, and compare the object before the senses
with the general type. It enables it also to think in the presence of the
object, and to perceive essential relations at the same time that it is occu-
pied with perception and conception. Thus it elevates the lower faculties
to thinking perception and to thinking conception. The child delights in
fairy tales because they play with the fixed conditions of actuality, and
present to him a picture of free power over nature and circumstances.
Thus they, to some extent, prefigure to him the conquest which his race
has accomplished, and is accomplishing, only it is made to appear as the
exploits of some Aladdin, or Jack the Giant Killer. To modify, change,
or destroy " the limits of common actuality " is the perpetual work of
the race. It molds the external world to suit its own ideas. Play is
the first education that the child gets to prepare him for this human des-

§ 85. Perception can be assisted by isolation of the object to be per-
ceived. The pupil should be trained to look for certain properties and
attributes, and to note their peculiarities. The categories under which
one may classify these properties and attributes are furnished by reflec-
tion. Hence, when one in the so-called " object-lessons " trains the pupil
to note in all objects certain constantly recurring predicates, such as color,
shape, frangibility, solubility, size, number, taste, smell, etc., he is bring-
ing thought and conception " back into perception " (see previous section)
and elevating mere perception into thinking perception. The difference
between ordinary perception and scientific perception lies just here : the
former is unsystematic and fragmentary, the latter is systematic and ex-
haustive. Thinking gives the system. Hence, the training of perception

Analysis and Commentary. 59

IS the subordination of it to the will, and the introduction of complete
systematic habits of activity in place of accidental perception.]

§ 86. All perceivable objects should be learned by actual perception
so far as is possible. When remoteness in space and time or inaccessi-
bility on account of size prevents this, a good substitute offers itself in
the way of pictorial representation. [The picture, of course, idealizes
much — it magnifies some objects and reduces others, and it never pre-
sents all of the features found in nature. But it omits unessential details
for the most part, and this fact makes a picture much easier to learn than
the real object, although the knowledge is not so practical. The picture
is commonly nearer the type or general form of the object than real
specimens ; the real specimens have much about them that is accidental,
and need much comparison to discover what is the normal type. The
picture gives this type at once, and hence gives assistance to the pupil —
half digests his mental food for him, in fact. Hence the pictorial repre-
sentation has advantages (easy of apprehension because it is a perception
reduced to conception) and disadvantages (because the pupil does not get
the strength that comes from reducing the specimens of nature to their
,types by his own efforts).]

§ 87. Accuracy is, above all, demanded in pictorial representations.
The picture-book came into use chiefly after decline of painting. Co-
menius (1658) gave a great impulse to education by his book, which at-
tempts to convey a knowledge of the world by pictures.

§ 88. Children should be exercised in classification. They should
collect and arrange cabinets for themselves. [This will give them ability
in recognizing the type in the specimen, the general in the particular.
Drawing, too, is excellent practice, if from objects direct, inasmuch as it
requires the pupil to omit all that is not characteristic of the object.
How far lines sufiice to delineate an object, and fix it unmistakably, and
what these few lines are, the art of drawing teaches. Characterization
must be learned first before any attempt at aesthetic effect. But true
works of art must be placed where the child will receive a silent educa-
tion from them, although no positive instruction is given in them.]

§ 89. Pictorial representation is of little service, unless accompanied
by analysis and explanation. [Mere gazing upon a picture is like the
thoughtless gazing upon real objects — it is not systematic, and does not
separate the essential from the accidental, nor exhaust the subject.]

§ 90. Training of the ear by music and by correct speaking. [Tones
are of all kinds — solemn, joyous, lively, sad, contemplative, discordant
and suggestive of hate and bitterness, harmonious and sweet and sug-
gestive of love and agreement, etc. There is a long scale of degrees to

00 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

each one of these feelinijs and passions, and music can present all sliades
of each. Even the keys have each a special character. The German
composers have used these and other properties of tones to advantage in
constructing great musical dramas, in wiiich pure music accomplishes re-
sults similar to words in poetry.]

§ 91. (1) Verification of conceptions through comparison of the con-
ception with tlie perception; (2) creative imagination, which modifies or
combines images ; (3) memory, which holds fast perceptions by attaching
them to arbitrary or conventional symbols, such as words.

§ 92. Method of verification and its function.

§ 93. [Emancipation of the mind takes place through its ascent into
formative power, and this is realized in two ways : (a) in reaching the
general types of objects, the mind finds the one form that stands for
many, and gains ability to see the one in the many, the power to hold the
essential and permanent without depending on any one particular object
or specimen or sense-perception ; (b) in reproducing, by aid of the
general conception or abstract definition, a number of special examples,
it is able to fashion them in various ways, and yet endow them all with
possible attributes and characteristics. The mind thus has free scope of
realization, and can, in an ideal world of its own creation, participate in
creative activity.]

§ 94. In the epoch of the development of the imagination comes in
•the study of art and literature.

The first classics for youth are those which have been developed by
nations in their earliest stages. Not only the light sides, but the darker
sides of character in these naive stories, are essential to their educative
effect. They furnish types of human character, and types of human situ-
ations, a knowledge of which constitutes wisdom. The conception of the
characters of Cain, Joseph, Samson, David, Saul, Ulysses, Penelope,
Achilles, and the like, furnishes a ready classification for special objects
of experience.

§ 95. Every child should read as indispensable the stock of stories
which furnish these general types of character and situation. [" Robinson
Crusoe," " Gulliver's Travels," " Don Quixote," the " Arabian Nights,"
the dramas of Shakespeare, should be read sooner or later. Earlier than
these, the old English stories and fairj' tales, and even Mother Goose's
melodies. A scale thus extendinof from the earth to the fixed stars of ffen-
ius furnishes pictures of human life of all degrees of concreteness. The
meager and abstract outline is given in the nursery tale, and the deep
comprehensive grasp of the situation with all of its motives is found in
Shakespeare. The summation of the events of life in " Solomon Grun-

Analysis and Commentary. 61

dy " has been compared to the epitome furnished by Shakespeare in the
" Seven Ages," and the disastrous voyage of the " Three Men of Goth-
am " is made a universal type of human disaster arising from rash ad-
venture.]

§ 96. Importance of avoiding morbid tendencies in the stories for
children. They must be naive and not sentimental ; but mere childish-
ness is to be avoided.

§ 97. Earnestness must predominate over play, as the child advances
into youth and youth into riper age. The biographies of Plutarch pre-
sent well-executed pictures of men of colossal characters placed in diflfi-
cult situations. Philosophical works, if taken up in later youth, should be
classical treatises on special problems of thought. Abstracts and summa-
ries are generally to be avoided.

§ 98. Memory. [The German word Gedaechtniss is contrasted with
the word Ermnerung ; the former may be translated " Memory," and the
latter " Recollection " — Recollection, the reproduction of the perceived
object in its particular existence, and Memory the reproduction of it by
its general type. With the general type the mind is able to master the in-
finite diversity of nature and reduce all to a few classes. Mnemonic arti-
fices are to be eschewed. " Memory is the stage of the dissolution of the
conception ; " this means that the power of representation becomes less
and less, a mere recalling of what has been perceived, and, as the mind
sti'engthens, it passes over into a faculty which calls up universals, or
general concepts in the place of particular images. Memory, in this
technical sense, deals with words — each word standing for some universal
concept. Language is therefore something that can be used by a whole
people — its words, standing, as they do, for universals, express for each
individual the contents of his observations, no matter how peculiar they
may be.]

§ 99. Repetition and the writing down of names and numbers are the
best means for fixing them in the memory.

§ 100. In the general images of the faculty of conception, necessity
of connection is yet wanting. Thinking, technically so called, discovers
necessary relations.

§ 101. A sense of truth may be fostered from childhood up. Preju-
dice and self-interest must be habitually set aside for the truth — for the
perception of things as they actually are. Great care, therefore, must be
exercised to prevent illusions (the activity of the productive imagination,
however essential it may be) from weakening the sense of truth.

§ 102. An acquaintance with logical forms is important for the
thorough education of the intellect. Logical forms give the archetypes

62 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

or simplest shapes of all problems that occur elsewhere. Neither mathe-
matics nor any other application of logic in the sciences can supply the
place of a logical training.

KANT'S ANTHEOPOLOGY.

TRANSLATED FROM THE OKRMAN OF IMMANUEL KANT BY A. E. KROEOER.

{Continued.)

Conceiving the Weaknesses and Diseases of the Soul in regard- to

its Faculty of Cognition.

A.

GENERAL DIVISION.

§ 43. The defects of the faculty of cognition are either weak-
nesses or diseases of the mind. The diseases of tlie soul, in their
relation to the faculty of cognition, may be subdivided under two
chief divisions. The one is called the mood disease {hypochondria)
and the other is called the j^ertwhed iniyid {mania). In regard to
the former, tlie patient is well aware that the current of his thoughts
is not all right, his reason not having sufficient self-control to di-
rect, check, or hurry on the direction of that current. Untimelj
joy and untimely sorrows — hence moods — change as does the
weather, which we have to take even as it comes. So far as the
second is concerned, it is a vohmtary flow of thought, which has its
own — subjective — rale, but runs contrary to the (objective) current
of thought, which harmonizes with the laws of experience.

In regard to the sensuous representation, a disorder of the mind
is called either idiocy or insanity. As an upsetting or topsy-tur-
vy ing of the power of judgment and of reason, it is called crazi-
ness or derangement. The man who in his imaginations habitually
neglects to compare them with the laws of experience {i. e., who
dreams while awake) is a phantastic person — a man of whims;
if he does so withj^a^Aos {Ajfeht) he is an enthusiast. Unexpected
promptings of a phantastic person are called moods of phantasti-
cality (raptus).

Kant'' 8 Anthropology. 63

Simpletons, stupids, numskulls, blockheads, and fools are distin-
guished from deranged people not only in regard to degree, but
also in regard to the different qualities of their moods ; and the
former are not yet qualified for the insane asylum, which is a
place where men must be kept in order, by another's reason, in
spite of the maturity and strength of their own age, in view of
their inability to attend to themselves to the smallest affairs of life.
Insanity when allied to pathos is madness, which may often be
original, but, at the same time, may come involuntarily, in which
ease it comes near to genius. Let one instance the poetic inspira-
tion {furor poeticus). But such an influx of the more gentle but
unruly current of ideas, when it touches reason, is called flighti-
ness {Schwdrmerei). To hrood over one and the same idea, which
yet has no possible object — for instance, over the death of a hus-
band— who, after all, cannot be called back to life — simply in
order to find rest in the pain itself, is dunjb craziness. Supersti-
tion is rather allied to insanity {Wahnsinn), SLn6 Jlightiness rather
to craziness (Wahnwiiz). The latter sort of mental disease is
also often called, in a milder phrase, exaltatioii or eccentricity.

To talk wildly when in a fever or an attack of aberration — say,
in a state of epilepsy — which is often excited sympathetically by a
powerful imagination through the mere fixed gaze of a madman
(for which reason persons of very excitable nerves should not ex-
tend their curiosity to tlie very cells of such unfortunates), is, nev-
ertheless, not to be treated as insanity. But that which is called
a conceit is not a disease of the mind, for that is generally under-
stood to be a moody aberration of the inner sense, but is usually
a haughtiness which borders on insanity ; and its claim that others
should, in comparison with such a person, despise themselves, runs
entirely contrary to its own purpose; just as in the case of mad-
men. For, by raising such a claim, he excites those same people
to curtail his vanity in all possible respects ; to ridicule him, and
expose him to laughter on account of his offensive foolishness.

More mild is the expression, he is cy^otchety (German, " he has a
<3ricket in his head "), (has a marotte), a principle which is claimed
to be popular, though it nowhere finds approval among the wise.
As an instance, let me cite the case when a man claims the gift of
certain presentiments, similar to the inspirations of Socrates, or of
certain influences said to be based on experience, though they are

04 The Journal of Speculative Philosoj)/ii/.

utterly inexplicable, such as sympathy-, antipathy, idiosyncrasy,
etc. {qualitates occultae)^ which chirp like a cricket in the brain,
and which, nevertheless, no one else can hear.

The mildest of all manners of overstepping the limits of sound
reason is the riding of a liohhy-horse ; a disposition to employ one's
self purposely Avith pet objects of the imagination, which the un-
derstanding merely plays with for its occupation, as with a real
business, and thus, as it were, a busied idleness. For old people
ot competence, and who have retired from busijiess, this dispo-
sition, which retreats again, as it were, into careless childhood, is
not only healthy, as an agitation which always keeps the vital
forces astir, but also amiable. At the same time it is ridiculous
to such a degree that the ridiculed himself must good-humoredly
join in the laugh against him. But even with the young and busy
people tliis hobby-riding serves as a recreation ; and those wise-
acres who criticise such petty, innocent follies with pedantic seri-
ousness deserve Sterne's admonition : " Why, let every one ride
his hobbj'-horse up and down the streets of the cxiy^ provided he
does not force you to mount helmid him.'''*

B.

Concerning the Weakness of the Faculty of Cognition.

He who lacks wit is called dull {phtusum caput). Nevertheless,
he may have a very good mind for matters that concern only the
understanding and reason. But let no one ask him to attempt the
poet ; as in the case of Clavids, for instance, whom his tutor was
about to apprentice to a blacksmith, because he could make no
verses, but who, when he got a mathematical book in his hands,
became a great mathematician. A mind of slow comprehension
is not necessarily a weak mind ; even as a mind of quick compre-
hension is not always thorough, and often very shallow.

A lack of judgment without wit is called sttipidity {stupiditas) \
with wit it is called silliness. He who shows judgment in busi-
ness affairs is called clever y if he combines wit with judgment, he
is called smart. He who merely affects either of these qualities —
that is, the pretentious wit as well as the would-be smart man — is
disgusting. Failures and missteps sharpen the wit i but he who

Kanfs Anthropology. 65

has reached such a height in this school that he can make others
smart through their faihire?, has dulled liis own wit. Ignorance is
not stupidit)' ; as in the case of the lady wlio, to the question of
an academician, "Do horses eat also at night?" replied, "How
can so learned a man be so stupid? " Bnt it is a proof of good
understanding if a person knows only how to question well (so that
he may be properly advised on the subject, either by nature or by
some other person).

A person is called a simpleton when his mind is unable to com-
prehend much ; but this does not constitute hitn stupid, unless he
comprehends it wrongly. Honest but sttcpid — as some people
improperly describe. " Pomeranian servants," for instance, is a
false and very censurable expression. It is false, because honesty —
fulfilling duty on principle — is practical reason. It is very cen-
surable, because it presupposes that every one who feels himself
able thereto would cheat, and that his not cheating arises only
from his inability. Hence the proverbs : " That man has not in-
vented powder " ; " He will not betray his country " ; " He is no
wizard," etc., betray misanthropic principles, namely, in this, that
even when we presuppose the good-will of those persons whom we
know, we cannot be sure of it ; but can be sure only in regard to
their inability or incapacity. Thus, as Hume says, the Grand
Sultan does not confide his harem to the virtue of those whom he
appoints its guardians, but to their inability — by appointing black
eunuchs.

To be very limited (narrow-minded) in regard to the extensive-
ness of one's conceptions does not of itself constitute stupidity ; it
all depends on their quality — on the governing principles. When
people allow themselves to be gulled by treasure-finders, gold-
makers, and lottery-dealers, this must not be ascribed to their stu-
pidity, but to their evil will ; that is, their purpose to become rich
at the expense of others, without a proportioned exertion of their
own. Craftiness — cunning, slyness {versutia, astutia) — is the abil-
ity to cheat others. The question now is, whether the cheat must
be smarter than he who is easily cheated, and whether the lat-
ter is stupid. A warm-hearted person, who readily trusts — that
is, believes, gives credit, etc. — is often also, though improperly,
called 2. fool; because he is an easy catch for rascals; in accord-
ance with the proverb : " When fools go to market the salesmen
XY— 5

66 The Joxirnal of Speculative Philosophy.

rejoice.'' It. is true, and a maxim of prudence, that I should uever
again trust tlie man wlio has cheated me once; for he is corrupt
in his i>rinciples. But n<it to trust other people, because 07ie man
has cheated me, is misantliropy. The real fool is the cheat. But
how if one great fraud has enabled him to place himself in such a
position that he no longer needs the confidence of others? It is
true that in such a case the character in which he appears under-
goes a change, but only to this extent : that whereas the cheated
cheater is ridiculed., men spit %Lpon the lucky cheat ; and thus
there is, after all, no advantage to be gained by cheating.*

* The Palestines who live among us have fallen into the not unfounded reputation of
being for the greater part addicted to cheating ever since their exile, owing to their usu-
rious tendency. Now, it is true that it seems strange to conceive of a nation of cheats.
But it surely is quite as stY-ange to conceive of a nation composed altogether of mer-
chants, the greater part of whom, united by an old supeistition, recognized by the
State wherein they live, aspire to no civil honors, but try to replace the loss of it by the
advantages to be obtained in overreaching the people who extend to them protection,
and even in overreaching each other. Now, it is true that this cannot be otherwise
with a whole nation of merchants — they thus being non-productive members of society
(like the Jews in Poland) ; and hence their constitution, sanctioned by old traditions,
and even recognized by us, among whom they live (and who have certain holy writ-
ings with them in common), cannot be abrogated by ua without our becoming guilty
of inconsequence ; although they make it the highest principle of their morality in deal-
ing with us, that "Every purchaser ought to keep his eyes wide open." Instead of
entering upon idle plans to make this people moral in regard to the points of cheating
and honesty, I prefer to express my notion concerning the origin of this curious con-
stitution— namely, a people composed solely of merchants.

Wealth was carried in the most ancient times by commerce from India across the
land to the western coasts of the Mediterranean and the ports of Phoenici.i — which in-
cludes Palestine. Now, it is true that it could also have taken its way across many
other places ; for instance, Palmyra, and in older times Tyre, Sidon, etc. ; and, Hkewise,
with a slight turn, across the sea, as Eziongeber and Elat ; perhaps, also, from the Ara-
bic coast to Thebes, and thus across Egypt to that same Syrian coast; but Palestine,
of which Jerusalem was the capital, was also advantageously situated for the caravan
trade. Probably the phenomenon of the ancient Solomonic wealth was the effect of
this commerce ; and the surrounding country of Palestine, even at the time of the Ro-
mans, was filled with merchants, who, after the destruction of Jerusalem — having pre-
viously established communications with other tradesmen of the same language and re-
ligion— gradually spread, together with these, into far-removed countries (into Europe),
always keeping in communication with each other, and finding protection from those
other countries on account of the advantages derived from their trade. It thus appears
that their dispersion over the whole world, together with their union in religion and
language, cannot at all be placed to the account of a curse pronounced upon this peo-
ple, but must rather hi considered a blessing ; especially as their wealth, estimated by
indiviiual possession, probably now exceeds that of any other people of the same num-
ber of persons. — Kote by Inunanuel Kani, the Author.

Notes and Discussions. 67

NOTES KKD DISCUSSIONS.

BERKELET8 IDEALISM.

The outlines of Berkeley's doctrine may be stated briefly as follows :
The individual experience is made up of " ideas." These ideas are inert,
fleeting existences, which do not have an independent being of their own,
but subsist only as they are perceived. They exist or have their reality
in active, indivisible " substances " or " spirits," which act, and think, and
perceive them. I know that I perceive such ideas — that is to say, I am
directly conscious of my own spirit or mind. Since the essence of this
spirit is to perceive and not to be perceived, I cannot have an idea of
it ; ideas, being passive and inert, cannot represent that which acts ; but
since I am conscious of my spirit I may be said to have a " notion " of it.
Further, I may reason by analogy that other men have spirits of which
they are conscious, for, though I cannot directly perceive these other
spirits — that is, cannot have an idea of them — yet I perceive certain
combinations of ideas which lead me to infer that particular agents or
spirits like myself accompany such combinations of ideas and perceive
them. Therefore I have a notion of other spirits as well as of my own.
In like manner I am conscious of relations which exist between ideas and
spirits. I am aware of a relation between my mind perceiving and the
ideas which it perceives ; and I may be said to have a notion of this rela-
tion, though I do not have an idea of it. Ideas, spirits, and relations,
then, make up the whole extent of human knowledge. Furthermore,
many of my ideas are not the product of my own activity, but are given
to me from without, and I have no control whatever over them. Some
other spirit, then, must be their cause. This cannot be a finite spirit
like my own, for it would have no more power to cause ideas than I have.
Therefore the cause of my ideas must be an infinite, divine spirit. They
exist in my spirit as a result of God's spirit. In God they have a perma-
nent existence by virtue of his own infinite power. Lastly, the soul or
spirit must be naturally immortal, because, being indivisible, incorporeal,
and unextended, it cannot be subject to the changes which affect the
body.

Bearing in mind this summary of the leading points of Berkeley's doc-
trine, let us see how far his results are logically deduced from the princi-

68 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

pies witli which he sets out ; and liow far, if at all, Berkeley has failed to
develop adequately the germs of his theory.

Tn the tirst place, Berkeley starts by positing the existence of ideas,
which mean, as the earlier portions of his work would imply, merely mo-
mentary sensations. Then, since these sensations are perceived, there
must be an active, causal agent or spirit — which is something entirely
different from passive, inert ideas — to perceive them. But why, from
the mere existence of ideas, does the existence of an active spirit follow ?
Why, from the fjict that our experience is made up of a tleetmg series of
momentary sensations, does it follow that there must be a single, identi-
cal, permanent subject of these sensations ? Berkeley himself gives no
logical answer. His only argument is an appeal to consciousness. But
powers are not objects of consciousness. " A power," says John Stu-
art Mill, " is not a concrete entity which we can perceive or feel, but an
abstract name for a possibility." The efficient power of which we are con-
scious is no more than a sensation, which is distinguished from our other
sensations or ideas merely by coming before them. Upon Berkeley's
theory we should have no assurance that the spirit of one moment was the
spirit of the next. If experience is made up of momentary sensations,
each of which implies the existence of a spirit to perceive it, what reason
is there for assuming the identity of any spirit over an interval ? "What
right have we to say that the spirit which perceives the sensation of one
moment is the same spirit as that which perceives the sensation of the
next moment? Berkeley would probably have said that just as we are
directly conscious of the spirit, so we are also conscious of its permanence.
This is true ; we are conscious of its permanence ; or rather we are con-
scious of it as permanent ; but this is as much as to say that conscious-
ness is not detached and momentary, as Berkeley makes it. In fact, we
are never conscious that we are feeling, but only that we have felt ; we
are never conscious that we are conscious, but only that we have been so.
There is no present moment of consciousness. Look for it, and it is al-
ready past. " Consciousness," says Hodgson, " is like a man walking back-
ward, who does not see each step as he takes it, but only immediately
after it has been taken." Now, upon Berkeley's theory it would be absurd
to say that any of these past consciousnesses are ours ; or, in other words,
it would be absurd to say that any consciousness is ours. We could not
be conscious of self at all if our life could be made up of momentary, in-
dividual experiences, unrelated to each other. There must, then, be an
element in cognition which Berkeley ignores.

The fact is that, in positing the reality of our ideas — that is, the reality
of the world around us as we experience it and know it — Berkeley posits

Notes and Discussions. 69

more than he is aware of. He is right in positing this ; he is right in
recognizing that the world exists only as perceived, but he failed to rec-
ognize the part which thought plays in this perception of the world. The
world of ideas is the only real world, but it is such by virtue of the rela-
tions of thought. If our ideas are only fleeting, single sensations, without
permanence or bond of union, then, from the world which they compose,
all relation disappears. Thus Berkeley's premises would not allow him
to recognize the existence of relations, but yet he cannot move a step
without tacitly recognizing them. He cannot even get out of his world
of ideas — of his mere sensations — without arbitrarily supposing that these
ideas imply — that is, are related to — a subject which perceives them. He
saw that his doctrine would destroy spirit as well as matter, unless he
admitted the existence of something which was not an idea — a spirit
which perceived, but was not perceived in turn ; and so he felt the neces-
sity of admitting the existence of relations — namely, the relation which
the perceived ideas bear to the perceiving spirit, and of which we may
have a notion, though not an idea. In this way Berkeley stumbled upon
his distinction between idea and notion. In his introduction on abstract
ideas he says that universality does not consist in the absolute positive
nature or conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the par-
ticulars signified or represented by it. Here he recognizes that relation
constitutes the universality of ideas. In the second edition of his " Prin-
ciples " he was even led to recognize relation as a third kind of existence,
the knowledge of which is given to us by a notion, as we have just seen
above. Thus the natural course of his thought leads him to see that his
idea implies something more than mere feeling, that cognition is more
than momentary, that the concept or thought-element plays a prominent
part in our knowledge of the world. But his adoption of the notion was
an after-thought, and he never pushed it to its legitimate consequences;
he never remodelled his earlier theory in the light of his new discovery.
If Berkeley had recognized the full importance and significance of the
thought-element at the beginning of his work, he might havQ understood,
-as Green says, by the percipi to which he called esse equivalent, definitely
the intelligi. If he had known how much he really posited when he
posited his world of ideas, he would have been saved from his inconsisten-
cies and contradictions.

What, then, is the full significance of that thought element in cognition
at which Berkeley only hinted ? What is the true ground of our knowl-
edge of self? In positing the world which we know, we posit something
more than mere limited, independent, individual experiences. Each of
our experiences has a meaning for us only in relation to the whole of

70 The Journal of Speculative Pliiiosophy.

which it is a part. To know the part we must recognize its conformity
to the whole. Each part implies the whole. Existence is not, as Berke-
ley would make it, a state which depends upon a single relation to an
individual mind, but it is position in a rational, unified system. What
Berkeley calls knowledge is, in fact, no knowledge at all, for the mere
perception of single objects is nothing by itself ; it becomes knowledge
only by being referred to something not perceived — only by being subject
to a universal law known by the understanding.

The function of such laws of the understanding is precisely what Berke-
ley overlooked in his earlier days. He felt the need of this thought-
function in his later time, and, as we have seen, even caught a glimpse of
its significance ; but he never saw its full bearing upon his system. These
laws of the understanding are what have been improperly termed " innate
ideas." They are the necessary forms of thought which the mind im-
poses upon its sensations. They make knowledge possible, but are pos-
sessed by the mind only so far as they act upon the sensations. If not in
operation, they are nothing. But given the data of sensation, and these
forms of the understanding — these antecedent conditions of experience
enable us to view the world as a rational whole, and to recognize the rela-
tions in which each single datum of experience stands to this rational
whole of which it is an insignificant yet necessary part.

Having seen the true significance of the thought-element in cognition,
we understand why Berkeley's neglect of it led to inconsistencies in his
theory. His great step was made when he shook off the old notion which
had been Locke's fundamental idea — namely, that the world first exists,
and then is thought of. He was the first to discern the truth that the
world really exists only so far as it is thought of. But, having advanced thus
far upon the right road, he was blinded by the ambiguity of his term
" idea," and, failing to recognize the true meaning of thought, stumbled,
and lost his way. He makes idea mean a single, momentary experience,
and thus confuses thought and sensation. He does not see that there is
anything more in cognition than mere single, detached sensations. The
permanent thought-element escapes him entirely for the time. As Green
says, " Berkeley failed to distinguish the true proposition, ' there is noth-
ing real apart from thought,' from this false one, its virtual contradictory,
' there is nothing other than feeling.' " He " merged both thing and
idea in the indifference of simple feeling." If he had recognized that the
idea was real by being thought, and not merely by being felt, he would
not have held that knowledge consists only of individual, momentary
ideas. If he had recognized the forms of thought as the antecedent con-
ditions of experience, he would not have been obliged to posit a spirit for

Notes and Discussions. Yl

the subsistence of his ideas ; for then he would have seen that the spirit
— the self-conscious subject — is the first and highest form of all experi-
ence. It is true that the world of ideas implies a thinking subject, but it
is not true that a fleeting succession of ideas iiuplies such a subject, which
is substantially what Berkeley posits. If we recognize that relation con-
stitutes the nature of ideas, we see that ideas are real in so far as they are
related ; that therefore the world is real because it exists in relation to a
thinking subject. It is true that the thinking subject also implies the
existence of the world ; we are conscious of self only by envisaging some-
thing which is not self, to which the self stands in a necessary relation.
It is by this synthetic principle of thought — the principle that each part
of existence implies all other parts — that we come to know both world
and ego as existing each for the other. Each is real because it stands in
a necessary relation to the other. Berkeley overlooks this synthetic prin-
ciple when he regards the world as a mere succession of separate sensa-
tions ; but, as I have shown above, he tacitly recognizes it when he asserts
that each of these single sensations implies a relation to a perceiving sub-
ject. But his neglect of this principle in the material world makes his
recognition of it in the connection of world and mind useless, and drives
him to an appeal to the. testimony of consciousness in support of his
theory of mind.

We are now in a position to see why the appeal to consciousness, as to
its self-identity, is not valid, according to Berkeley's method. First, in
regard to the identity of ideas. Berkeley makes coherence one test of
the reality of ideas. But what right has he to assign coherence to a
fleeting series of experiences ? Coherence in sensations implies a perma-
nent element in those sensations. Berkeley recognized this in so far as
he saw that certain sensations come back in the same form whenever per-
ceived, and consequently must have remained in existence in some other
mind ; but he failed to see that the sensations of one moment are not the
same as those of a past moment, but only similar to them, and that what
has been kept in existence is a law, by virtue of which similar sensations
will again occur under similar conditions. Thus the permanent element
in sensations is a law, and all coherence must depend upon such law.
Mere succession of feelings cannot be called coherence, for coherence can
be afiirmed only of a system of relations. Thus it is with the permanence
or identity of consciousness. A fleeting succession of single sensations
can not imply, as we have seen, the existence of a thinking subject. Far
less can they imply the existence of a permanent subject which is
identical with itself over an interval of time. For such identity can be
known only by a consciousness of the relations which the subject bears to

72 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

the rational wliolo of existence. Berkeley is driven to account for the
pernianence of ideas and spirits by the theory tliat God ordains such an
order, or by tlie tlieory of continuous creation.

The neglect of the syntlietic principle of thouglit is again evident in
the weakness of Berkeley's argument for immortality. Since the soul is
indivisible, incorporeal, and unextended, he says, it cannot be subject to
the changes which atfect the body, and must, therefore, be immortal.
But, as Green points out, if being unextended constitutes immortality,
then sounds and smells must be immortal. And, even though the fact
that a series of sensations are not intluenced by time may prove them end-
less, it does not follow from this that they possess an immortal soul, for
the being of a soul needs something more for its constitution than a mere
series of sensations ; it needs the presence of a thinking subject which is
identical with itself through time. Such a subject, as we have seen, the
synthetic principle that one part of experience implies all other parts
makes possible. Upon such a principle, and upon such a principle alone,
can we rationally found a doctrine of immortality.

As Berkeley infers the existence of his own spirit from the existence of
his ideas, so from tlie existence of his own spirit he infers the existence
of others in the world around him. Since wehave a notion of ourselves
as spirits, and have ideas of bodies which move as if they were controlled
by like spirits, we infer the existence of such spirits. This bald infer-
ence becomes an induction amounting to certainty when we consider
that the beings which we call our fellow-men stand in the same relation
to the universe as we ourselves stand, and that, if we do not conceive of
them as embodying a self-conscious subject, we cannot conceive the whole
of the universe to be a rational whole.

Berkeley solves the problem of extension by reducing the idea of ex-
tension to a series of single sensations. He thus gets rid of extension as a
relation between ideas, or, in other words, gets rid of it entirely, for the
only meaning of extension is a relation between ideas. If extension is
equivalent only to a series of single sensations, there is no one moment at
which it can be said to exist, for no two parts of a series can exist at the
same time. If Berkeley had recognized the true function of the under-
standing, he would have seen that extension was not a sensation or a series
of sensations, but such a relation between ideas as can be thought of apart
from all sensation ; and that, far from being the result of sensations, it is
one of the antecedent conditions which make sensations possible, and
form them into what we call knowledge. The intinite divisibility of ex-
tension, then, no longer troubles us. If extension were made up of a series
of sensations, it could not be infinitely divided, because sensations cannot

Notes and Discussions. 73

be infinitely small; but, since it is not made up of a series of sensations
— since it is a form of tlie mind — it is ideal, and therefore potentially
capable of infinite divisibility, though not actually capable of such divisi-
bility for our experience.

Berkeley posits a God still more arbitrarily than he posits finite spirits.
We are conscious of our own active power, and we are also conscious of
possessing ideas over which we have no control. The source of these
must, then, be some other active power. All those ideas which are not
the product of finite spirits must be the effect of an infinite spirit. The
world — that is, the sum of those primary qualities of which Locke made
matter the substance — must have a single, self-conscious subject as its
cause. But, even if we are conscious of our own activity, what right have
we to infer from this another activity of which we are not conscious ?
Since we cannot have an idea of this activity, we might turn against it
Berkeley's own argument against the existence of matter, in which he
says that it makes no difference to us whether such a matter exists or not,
if we can have no idea of it. He would admit that we could have no
idea of God, but he would not admit for an instant that his existence was
a matter of indifference to us. He would say that, if we do not have an
idea of God, we at least have a notion of him. Why, then, have we not
a notion of matter ? The fact is, that we do have a notion of mat-
ter, and, in denying this, Berkeley cut away the only logical props of
the spiritualism that he sought to uphold. We have a notion of
matter as "a basis of intelligible relations." . Locke came nearer the
truth than Berkeley in his doctrine of a deity when he said that the
world was a system of relations, and as such must have a present and
eternal subject of those relations. But Berkeley, having made his world
a series of single sensations, of which the only logical subject would be a
mere " feeling substance," finds himself driven, in his zeal for an intelli-
gent deity, to posit arbitrarily an infinite activity as the cause of the world
of his experience. Berkeley sees that such a being must be in relation to
the world. Thus relation comes to him as an after-thought, and he says
that we must have a notion of the deity. This strikes nearer the truth.
If we start with relation, if we recognize that every idea — or, better, every
thing — has its nature, not in sensation, but in relation, then we see that
the universe is a rational whole, implying the power of an eternal con-
sciousness ; we sec that an intelligible world can exist only in relation to
a self-conscious subject, and that the condition of our knowledge of such
a world is the presence of that subject in us. Indeed, what is a rational
whole but a universal reason — that is, God himself? " What I mean by
God is the reason which meets me on every side, and is the law of my being."

74 Th^j Journal of Speculative Ph'dosophij.

To sum up the prcrodiiii;- ury-unient, Berkeley's idealism is brictly this;
I posit ideas, by which I mean sensations. They compose the world of
my experience. But I find that somethinu; more is necessary to knowl-
edge ; the world would be annihilated if sensations were all that existed,
and so I infer spirits which feel the sensations. I am directly conscious
of my own spirit, and therefore liave a right to infer tliat other men are
conscious of their spirits. But this is not quite all that the world con-
tains. I have ideas which are certainly not the products of my own spirit,
because I have no control over them ; nor can they be the product of the
other finite spirits whose existence I have inferred, because they are spir-
its like my own, A^hich can no more control their ideas than I can control
mine. These ideas must, then, be the product of the activity of an infinite
spirit — a self-conscious subject of the universe. Since I have inferred the
existence of spirit, I must have soine knowledge of spirit, and yet I am
certain that I cannot have any idea of it. I do woi feel it. It must be,
then, tbat I am conscious of the relation which spirit bears to my sensa-
tions, and so have a notion of this relation. This notion is something
very different from the knowledge which is given to me by my sensations
or ideas.

The more rational idealist says : I posit ideas, by which I mean not
merely sensations, but those data of knowledge which have two sides —
a side of thought and a side of feeling — both of which are equally essen-
tial to ideas, and can be known only with reference to the rational whole
of which they form essential parts. These ideas constitute the world of
my experience. They are real for me, because the only test of reality is
the test of relation. But what have I posited in positing ideas as the
data of my knowledge ? Obviously, not merely their feeling side, which
is the element that the outer world contributes to them, but also their
thought side, which is the element that I contribute to them. I have thus
posited my own existence, and that of all beings which are capable of
having similar ideas. But this is not all that I have posited. I have
said that the condition of my having ideas is the fact that I recognize
them to be parts of a rational whole. I have thus posited a rational
whole in which these ideas exist — that is, I have posited a God in whom
we see all things. Vision in God is the logical result of my premises.
" We apprehend anything in so far as it is a manifestation of one perma-
nent reason — all that we mentally are we see in God."

Berkeley was the discoverer of a great truth. The fact that he saw but
a part of the consequences of his conception only illustrates how little any
one mind, however gifted, is permitted to contribute to the progress of
human thought. The great problems of the world are too vast to find

Notes and Discussions. T5

completion within the narrow limits of a single intelligence. But, if

Berkeley advanced only a short way upon the right road, he pointed out

to his successors the way which they should follow, and at the present

day mankind are still working under Bishop Berkeley's guidance.

Charles Wesley" Bradley.
Cambridge, Mass., June, 1880.

THE CONCORD SUMMER SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY.

July and August, 1881. — This institution seems to have been still
more successful the past season than the first : the attendance nearly
doubled, and receipts from fees proportionate. A gift from Mrs. Elizabeth
Thompson enabled the managers to build a hall for the better accommo-
dation of the school. The following circular gives all details necessary to
answer inquirers. We published last year's programme in this Journal
for January, 1880.

The Concord Summer School will open for a third term on Monday, July 11, 1881,
at 9 A. M., and will continue five weeks. Tbe lectures in each week \vill be eleven ; they
will be given morning and evening, except Saturday evenings, on the six secular days
(in the morning at 9 o'clock, and in the evening at 7.30), at the Hillside Chapel, near
the Orchard House.

The terms will be $3 lor each of the five weeks, but each regular student will be
required to pay at least $10 for the term, which will permit him to attend during three
weeks. The fees for all the courses will be $15. Board may be obtained in the village
at from $6 to $12 a week, so that students may estimate tiieir necessary expenses for
the whole term at $50. Single tickets, at 50 cents each, will be issued for the con-
venience of visitors, and these may be bought at the shop of H. L. Whitcomb, in Con-
cord, after July 1, 1881, in packages of twelve for $4.50, of six for $2.50, and of three
for $1.25. It is expected that the applications for course tickets will exceed the number
which can be issued. Any one to whom this circular is sent can now engage tickets
by making application, and sending with the applicat'on $5 as a guaranty. For those
who make this deposit, tickets will be reserved till the first day of July, 1881, and can
then be obtained by payment of the balance due. Course tickets at $15 will entitle the
holders to reserved seats, and $10 tickets will entitle to a choice of seats after the course
ticket holders have been assigned seats.

All students should be registered on or before July 1, 1881, at the office of the Sec-
retary in Concord. No preliminary examinations are required, and no limitation of
age, sex, or residence in Concord will be prescribed ; but it is recommended that persons
under eighteen years should not present themselves as students, and that those who
take all the courses should reside in the town during the term. The Concord Public
Library, of 16,000 volumes, will be open every day for the use of residents. Students,
coming and going daily during the term, may reach Concord from Boston by the Fitch-
burg Railroad, or the Middlesex Central ; from Lowell, Andover, etc., by the Lowell and
Framingham Railroad ; from Southern Middlesex and Worcester Counties, by the same
road. The Orchard House stands on the Lexington road, east of Concord village, ad-

76

The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

joining the Wayside estate, formerly the residence of Mr. Hawthorne. For fuller infor-
mation eoncerning the town and the school, we would refer applicants and visitors to
the " Concord Guide-Book " of Mr. George B. Bartlett.

Leotukes and Subjects, 1881.

Mr. a. Bronson Alcott, Dean of the Facul-
ty. Five Lectures on The Philosophy of
Life.

Mr. Alcott will also deliver the Salutatory and
Valedictory.

PROFESSOR Harris's first course.

1. Philosophy Distinguished from Opinion or

Fragmentary Observation ; the Miraculous
T8. the Mechanical Explanation of Things.

2. ]\'ofninalis7n of Locke and Hume; Pantheistic

liealism of Ilobbes^ Spinoza, Comte, and
Spencer vs. the Bealism of Christianity.

3. The. Influence of Nature upon the Human

Mind. The Emancipation of the Soul from
the Body.

Mr. E. C. Stedman will read a Poem at the

openiuf; eeeslon, July 11, 18S1.
Professor W. T. IIarkis. Five Lectures on

Philosophical Distinctions, and five on He-

geVs Philosophy.

4.

5.

-PHILOSOPHICAL DISTINCTIONS.

Sense-Impressions and Recollections vb. Mem-
ory and Reflection. Animal Ci'ies and Ges-
tures vs. Human Language.

The Metaphysical Categories used by Nat-
ural Science— Thing , Fact, Atom, Force,
Law, Final Cause or Design, Correlation,
Natural Selection, Reality, Potentiality and
Actuality.

professor Harris's second course. — hegel's philosophy.
1. HegeVs Doctiine of Psychology and Logic ; i 4

his Dialectic Method and System.

2. HegeVs Doctrine of God and the World— Cre-

ator and Created.

3. Hegel's Distinction of Man from Nature.

Two Kinds of Immortality, that of the
Species and that of the Individual.

HegeVs Doctrine of Providence in History.
Asia vs. Europe as furnishing the contrast
of Pantheism and Christianity.

HegeVs Theory of Fine Arts and Literature
as reflecting the development of Mali's Spir-
itual Consciousness.

Dr. H. K. Jones. Five Lectures on The Platonic Philosophy, and five on Platonism in its Re-
lation to Moder?i Civilization.

FIRST course. the PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY.

3

1. The Platonic Cosmology, Cosmogony, Physics,

and Metaphysics.

2. Myth ; The Gods of the Greek Mythology ;

The Ideas and Principles of their Worship,
Divine Providence, Free Will, and Fate.

Platonic Psychology ; The Idea of Conscience;
The Dcemon of Socrates.

4. The Eternity of the Soul, and its Preexistenee,

5. The Immortality of the Soul, and the Mor-

tality of the Soul ; Personality and Individ-
uality ; Metempsychosis.

second course. platonism in its RELATION TO MODERN CIVILIZATION.

1. The Social Genesis; The Church and the

State.

2. The Education and Discipline of Man ; The

Uses of the World we Live in.

Mr. Denton J. Snideb. Five Lectures on
Greek Life and Literature.

Mrs. Julia Ward Howe. Two Lectures : 1.
Philosophy in Europe and America. 2. The
Resrills of Kant.

Miss Elizabeth P. Peabody. Two Lectures :
1. Dr. Channlng ; 2. Margaret Fuller.

Mrs. E. D. Cheney. A Lecture on The Rela-
tion of Poetry to Science.

3. The Psychic Body and the Material Body of

Man; The Christian Resurrection.

4. The Philosophy of Law.

5. The Philosophy of Prayer, and the "Prayer

Gauge.'"

Kev. J. S. Kidney, D. D. Three Lectures on
The Philosophic Groundwork of Ethics.

Mr. S. H. Emery, Jr. Two Lectures on System
in Philosophy.

Rev. F. H. Hedge, D. D. A Lecture on Kant.

Mr. J. Elliot Cabot. A Paper on The Basis
of Kant s Doctrine of Synthetic Judgments.

President Noah Portbr. A Lecture on Kant-

Notes and Discussions.

77

Mr. F. B. Sanborn. Three Lectures on Litera-
ture and National Life: 1. Roman Litera-
ture ; 2. English and Oerman Literature ;
3. American Literature and Life.

Mr. H. G. O. Blake. ReadingB from Thoreau.

Mr. John Albek. Two Lectures on Faded
Meta'phors.

Rev. Dr. Bartol. A Lecture on The Trans-
cendent Faculty in Man.

Peogramme

JlTLT, 1881.

11th, 9 A. M.

10 A. M.

7.30 P. M.
12th, 9 A. M.

7.30 P. M.
13th, 9 A. M.

7.30 P. M.
14th, 9 A. M.

7.30 P. M.
15th, 9 A. M.

7.30 P. M.
16th, 9 A. M.
ISth, 9 A. M.

7.30 P. M.
19th, 9 A. M.

7.80 P. M.
20tb, 9 A. M.

7.30 P. M.
21st, 9 A. M.

7.30 P. M.
22d, 9 A. M.

7.30 P. M.
23d, 9 A. M.
25th, 9 A. M.

7.30 P. M.
26th, 9 A. M.

7.30 P. M.
27th, 9 A. M.

7..30 P. M.
28th, 9 A. M.

Mr. Alcott (Addrees).

Mr. Stedman (Poem).

Professor Harris.

Mrs. Cheney.

Professor Harris.

Dr. Jones.

Professor Harris.

Mr. Alcott.

Miss Peabody.'

Dr. Jones.

Professor Harris.

Mrs. Howe.

Mr. S. H. Emery, Jr.

Mr. Alcott.

Dr. Jones.

Mr. Blalie.

Dr. Jones.

Mr. S. H. Emery, Jr.

Dr. Kidney.

Mr. Albee.

Dr. Jones.

Mr. Albee.

Dr. Bartol.

Mr. Snider.

Professor Harris.

Dr. Kidney.

Mr. Snider.

Dr. Jones.

Professor Harris.

Mr. Alcott.

Dr. E. MuLFORD. A Lecture on The Philoso-
phy of the State.

Professor George 8. Morris. A Lecture on
Kant.

Professor J. W. Mears. A Lecture on Kant.

Professor John Watson. A Lecture on The
Critical Philosophy in its Relation to Real-
ism and Sensationalism.

OF Lectures.
July, 1881.

S8th, 7.30 P. M.

29th, 9 A. M.

7.30 p. M.

30th, 9 A. M.

Dr. Jones,
Mr. Snider.
Mr. Snider.
Dr. Kidney.

Concord, 1881.

BERKELEY,

August, 1881.

1st, 9 A. M. Dr. Jones.

7.30 p. M. Mr. Snider.
2d, 9 A. M. Dr. Hedge.

7.30 p.m. Mr. Cabot.i
3d, 9 A. M. Professor Watson.

7.30 P. M. Professor Harris.
4th, 9 A. M. Mr. Alcott.

7.30 P. M. Dr. Mears.
5th, 9 A. M. Professor Q. 8. Morris.

7.30 p. M. Mrs. Howe.
6th, 9 A. M. President Porter. The Kant

Centennial.
8th, 9 A. M. Professor Harris.

7.30 P. M. Mr. Sanborn.
9th, 9 A. M. Dr. E. Mulford.

7.30 P. M. Mr. Sanborn.
10th, 9 A. M. Dr. Jones.

7.30 P. M. Professor Harris,
nth, 9 A. M. Mr. Alcott.

7..30 P. M. Mr. Sanborn.
12th, 9 A. M. Dr. Jones.

7.30 P. M. Professor Harris.
13th, 9 A. M. Miss Peabody.'

11 A. M. Mr. Alcott.

A. BRONSON ALCOTT, Dean.
8. H. EMERY, Jr., Director.
F. B. SANBORN, Secretary.

THE NEW MATERIALISM, AND THE DIMINU-
TION OF LIGHT BY DISTANCE.

Editor Journal of Speculative Philosophy :

My DEAR Sir : Allow me to draw your attention to three subjects, one
in Physics and two in Metaphysics, all of them now occupying very gen-
erally the thoughts of the scientific, both in Europe and America, but on

I These Lecture* are announced conditionally, and may be withdrawn or changed.

T8 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

which very tow people tliink themselves competent to express an opin-
ion, much less to controvert, in regular discussion, the discoveries or
conclusions arrived at in connection with them. And I do not allow
myself to be deterred from making this request by the mere circumstance
of my own studies having been very intimately connected with two of
these subjects, nor by the circumstance that I am entirely opposed to the
conclusions of one of them. What we want on all of them is discussion.
These three subjects are: (1) Berkeley's grand doctrine that there is no
material Ding an sich — that all material substance consists wholly of
phenomena — that the Hard and the Heavy, and the Large and the Solid,
are all phenomenal — all things which exist by means of percipient nature.
(2) The New Materialism, sometimes called the French Materialism, ac-
cording to which nothing exists but thoughts, there being no thinker, no
percipient, no immaterial Ding an sich, no distinct entity that knows or
perceives any thing. (3) The fact, in Physics, that Light does not dilate,
enlarge, or expand (as air does when heated), which has been until quite
recently the universal conviction of the learned — that the solar system
has consequently an equal amount of the solar light in every portion of
it, even if, as was supposed, such expansion would not also have had this
efiect of equalizing this light throughout the system, and that all the
planets are equally illuminated, notwithstanding the great difference in
their distances from the sun ; a strange discovery to have been made at
so late a period of Physical Research.

I do not propose to do more here than offer the few remarks neces-
sary to exhibit the position of each question, for the purpose of directing
your attention to the great advantage which must result to scientific
progress from a prompt and thorough discussion of them in your coun-
try. For what we want everywhere on these three subjects is, as I have
said, discussion — not one-sided talk, not that sort of controversy in which
the answer and the question have a year, or ten years, or twenty years
between them — aye, in which very often half a century or a century in-
tervenes between the objection and the reply. That sort of discussion
is really none at all, as those well know who seek to avoid discussion and
adopt this as the best mode of doing so. Even a quarterly discussion is
very slow, and too slow. A quarterly journal, to be in this respect quite
effective, would need to publish the letters which pass between contro-
versialists during the intervals of its appearance ; and T can believe that
the facilities afforded by your great national journal of free and careful
thought will tempt some vigorous controversialists into this arena. As
for me, as far as I can be of use, I pledge myself to take whatever share
of such discussions you desire.

Notes and Discussions. 79

BERKELEY.

With regard to the Berkeleian proposition, it is true that this great
discovery is received by all the deepest thinkers on your side of the Atlan-
tic, as well as by almost all among us, and by most others who are at all
versed in such subjects — to say nothing of the four celebrated Germans,
whose doctrines, whether right or wrong, had confessedly no other starting
point, no other ground to rest upon except that proposition. What we now
want is its discussion and exposition for the millions everywhere. There
has been, it seems, but the one exposition of the doctrine since Berkeley
himself wrote, and this one has been made in Europe. Why has there been
not even one made in America ? In all countries those who write on this
doctrine seem to be only those who can criticise it and find fault with it.
Nor as yet, that I know of, has there been a single discussion of the sub-
ject in America — nothing but, as with us, some one writing from time to
time, to say he cannot understand what Berkeley meant — that in the
doctrine he sees nothing but nonsense ; that he finds nothing a priori
in it, as so many others profess to find — nay, that Berkeley himself came
at last to recognize the unreasonableness (the non-understandableness)
of his own doctrine, and in his old age renounced the whole thing. For
such, as you probably are aware, is one of the modes in which Berkeley's
proposition has been recently attacked in America as well as among us.
This mode of attack, however, would seem to have originated here. The
last and by far the ablest of Berkeley's critics on our side of the water,
and perhaps even, you will admit, far abler and far more laborious in his
researches and his efforts than any other that has ever written, is my dis-
tinguished friend. Professor Fraser, of Edinburgh. And he has declared
not only that he could give no rational account of the doctrine, nor see
any thing rational in it, but that Berkeley himself in his old age was in
the same predicament, and has in his last work fallen back into the old
theory of an occult matter — a material Ding an sick — that, in short, he
renounced his own grand discovery.

To show further the position of this question, I will, with your per-
mission, here cite from my Expository Edition of Berkeley the following
summary of what has been done to explain and defend the doctrine :

"Besides the prize of £100 offered in 1847-8, to our opponents,
then a considerable party, for any refutation upon which they should
themselves be able to agree within a year, which refutation they declared
themselves unable to produce ; and a further prize of £500, offered in
1850, to one able writer among them — Mr. Jobert — on the sole condition
that he should obtain the approbation of any three others of the party

80 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

for such arg-uments as he iniglit be able to adduce ; in which effort, how-
ever, he also was entirely unsuccessful, as he himself candidly states in the
treatise called ' Ture Sounds,' expressly written on that occasion by him-
self; besides these two prizes, I published, at the same time as the first,
a full explanation and defense of the doctrine in octavo, ' The Nature and
Elements of the External World ' — a work in which all objections were
fully discussed, aTid the first work, as far as I can learn, that, since Ber-
keley's own writings, has ever been written to point out the reasonable-
ness and a priori character of his doctrine. I gave another thorough ex-
position of the whole subject in 1870, in an article in the 'Contemporary
Review ' for the March of that year, with the title ' Hegel, and his Con-
nection with British Thought,' and one unassociated with the name of Ber-
keley, under the title of ' The Thinking Substance in Man,' in our ' An-
thropological Review' for May, 1865. I may also mention some discus-
sions abroad ; one, in the ' Halle'sche Zeitschrift,' with my able and la-
mented friend. Professor Ueberweg, left unfinished at his death ; another
with Baron Reichlin-Meldegg at the same time, in the same journal ; an-
other soon after in the ' Monatshefte,' of Berlin ; and one in the Roman
review, ' La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane,' with that highly distinguished
metaphysician and statesman, the Count Mamiani, who has done so much
for the philosophy of Italy and the philosophical literature of the w^orld ;
in all which writings and discussions will be found the fullest explanations
of every difficulty supposable in the doctrine" (p. 50-1, Editor's Intro-
duction).

THE NEW MATERIALISM.

The New Materialism is the subject adverted to, in a letter of mine,
a few years ago in "The Journal of Speculative Philosophy," with the
title, " Is Thought the Thinker ? " The Old Materialism was to the effect
that there is nothing existing but the Ding an sich of Kant, or what used
to be understood as the bearer of material qualities, but which itself had
no material qualities whatever; that everything which exists consists of
that ; and that this occult matter, when it is connected with a particular
shape, secretes Thought — that Thought of all kinds is one of its secre-
tions. Berkeley pointed out that this sort of matter does not exist at
all; that immaterial matter is a physical impossibility, and that the
matter wdth which we are acquainted — not which has, but which con-
sists wholly of, material qualities — has the nature of Thought, i. e., is
Thought — is a Phenomenon. But, this being seen, it was at once seen
that matter could not possibly perceive anything nor think ; for a
phenomenon could not think nor perceive anything. This was seen at
once. There was, therefore, no alternative but to recognize an imma-

Notes and Discussions. 81

terial entity as the nature which perceives and thinks; this was the
corollary of Berkeley's Proposition ; for that such a nature exists we
have upon even a higher evidence of consciousness than we have the fact
that the things themselves which are perceived, exist. And this nature
which perceives — this immaterial entity — is what we call " Spirit." Pro-
fessor Ferrier fully recognized the truth of Berkeley's proposition, and also
the truth of its natural corollary ; but he held that the Percipient and
the thing perceived — the Thought and the Thinker — were so essentially
united that they constituted in every case but one thing. He does not,
however, appear to have denied the distinct reality of the two elements
in this union, although he has left it very difficult to see how, according
to him, they could be separated. Hegel had previously, and from reason-
ing somewhat similar, arrived at the same union as Ferrier, not, however,
regarding it, like Ferrier, as a union of two distinct elements, but as
only one element, one nature, and this he called indiscriminately the Per-
cipient, or thing perceived — the Ego or its thoughts, frequently repeating
that they were one and the same thing : Das Denken ist das Ich. M.
Renouvier, in France, and simultaneously but quite independently Mr.
Shadworth Hodgson, in England, take up this theory of nature where
Hegel left it, and, making in it but a verbal alteration, tell us that Thought
is not the Thinker, that Thought is a phenomenon, and a phenomenon
does not think ; but that, nevertheless. Thought is the whole of nature —
the whole of what exists ; that, if we examine v/ith a little care, we shall
find there is no thinker wanted, and no trace in nature of a thinker or
perceiver. According to these writers, then, without any equivocation,
all is Thought — i. e., all is of the same essence as Matter — is, in short,
matter; nothing exists but the material substance. This is the New
Materialism ; the only difference between it and the Old being that those
who held the. Old held that their material substance could think and
perceive things and be conscious, Avhereas those who hold the New Ma-
terialism tell us that their •matter does not think or perceive anything,
and is not conscious ; and, moreover, that nothing can think or perceive,
and that there is nothing conscious. If the propounders of this New
Materialism could be induced to explain themselves, and thought their
doctrine could bear a little manipulation, a full discussion of it could not
fail to be attended with much interest and with great advantage to the
removal of metaphysical confusions ; for its living propounders are men
of no ordinary talent. Until they do so, however, it can only seem very
unreasonable to suppose that there can be perceptions without a nature
that perceives, or thoughts without a nature that can think. I may add
that Shadworth Hodgson is one of our ablest writers upon metaphysical
XV— 6

82 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

sul)jocts. His admirable work on "Time and Space" is well known,
wluoh was followed by the "Theory of Practice," in two volumes; and
in 1878 the "Philosophy of Reflection" appeared, which contains his
exposition of this New Materialism, also in two volumes.

THK DIMINUTION OF LIGHT BV DISTANCE.

The third subject of which I now write to you is wholly unconnected
with metaphysics. It is in every sense of the term a physical subject ; but
needs discussion as much as the other two to bring it thoroughly before
the minds of those who are not habitually engaged in such inquiries.
Until quite recently it has been the common idea of the learned and un-
learned alike, that the solar system is most unequally illuminated ; that
Neptune's light from the sun is nine hundred times less than ours ; that
portions still more remote from the sun than Neptune are almost in dark-
ness, and that Mercury's light would so dazzle us that we should there be
much in the same predicament as darkness would reduce us to — we should
see nothing. Now, through a large amount of false theories and false
reasoning, and the bigotry which too surely goes with these, it has been
at length discovered that, on the contrary, every part of the system has
the same degree of the solar light — that the most distant planets have as
strong a light as those nearest to the sun, although the sun is the sole
source of this light to all.

This equality of the solar light throughout the system is abundantly
proved, for the unsophisticated mind, by the fact that outside the at-
mosphere of the planets there is no medium that can diminish light to any
sensible degree at any distance from the sun. All the diminution of
light by distance, with which we are acquainted, is effected in and by a
medium depending entirely, as we experience, upon the length and den-
sity of the medium. But there is no medium perceptibly to diminish
light between the planets and the sun. The medium in that space is two
hundred and fifty millions of times — some say millions of millions of
times — less dense and less obstructive of light — less absorbent — than the
air we live in, and in which light is diminished so much at a very short
distance from the source. This fact is proved by the immense velocity
with which the planets move in that medium. So rare, in fact, is the
medium between the planets and the sun that many astronomers have
imagined there could be none. Such a diminution, then, as would result
from that attenuation, could not be discernible by sight like ours within
the limits of the system. This, which no scientific man disputes, is less
known to the less scientific public ; but even for them it can be attended
with no difficulty.

Notes and Discussions. 83

Why, then, it will be asked, have scientific men so long tauglit tliat !l

Neptune's liglit was only the nine hundredth part of that degree of the
solar light which reaches our orbit ?

The answer is, that they have hitherto supposed all light proceeding
from a single source to be diminished in two Avays at the same time — by
the medium and by the enlargement of the space to be illuminated. They
admit that the sun's light, in passing through the system, is not to any
perceptible degree diminished by the medium ; but until quite lately they
held — and some still hold — that light is diminished when the 'space to be
illuminated is enlarged ; and they professed to give the law for this
diminution — a law founded upon the reversal or inversion of a geometri-
cal law, and which is attended, as might be expected, with several extra-
ordinary blunders of its own ; but it is unnecessary here to speak of the
law ; it is enough that I should now speak only of the diminution itself
for which this law was assigned.

It was held, Jirst, that light is diminished when the illuminated space
is enlarged, and, secondly, that this space was enlarged in proportion to its
greater distance from the sun ; and certainly we can see that, if these two
assertions were true, the sun's light would become immensely diminished
in consequence of the vast extent of the solar system. The theory in-
volved in the first of these two statements, and which was adopted with-
out the least experiment, was, that light expands, enlarges itself, and
becomes more and more dilated, in proportion as the space around it is
enlarged ; that the quantity of light, therefore, given out by the sun, and
which, in the comparatively small spheres of space near him, would be
considerable, becomes very much attenuated and impoverished by the
time it has spread throughout the whole system.

Now, the only two things which I need here point out are, that this
Dilatation Theory for light can be shown, experimentally, to be a fiction ;
and that, even if it were true, it would still leave the solar light perfectly
equal throughout the system, for the illuminated area remains always the
same. If light sought its own equilibrium, as this theory pretends, and
expanded to the space it had to fill, there would be (and there Avould
have been from the origin of things) as much of it in one part of the solar
system as in another, day and night continually, without any modification
in any part.

But the Dilatation Theory is a fiction, as is at once manifest from
our most familiar experiences. " The light in a room, with folding doors
in each of its four walls, is not diminished when the folding doors are
successively opened into other rooms, in which other four rooms there
was previously no light. There is in such a case no ' diluting ' whatever,

84 Tlie Journal of Speculat'me Phllosoj)hy.

no thinning out or spreading going on, with regard to the light of the
first room. The hirge additional anioinit of light which, in Nature, we
here see to be the tnic result from the enlargement of the space — the
liglit now in the additional rooms — is supplied from the same single
source, without any of this thinning or expanding ; without withdrawing
from the center room the smallest amount of its original illumination."
(Sol. Ill of the Sol. Sys., p. 61.)

Although scientific men are now pretty generally convinced of the
truth of the fact here pointed out, the teaching of so many ages has pro-
duced a large amount of misapprehension which, like all error, can best
be removed by discussion, for which none are better qualified, on their
side of the question, than those few^ professional men who still remain
unconvinced, either in America or in Europe.

I may mention that, as in the case of my Berkeleian expositions, I,
on this occasion also, offered a prize for the purpose of making it clear to
the uninitiated that no one could disprove the facts I indicate. I offered
a prize of fifty guineas, through my publishers, to professional men in all
countries, for the best disproof of my facts, or best justification of their
own theory, which any four or five of them could agree upon among
themselves as suflicient, / requiring no further arbitration. It was open
for one year ; and, as in Berkeley's case, here also my opponents, as I
expected, were not able to send in a single essay.

Such are three questions now calling for discussion, and such the
position in Avhich each question stands.

I remain, my dear sir, faithfully yours,

CoLLYNS Simon.

EuGBT, England.

PHIL OSOPHEMES.

SELF-KNO WLED GE. 1
Know first thyself, then all things see,
God and thy fellow find in thee ;
Around, above, to thee is naught.
Save as thou findest in thy thought.
Deeper thy depth, sense more profound.
Than heart or head avail to sound.

THE HEART.
Heart, my heart, whose pulse's play

Repeats each moment's destiny,
Dost all thy life's terrestrial day

Dial, on time, my past eternity.

Notes and Discussions. 85

THE ONE.

One is One in holy Three,
Unlapsed in Self's duplicity.

CHARITY.

Her tenements and estates

She letteth fair and free,
Taketh nor rents nor rates,

Asketh not usury ;
Earth, air, and fire, the sea.

She loveth to dispense,
Nor stints necessity,

Nor doleth Providence.

MANHOOD.

Success, success ! to thee, to thee.
As to a god, men bend the knee ;
The gold alone the gold can buy.
Manhood 's the sterling currency.

INNOCENCE.

Blest Pair 1 all beautiful, unblamed.
Naked are they, chaste, unashamed.
No fruits forbidden them to taste,
Till shame despoils the sweet repast ;
Life's brimming cup, if once we spill,
Time's longest term shall not refill.

FRE-EXIS TENCE.

Alas ! how little thought is spent
On our birth-song, preeminent ;
Fond recollections, vague and vast,
Glad tidings of our ancient past !
This did the blest Messias teach.
And this his ministers must preach.

ATONEMENT.

Love loves to suffer, sacrifice ;
He suffers so, and stoops to rise.
His head upon his breast he bends,
And, resurrect, to heaven ascends.

DEATH.

0 Death I thou utterest deeper speech,

A tenderer, truer tone,
Than all our languages can reach.

Though all were voiced in one.

86 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

■ •

Tliy };lanco is deep, ami .far beyond
All that our eyes can see,

Assures to fairest hopes and fond
Their immortality.

INFANCY.

Nurseling, underneath the sky.

Finds itself a shapen I ;

Feels itself, through all it sees,

Loveliest of mysteries.

Yet wondering why its real age

So blotted is on time's strange page,

And all life long with ceaseless fret

Conning the puzzling alphabet.

HUMAN LIFE.

Pause and reflect; — benignant Fate

Wreathes not with flowers life's narrow gate.

Rather her pleasant plots adorns

With hedge-rows round of prickly thor.is ;

Hard were our lot, esteemed severe,

Were it all smiles without one tear.

PARADISE.

Up, onward, and ever,

Be thy brave endeavor.

Yet know thou shalt not find

Paradise, save in thy mind ;

Forth from self thou canst not flee,

Thou tak'st bale or bliss with thee.

THE TRINITY.

The Three he saw, the One adored.
The Father, Son, Inspiring Word,
Blest Three in One, while One in Three,
In undivided unity.

CHRISTIANITY.

The gracious faith, our heart's felt need.
Love's sovereign grace fused in our creed ;
Its genial truths set forth in lovely guise.
And read anew with newly chrisstened eyes :
What were Christ Jesus' life, and gospel sweet,
If not in loving hearts he fixed his holy seat ?

Notes and Discussions. 8T

HUXOER.

" Take this, my child," the Father said —
" This globe I give thy mind for bread."
Eager he seized the proffered store,
The bait devoured, then asked for more.

THE SPHINX.

Gaze not upon this Charmer's face

Iq an unguarded hour.
Lest, caught and clasped in dire embrace,

Thyself the Maid devour,
Unless thou straight apply the key
That opes her fearful mystery.

SINGLENESS.

When thou approachest to the one.

Self from thyself thou first must free,
Thy cloak duplicity cast clean aside,

And in the Being's Being be.

' FACE AND SURFACE.

Pure mind is face.

Brute matter, surface all,
As souls, immersed in space.

Ideal rise, or idol fall. ,

ORGANIZATION.

Forth from the chaos dawns in sight
The globe's full form in orbed light ;
Beam kindles beam, kind mirrors kind,
Nature's the eyeball of the mind ;
Its fleeting pageant tells for naught,
Till shaped in mind's creative thought.

LIFE.

Life omnipresent is,

All round about us lies.

To fashion forth itself

In thought and ecstasy.

In wonder and surprise ;

Each thing with life is fraught,

Matter precipitate of thought ;

Round the wide world thought ceaseless runs,

Its circuit suited to superior suns ;

From mote and mountain hastes to flee,

Darting at its infinity.

88 Tlie Journal of Speculative Philosop/uj.

ADAM.
Man omnipresent is,

All round himself he lies,
Osiris sproatl al)roiul

Upstiirliig in all eyes;
Nature his globed thought.
Without him she were natight ;
Cosmos from chaos were unspoken.
And God bereft of visible token.

THE SEEMma.

The mind's sphere

Is not here ;

The ideal guest,

With ceaseless quest,

Pursues the best.

The very better,

Meanwhile'her fetter,

Her prescient desire,

Higher and still higher.

Is ever fleeing

Past Seeming to Being ;

Nor doth the sight content itself with seeing ;

While forms emerge, they fast from sense are fleeing ;

Things but appear, to'vanish into Being.

A. Bronson Alcott.
Concord, Mass.

DR. WILLIAM JAMES ON GREAT MEN AND GREAT THOUGHTS

VEE8US ENVIRONMENT.

In the Atlantic Monthly for October; 1880, Dr. James contributed
an article on the subject of the production of genius by the environment.
Our readers are familiar with the clearness and cogency of this writer
through his interesting articles in this Journal on " The Brute and the
Human Intellects," " Mr. Spencer's Definition of Mind," " The Spatial
Quale," etc., and with similar articles that he has published in M. Ribot's
Revue Philosopkique, and in " Mind " (the great English organ of psy-
chology and philosophy). The article under present consideration in the
Atlantic seems to us the best of all that has come from his pen. We copy
two paragraphs from the article containing summary statements of his
position :

"The evolutionary view of history, when it denies the vital impor-
tance of individual initiative, is, then, an utterly vague and unscientific
conception, a lapse from modern scientific determinism into the most

JS'^otes and Discussions. S9

ancient Oriental fatalism. The lesson of the analysis that we have made
(even on the completely deterministic hypothesis with which we started)
forms an appeal of the most stimulating sort to the energy of the individ-
ual. Even the dogged resistance of the reactionary conservative to
changes which he cannot hope entirely to defeat, is justified, and shown
to be effective. He retards the movement ; deflects it a little bv the con-
cessions he extracts ; gives it a resultant momentum, compounded of his
inertia and his adversaries' speed ; and keeps up, in short, a constant
lateral pressure, which, to be sure, never heads it round about, but brings
it up at last at a goal far to the right or left of that to which it would
have drifted had he allowed it to drift alone."

" The plain truth is that the ' philosophy ' of evolution (as distin-
guished from our special information about particular cases of change) is
a metaphysic creed, and nothing else. It is a mood of contemplation, an
emotional attitude, rather than a system of thought ; a mood which is old
as the world, and which no refutation of any one incarnation of it (such as
the Spencerian philosophy) will dispel ; the mood of fatalistic pantheism,
with its intuition of the one and all, which was, and is, and ever shall be,
and from whose womb each single thing proceeds. Far be it from us to
speak slightingly here of so hoary and mighty a style of looking on the
world as this. What we at present call scientific discoveries had nothing
to do with bringing it to birth, nor can one easily conceive that they
should ever give it its quietus, no matter how logically incompatible with
its spirit the ultimate phenomenal distinctions which science accumulates,
should turn out to be. It can laugh at the phenomenal distinctions on
which science is based, for it draws its vital breath from a region which
— whether above or below — is at least altogether different from that in
which science dwells. A critic, however, who cannot disprove the truth
of the metaphysic creed, can at least raise his voice in protest against its
disguising itself in ' scientific ' plumes. I think that all who have had the
patience to follow me thus far will agree that the Spencerian ' philosophy '
of social and intellectual progress is an obsolete anachronism, reverting to
a pre-Darwinian type of thought, just as the Spencerian philosophy of
' force,' effacing all the previous phenomenal distinctions between vis viva,
potential energy, momentum, work, force, mass, etc., which physicists
have Avith so much agony achieved, carries us back to a pre-Galilean
age."

Dr. E. Gryzanowski (known to us by his able articles in the North
American Meview) has written from Leghorn a letter of recognition to the
author, the following extracts from which we are permitted to use :

90 The Journal of S])eculative Philosophy.

"Wliatevar I miy liivo written seven or ei:z;ht years ii2;o, I have uow the liveliest
ni»ral and intellectual interest in the triumph of that truth which is embodied in your
thesis. I need not disown the passage quoted by you, but, if I were to write it again
to-day, I should not leave it without the correction pointed out by you ; tliat is to say,
I should lay greater stress on the germ and its typical potentialities than on the soil
and its purely nutrient capabilities. I not only agree witli you on the subject, but I
almost feel inclined to go a little farther than you, and to reinstate spontaneity in all
the rights and honors it used to enjoy before the advent of materialism. I would, with
you, say : There is a soil, or menstruum, of outward circumstances, which must be
under the sway of known and knowable, laws of causation. There are, imbedded in
this soil (or immersed in this menstruum), tlie germs (or ferments) of typical individua-
tion, which seoii to be under the sway of unknown and mostly unknowable laws of
cellular (not molecular) causation, and, I would add, the causal jon'ws of these germs or
ferments — /.. e., that which, though unknown itself, manifests itself as spontanecus dif-
ferentiation, and wliich,/))-o kmto, negates causation and can modify it or bid it stop —
this causal prius must belong to a thii-d si)lK're, not of causation and necessity, nor of
absolute arbitrariness, but of self-determination {selbst Bestrmmung). God has been
called the causa suL the point where cause and ett'ect coincide. But we need not go so
f;ir ; what we want is the rehUion of cause and effect in the lower regions of finite and
imperfect selbst Bestimmung, called human ethics. Here I maintain (inducting, not
postulating it) that, if the reign of law is absolute in physico-chemical causation (so
that effect can be calculated from cause, and cause inferred from effect), and if the
reign of law begins to be, to say the least, ' parliamentary ' in the world of organic
evolution (which is a world of instincts and emotions), remaining absolute only in so
far as the cell, though autonomous as form, is subject to the law as a piece of molecu-
lar matter — his Majesty becomes a mere citizen in the world of conscious volition,
which would be a world of free-will or of freedom, if the willing agents did not continue
to be animals, and, as animals, pieces of matter, so that necessity, contingency, and
freedom must coexist in these complex beings.

" Or thus : If, in the inorganic world, we have the equation causa = ejf'ectus, so that
cause and effect are mutually calculable, we have in the organic world the inequality
causa < effectus ; we see the whole effect, but only part of the cause, viz., the physico-
chemical part. To make here, too, the cause equal to the effect, we must aiid to it
the physiological fictions c.Tlled soul, life, instinct, emotion. And, thirdly, we have
in the sphere of self-conscious volition nothing but apparent effects, the cause being
evanescent, inconceivable, irrational. Both from the materialistic and from the ration-
alistic (or utilitarian) standpoint, these effects (when moral actions) appear fofiiish
and insane. How can there be law and causation in morals ? In the name of what
logic or common sense must I practice self-denial, altruism, heroism, martyrdom, Mitldd
[compassion] (which is Leid [pain] not pleasure), not to speak of honesty, frugality,
and other devices of human torment and botheration? Was it ever easy to do one's
duty, and does not this world belong to the strong, the clever rogue, the surviving fittest,
rather than to the guileless, kind, and honest man ? That which avenges itself always,
and for which there is no forgiveness on earth, is the error of calculation — the error of
judgment, not the curmudgeon's sins. If, then, we are told to be altruistic rather than
egoistic, bad reckoners rather than cceurs mediants, if we are told, when wronged or
insulted, not to chase, bite, scratch, or kill our enemy, but to forgive him (so that his
action, which would be a cause of certain effects called revenge, shall be no cause at

Notes and Discussions. 91

all) — these commandments imply that we, as morally quasi-free agents, belong to a
sphere in which the worldng of causation may be stopped by an autonomous force
called ' will.'

"This world, as a mass of metals and gases, is an indifferent world, neither good nor
bad. It became a bad world through the advent of organic life, where passion and re-
venge reign supreme, and none but the fittest survive. And it continues to be a bad
world, even after the advent of man, who can choose between revenge and mercy, be-
tween good and evil. It continues to be a bad world, not because man always chooses
the evil, but because, when choosing the good, he ceases to fit into this world, he ceases
to be the fittest in the realm of causation, and causation destroys him, slowly or quickly,
as the case may be.

"Free-will, as a moral agency, is and must be at war with causation, i e., must be
able to act on principles which are not those of pure reason.

"What stands behind the will we do not know, but, if pressed for an answer, I
should not consider myself defeated by accepting Mr. Spencer's deputy-god, or anything
of that kind.

"Mr. Spencer, I dare say, admits the existence of such things as axioms of pure rea-
son, drawn not from experience by induction, nor from principles by deduction, but a
priori. The deniers of free-will are, consequently, in the same necessity of seeing in
pure reason or in the ' a priori ' either a quality of matter or a ' deput3'-god.' They
all believe in pure reason ; but, if pure reason has its a priori, why should not free-will
have its a priori of intuitive axiomatic obligation ?

"I confess I cannot get on in philosophy, or arrive at any comprehensive world view,
without the assumption (inducted, not postulated) of such a third sphere of (condi-
tioned) spontaneity. This mechanizing, mathematicizing, and calculating of every thing
in the world, from the unseen heroisms of private life to railway accidents, and from
the death of Jesus of Nazareth to the yearly numbei' of misdirected letters, is begin-
ning to be tiresome and provoking. In Mr. Spencer's sociological world there is no
room either for self consciousness, or for genius, or for morals. In it all action, whether
in speech or motion, is reflex action, and the causes of obligation, in so far as this
obligation transcends calculable utility, must be sought in folly inherited or acquired.
I, therefore, cling to my belief in three worlds :

" 1. The inorganic w^orld : reign of lav/ and necessity.

" 2. The organic world : reign of law and necessity, js/ms dawn of spontaneity (in form
of individual life, instincts, spontaneous variation).

" 3. The human world : reign of law and necessity (in so far as man is a mass of mat-
ter), plus dawn of spontaneity (in so far as man is an animal), plus dawn of free volition
(in so far as man can defy nature and causation, and can reluse to be guided by pure
reason alone).

" Each of these spheres has its own evolution. The survival of the fittest remains
true in all, but the standard of fitness changes, and, in the Christian religion, the lowly
and the weak become the terror of the strong.

" People have tried hard to reconcile evolutionism with morality, the survival of the
fittest with the institution of hospitals and almshouses, etc. But it is useless to try the
impossible, and I rejoice, for it is this very irreconcilableness which will sooner or later
free us from the incubus of materialism. The dilemma being either materialism with-
out morality or morals with matcriahsra relegated to its proper sphere, mankind will, I
think, in the long-run pronounce in favor of the second horn, and if it does not (for
there is no telling), it will go to the dogs, and below the dogs to molecules, and below
the molecules to atoms and chaos."

92 The Journal of Speculative PhllosopTiy .

THE CENTENNIAL OF KANT'S " ERITIEy

Professor Mears, of Hamilton College, has agitated tlie question of
a formal celebration of the centennial of the publication of Kant's Kritik
der Reinen Vernunft^ as appears by the following circular. We are happy
to add that his efforts have met with success. The 6th of July, 1881, at
Saratoga, is fixed for the date of the meeting. We publish a full pro-
gramme of the meeting in this number.

" Dear Sir: I herewith inclose a copy of an article printed in the ' Pcnn Monthly'
of December, 1880, to which I ask your attention. If the proposed celebration strikes
you favorably, will you not signify your approval of it to the undersigned as early as
possible ? And if you are disposed personally to aid in the affair by being present and
by reading a paper on some aspect of the subject, will you not communicate your in-
tention at least by the 15th of April next?

"The time and place of meeting remain to be fixed, but the early summer would
doubtless be the best time, and the place would probably be somewhere in New England
or New York State. Your own opinion on the subject is respectfully solicited.

"John W. Mears.

" 'Next year (1881) will complete the century since this remarkable production was
given to the world. It made an epoch in the history of philosophy, not only in Ger-
many, but all over the thinking world. It revealed and vindicated the inherent power
of the mind, and the independent activity of thought to a degree and in a manner
never before attempted. The thoroughness, depth, and logical character of the author's
investigations may be said to have introduced the rigorous method of science into meta-
physics, and delivered it forever from the reproach of vagueness and dogmatism. All
the thinking of centuries preceding seemed, in contrast to the " Kritik,'' to be shallow
and purblind. All the thinking that has followed it has been amenable to a higher
standard of judgment, and must render a stricter account of its attitude toward those
fundamental conditions of knowledge of which Kant has shown that thought cannot
legitimately rid itself. No one dare attempt to construct a system of pliilosophy to-
day without reference to the work accomplished by Kant. He cannot be passed by a
flank movement ; his lines extend across the whole field ; his positions must be met
and fairly captured, or incorporated into and harmonized with the new principles of the
proposed new system.

'"Wliat this wonderful speculative reformer accomplished for the thinking of Ger-
many can only be learned by a survey of the progress and development of German
philosophy during the century. The whole of that mighty movement has been the
direct outgrowth of the " Kritik." And in these last days, after speculation has wan-
dered widely and wildly from the original path, the countrymen of Kant are coming
back to the soberer and solider principles of the "Kritik."

"'The thinking of Scotland has been immensely widened through the influence of
Kant. In the greatest represent itive of the Scottish school. Sir William Hamilton, the
Kantian spirit and tendency struggle constantly with the older and simpler tendency
derived from Reid. Almost every thing in Hamilton which is stirring and stimulating,
which widens the view, which is disciplinary and tonic, which is fresh and original, may

Notes and Discussions. 93

be called Kantian, either in its source or in its spirit. His school, if we may speak of
such, is Scoto-Gerraau, just as Kant himself by extraction was.

" 'Dr. McCosh, in one of his recent writings, has proposed to the new generation of
thinkers, especially in America, the problem of discrimination between the good and
the bad in Kant. That there has been not a little to condemn in Kant (especially the
proton pseudos of the "Kritik," that the primary principles of knowledge may pos-
sibly be true only for human minds), the writer would unhesitatingly admit. But the
honored President of Princeton College appears disposed to recognize extremely little
of good in Kant, and, perhaps, would discourage any considerable awakening of interest
in the study of the "Kritik" in our American colleges.

" ' For our part, we believe the general American mind has arrived at a stage of
thought and has attained a capacity of speculation where it can profitably occupy itself
with the problems of the "Kritik." Nor will any one doubt that the national mind
needs to be pinned down to close thinking, not only upon such topics, but needs also
to acquire that habit of close thinking on all topics which will be cultivated best of
all by the study of the " Kritik." Using the experience of a whole century, chiefly that
of Germany, as a test of the good and bad in Kant, our youth, with little peril to impor-
tant principles, can enjoy the incomparable advantjges of the study of this great
author. I cannot doubt that the " Kritik " itself ought to form part of the curriculum
of the higher classes in every college; they ought not to be put off with lectures, criti-
cisms, or scanty abstracts, but the author himself, with all his difficulties and in his
own way of stating and deducting his principles, should be put into their hands in a
faithful translation.

" ' The object of this paper is to propose to all interested in the study of the higher
problems of philosophy in this country a celebration of the cmUennial of KanVs
^^ KritiJc''^ some time in the year 1881. It is believed that there are enough so inter-
ested to secure success, if not to give eclat, io such an occasion, provided their attention
can be turned to the subject. There are thinkers among us competent to handle every
aspect of the critical philosophy which would demand attention. Their essays and
discussions v>'ould give an impulse to higher philosophical studies, and would elevate
the standard of instruction in those branches. The celebration would help to establish
or diffuse more widely among us those fundamental and impregnable principles of the
spiritual philosophy which are so powerfully assailed by the materialistic tendencies of
our time. It would help to concentrate, crystallize, and organize an American school,
or, if not that, a recognized American sentiment favorable to the cultivation of exact
thinking in pure metaphysics, parallel to the demand for exact calculation and experi-
ment in natural science, vindicating and demonstrating the logical priority and superior
comprehension and depth of the former to the latter.

" ' Such a centennial celebration might be made an adjunct to some of those regular
educational gatherings which are held every summer. Possibly it might come off at
Concord, but the movement would gain immensely in dignity and efficiency if it could
be carried on independently of every other interest.

" 'While the work of the celebration ought to be substantially the presentation of
the Kantian barrier to all the loose and materialistic thinking of our time, it ought not
to exclude the opposition to Kant on metaphysical grounds. It would indeed be essen-
tial to such an occasion that the defects and errors of the "Kritik," and the wrong
tendencies and great evils which grew out of it, either by misconception or exaggera-
tion, or as legitimate results, of Kant's own teachings, should be fully exhibited. The
purpose of the celebration should not be the indiscriminate eulogy of the famous

94 The Journal of Speculatim Philosophij .

thinker, but the attainment, as nearly as possible, of a just estimate of his work. Thus
guanleil, tliere is no good reason to fear a recurrence of the long train of evil conse-
quences which followed the original acceptance of the Kantian philosophy in Germany,
The age and lime would not admit of such a glaring anachronism.

"'Afew of the topics which might be ])ro(itably treated on such an occasion would

be:

"' 1. The higher problems of philosophy.

" "1. The utility of the study of Kant, its relations to the sensationalist and ma-
terialist schools of to-day.

"' 3. Kant and rationalism: evils and defects of his teachings.

" ' 4. K.int and the Scottish schools. Is a return from Hamilton to Reid logically
aduiissible?

'" 5. Fortunes of Kant in Great Britain and America.

" ' 6. Revival of Kantian studies in Germany.

" ' 7. Is Realism the teaching of the " Kritik ? "

" ' 8. Can the " Kritik" be foirly treated from the ground of Ilegelianism ?

'"9. The interdependence of empirical and of metaphysical knowledge. The har-
monizing of divergent tendencies of thought.

'" 10. The first and second editions of the "Kritik."

" ' 11. Metaphysics as a science and metaphysics in the sciences.

'" 12. Is a return from Hegel to Kant logically admissible?

"'13. Historical relations of the " Kritik," before and after. Under this topic an
immense field is opened, which it would be useless to attempt to cover.

"'14. A compendious statement of the main principles of the "Kritik," in the
nature of an introduction to the study of the work itself.

" ' Many more suggestions might be added, as to topics to be discussed, as to the
place of meeting, and as to the disposition of the valuable material which would then
be accumulated. If published in a volume, it would not only form one of the best in-
troductions to the study, but would be no unworthy monument to the hundredth anni-
versary of the appearance of the "Kritik."

"'John W. Meaks, D. D.,

'""Albert Barnes" Department of Philosophy, Hamilton College, Clinton, N. Y.' "

PEOGEAMME OP THE CENTENNIAL OF KANt's " KRITIK."

It will be celebrated in the parlor of Temple Grove, in Saratoga, New York, on the
6th of July, 1881. The exercises, according to the following programme, will com-
mence at nine o'clock a. m. :

I. The Lord's Prayer, Book of Common Prayer. II. Organization. III. Reading of
Correspondence. IV. Opening Address, " Significance of the Centennial," Professor
John W. Mears, D. D., Hamilton College. Y. " The Higher Problems of Philosophy,
Introductory to the Study of the ' Kritik,' " Professor George S. Morris, Johns Hopkins
University. YI. " Can the ' Kritik ' be fairly treated from the Ground of Hegelianism ? "
AYilliam T. Harris, LL. D., Editor of the " Journal of Speculative Philosophy." YII.
" Kant's Distinction between the Speculative and the Practical Reason," President Bas-
com, ^Yisconsin University. YIII. " The Present Influence of Kant upon Philosophic
Progress," Professor Josiah Royce, University of California. IX. " The Antimonies in
the Light of Modern Science," Lester F. Ward, United States Geological Survey.

Papers are also expected from Messrs. Halstead and Burt, Fellows of Johns Hopkins

Notes and Discussions. 95

University, and others ; while the presence and cooperation of President Porter, of Yale ;
President Anderson, of Rochester University ; Professor North, of Hamilton College ;
Professor Torrey, of the University of Vermont ; President Dodge, of Madison Univer-
sity ; Mr. James M. Libbey, of the " Princeton Review ; " Rev. Dr. Millard, of Syracuse ;
and many others, are confidently expected.

The New York State Teachers' Association, meeting in Saratoga, July 5th, 6th, and
^th, through their President, Professor Jerome Allen, of the State Normal School, Gen-
eseo, oifers to the recognized attendants upon the Kant Centennial the same privileges,
" in all respects," as are enjoyed by themselves, in respect to railroad and steamboat
fares and hotel accommodations. Your presence is cordially invited.

John W. Meaks.

KANTS ''CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON:'

The following article, wliich appeared in the Boston Advertiser^ from
the pen of Mr. Edwin D. Mead (whose translation of Hegel on Jacob
Boehme for this Journal will be remembered), is so appropriate to the
time, and so full of interesting information, that we reprint it entire :

It is just a hundred years since the appearance of Kant's " Critique of Pure Rea-
son," the most revolutionizing work in the whole history of modern thought. The
centennial is being observed with great devotion in the scientific world of Germany,
and will be appropriately recognized everywhere. The Concord School of Philosophy
announces a special Kant week, and the reviews will all be stimulated to active discus-
sion of the great thinker's varied work and influence. The " Critique of Pure Reason "
is, of course, Kant's magnum opus, but it is only one of the three constituent parts of
his philosophical system. It is quite impossible to understand Kant's purpose and
significance without reading the "Critique of Practical Reason" and the " Critique of
Judgment," especially the former. In the Kant-Cyklus, arranged for the last Semester
by the Philosophical Society of the University of Leipzig, in commemoration of the
centennial, the thesis maintained by one of the essayists was that the principal aim of
the "Critique of Pure Reason " was the establishment of a moral theology. This con-
ception, not a new one, to be sure, is not without very much reason. The " Critique of
Practical Reason" is the exposition of this moral theology, and the most important
ethical work altogether which has appeared in modern time, or, perhaps, in any time.
It is the positive portion of Kant's system and the foundation of the philosophy of
Fichte. Yet it is only within a year or two that this great work has become accessible
to the English reader, through Mr. Abbott's careful translation. The " Critique of
Judgment" has never yet been translated, though it is understood that a competent
scholar is engaged in the work, and we may hope presently to have a fairly complete
English edition of Kant's greater works. There are translations of the "Prolego-
mena," of the " Metaphysics of Ethics," and of the " Religion of Reason " — good trans-
lations, for the most part, but students do not seem to be so well aware of this as they
should be. As to Kant's other works, so little is generally known that the complete
list of bis writings, w4iich follows, will, it is hoped, be read just now with interest by
many. The writer does not know of any such list in English. Kant's intellectual ac-
tivity extended to almost every province, and in politics, {esthetics, and the natural sci-

96 Tlie Joxirnal of Speculative Philosophy.

enccs, as well as in ethics, religion, and nictapliysies, he has written what will las;t for-
ever. The dates of the publiealion of the various works are given for the convenience
of those who may be interested in tracing the development of Kant's thought. Kant
was born in 17-4, and was oons('(iuently fiffy-scvcn years old wlun the "Criti(iuo of
Pure Reason " appeared. Of all the works which he published before 1781, that which
probably attracts most attention to-day is the essay upon the " Theory of the Heavens,"
published in 1755, in which the nebular hypothesis was propounded and maintained
l'or(.'i!)ly and in detail. The theory of Laplace should be called the theory of Kant,
and, indeed, is beginning to be called so by many scientilic men. Of the other smaller
works of Kant, none is more remarkable than that entitled " Eternal Peace," which
was the first loud note of internationalism, and contains a distinct programme for the
" federation of the world."

1747. Thoughts upon the true estimate of Working Forces, and a consideration of
the arguments of Herr von Leibnitz and others "in the mechanical controversy, with
preliminary remarks upon the force of bodies generally.

1754. A consideration of the question, Whether the earth, in its revolution around
its axis, has undergone any change ?

1754. The question, Whether the earth grows old, physically considered?

1755. A General History of Nature and Theory of the Heavens, or an Inquiry into
the Constitution and Mechanical Origin of the Universe, from the standpoint of the
Newtonian Laws.

1755. Some brief remarks upon Fire

1755. A New Examination of the First Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge.

1756. Upon the Causes of the Earthquakes from which the western parts of Eu-
rope suffered toward the end of the preceding year.

1756. Descriptive Account of the most remarkable incidents in connection with the
Earthquake which shook a large portion of the earth at the end of 1755.
1756. Supplementary remarks upon the recent Earthquakes.
1756. On the use of a Geometrical Metaphysics in Natural Science.

1756. New Observations, explanatory of the theory of the Winds.

1757. Outline of a proposed course of lectures in Physical Geography, with a brief
appendix upon the question. Whether the reason why the west winds in this section are
damp is that they have swept over a great stretch of sea ?

1758. A New Theory of Motion and Rest, with a consideration of the effects of the
theory upon the first principles of natural science.

1759. Some brief observations upon Optimism.

1760. Thoughts upon the untimely death of Herr Job. Friede. von Funk, in a letter
to the mother of the deceased.

1762. A Demonstration of the subtile deceptiveness of the four syllogistic forms.

1763. A Letter to Fraulein Charlotte von Knobloch upon Swedenborg.

1763. An Attempt to introduce the conception of Negative Quantities into Phi-
losophy.

1763. The only possible ground for a Demonstration of the existence of God.

1764. Opinion concerning the adventurer, Jan Pawlikowicz Zdomozyskich Komar-
nicki.

1764. A Study of the Diseases of the Head.

1764. Observations upon the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime.

1764. An Inquiry into the soundness and clearness of the principles of Natural

Notes and Discussions. 97

Theology and Morals ; in answer to a question proposed by the Berlin Royal Academy
of Sciences in 1763.

1765. Programme of Lectures for the Winter Semester of 1765-66.

1766. Dreams of a Clairvoyant, illuminated by Dreams of Metaphysics.
1768. Upon the ground of distinguishing particular divisions in Space.

1770. Upon the Form and Principles of the world of Sense and the world of
Thought.

1771. Review of Moscati's work upon the difference in the structure of Men and
Animals.

1775. Upon the different Races of Men.

1776-78. Essays and Reviews upon Basedow's Philanthropin.
1781. (Critique of Pure Reason.

1783. Prolegomena to every future Metaphysic which can possibly rise in the form
of a science.

1783. A Review of Schulz's Attempt to establish an Ethical System for all men
without distinction of Religion.

1784. Idea of a Universal History from a cosmopolitan standpoint.

1784. An answer to the question : What is Aufkldrung .«'

1785. Reviews of Herder's Ideas upon the Philosophy of the History of Mankind.
1785. Upon Volcanoes in the Moon.

1785. Upon the injustice of Publishers' Piracies.

1785. A Scientific Principle of Classification for the Races of Men.

1785. First Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics.

1786. Conjectural Beginning of Human History.

1786. Review of Gottl. Hufeland's Inquiry into the Principles of Natural Law.

1786. What is it to fix one's latitude in thought (sicli im Denken orientiren)?

1786. The Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science.

1786. Remarks upon Ludw. Heinr. Jakob's Criticism of Mendelssohn's Morgen-
stunden.

1788. Upon the employment of Teleological Principles in Philosophy.

1788-91. Seven short essays: Is the Fact of Thinking an Experience? Upon Mira-
cles ; Refutation of Problematical Idealism ; On Special Providence; On Prayer ; On the
Momentum or Velocity of Bodies at the First Instant of Falling ; On the Formal and
Material Significance of Certain Words.

1788. Critique of Practical Reason.

1790. Critique of the Judgment.

1790. Upon a Discovery by which an already existing Critique of Pure Reason shall
enable us to dispense with all new ones.

1790. Upon Fanaticism and the means of guarding against it.

1791. Upon the Miscarriage of all philosophical attempts in Theodicy.
1793. Religion within the limits of Reason.

1793. Upon the common saying: A thing may be good in Theory, but not in Prac-
tice.

1794. Something upon the influence of the Moon on the Weather.
1794. The End of all things.

1794. Upon Philosophy in general : an introduction to the Critique of Judgment.

1795. Eternal Peace : a philosophical scheme.

1796. Upon the Organ of the Soul: a letter to Sommering.

XY— r

98 The Journal of Speculative Philosoplnj .

1796. Upon a certain genteel Tone which lias recently niiule itself apparent in Phi-
losophy.

1796. Settlement of a Mathematical Controversy which rests upon a misundcr-
staiulins.

17".t6. The Announcement of the approaching Conclusion of a Treaty of Eternal
?eace in Philosophy.

1797. The Metaphysics of Ethics. First Part: Metaphysical Principles of Law.
Second Part : Metaphysical Principles of Morals.

1797. Upon an alleged right to Lie from motives of Humanity.

1798. Upon Book-making and Publishing: two Letters to Friedrich Nicolai.

1798. The Conflict of the Faculties. [This work contains the well-known essay
upon the Power to overcome bodily affections and disorders by the pure exercise of the
Will]

1798. Anthropology, Pragmatically considered.

1800. Prefatory note to Lachmann's Examination of the Kantian Philosophy of
Religion.

1800. Prefatory note to Mielcke's Lithuanian Dictionary.

1800. Logic: A Handbook for use with Lectures. Revised for publication, at the
author's request, by Gottlob Benjamin Jasche.

1802. Physical Geography. The author's MS., revised by Er. Fr. Theod. Rink.

1803. On Pedagogy. Edited by Dr. Fr. Theod. Rink.

1804. Essay upon the question : What are the real advances which metaphysics has
made in Germany since the times of Leibnitz and Wolf; a prize question proposed by
the Berlin Royal Academy of Sciences in 1791. Edited by Dr. Fr. Theod. Rink.

The complete editions of Kant's works contain, in addition to the above, various
public declarations of Kant, poetical tributes to deceased colleagues, collections of
apoth'gms and interesting observations from his note-books, and portions of his corre-
spondence with Lambert, Moses Mendelssohn, Marcus Herz, Reinhold, Jacob!, Fichte,
Schiller, and others.

EnveiN D. Mead.

Boston, Mass.

BAYAEB TAYLOR'S INVOCATION OF GOETHE.
(A free translation of his " An Goethe,^'' prefixed to his translation of Faust.)

Exalted soul, to spirit realms translated,

Wherever thy bright dwelling-place may be —
To higher being art thou new created.

And singest there the fuller litany.
From chosen striving — tasks divine thou'rt learning,

From purest ether where thou breathest free.
Oh, bend thee to the fav'rable returning

Of these last echoes of thy minstrelsy !

The wreath, dust-covered from the ancient Muses,

In splendor new thy daring hand did bear —
Thou solv'sl the riddle of remotest ages.

Through newer faith, intelligence more rare.

JVoies and Viscussions. 99

And when man's active, working thought, is bounded.
Canst claim a world-wide Fatherland and Home,

While thy disciples see in thee astounded,
Embodied now the century to come.

What thou hast sung, all joys and lamentations.

Life's contradictions ever mingled new,
The harp re-struck, whose thousand voic'd vibrations

Once Shakespeare woke, once Homer sounded too —
Dare /translate, in accents strangely sounding,

All that the many have essayed in vain ?
Oh, let thy spirit, through my voice resounding.

Inspire my soul to imitate thy strain !

Caroline Eliot Lacklaxd.
St. Loi'is, Mo., January. 1881.

SOCIAL SCIENCE.

The Committee on Education of the American Social Science Asso-
ciation has issued the following circular, with a view to draw the interest
of parents to the stadia of mental development in their infant children.
The project originated in the mind of the zealous and active Secretary of
the committee, Mrs, Talbot, who has already collected a great mass of
interesting facts, from which we hope to present selections from time to
time in this Journal :

We have been made familiar with the habits of plants and animals from the careful
investigations which have from time to time been published — the intelligence of animals,
even, coming in for a due share of attention. One author alone contributes a book of
0!ie thousand pages upon "Mind in the Lower Animals." Recently some educators in
this country have been quietly thinking that to study the natural development of a
single child is worth more than a Noah's Ark full of animals. Little has been done in
this study, at least little has been recorded. It is certain that a great many mothers
might contribute observations of their own children's life and development that might be
at some future time invaluable to the psychologist. In this belief the Education De-
partment of the American Social Science Association has issued the accompanying
register, and asks the parents of very young children to interest themselves in the
subject.

1. By recognizing the importance of the study of the youngest infants.

2. By observing the simplest manifestations of their life and movements.

3. By answering fully and carefully the questions asked in the register.

4. By a careful record of the signs of development during the coming year, each
observation to be verified, if possible, by other members of the family.

5. By interesting their friends in the subject and forwarding the results to the
secretary.

6. Above all, hy perseverance and exactness in recording these observations

100 The Journal of Speculative Pli'dowphij.

From the records of many tliousand observers in the next few year.s it is believed
that important facts will be gathered of great value to the educator and to the psy-

chologist.

FIE8T SERIES.

Registo- of Phi/sical and Menial Development of (give the baby's full name).

Name and occupation oftheAither? Place and time of father's birth ? of mother's
birth ? of baby's birth ? Baby's weight at birth V at three mcmths ? at six months '! at
one year ? Is baby strong and healthy, or otherwise V At what age did the baby exhibit
consciousness, and in what manner? At what age did the baby smile? recognize its
mother? notice its hand? follow a light with its eyes? hold up its head ? sit alone on
the floor? creep? stand by a chair? stand alone? walk alone? hold a plaything when
put in its hand? reach out and take a plaything? appear to be right- or left-handed ?
notice pain, as the prick of a pin? show a like or dislike in taste? appear sensible to
sound? notice the light of a window or turn toward it? fear the heat from stove or
grate? speak, and wiiat did it say? How many words could it say at one year? at
eighteen months? at two years?

Will the mother have the kindness to carefully answer as many as possible of these
questions and return this circular, before July 15, 1881, to

Mrs. Emily Talbot,
Sea-etary of the Education Department of the American. Social Science Association,

66 Marlborough Street, Boston, Mass.
Boston, 1881.

PEOGEAMME OF THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, AT SAEATOGA

MEETING OF 1881. -

The Papers invited and the General Order of Business for the Saratoga Meeting of
1881, so far as can now be announced, appear in the following list. The sessions will
be held in Putnam Hall, and the head-quarters of the Association will be at the United
States Hotel, as in former years :

I. The General Session.

Monday, September 5. — At 8 p. m., Opening Address of President Wayland, of
New Haven. At 9.30 p. m.. Reception of members and guests at the United States
Hotel.

Tuesday, September 6. — At 9 a. m.. Report of the General Secretary. At 9.30
A. m.. Other Reports and Communications. At 8 p. m., a Paper by Charles Dudley
Warner, Esq., of Hartford, Conn., on American Journalism.

Wednesday, September 7. — At 8 p. m., an Address by Hon. Francis A. Walker,
Superintendent of the Census, on Some Results of the Census of 1880, followed by a
Debate.

Thursday, September 8. — At 8 p. m., an Address by George William Curtis, Esq.,
of New York, on Civil Service Reform in America, followed by a Debate.

II. Department Meetings.

Tuesday, September 6. — Department of Education.— M 10 a. m.. Address by the
Chairman of the Department, Prof. W. T. Harris, of Concord, Mass. At 11 a. m, a
Report by the Secretary, Mrs. Emily Talbot, on the Work of the Department. At
11.30 A. M., a Paper by Senator Brown, of Georgia, on the Relation of the Federal Gov-
ernment to Common Schools. At 12 m., a Paper by Gen. John Eaton, on the question

Notes and Discussions. 101

of Education in the Southern States, followed by a Debate. At 1 p. m., a Paper by Piof .
G. S. Hall, of Cambridge, Mass., on The Religious Training of Children. At 4 p. m.,
a Debate on the Education of the Deaf, opened by Dr. Edward M. Gallaudet, of
Washington, D. C.

Wednesday, September Y. — Department of Health. — At 9.30 a. m., an Address by
the Chairman of the Department, Walter Channing, M. D., of Boston. At 10 a. m., a
Paper on House Drainage, by Edward S. Philbrick, Esq., of Boston, followed by a
Debate. At 11 a. m., a Paper on The Success of Women as Physicians, by Dr. Emily
Pope, of Boston. At 12 m., a Paper on The 3Ioral Treatment of Incipient Insanitji, by
Dr. Mary Putnam Jacobi, of New York. At 1 p. m., a Report by the Secretary, E. AV.
Gushing, M. D., of Boston.

Thursday, September 8. — Department of Jurisprudence. — At 10 a. m., a Paper by
Prof. W. C. Robinson, LL. D., of the Yale Law School, on the Unification of our Juris-
prudence. At 11 A.M., a Debate on the Temperance Question: Hon. P. Emory Al-
DRicH, of Worcester, Mass., will advocate Prohibitory Legislation ; Rev. Leonard W.
Bacon, of Norwich, Conn., will advocate a License Law ; Hon. F. W. Bird, of Walpole,
Mass., will advocate Unrestricted Traffic. At 12.30 p. m., a Paper on Divorce Legisla-
tion, by Ex-President T. D. Woolsey, D. D., LL. D., of New Haven.

Friday, September 9. — Department of Social Economy. — At 10 a.m., Address by
the Chairman of the Department, Prof. W. B. Rogers, of Boston. At 10.30 a. m.. Re-
ports from a Special Committee on Homes for the People, by Robert Treat Paine, Jr.,
Esq., of Boston, and others, followed by a Debate. At 12 m., Reports from a Special
Committee on Art in its Relation to the People, followed by a Debate.

Other announcements will be made later, and some changes in the above order will
doubtless be made.

The presence of the members of the Association is invited at the Eighth Annual
Conference of Charities, to be held in Boston from the 25th to the 30th of July, 1881.
Governor Long, of Massachusetts, will preside at the opening of the Conference and
several of the Governors of States are expected to be present, as well as delegates from
a majority of the States and from Canada. The retiring President of the Conference
(Mr. F. B. Sanborn) will give the annual Address on Monday, July 25, and one of the
six Standing Committees will report on that day, and on each of the other days of the
session. The forenoons will be given to these reports and to the debates following, the
afternoons to visiting institutions of charity and correction in the vicinity of Boston,
and the evenings to a session for papers and debates.

Members of Boards of Charities and Prison Commissions are ex officio members of
the Conference, as well as the delegates appointed to represent States. All persons
officially connected with public charitable, penal, or reformatory establishments, who
attend in that capacity, are also members of the Conference ; and all persons regularly
delegated to represent private charitable organizations are admitted as members on
presenting their credentials. All other persona interested in charitable work are invited
to be present.

102 Tlie Journal of Sj)eculativie Philosophfj.

BOOK NOTICES.

Meditations on The Essence of Christianity. By R. Laird Collier, D. D. Boston :
Roberts Brothers, 1876. [Contents: (1) The Only God; (2) The Real Christ; (3) The
Known Spirit; (4) The Right Religion; (5) The Sure Hell; (6) The True Heaven.
[The introduction commences : "After reading Feuerbach's ' Essence of Christianity,'
Buechner's 'Force and Matter,' and other books of like tendencies, I was led to look
into my own heart to see if my faith in Christ and Christianity had been either de-
stroyed or disturbed. I meant to make honest work of it. The forms in which I had
held the ' Old Faith ' had in many cases been modified, and in some wholly given up.
But the 'things essential,' the 'things which remain,' became more real and more
dear to me as I disencumbered them of their tr^iditioual and conventional phraseology,
and consented to conform their outward expresrrion with modern consciousness, and
the original and permanent spirit of Christianity itself."]

The Logic of Chance, an Essay on the Foundations and Prov nee of the Theory of
Probability, with especial reference to its Logical Bearings iind its Application to Moral
and Social Science. By John Venn, M. A., Fellow and Lecturer in the Moral Sciences,
Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. Examiner in Logic and Moral Philosophy in
the University of London. Second edition, re-written and greatly enlarged. London:
Maciaillan and Co. 1876.

[From the Preface : " Not only, to quote a common l>ut often delusive assurance,
will ' no knowledge of mathematics beyond the simple rules of Arithmetic' be required
to understand these pages, but it is not intended that any such knowledge should be
acquired by the process of reading them." Part I treats of tlie Physical Foundations of
the Science of Probability (chh. I — IV); Part II, of the Logical Superstructure on the
above Physical Foundations (chh. V — XIV); Part III, of the Various Applications of
the Theory of Probability (chh. XV — XVIII). (Chapter XV treats of Insurance and
Gambling.y]

Bacon versus Shakespeare: A plea for the Defendant. By Thomas D. King, Mon-
treal, and Rouse's Point, New York : Lovell Printing and Publishing Co., 1875. [Page
143: "Bacon being Shakespeare is inconsistent with all precedent and all subsequent
literary combinations. With the object of helping the readir to form a conclusion, I
have put in parallel columns a list of authors and their works, and a list of poets and
dramatists, in a sort of chronological order, to show at a glance that the poet's mind is
of a different stamp or kind to that of the philosopher.

Andefit.

Thales, the father of Greek Philosophy. I Homer, the father of poets.

Socrates and Plato. i JEschylus and Sophocles.

Archimedes and Aristotle. 1 Pindarus and Anacrecn.

Pliny and Cicero. i Horace and Catullus.

Book Notices. 103

Roger Bacon, Experimental philosopher.
Richard Hooker, Ecclesiastical polity.

Modern.

Geoffrey Chaucer, Canterbury Tales.
Edmund Spenser, Faerie Queene.

Bacon (Lord Verulam), Novum Organum. William Shakespeare, England's Dramatist

Sir Kenelm Digby, Metaphysician.
Ralph Cudworth, Intellectual system.
Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan.

Ben Jonson, Drr.matist.
John Milton, Paradise Lost.
Samuel Butler, Iludibras.

Let any one read, even cursorily, the works of these philosophers, dramatists, and
poets, and I feel certain he will come to the conclusion that Bacon never wrote the
plays and poems of Shakespeare."]

An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. By Jeremy Bentham,
Esq., M. A., Bencher of Lincoln's Inn, and late of Queen's College, Oxford. Oxford: At
the Clarendon Press, 1876. ["The First Edition of this work was printed in the year
1780, and first jjublished in 1789. The present edition is a careful reprint of 'A New
Edition, corrected by the Author,' which was published in 1823." Fublisher^s note.
Page I: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters,
pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to
determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on
the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us
in all we do, in all we say, in all we think; every effort we can make to throw off our
subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend
to abjure their empire ; but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The
principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that
system the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the Lands of reason and
law. Systems which attempt to question it deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprices
instead of reason, in darkness instead of light. . . . By utility is meant that prop-
erty in any object whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or
happiness (all this in the present case comes to the same thing), or (what comes again
to the same thing), to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to
the party whose interest is considered ; if that party be the community in general, then
the happiness of the community; if a particular individual, then the happiness of that
individual."]

Emmanuel, ou La Discipline de FEsprit. Discours philosophique par Jean Wallon.
Paris. G. Charpentier, Editeur. 1877. [Cowtoii's (translated) : (1) Of truth in gen-
eral; (2) Of man and his faculties, or the three temporal forms of the soul ; (3) Of the
True and of the understanding which is the totality of our ideas acquired or received;
(4) Of the Good and of the Will, whose determinations are always present ; (5) Of the
Beautiful and of Love, which is the consciousness of anticipation of some future state;
(6) Of the Soul and of Religion, whose object it is to restore daily the unity of our Being
which we constantly destroy ; To young men ; The truth.]

Philosophische Schriften von Dr. Franz Hoffmann, ord. prof, an der Universitaet
Wuerzburg, etc. Vierter Band. Eriangen. Verlag von Andreas Deichert, 1877. [Con-
taining sixty-two sliort articles, mostly book notices, averaging about eight pages each,
being reprints of the author's critiques of the philosophical literature appearing in the
years 1861-1871.]

104 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

Theorie du Fatalisrae (Essai de Philosophie Materialiste) par B. Conta, rrofesscur de
droit civil ^ TUniversitt' de Jassy. BruxcUes et Paris: Germer Bailliere Libraire.
1877. [Contents (translated) : (1) chapter I, physical aiAl physiological phenomena;
chapter II, social phenomena — historical and statistical facts ; chapter III, psycholog-
ical phenomena ; (a) nature and seat of the soul, (b) teachings of physiology, (c) the
author's hypotheses, (d) faculties of the soul, (c) dreams, (f) generalizations and r6sum6 ;
chapter IV, practical value of the theory of fatalism. Page 12, (translated) : " Statis-
tics furnish us the most convincing proofs of the existence of fate in the domain of so-
cial phenomena." rage 23 : "In the present state of the positive sciences, it can be
proved that there exists in the universe — so far as we can know — no other substance
than matter. On the one hand experience proves that there exists nothing in the
world without properties. Properties of matter come under the generic designation of
force. Hence there is no matter without force, and no force without matter. In virtue
of its properties, matter changes continually, but not at a uniform rate of motion. It
varies conformably to the law o{ universal undulation (the author's work, 'Theorie de
I'ondulation universelle,' is referred to), and there arises a metamorphosis of matter
which assumes an infinity of transitory forms in time and space."]

Books Received. 105

BOOKS EECEIVED.

The Scottish Philosophy, Biographical, Expository, Critical, from Hutcheson to
Hamilton. By James McCosh, LL. D., D. D., President of the College of New Jersey,
Princeton. New York : Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1875.

The Literary World. Boston, May 22, 1880. (Containing contributions in prose
and verse on the occasion of Emerson's seventy-seventh birthday, thirty or more emi-
nent literary persons taking part ia this worthy undertaking.)

Gage's Mathematical Series : The Teacher's Hand-Book of Algebra ; containing
Methods, Solutions, and Exercises illustrating the Latest and Best Treatment of the
Elements of Algebra. By J. A. McLellan, M. A., LL. D., High-School Inspector for
Ontario. Toronto : W. J. Gage & Co. 1879.

The Ultimate Generalization : An Effort in the Philosophy of Science. New York :
Charles P. Somerby. 18Y6.

Elements of Natural Philosophy : A Text-Book for High-Schools and Academies. By
Elroy M. Avery, Ph. M., Principal of the East High School, Cleveland, Ohio. New
York : Sheldon & Co. 18'78.

The Public Library and the Common Schools : Three Papers on Educational Topics.
By Charles F. Adams, Jr. (Containing: L The Public Library and the Public Schools;
II. Fiction in Public Libraries, and Educational Catalogues ; III. The New Departure
in the Common Schools of Quincy. Boston: Estes & Lauriat. 1879. Pp. 1-51.

Outlines of Etymology. By S. S. Haldeman, LL. D., M. N. A. S. Philadelphia : J.
B. Lippincott & Co. 1877.

Love or Fame, and Other Poems. By Fannie Isabelle Sherrick. St. Louis : W. S.
Bryan, Publisher. 1880.

Oddments of Andean Diplomacy, and Other Oddraents, including a Proposition for a
Double-Track Steel Railway from the Westerly Shores of Hudson Bay to the Midway
Margin of the Strait of Magellan, etc. By Hinton Rowan Helper. St. Louis : W. S.
Bryan, Publisher. 1879.

Shakespeare: A Biographic, Esthetic Study. By George H. Calvert. Boston: Lee
& Shepard, Publishers. 1879.

Art-Life, and Other Poems. By Benjamin Hathaway. (Second thousand, revised.)
Chicago : S. C. Griggs & Co. 1878.

The Child's Catechism of Common Things. By John D. Champlin, Jr., late Associate
Editor of the " American Cyclopaedia." New York : Henry Holt & Co. 1879.

106 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

Thirteen Papers in Siipi)ort of Mr. Helper's Selienie for constnieting a 'Longitudinal,
Double-Traek Steel liaihvay through North and Central and South America. St. Louis:
Wm. S. Bryan, Publisher. 1880. Pp. 1-24.

II Poaitivismo e il Razionalismo ossia Missione della Scienza in qucsto ultimo Dc-
cennio 1870-'80 pel Sac. Antonio Maugeri M. 0. (Prof di Filosolia razionale in qucsta
R. Universitil.) Catania: Tipografia Nazionale di A. Elia. 1880.

Alcohol in Health and Disease. By R. M. Bucke, M. D., Medical Superintendent of
the Asylum for the Insane, London, Ontario. Price, 10 cents. London, Ontario :
William Bryco. 1880. Pp. 1-28.

History of the Christian Religion to the Year Two Hundred. By Charles B. Waite,
A.M. Chicago : C. V. Waite & Co. 1881.

Sein und Erkennen. Eine fundamental-philosophische Untersuchung von Dr. Jul.
B^rgmann (ord. Prof. Phil, an der Universitact zu Marburg). Berlin : Ernst Siegfried
Mittler und Sohn. 1880. Pp. 1-191.

The Centennial Outlook in Education : Address at tlie Nashville Teachers' Centen-
nial, May 7, 1880. By Professor Edward S. Joynes, of the University of Tennessee.
Pp. 1-8.

Address of Superintendent A. P. Marble, Worcester, Massachusetts. (Reprint from
the " Pittsfield Sun " of June 9, 1880.) " Kearneyism in Education, or Public Schools
and their Critics." Pp. 1-10.

Topics of the Day : A Bulletin published for the Use of the Public Schools of Wor-
cester, Massachusetts. (Giving a concise summary of the news of the day and an
intelligent explanation of its significance. Designed to make pupils familiar with the
leading topics discussed in the daily newspapers.) Pp. 1-6.

Ejccelsior Songs and Poems. By Robert Sinniekson. Published by the Author, and
for sale by Alpaugh & Thompson, Trenton, New Jersey. 1880. Pp. 1-20.

The Principles of Psychology. By John Biseom, Author of "Philosophy of Rhet-
oric," " Esthetics," " Philosophy of English Literature," and " Philosophy of Reli-
gion." New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1877.

Two Papers on Academic Degrees : I. On the Regulation and Control of the Degree-
conferring Power ; II. On the Origin and Significancy of Academic Degrees. By Fred-
erick A. P. Barnard, LL. D., M. N. A. S., President of Columbia College, New York City.
New York : Macgowan & Slipper, 30 Beekman St. 1880. Pp. 1-34.

Minerva : A Monthly Review. E Jited by Pericles Tzikos, Rome, Italy. (A monthly
magazine in Rome, published in the English language, and edited by a Greek !)

The YouQger Edda : also called Snorre's Edda, or the Prose Edda. An Enghsh
Version of the Foreword; The Fooling of Gylfe, the Afterword; Brage's Talk, the
Afterword to Brage's Talk, and the Important Passages in the Poetical Diction, with
an Introduction, Notes, Vocabidary, and Index. By Rasmus B. Anderson, Professor
of the Scandinavian Languages in the University of Wisconsin. Chicago : S. C. Griggs
& Co. London : Triibner & Co. 1880.

Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle. Compiled by Edwin Wallace, M. A., Fellow
and Tutor of Worcester College, Oxford. Second and Considerably Enlarged Edition.
Oxford and London: James Parker & Co. 1880. Pp. 1-70.

Books Received. 107

First Principles of Political Economy concisely presented for the use of classes in
High Schools and Academies. By Aarou L. Chapin, D. D., President of Beloit College.
New York : Sheldon & Co. 1880.

Liteiary Art. A Conversation between a Painter, a Poet, and a Philosopher. By
John Albee. New York : G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1881.

Arnold of Rugby. An Essay by Miss Grace C. Bibb, Professor of Pedagogics in the
State University at Columbia, Missouri. Pp. 1-21.

On the Philosophy of Kant. By Robert Adamson, M. A., Professor of Logic, Owens
College, Manchester, England. (Shaw Fellowship Lectures — 1879.) Edinburgh: David
Douglas. 1879.

Certain Men of Mark: Studies of Living Celebrities. By George Makepeace Towle.
Boston : Roberts Brothers. 1880. (The Celebrities include Gladstone, Bismarck, Gam-
betta, Beaconsfield, Castelar, Victor Hugo, John Bright, and the Emperors Alexander
of Russia, William of Germany, and Francis Joseph of Austria.)

Grundzuege der Societats Philosophie: Ideen ueber Recht, Staat, Gesellschatt und
Kirche von Franz von Baader. Mit Anmerkungen und Erlauleruugen. Von Professor
Dr. Franz HcfFmann. Zweite verbesserte und erweiterte Auflage. Wiirzburg : A. Stu-
ber's Buchhandlung. 1865. Pp. 1-208.

Des Systems der Philosophie als Exacter Wissenscbaft. Vierter Theil enthaltend
die Philosophie der Geschichte. Von C. L. Michelet. Erste Abtheilung : Die Urwelt,
der Orient, Griechenland, Zweite Abtheilung ; Rom, das Christliche Europa, America,
die Nachwelt. Berlin: Nicolaische Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1881. (Each part consti-
tutes a single volume.)

Tiie American Journal of Science and Arts. Third Series. Article LX. On the
Transmission of Sensation and Volition through the Nerves. Contribution from the
Physical Laboratory of the Cornell University. By M. M. Garver, B. S., Professor of
Natural Science in Mercersburg College, Pennsylvania. (Reprint from the "Am. Jour.
Sci." for June, 1878.)

The Legal Aspects of Partial Moral Mania. By Ernest Howard Crosby, A. M., LL. B.,
Counsellor at Law. ^Read before the Medico-Legal Society of the City of New York,
December 3, 1879. Reprint from the Bulletin of the Society.) Pp. 1-14.

Era Nova, Revista do Movimento Contemporaneo Dirigida. Por Theophilo Braga e
Teixeira Bastos, Proprietario-gerente Antonio Furtado. No. 1. Anno I, Julho, 1880.
Lisboa : Escriptorio da "Era Nova." (Contents of this First Number: (1) Popular
Portuguese Books by Th. Braga ; (2) On the Creation of Man, by T. Bastos ; (3) The
Over-Excitation of Cerebral Activity, by Silva Gra9a ; (4) Poem by Alexandre da Con-
cei9ao ; (5) BibUography.)

The Causes which produce the Great Prevailing Winds and Ocean Currents, and
Their Effects on Climate. By C. A. M. Taber. Boston: David Clapp & Sons. 1881.
Pp. 1-54.

Rules and Regulations of the Female Normal School at Tokio, Japan. (The pam-
phlet is wholly in Japanese. Its sender is the Vice-Minister of Education, Tanaka Fuji-
maro, who visited and thoroughly inspected our educational establishments in 1876,
and has shown great ability in all his undertakings for the benefit of education in Japan.)

108 The Journal of Speculative Phllosoj^hy.

Gnindzncpe der Philocophio ties Nioolaus Cusaniig. Mit Bcsondcrer Boriicksichti-
guii^ (iiT Lehro vom Erkennen. Yon Dr. Ricliiiid Falckonberg, Privatdoccut der Phi-
losopliie an der Uuiversitaet Jena. Breslau: Verlag von Wilhclm Koebner. 1880. Pp.
1-1 f.l.

The Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review. October, 1872. Article VI.
Outlines oF J. A. Dorner's System of Theology, transhited by G. S. Hall, A. M., New
York.

Yellow Fever; Nature and Epidemic Character caused by Meteorological Influences;
verified by the Epidemics of Shreveport and Memphis in 1873, by that of Savannah in
187(1, l>y the Great Epidemic of the Mississippi Valley in 1878, and by the one in
Memphis in 1879. By C. Spinzig, M. D. St. Louis, Missouri, 1880. For sale by D.
Appletou & Co., New York. Pp. 1-204.

Who planned the Tennessee Campaign of 1862 ? or, Anna Ella Carroll vs. Ulysses S.
Grant: A Few Generally Unknown Facts in Regard to our Civil War. By Matilda
Joslyn Gage. (National citizen tract No. 1.) !B. F. Wade, Chairman of the Militai'v
Committee of the United States Senate, wrote, February 28, 1872 : "... It came to
my knowledge that the expedition that was preparing ... to descend the Mississippi
River was abandoned, and the Tennessee expedition was adopted by the Government in
pursuance of information and a plan presented to the Secretary of War, I think in the
latter part of November, 1861, by Miss Carroll. . . . The transfer of the armies from
Cairo and the northern part of Kentucky to the Memphis & Charleston Railroad was
her conception, and was afterward carried out generally, and very much in detail, ac-
cording to her suggestions. . . ." Pp. 1-16.

Grundragen af Emanuel Hvalgrens Filosofiska System. Goteborg. 1879. [See
"Jour. Spec. Phil.," Vol. VIII, July, 1875, p. 285 ; and Vol. XII, January, 1878, p. 92.]
Pp. 1-84.

Shall we have Free High Schools ? By E. R. Sill. San Francisco : The California
Publishing Company. 1881. Pp. 1-8.

The Philosophy of the Sciences, or a Classified Scheme of Knowledge, arranged with
Reference to Right Methods of Instruction. By J. M. Long, A. M. Chilicothe, Missouri.
1879. Pp. 1-11.

The Philosopher's Stone. A Lecture by General N. B.Buford. Delivered before the
Philosophical Society of Chicago. Chicago : George W. Spencer. 1880. Pp. 1-24.

Echoes from Mist-Land ; or, the Nibelungen Lay revealed to Lovers of Romance and
Chivalry. By Auber Forestier. Chicago : S. C. Griggs & Co. 1880.

The Platonist. Edited and Published by Thomas M. Johnson, Osceola, St. Clair
County, Missouri. A monthly periodical devoted chiefly to the dissemination of the
Platonic philosophy in all its phases. Pp. 1-16. $2 per annum. [Contents of No. I :
(1) Short Sentences from Platonists and Pythagoreans ; (2) Editorials ; (3) The Nature
and Destiny of the Human Soul ; (4) The Spectator of the Mysteries. By Alexander
Wilder; (5) Philosophic Caste. By Dr. H. K. Jones; (6) "That Intelligibles are not
External to the Mind," and " Concerning the Good." Translated from the 5th Book of
5tli Ennead of Plotinus by Thomas M. Johnson; (7) Life of Plato; (8) The Concord
School of Philosophy ; (9) Platonic Demonstration of the Immortality of the Soul.
Reprinted from Thomas Taylor's translation ; (10) General Introduction to the Philoso-
phy and Writings of Plato. Reprinted from Thomas Taylor; (11) The Phaedrus of
Plato ; (12) Archytas on Wisdom, translation, reprinted.]

Books Received. 109

Dr. Hans Vaihinger's Kant-Commentar. [Some advance sheets of his great work
on Kant's " Critique of Pure Keason." It begins with a general introduction on the
historical and actual significance of the " Critique of Pure Reason," and a general sur-
vey of Kantian literature. Specially valuable are the tables showing the writers on
the subject, classified so as to show in one column the commentators and historians of
the movement, und in the second column the opponents, the adherents of the system
of Kant being subclassified as German and foreign, and as full adherents or partial ad-
herents {halbe Anhdnger), the opponents being subclassified as native and foreign, and
as dogmatists or empiricists. Far more valuable is the survey of the most important
writings in elucidation of Kant's " Critique of Pure Reason," divided into three periods,
and with complete references to the particular works in which they are to be found,
and with briefly expressed judgments on their character. A special introduction follows
on the standpoints of dogmatism, scepticism, and criticism. The work will be com-
pleted in four or five volumes, the first volume being ready by the latter part of sum-
mer, 1881, and will form a complete historical commentary — a sort of '■'■variorum'''' —
gleaning from all that has been done in the century of the existence of the greatest
work of Kant.]

The Public-School System a Failure : A Reply to Richard Grant White. A paper
read before the Massachusetts Teachers' Association, December, 1880. By B. F.
Tweed. Boston: Lee & Shepard, Publishers. Price, 10 cents. Pp. 1-15.

Secretary Schurz. Reply of the Boston Committee. Governor John D. Long, Chair-
man. Misrepresentations corrected and important facts presented. Boston : Frank
Wood. 1880. Pp. 1-21.

Western Men Defended. Speech of Mr. T. H. Tibbies in Tremont Temple, Boston,
Massachusetts, December, 1880. The treatment of the Indians. Boston : Lockwood,
Brooks & Co., Publishers. 1880. Pp. 1-8.

The Spell-Bound Fiddler : A Norse Romance. By Kristofer Janson. Translated
from the oiisiinal by Auber Forestier, with an introduction by Rasmus B. Anderson.
Chicago : S. 0. Griggs & Co. 1880.

A Candid Examination of Theism. By Physicus. Boston : Houghton, Osgood &
Co. 1878. [Volume XIII of Truebner's " English and Foreign Philosophical Library."]

Lectures on Teaching : Delivered in the University of Cambridge during the Lent
Term, 1880. By J. G. 0. Fitch, M. A., Assistant Commissioner to the late Endowed-
Schools Commission, and one of her Majesty's Inspectors of Schools. Cambridge : At
the University Press. 1881.

The Waverley Dictionary : An Alphabetical Arrangement of all the Characters in Sir
Walter Scott's Waverley Novels, with a Descriptive Analysis of each Character, and
Illustrative Selections from the Text. By May Rogers. Chicago : S. C. Griggs & Co.
1879.

Sanskrit and its Kindred Literatures : Studies in Comparative Mythology. By Laura
Elizabeth Poor. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1880.

Unscientific Materialism. A criticism of Tyndall's " Fragments of Science." Fifth
edition. An article from the " International Review " of January, 1879. By S. H.
Wilder. New York, 1881. Pp. 1-16.

Sanitary Rewards and Punishments. A paper read January 7, 1880, before the
Sanitary Convention at Detroit, Michigan. By Henry W. Lord, Secretary Michigan
State Board of Charities and Corrections. Pp. 1-8.

110 The Journal of Speculative Philoso^yhy.

Ponal ami Prison Discipline. A paper read on Wednesday evening, Jnne 30, 1880,
before the National Cont'erenoe of Charities and Corrections al Cleveland, at the seventh
anrmal session. By Henry W. Lord, of Detroit, Michigan. Lansing, Michigan : W. S.
George & Co. 1880. Pp. 1-18.

A Talk about Swedenborg. By Frank Sewcll, President of Urbana University, Ur-
ban:), Ohio. New York : New Church Board of Publication, 20 Cooper Union. Pp. 1-S4.

Tokio K;usei Gakko : Imperial Univeisity of Tokio, Tokio, Japan. The Calendar lor
1875. [Containing a history of the institution, regulations, and schedules of the course
of study, besides the usual matter.] Pp. l-l^G.

The Beautiful and the Sublime : An Analysis of these Emotions and a Determination
of the Objectivity of Beauty. By John Steinfort Kedne3\ New York : G. P. Putnam's
Sons. 1880.

Panola: A Tale of Louisiana. By Mrs. Sarah A. Dorsey, Philadelphia; T. B. Pe-
terson i: Brothers. 18*77.

The Fasti of Ovid. Edited, with notes and indices, by G. H. Ilalhim, M. A., late Fel-
low of St. John's College, Cambridge, Assistant Master at Harrow. London : Macmil-
lan & Co. 1881.

Christian Civilization : With Special Reference to India. By William Cunningham,
M. A. London : Macmillan & Co. 1880.

The Churches of Asia : A Methodical Sketch of the Second Century. By William
Cunningham, M. A. London : Macmillan & Co. 1886.

Les Maladies de la Memoire. Par Th. Ribot, directeur de la Revue Philosophique.
Paris. Librairie Germer Bailliere et Cie. 1881. Pp. 1-169.

The English Poets. Selections with critical introductions by various writers, and a
general introduction by Matthew Arnold. Edited by Thomas Humphrey Ward, M. A.,
late Fellow of Brasenose College, Oxford. Vol. I, Chaucer to Donne. Vol. If, Ben
Jonson to Dryden. Vol. Ill, Addison to Blake. Vol. IV, Wordsworth to Dobell.
London and New York : Macmillan & Co. 1880.

Epicureanism. By William Wallace, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of Merton College,
Oxford, LL. D., St. Andrews. [Being volume of the series of the " Chief Ancient
Philosophers."] Published under the direction of the Committee of General Literature
and Education appointed by the Society for promoting Christian Knowledge, London.
New York : Pott, Young & Co. 1880.

Rodgers' " Bird's-Eye Views." A Business Man's Sheet of Ready Information, for
Use in Letter-Writing. Published by L. H. Rodk'ers, Successor to the American Mani-
fold Writing-Paper Co., 75 Maiden Lane, New York City. One Large Sheet. Price,
25 cents.

The Western Magazine. Devoted to the Intellectual Progress of the West. Edited
by Mrs. Helen Ekin Sarrett. Chicago, Illinois. 1880.

Vier Grundfragen. Von A. Spir. Leipzig : Druck und Verlag von J. G. Findel.
1880. Pp. 1-106.

Ontology. By Emanuel Swedenborg. From a Photo-Lithographic Copy of the
Original Latin Manuscript still preserved in the Library of the Academy of Sciences at
Stockholm. Translated by Philip B. Cabell, A. M., Professor of Ancient Languages 'in
Urbana University, Ohio. Philadelphia : J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1880. Pp. 1-40

BooTts Received. Ill

On the Complexity of Causes: An Address read before the Department of Higher
Instruction of the National Educational Association, at Chautauqua, 1880, by Eli T.
Tappan, President of the Department. Pp. 1-7.

The Solar Illumination of the Solar System. A Treatise in Popular Language on the
L;iw and Theory of the Inverse Squares; being an Analysis of the Two Received
Laws relating to the Diminution of Light by Distance, wherein it is shown that, accord-
ing to undisputed facts of nature and of science, the solar illumination is equal
throughout the whole system, and the Law of the Inverse Squares for Light physically
impossible. To which is added the prospectus for a prize of fifty guineas offered
for disproof of the scientific facts here for the first time indicated. Also an Appendix
of Extracts from the Writings of Professional Men. By Collyns Simon, Hon., LL. D.
Edin. Williams & Norgate. London. 1879.

Three Addresses on Emanuel Swedenborg as a Scientist, Philosopher, and Theologian.
Delivered at the Twenty-seventh Annual Meeting of the Ohio Association of the New
Church, at Cincinnati, Ohio, on Sunday Evening, October 10, 1880. New York: E. H.
Swinney. 1880. Pp. 1-40.

The Dental Jairus : A Monthly Journal of Dental Science. Edited by W. 0. Thrail-
kill, D. D. S. Sacramento, Calitornia. December, 1880.

Tenth Annual Eeport of the Leeds Public Library, lS79-'80. Established in 1868
under the Act of 1855. Leeds, England: James Yates, Public Librarian. 1880. Pp. 1-18.

The Western Farmer of America. By Augustus Mongredien. London, Paris, and
New York: Cassell, Petter, Galpin & Co. 1880. Pp. 1-30. [Advocating a reduction
in the tarifFof the United States.]

John Swinton's Travels. Current Views and Notes of Forty Days in France and
England. By John Swinton. New York : G. W. Carleton & Co. 1880. Pp. 1-46.

Fragments of Christian History to the Foundation of the Holy Roman Empire. By
Joseph Henry Allen, Lecturer on Ecclesiastical History in Harvard University. Bos-
ton : Roberts Brothers. 1880.

Moral Causation ; or Notes on Mr. Mill's Notes to the Chapter on "Freedom" in the
third edition of his "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy." By Patrick
Proctor Alexander, M. A., Author of "Mill and Carlyle," etc. Second Edition, Revised
and Extended. Edinburgh and London : William Blackwood & Sons. 1875.

Boston Monday Lectures, 1880-'81. Christ and Modern Thought. With a Prelim-
inary Lecture on the Methods of meeting Modern Unbelief. By Joseph Cook. Bos-
ton: Roberts Brothers. 1881.

Great Citizens of France. Victor Hugo : His Life and Works. From the French of
Alfred Barbou. By Frances A. Shaw. Chicago : S. C. Griggs & Co. 1881.

The Poetry of the Future. By Walt Whitman. (Reprint from the "North Ameri-
can Review " for February, 1881.) Pp. 1-15.

La Science Sociale Conlemporaine. Par Alfred Fouillee. Paris: Librairie Hachette
et Cie. 1880.

The School of Life. By William Rounseville Alger. Boston : Roberts Brothers. 1881.

Zwei Individualisten der Schopenhauer'schen Schule. Von 0. Plumacher. W^ieu :
Verlag von L. Rosner. 1881. Pp. 1-112.

112 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

Aus dem Tagebuche eines Pbilosophon. Von L. B. Hellenbach. Wien : Verlag von
L. Rosner. 18S1.

Pliilosophy of Religion. A Review of Principal Caird's Work. By Professor W.
H. Wynn, Ph. D., Iowa State Agricultural College, Ames, Iowa. (Reprint from the
"Lutheran Quarterly," January, 1881.) Gettysburg: J. E. Wibble. 1881. Pp. 1-2*7.

Jaliresbericht iiber die Konigl. Stuilicnsanstaltin Speier fur dasStudienjahr 1879-80.
Mit cinem Progriinime : Die Ursiiclien der Moderuen llelbrnivcrsuclie auf dem Gebiete
der Logik. Yon Professor Dr. Leonhard Rabus. [The essay on logic contains twenty-
five pages and discusses : (a) The Reciprocal Influence of Logic upon Other Prov-
inces ; (6) The Influence of Philosophy upon Logic ; (<•) The Real Value of Logic]

Universal Necessity : A Philosophical Necessity. By Werner A. Stille, Ph. D. St.
Louis, Missouri : C. Witter. 1881. Pp. 1-35.

Eastern Proverbs and Emblems Illustrating Old Truths. By the Rev. J. Long,
Member of the Bengal Asiatic Society, F. R. G. S. London: Truebner & Co. 1881.
(A volume published in " Truebner's Oriental Series.")

Hindu Philosophy. The Sankhya Karika of Iswara Krishna. An Exposition of
the System of Kapila. With an Appendix on the Nyaya and Vaiseshika Systems.
By John Davics, M. A. (Cantab.), Member of the Roy;il Asiatic Society. London:
Truebner & Co., Ludgate Ilill, 1881. (A volume of " Truebner's Oriental Series.")

Aspects of German Culture. By Granville Stanley Hall, Ph. D., Harvard University.
Lecturer on Contemporary German Philosophers and on Pedagogy. Boston : James
R. Osgood & Co. 1881.

The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Translated by F. H. Peters, M. A., Fellow
of University College, Oxibrd. London: C. Kegan Paul & Co. 1881.

Edgar Quinet: His Early Life and Writings. By Richard Heath. With Portraits,
Illustrations, and an Autographic Letter. London: Truebner & Co. 1881. (Being
volume XIV of " The English and Foreign Philosophical Library.)

Scotch Sermons, 1880. [Containing Sermons by the reverend gentlemen John
Caird, D. D., John Cunningham, D. D., D. J. Ferguson, B. D., William Knight, LL. D.,
William Mackintosh, D. D., William Leckie McFarlan, Allan Menzies, B. D., James
Nicoll, Thomas Rain, M. A., Adam Semple, B. D., John Stevenson, Patrick Stevenson,
and Robert Herbert Story, D. D.] New York : D. Appleton & Co. 1881.

The Republic of God. An Institute of Theology. By Elisha Mulford, LL. D. Bos-
ton: Houghton, Mifllin & Co. The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1881.

Faith and Freedom, By Stopford A. Brooke. Boston : George H. Ellis. 1881.

Kant and His English Critics. A Comparison of Critical and Empirical Philosophy.
By John Watson, M. A., LL. D., Professor of Philosophy in Queens University, King-
ston, Canada, Glasgow: James Maclshose, Publisher to the University. 1881.

The Contemporary Review, November, 1880. Article No. 8, " The Future of the
Canadian Dominion." By William Clarke, M. A., of Cambridge, England. London, 1880.

Commensuration: Groundwork of Classification. With a Panorama of Evolution,
and an Exposition of Darwinism and Theology conciliated. (An abstract of the com-
mensurational system.) By Charles De Medici. New York. 1880. Pp. 1-41, quarto.

THE JOURNAL,

OF

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY

YoL. XV.] April, 1881. [Ko. 2.

THOUGHTS O^ THE BASIS OF AGNOSTICISM.

BY WILLIAM T. HARRIS.

The very numerous treatises on Ethics of the present time in-
dicate the whereabouts of philosophical activity. The philo-
sophical common mind (so to speak) stands where the mind of
Kant stood more than one hundred years ago. It is the positive
side of the '•'■Aitfklarung " — the clearing up of consciousness — first
a negative movement of revolt from all tradition, all customary
beliefs, all habitual modes of thought, all conformity to institu-
tions— a cleansing of the mind from all that is imposed upon it
fronj without. Next, the mind begins the positive movement of
taking an inventory of its possessions, of its own inalienable mat-
ter and force, its inseparable ideas and principles. From these
innate ideas and principles it proceeds to reconstruct its view of
the world, and to tind what there is in it that is demanded by
man's nature. He asks for the nature of the first principle of
the universe, his own origin and destiny, and the true form of the
conduct of life.

The first question of all concerns the Conduct of Life : that is
the most practical of all questions, and a matter of daily and hourly
concern to each human being. The negative movement repudi-
ates all that it ^\\^& prescribed — all prescription — hence all use and
XY— 8

114 The Journal of Sj)eculatlve Philosoj>hy.

wont, nil ni(M-aI customs. But tliese most essential relations to
everv-dav life cannot be io:norefl. There is an external constraint
here, in case of violation. Society, as oro;anized into an institution
of justice, will not permit the practical violation of its laws, no
matter liow much one's theoretic views are opposed to them. The
moral basis of social and political organizations is felt and ac-
knowledged by all, or by the vast majority. Hence "free think-
ers," or emancipated spirits, must set themselves to account for
the ethical world in which they live and must live. If ethics is
left as something alien — something entirely artificial and imposed
on the individual from without — his emancipation will be incom-
plete in essential particulars. His first business must be to find
a ground for moral customs, habits, and conventionalities in his
own nature.

This first effort at reconstructing the world of institutions pro-
duces ethical philosophies. "We know with what wonderful depth
and completeness Kant and Fichte have behaved in this field. But
all labor in this direction arises from a desire to preserve the free-
dom of thought which the first protest had asserted. Hence even
the utilitarian systems and the mechanical systems of morality are
on the positive, or constructive, side of the Aiifkldrung. They
concede morality as necessary and substantial, and endeavor to
deduce it from the constitution of man. The immense develop-
ment of empirical science in the past century has brought the
common consciousness of educated people up to the contemplation
of the problem : Are right and wrong mere conventional distinc-
tions, or do they rest on the nature of man and the structure of
the universe? If we arrive at "free thinking," what basis for
morality have we then ? Scarcely a thinker of the materialistic
school but has deemed it necessary to explain the origin and im-
portance of ethical ideas.

Universal and necessary ideas, if there are any, must all have
the same explanation which is given to the moral ideas. If habit-
ual association is the origin of all our universal and necessary
ideas, including the moral ideas, and physiological conditions are
the cause of habitual association, the authoritative power of such
ideas is very much abated. For it is our negative conditions, the
limitations incident to our finitude, that furnish the origin of these
ideas. Sir William Hamilton had gone so far on this road as to

Thoughts on the Basis of Agnosticism. 115

sncrgest that the idea of causality is due to a mental impotence. If
physiological conditions are the basis of necessary ideas, it follows
that these ideas are subjective, and neither universal nor necessary
in any objective sense. They may be universal and necessary
throughout the universe, but it by no means follows from the fact
that we seem to see their universality and necessity. "How do
we know but that somewhere in the universe there are," etc.,
etc., is the general form of agnosticism resulting from this first
phase of explanation of our ideas.

At this point there is a chasm yawning between the objective
universe, as it is conceived to exist in itself, and our knowledge
of it. Moral ideas, and other seemingly universal and necessary
ideas, must appear to us to represent the absolute nature of objec-
tivity, the trend of the absolute purpose which animates the uni-
verse. But the consciousness of the Aufhldrung perches itself
outside of itself and its necessary ideas — outside of the universe
even, and says : " To me it is not given to know things in them-
selves. What I know is subjective only. It may or may not have
its correspondence in things in themselves. Were I differently
constituted things would appear differently."

This physiological standpoint for psychology determines at once
the character of the ontology. It was Victor Cousin who laid so
much stress on the fact that the theory of psychology determined
that of ontology. John Locke and Immanuel Kant both began
their systems with an investigation of the faculty of cognition.
So did Hobbes, so did David Hume.

Kant's theory of psychology is, after all, not so widely distinct
from that of the physiologists of our day — at least in one impor-
tant respect. He holds that our mental constitution (and it may
be material or spiritual) furnishes the forms for all our knowing,
and that all our knowing is subjective. For that reason, we are
limited to our own subjective forms of the mind when we gen-
eralize. Of the objective constitution of the world we are, and
always must be, ignorant.

It is true, says Kant, that we have certain postulates — moral
principles and regulative ideas, which are practically objective
for us ; we must assume their universal validity. But in this the
Kantian is little better than the physiological psychologist, who
also admits the practical necessity of moral principles and logical

116 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

laws of thought, but exphiins them by habitual association, based
on phj'sical constitution. If our "constitution is the negative
limit to our knowledge which coniines us to a purely subjective
field of cognition," it matters little whether it is physiological or
spiritual. With the physiological view we feel certain that the
soul perishes with the body, but with the Kantian vie\v we find
only that our supposed insight into the soul's immortal nature is
illusory — a " paralogism of pure reason." After this discovery of
the fallaciousness of our insiglit, we may believe in immortality, if
we can : it is a postulate of our practical activity, and so forth.
We have nothing but subjective ideas wherewith to discriminate
between physiology and psychology, and we cannot say that Kant
finds for us any sufficient refuge from materialism.

Nevertheless, Kant is so much more subtle and discriminative
in his thinking than the other sceptical thinkers of modern times
that he is unequalled as a discipline for the training of philo-
sophical thinkers. He teaches us how to find exactly the essential
objects and the crucial problems of method. He teaches us how
to concentrate the rays of our mind into a focus on these essential
questions. He shows us, by the way, the criticism of innumerable
shallow views, and enables us to dispose of them. He furnishes
us just the critical data with which to arrive at positive results.

Kant's standpoint is easily turned from a negative one, essen-
tially agnostic and sceptical, into a thoroughly positive one fur-
nishing a basis for a philosophy that is not merely dogmatic,
though positive; and not sceptical, though critical; but an exhaus-
tive, speculative view elevated above the realm of possible doubt
or scepticism. His post is one on the utmost advance of scepti-
cism— the turning point where it proves the reductio ad ab&urduin
of scepticism, and renders insight into the objective and absolute
nature of things.

This reductio ad dbsurdum — the self-refutation of scepticism or
agnosticism — may be briefly given :

Self -Refutation of Kantian Agnosticism.

Thesis : We cannot know things-in-themselves.
Proof : Because all our knowledge is determined by certain
general forms which are forms-of-the-mind — the general constitu-

Thoughts on the Basis of Agnosticism. 117

tion or nature of the mind. Some of those forms are the ideas of
Time and Space, which are forms of sense-perception ; other forms
are ideas of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Mode, Avhich are
forms of our reflection upon objects, or forms of generalization of
experience. These forms are subjective — the mental coefficient
in the product of knowledge. It is impossible to tell what the
objective factor of knowledge is, or would be after this mental
factor has been removed.

Antithesis : Our knowledge is not merely subjective, but ex-
tends to things-in-themselves.

Proof: Because our universal and necessary ideas are all of
them seen to possess universality and necessity, for the reason that
they are logical conditions of the existence of the world. and of
its contents. They are seen to be necessary forms for all experi-
ence in the fact that they are the only forms in which objective
existence is possible — and hence this necessity and universality
arise wholly from the function they have as conditions of the
existence of objective reality. Therefore, tlie universal and neces-
sary ideas of the mind — Time, Space, Quality, Quantity, Rela-
tion, Mode, and all others — possess the characteristic of subject-ob-
jectivity— i. e., of being equally conditions of thought and Being.
That which makes them '' universal and necessary " is their obvi-
ous character of exhaustiveness — they are not some attributes of
objectivity, accidental to its being, but essential conditions of it,
without which objectivity were impossible.

Resolution of the Antinomy.

I. The Thesis and Antithesis agree in acknowledging universal
and necessary ideas. But the thesis affirms their subjectivity only,
while the antithesis affirms both their subjectivity and objectivity.

The thesis as well as the antithesis recognizes universal and
necessary ideas by this characteristic : they furnish an essential
condition for objective existence ; the latter would be impossible
without them. But the thesis infers from this necessity their ex-
clusive subjectivity, and forgets that its ground for their subjec-
tivity is their essential objectivity.

III. The antithesis sees their subjective character, and does not
forget their objectivity on which it is based. Hence it concludes

118 The Journal of Speculative PhUosophy,

that they are universal — that is to say, both objective and sub-
jective.

IV. Hence the antithesis is no part of an antinomy; the thesis
disappears in the antithesis, and the hitter becomes the concrete
principle, expressing the whole truth.

Proof : Any assumed attitude of scepticism denies objectivity
to ideas. In denying objective validity to ideas, it posits a limit
to the subjective, and posits a field of objectivity over against the
subjective. In thus assuming a judicial attitude in regard to the
two provinces, the subjective and objective, it has assumed to
transcend subjectivity and take for itself a universal point of view
in order to give each province its just dues.

The critical philosophy posits a distinction between a sphere of
cognition and a sphere of things in themselves. This distinction
is a quality -distinction — a sphere in which somewhat and other
mutually limit each other. But to make quality apply to the
subjective and objective in this way is to subvert its own doc-
trines, which hold quality to be merely subjective and hence no
principle that will apply to objectivity.

By no possibility can a philosophical doctrine assume a sceptical
attitude in regard to the objectivity of ideas, without assuming for
itself what it denies to ideas. It must make an objective applica-
tion of ideas in order to prove their subjectivity and their non-
objectivity.

Space and Time, if made purely subjective, do not lose their
character of being the logical condition of the existence of all
bodies and movements. Time and Space are the logical condition
of the existence of the world, whether we choose to call them
objective or subjective. Hence it becomes a play on words ; we
might as well say : " We can know only the subjective because all
objective is subjective." The world is likewise subjective if Time
and Space are subjective.

Quantity, quality, relation, and mode, if made purely subjec-
tive, do not lose their character, but only make all that partakes
of their nature subjective.

Hence whatever is Quantity — one, many, or a totality — is

subjective.
Whatever is Quality — i. e-., reality, negation, or limitation —
is likewise subjective.

Thoughts on the Basis of Agnosticism. 119

Whatever is Relation — /. e., involves dependence or influence
of any sort, whether of causality or of substance, or any
other relation — is also subjective.
Whatever possesses Mode — whatever is either possible or im-
possible, existent or non-existent, contingent or necessary
— is subjective.
Now a purely " objective" that possessed no mode — was neither
existent nor possible — would be just the objective that is left for
Kantian agnosticism; but this is not at all the unknown "thing-
in-itself " meant by such agnosticism. They have not observed
the fact that their inventory of what is subjective has exhausted
the possibilities of Being and left no space or time or existence,
or possibility for Things-in-themselves outside of the subjective.
The very category of " objective " itself is a category of relation,
and itself therefore a subjective distinction.

Physiological Agnosticism.

Again, supposing the sceptic or agnostic were to take the stand-
point of physiological psychology and not the Kantian — still the
self-refutation would be quite as real, although not so obvious.
Kant has developed the elements of contradiction in scepticism to
the last degree. This is the merit which gives to his works their
great value as a propaedeutic in philosophy, and furnishes so fruit-
ful a germ for new systems of thought. The physiological psy-
chology, 071 the other hand, is not critical, but naive and dogmatic.
Instead of discriminating to endless extent the various categories
of thought, it confuses them with utter unconcern. It thinks that
quantity and quality are interchangeable ; that no ideas are uni-
versal and necessary. It assumes, without critical examination,
that thought is a determinate, a product, a particular kind of
secretion — or at least a function — of the brain. Being thus deter-
minate, it is, qualitative, ov has limits as regards an outlying sphere
of reality. The view of the world and things is determined by
the physical constitution of the organ of the mind. Were the
body different the mental view would be different. If surround-
ing conditions, such as food, climate, hereditary descent, etc.,
vary, then mind varies. This is carried out to its ultimate conse-
quences when one holds that our minds might be so constituted
that we should regard 2 + 3 as making 4, or 2 -]- 2 as making 5.

120 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

But ill all cases the criticism of the faculty of cognition is per-
formed by that fiiculty itself. It is a self-ineasurenient. In meas-
uring there must be a scale or measuring-rod to which the object to
be measured must be applied; and the scale must extend beyond
that which is measured by it, or else the limits of the object will not
be ascertained. But here the same faculty must serve in one
capacity as the scale or standard, and in another capacity as the
object measured by it. Hence whatever results are reached with
regard to the object measured, the same results will be true of the
faculty of cognition regarded as scale or measure. Hence the
cognition will be unable to place itself side by side with some-
thing else and mark off its own limits. It is obliged to posit for
itself whatever other it may regard as a limit. Hence it is always
self-determined and not qualitatively determined at al). (A quali-
tative determination is one in which somewhat and its other
mutually limit each other.) Any criticism that attempts to ±ix
the limits of human cognition will meet this difficulty. It will
presuppose that it has before it as its object both itself as limited
and the object lohich limits it. The theory that mind is a func-
tion of brain, and limited by the structure of the brain, is formed
by an intellect that knows not only the structure of brain, but t^ie
structure of an indefinite number of other bodies. Not only this, it
knows the nature of those general conditions, space and time and
movement, which are the logical conditions of all physical exist-
ence. Hence there are no limits to be found in the intellect that
indicate any qualitative limits known to belong to brain.

In general, the position taken by agnosticism, that there is a
possibility that necessary ideas do not apply to things in them-
selves, is itself a position taken as regards objective possibility or
non-possibility ; hence it is self-contradictory. Reduced to its
lowest terms, it says : " Objective possibility is sufficiently known
by the human mind to affirm of it its difference from any human
knowledge of it."

The Unification of Science. 121

THE UNIFICATION OF SCIENCE.

BY ALFRED ARNOLD.

"The Law of Relativities" implies a universal science. This
law — tliat phenomena or things perceived are only the effects of
methodical relations or interactions of other things — is an ac-
cepted scientific fact, evident in our experiences.

The following paper gives the final analysis of all Being; har-
monizing, and bringing into the field of science, physics, meta-
physics, and religion.

First Principles.

Principles and phenomena, jointly, constitute all Being — the
inner and outer worlds — self, and not self. Principles are inde-
structible, inner and outer relativities ; and Phenomena, or things
perceived, are effects of their unstable relations. What we per-
ceive as matter is a phenomenon ; it exists only as an effect of un-
stable interactions or relations of inner and outer principles. It has
no abstract existence, either in the outer or the inner world. Pro-
fessor Huxley, in " Lay Sermons," says : " Matter may be called
a form of thought." Dr. Tyndall, in " Virchow and Evolution,"
says : " Matter is that mysterious something by which all has
been accomplished." Physicists, generally, accept the Boscovitch
theory, that matter consists of immaterial atoms of force. These
irrational, contradictory definitions result from considering mat-
ter as an abstract, indestructible substance. Mistaking unstable,
phenomenal matter for indestructible physical principles leads to
belief in personal annihilation. But, as that which appears as the
material body results, like all physical phenomena, from the in-
teraction of outer physical and inner conscious principles, we know
that neither the phenomenal body nor the interacting physical
principles cause consciousness ; and, as neither the creation nor
annihilation of these interacting physical and conscious principles
is thinkable, we are forced to conclude that they are ever-exist-
ing; hence immortality of mind and body; so-called death being
only a change in the conditions of the phenomenal body. Anni-

122 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

hilation and creation are only changinp; the adaptations of con-
stant means to unstable phenomenal ends, so tliat, the creation of
new ends beinsi; the inevitable annihihition of the old, all creatable
things are destructible ; only physical and mental means or prin-
ciples always will and — though little of the past is remembered —
always did exist ; that either conscious or physical principles, or
that any indestructible thing had a beginning is unthinkable ;
whatever can be done can be undone; to alternately do and undo
phenomena is the Order of Nature, but the Principles of nature
can be rationally thought of only as constant ; without beginning
or end. *

The following deductions from Natural Science give the con-
stituent parts of all Being and their general modes or 'methods —
the Inexorable Order of Nature :

I.

Eelativities, and their realized relations, constitute all being.
The relativities are constant inner and outer principles, and their
changing methodical relations or interactions result in states of
consciousness or phenomena — definite, unstable, perceived, phys-
ical and mental being. (2) "We know that a phenomenon re-
sults from a relation, because, like no other thing than a definite
relation, its annihilation is the inevitable creation of another.
And as only principles are potent and indestructible, they are, in-
evitably, the elementary relativities. (3) Methodical annihilations
and creations of specific relations of principles — phenomena, or
things that appear — constitute the order of nature. Appearances
are not unlike the things that appear, because the appearance is
the identical and only thing that appears. As this appearance, or
thing that appears, results fi'om the interaction of both inner and
outer principles, previous to this interaction, not the thing, but
only its cause existed. As the foi'ms, motions, and forces of waves,
which appear to us through physical sense, result from the inter-
action of inner and outer principles, they are only joint inner and
outer existences; therefore undulating ether is an imaginary sub-
stance used to give a definite idea of the modes of outer prin-
ciples whose realized relations with inner conscious principles are
heat, light, color, etc. (4) Atoms, molecules, and molecular mo-

The UnijiGation of Science. 123

tions are only working hypotheses employed to fix a vivid, definite
idea of principles, their combinations, relations, and methodically
changing relations. (5) Science has resolved all matter to force,
and force to potentiality ; and, as we know that potentiality is only
a relation of principles in the order of nature, we know that force
is only a relation ; its annihilation being the creation of the poten-
tial relation. (6) We know that phenomena are the realized re-
lations of dynamical and conscious principles, because only modes
of motion pass to and from the seat of consciousness.

II.

Consciousness inevitably implies personality — self — the Ego.
Sensation, thought, emotion, memory, want, volition, power or
effort to relieve, and relief are, as persistent principles, properties
of self; and their unstable, methodical, realized relations wath
each other, and with other principles, are phenomena or expe-
riences. (2) Ilarmonions relations are pleasurable, discordant re-
lations are painful ; therefore pleasurable relief from our several
wants is proportionate to our knowledge of the essential prin-
ciples, and of the essential methods of bringing them into the
essential relations. Hence the value of knowledge, and our in-
centive to acquire it. (3) We cannot reasonably assume that
any specific thing is unknowable, because only infinite knowledge
can know the limits to future finite knowledge; only abstractions
— nonentities — are impossible to knowledge. (4) Self and not
self imply each other; they are joint existences. They consist of
both principles and the relation of principles, and are, therefore,
ever existing, remaining constant thnrngh the successive changes
of their phenomena. But, as memory does not extend to C)ur
known personal identity of early childhood, our previous identity
is of course forgotten ; present memory comprises nothing before,
and only an infinitesimal part of our momentary experience
since, birth. Self, or personality, consists, either of ever-existing
principles, or ot" only unstable phenomena subject to creation and
annihilation — there is no middle ground. And it is absurd to
assume that infant body and mind is not a new relation of pre-
viously existing personal, as well as physical, principles; assum-
ing that personality results from only impersonal principles is

124 The Journal of SpeGidative Pliilosojyhy.

equivalent to as'suming that it results from nothing, which is
absurd.

III.

As states of consciousness — phenomena — result from physical
and mental interaction or relations, mind and body are inevitably
inseparable ; and the study of Biology is only searching for the
pliysical, sensiferous, and mental principles; the indestructible
personality discerned only through our reasoning faculties. (2)
We have the same evidence that our bodies, perceived in dreams,
trances, etc., distant from the torpid body, are seats of conscious-
ness or self, as that our wakeful bodies are — viz., they are, to self —
materialized seats of conscious, personal identity ; they are sen-
siferous, thinking, emotional bodies. Therefore, as these several
bodies comprise the material, sensiferous, tiiinking, emotional prin-
ciples— consciousness or self — it matters as little how long or short
the duration of any specific body, as of any other unstable phe-
nomenon ; for each body being only a specific relation of physical
and personal principles is, when destroyed, as inevitably followed
by another as are the properties of matter when destroyed, or as
the relation of a moving man on a chess-board is followed by an-
other and different one. (3) As phenomena are relations of both
personal and external principles, like phenomena are inevitable to
like inner and outer relations, but unlike phenomena result when
the inner relations differ, as in the color-blind, lunatics, clairvoy-
ants, and dreamers, who perceive phenomena not perceived by
others at the same time and place, and others perceive phenomena
not perceived by them. The usual state of personal relations is
called the normal state, and unusual states abnormal; all states
are, of course, equally natural, and the most pleasurable state pro-
portionate to pain, whether usual or unusual, is the most desirable
state. (4) Sensiferous organs present only unstable, physical
phenomena. The so-called indestructible elementary substances
are unstable materialized relations, and their disappearance in
chemical combinations is their total annihilation, and the creation
of other specific relations, or wholly difterent material things. (5)
Time and Space are principles or relativities, from whence the
phenomena extension, form, limitation, motion, succession, etc.,
are derived.

The Unification of Science. 125-

lY.

Self and not self are, tlien, jointly Nature, as inseparable as
God and the intelligence that Nature displays. God is in us, and
we in him. "In him we live, and move, and have our being."
As principles are only methodical designs, they are attributes of
him. He is Universal Being — the ever-existing, omnipresent,
omniscient, omnipotent "I AM" — and all conscious beings are
integrals. Our knowledge of him is infinitely greater than our
knowledge of man, because we discern in man only an infinitesi-
mal part of the intelligence we discern in Nature.

Creation and Annihilation.

Physical force and all other physical properties are subject to
practical creation and annihilation. Physical force is static when
it pertains to rest. It is created and annihilated by changing the
space relations between the fulcrum and two ends of a lever. As
the substance of the lever remains constant, the static force created
is only the physical realization of a relation of principles pertain-
ing to space — only the result of modes or methods — and we create
it and annihilate it by methodically ch;inging the space relations
of these principles — e. g., the static force of gravity is increased
and diminished by less or greater distance.

Force is dynamical and efl'ective when it pertains to motion.
A body at rest on the surface of the earth is moving round the
centre of the earth more than a thousand miles an hour; to stop
this motion, the body must be moved in the opposite direction
with a like velocity relative to its then position on the sur:^ace of
the earth ; so that both motion and rest are constant conditions of
every mass and molecule of matter. They are two relations in
space. The changing space relations between molecules or masses
we call motion, and the unchanging relations we call rest; and
the interchange of these relations we call force or energy. The
body at rest on the surface of the eartli had not, nor has it now,
any mechanical force, but it was subject to a potential relation of
principles pertaining to time and space, and changing that rela-
tion destroyed that potentiality, created force, destroyed that
force, and created another and different potentiality in the oppo-

126 The Journal of Speculative Philosoj^hy.

site direction. There is no conservation of physical energy.
There is no more energy in a lifted than in an nnlifted weight, in
a bent than in an nnbent bow, nor in motion than in rest. So-
called potential enei-gy is a specific, inert relation, which must be
totally destroyed and another created to bring energy into exist-
ence.

The potentiality of a ponnd weight moving eight feet per sec-
ond equals one foot-]>onnd of power. Now change the relation
of space to time, from 8 : 1 to 16 : 1, and it increases the potentiality
fourfold. As the same constant pressure or force that gave the
velocity of eight feet per second, or one foot-pound in one quarter
of a second, applied through one foot of space, gives sixteen feet
per second, or four foot-pounds in half a second, applied through
four feet of space — all else but relations pertaining to time and
space having remained constant — it follows that motion and
dynamical force are only relations of principles pertaining to time
and space, and we create and annihilate them by methodically
changing the relations of these principles. The force that sinks
an enemy's ship exists not in the powder and ball, but is a specific
relation of dynamical principles pertaining to tiuje and space, to
which powder, ship, and ball are, as our analysis of motion showed,
equally subjective; and this relation is created by methodical
action of iinite mind or will. Therefore, that mental effort which,
through ivhatever means, changes the relations of these constant
principles — as immaterial as the will to which they are subject —
creates and annihilates physical force, motion, and rest, whether
they relate to masses, as cannon-balls, or to the molecules of the
brain. And as these methodical principles are intelligent designs
in the Order of Nature, it follows that the elements of the Uni-
verse are only attributes of Supreme Mind, of which iinite minds
are integrals.

When the mind brings the proper dynamical principles into
^proper relations, and tlien, through the brain, nerves, muscles,
hand, and cue, realizes the relations as physical sense, by moving
hand, cue, and billiard-ball, each impact of cue, balls and cushions
of the table, is a creation of a specific physical force, secondary to
the will-force. The player, previous to each stroke, mentally
brings the proper principles of dynamics into proper relations,
thus originating a special law to govern the ball after it leaves the

The Unificatimi of Science. 127

cue, and then will-force, bj giving proper motion to brain mole-
cules, muscles and cue^ executes this law through all its ramifica-
tions of secondary forces and motions in accordance with his origi-
nal design. When the dynamical principles are brought into
proper relations, the created forces are as truly realized to mental
sense as they are to physical sense when, afterwards, physically ex-
pressed. The first is cognition, the second recognition. Though
we are physically insensible to the Weill's action on the brain, we
are sensible of its efiect on the hand and cue, and tracing the
physical force back, from the cne to the first impulse of the brain,
inevitably traces the will force to that impulse.

Now imagine that physical force is indestructible, and that the
force of each impact of the cue was communicated to it, from
molecule to molecule, throughout all time and space, governed
only by physical, which is mechanical law. Imagine that this
mechanical force, in the form of chemical action, in the brain of
these players evolved the thought that they would play this game
of billiards one year thereafter, and at the end of that year evolved
another thought that they would postpone the game another year.
And then that this persistent force evolved the thoughts, wills,
and physical actions of these players during these two years which
resulted in the written history of England by one, and that of
America by the other, and at the appointed time, to a moment;
this indestructible force gave the molecules exact, proper direc-
tions and velocities, at each proper impact of the cue, and at the
same time deluded the players into the belief that they and not it
originated all this. Imagine all these experiences to have origi-
nated only in physical or mechanical law, and we comprehend
the absurdity of that " scientific imagination " which " discerns in
matter all the promise and potency of life."

As changing the relations of anything is — like moving a man
-on a chess-board — the annihilation of the old relation, and inevita-
ble creation of another, so all so-called decompositions of matter
are total annihilations of the old matter, and actual creations of
the new. In the decomposition of water the relation of principles
which constitute hydrogen and oxygen are brought into being
only when those which constitute water are annihilated ; metals
are oxidized in water only by destroying water relations and cre-
ating others ; if water were hydrogen and oxygen, it would be

128 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

coinhustible and explosive, l)ecause things exist only in their quali-
ties; dec'onipusing water with the poles of a battery distant from
each other is a practical demonstration that water is not combined
hydrogen and oxygen. Inertia exists not in rest, nor in constant
velocity ; but changing these relations to either accelerating or
retarding motion creates it. Cliemical discoveries of new kinds
or qualities of matter result only from methodically changing
the relations of chemical jn-inciples; hence the persistence of
these discoveries. Experimental research is only searching for
unknown methodical relations of principles essential to the
existence of some specific physical thing. Matter, then, persists
onlv as a constant succession of annihilations and creations ;
its persistence being the joint persistence of relativity and re-
lation.

Pleasures and pains are realized relations of physical, mental, and
moral principles, and knowledge of these principles enables ns to
create the former and destroy the latter — as fire, wisely employed,
results in pleasure ; but pain, caused by incendiary fires, is a spe-
cific relation of physics, vice, and folly, created by the incen-
diary.

Physical things, then, are brought into being by methodical
mental power, whether it be the fiat of God in a physical imi-
verse, or of finite power in the vocal expression of thougiit, or the
movement of a steamship — as when, in practical affairs, the prin-
ciples of chemistry, mechanics, law, trade, morals, etc., are care-
fully considered and brought into proper relations by voluntary
mental power, which then physically demonstrates, or realizes as
physical sense, the desired relation. Not these constant princi-
ples alone, but the Supreme, or the finite designer and creator of
their several essential relations, is the cause of definite physical
being.

Evolution.

That the Order of Nature is inexorable and consists, in part, of
the freedom and power of finite beings to create pleasurable and
destroy painful relations, to the extent of their knowledge of its
methods, and that its modes of progress is " survival of the fittest,"
is evident. But that theory of evolution which wholly subjects
mind to physical law is contradicted by science, and by every

The Unification of Science. 129

willed action of its self-deluded believer?. Man's physical power
is proportionate, not to his rauscle, bnt to his knowledge and
wisdom. Suspend all will-power over matter ibr one minute
in any great city, and no more would be heard of the evolu-
tion of intelligent automata. Human progress comes not from
waiting, Micawber-like, for something to turn up or be evolved,
but from the consciousness and execution of personal power
to create pleasurable relations from omnipotent, constant prin-
ciples.

The existence of will power over matter, being as evident as
the existence of reason, can, no more than reason, be reasoned out
of existence.

Supreme law, or the Order of Nature, is founded on justice ;
and human law, or the order of State, is intended to be so found-
ed ; not justice to an isolated person — no such person exists — but
to the person as a part of the Universe, or as a part of the State.
Most pleasure results from knowledge of, and obedience to, these
laws ; but each subject is free to disobey them through ignorance
or through vice — which is ignorance of true policy — and suffering
the penalty tends to his education and virtue. Thus, Supreme
design or law makes progression — "survival of the fittest" — in-
evitable, and secures, without amendment, all the harmony and
pleasure possible to individual freedom and finite knowledge, in
every stage of progress. And, moreover, law, penalties, and free-
dom are essential to the existence of conscious beings — no suffer-
ing, no wants; no wants, no action ; no action, no life. And life
is possible only to freedom ; to be wholly subjective is to be wholly
passive, and to be wholly passive is death. Thus, by analyzing
phenomena, we find absolute perfection in what otherwise appears
like imperfection.

It needs no argument to show that Supreme Intelligence reigns
in the order of nature, because all get intelligence from there,
and none can suppose it comes from where it is not. And, fur-
thermore, as intelligence implies personality, and personality emo-
tional, sympathetic feeling; answer to prayer — sincere, ardent
sup{)li(^ation for a harmless object, either uttered or expressed in
thought — evidently accords with the Order of Nature. But,
through unwisdom, few just and needful prayers are oftered, and
few are answered.
XV— 9

130 The Journal of Speculatim Philo,so2>hy.

Two States of Personal Being,

Self occupies two alternate normal states of being — wakeful
and sleeping states. The so-called abnormal states — somnambu-
lism, clairvoyance, hallucination, and illusion — may be called semi-
sleeping states.

The fact that some persons are, at the moment they wake,
always conscious of dreaming, though the dream may escape
memor}' the next moment, and that we often discern conscious-
ness in others in partial or unrestful sleep, though they do not
remember having dreamt, and that pleasant dreams make sleep
no less refreshing and invigorating to both mind and body, and
that somnambulists and clairvoyants retain self-consciousness, but
retain no memory of it, makes it reasonable to conclude that con-
sciousness and mental activity are constant in sleep, and in all
other torpid, inoperative conditions of the material body.

That physical things perceived in dreams, including a new body
distant from the torpid, sleeping body, are as real as those per-
ceived when awake, is demonstrated so far by the real physical
light seen by clairvoyants and somnambulists, and as all physical
things are relations, all realized relations must be equally real and
practical for the purposes to which they are adapted ; the shadow
is as real as that which casts it — in fact all being is real; the
question Science puts to Nature is not What is real ? but What
is ? The words unreal, unnatural, and supernatural have, in our
present state of knowledge, no meaning whatever. The body
realized in dreams is to self a vivid, materialized, sensiferous,
thinking, emotional body, and the wakeful body is to self only
this; all physical phenomena of either state are, to the person
changing states, destroyed, and others, differently conditioned,
appear in the other state. Both physical and mental sense being
equally real in both states, it is absurd to assume that they are re-
lations of real things in one state and of nothings in the other ; from
nothing, nothing proceeds; but physical phenomena proceed from
inner and outer means then and there existing, and changing the
existing means changes the phenomena. All means, modes, and
methods are subjects for experimental research. As the organs of
sense are inoperative in the sleeping, torpid body, mind in dreams
is as dependent on the body distant from the torpid body, and on

The Unification of Science. 131

other physical things then perceived, as it is on the torpid body,
and things perceived when awake. Greater rapidity of thought,
with less circulation of blood in the brain, is almost conclusive
that self is not in the sleeping body, but is in the dreaming body
distant from the sleeping body.

To exphiin these phenomena by the words " abnormal," " imag-
ination," "delusion," "indigestion," etc., is only expressing igno-
rance of the principles in nature of which they are all the realized
relations. And as our lives are nearly equally divided between
these two states of being, and as changing states without inter-
ruption of consciousness suggests immortality of personal identity,
mind and body, in their several states or conditions, should occupy
the first place in scientific investigation. Religious Faith has done
its work well, but advanced minds now want demonstrative proof
of a future life more than they do any other new discovery.

Universal Science.

Rational pleasure being the sole object of knowledge. Science
may be best defined as knowledge of specific methods of prevent-
ing and destroying specific pains and creating specific pleasures.
It enables us to create pleasurable relations known to the ignorant
only as " favorable circumstances," or "good luck," and to avoid
or destroy painful relations, known as unfavorable circumstances,
or "bad luck;" and as pleasures and pains are the realized rela-
tions of physical, mental, and moral principles subject to our wills,
to the extent of our knowledge and wisdom. Science should in-
clude all, in one general method.

We know, then, from a rational analysis of our experiences, that
physical and mental phenomena are unstable, realized relations of
constant principles, and as these principles form the basis of uni-
versal being, they are the proper basis for a Universal Science
broad enough to include self-respect, knowledge of God, profound,
logical, religious sentiment, and evidences of immortality.

132 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

GOD IN Ills ETERNAL IDEA.

TRANSLATED FROM THE THIRD PART OF HEGEL's " PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION " BY

F. LOUIS SOLDAN.

If God is thus contemplated in the element of thought, he is, so
to say, before or outside of the creation of the world. Inasmuch
as he is so in himself, he is the eternal idea which is not yet posited
in its reality, and is, therefore, as yet, the abstract idea.

God in his eternal idea is in this form still in the abstract ele-
ment of thinking, not in that of comprehension. This pure idea
is what we have already become acquainted with in the preceding
sections. It is the element of thought, the idea in its eternal Pres-
ent as it is for free thought which has the fundamental determina-
tion of being unobscured light, of being identity with itself ; it is
an element which has not yet the attribute of alienation or other-
ness in it.

In this element there is :

1. A determination necessary, since thinking in general is dif-
ferent from thinking which comprehends [things as a whole].
The eternal idea, in and for itself in thought, is idea in its abso-
lute truth. Religion has, therefore, a content, and the content is
object ; religion is the religion of man, and man, among other
things, is thinking consciousness. The idea must consequently
exist for thinking consciousness ; man, however, is not merely
this ; in thinking alone he becomes truly man, for thinking alone
the universal object exists, for it alone exists the essence of the
object, and since in religion God is the object, he is essentially the
object for thought. He is an object inasmuch as the spirit is con-
sciousness, and he is for thinking, because it is God who is the
object.

God cannot exist as God for the sensuous, reflecting conscious-
ness— that is to say, not according to his eternally in and for
itself existing essence ; his phenomenality is something different ;
it exists for sensuous consciousness. If God existed in sensation
only, man would not rank higher than the animal ; he certainly
exists for feeling also, but only in his phenomenality. Neither
does he exist for the ratiocinative consciousness; reflection is, in-

God in his Eternal Idea. 133

deed, thinking, but it is also contingency for wLich the content
may be ever so arbitrary, or limited. God may be such a content,
or may not. Essentially he is for thought. This must be said
when we start fi"om the subjective, from man. But we reach the
same conclusion if we begin with God. Spirit exists only as re-
vealing itself, as distinguishing itself for the spirit for which it
exists ; this is the eternal idea, the thiukirig spirit, or spirit in the
element of its freedom.

In this, God is self -revelation, because he is spirit ; but he exists
not yet as a phenomenon. It is, therefore, essential that God
exists for the spirit.

Spirit [as object] is the [same as the] thinking spirit. In this
pure thinking the relation is immediate, and there is no difference
which could separate them ; there is nothing between them ; think-
ing is the pure unity with itself, where all that is dark, all that is
obscure, disappears. (See note on p. 136.) This kind of thinking
might be called pure intuition since it is the simple activity of
thinking, in which there is not separation between subject and ob-
ject ; and, properly speaking, these two do not yet exist. This
kind of thinking has no limitation ; it is universal activity ; its
content is the universal itself ; it is pure circulation, or pulsation
within itself. It will, however, arrive also at :

2. Absolute diremption. How does this act of distinction take
place? Thinking, in actu, is unlimited. The first distinction is,
that the two sides which we have looked upon as the two modes of
the principle are different according to their points of departure.
The one side, subjective tliinking, is the movement of thinking by
which it rises from immediate, particular being, and elevates itself
therein to the universal and infinite, as is the case in the first
proofs of the existence of God. In so far as it has reached the
universal, thinking is unlimited ; its end is infinitely pure think-
ing, in which all the mists of finitude have disappeared. It then
thinks God ; all particularity has disappeared, and thus religion,
the thinking of God, begins. The other side is the one which has
the second point of departure, which starts from the universal,
from the result of that first movement, from thinking, from the
idea. The universal, on the other hand, is movement in itself,
which consists in its power to distinguish itself in itself, and to con-
tain this distinction in itself, but in such a way that it does not ob-

134 Tlie Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

scure the universality. (See note on p. 136.) Universality here
has a difference in itself, and proceeds in its entirety. This is the
abstract content of thinking, and this abstract thinking is the re-
sult which has been arrived at.

Both sides oppose each other thus : Subjective thinking, the
thinking of finite spirit, is a process as well, it is mediation in it-
self ; but this process lies outside of it, behind it, and religion be-
gins only when this thinking has arisen. It is thus in religion
pure, motionless, abstract thinking. Concrete thinking, however,
coincides with its object, for it is the thinking which begins with
the universal, which distinguishes itself and goes on in union with
this distinction ; the concrete is the object for thinking as think-
ing. This thinking is, therefore, abstract thinking, and, in conse-
quence, it is the finite ; for the abstract is finite, but the concrete
is the truth and the infinite object.

3. God is the spirit ; in abstract determination he is determined
as the universal spirit which particularizes itself ; this is the abso-
lute truth, and that religion is the true one which has this content.

The spirit is this process, it is movement and life ; in other
words, it can distinguish and determine itself, and the first deter-
mination is, that spirit exists as this universal idea itself. This
universal contains the whole idea, but it only contains it [implicit] ;
it is idea only in itself.

In the judgment, there is the alien, which stands over against
the universal, the particular ; there is God, as that which is dis-
tinguished from himself, but he is so in such a way that this dis-
tinct thing is his whole idea in and for itself. Thus these two
determinations are the same for each other ; they are identity, they
are one, and this distinction is not cancelled merely in itself, not
merely for our knowing, but rather in such a manner that their
identity is posited, and that these distinctions cancel themselves.
It is implied in this distinction that the difference is posited as nu-
gatory, and thus each [distinct phase] is in the other as in itself.
In this process lies the nature of spirit itself, or, expressed in the
form of feeling, it is eternal love. The holy spirit is eternal love.
If we say : God is love, it is a very sublime and true saying, but it
would be meaningless to take it simply as a simple determination,
without analyzing what love is.

Love is a distinction of two, who yet, for each other, are simply

Qod in his Eternal Idea. 135

not distinguished. The feeling and consciousness of this identity
is love. Love is this being- outside-of-myself : I have my self-
consciousness not in myself, but in another ; yet it is another in
which alone I am satisfied, and at peace with myself (and I exist
solely because I have peace in myself ; if I lack this peace I am the
contradiction which disintegrates itself) ; this other or alien, while
thus being outside of me, has its self -consciousness in myself alone,
and the two are only this combined consciousness of this sundered
being and of their identity. This perceiving, this feeling, this cog-
nizing of unity, is love.

God is love, i. e., he is this distinguishing, and [at the same time]
the nugatoriness of this distinguishing, this playing with distinc-
tion without being in earnest with it, which is posited as being
cancelled, i.e.^ [he is] the eternal, simple idea.

This eternal idea has found expression in Christian religion in
what has been called the holy Trinity — that is, God himself, the
eternally triune God.

God exists here only for the thinking man, who quietly remains
withdrawn within himself. The ancients called this enthusiasm.
It is the purely theoretical contemplation, the highest repose of
thinking, but it is at the same time the highest activity in grasping
the pure idea of God and in becoming conscious of it. The mys-
tery of the dogma of what God is, is here communicated to man-
kind ; men believe in it, and are already blessed with the highest
truth when they receive it in their image-conception only, or as a
mental representation, even when they are not conscious of the
necessity of this truth, and do not comprehend it. Truth is the
disclosure of what spirit is in-and-f or-itself ; man is spirit himself,
therefore truth exists for him, but truth as it comes to him at first
does not have for him the form of freedom ; it is something that
is given to him, something which he has received, but which he
can receive only because he is spirit. This truth, this idea, has
been called the dogma of the Trinity — God is spirit, the activity of
pure cognition, activity which is by itself. It was principally Aris-
totle who conceived God in the abstract determination of activity.
The pure activity is a knowing {Actus Purus^ in the time of the
scholastics), but pure activity, in order to be posited as activity, must
be posited in its phases {Momenteii). In the process of knowing, an
other, an alien which is known, is necessary, and when the knowing

136 Tlie Journal of Speeidative Philosophy.

cognizes it, tlie other becomes appropriated by it. In this process
it is contained that God, wlio is eternally in-and-for-himself, begets
himself eternally as his Son, and distinguishes liiniself from him^
self; it is the absolute [diremption as exhibited in the form of]
judgment (Urtheil). What lie thus distinguishes from himself
does not have the form of otherness, of alien being, but the thing
distinguished is immediately nothing but that from which it is
distinguished. God is spirit ; no dimness, nor tint, nor blending
enters this pure light.' The relation of father and son has been
taken from organic life, and is nsed as an image-concept only. This
natural relation is only a simile, and therefore does not quite cor-
respond to what it is intended to express. We say God begets
eternally his son, God distinguishes himself from himself, and in
these expressions God forms the starting point of our exposition.
We say: He does this, and is in the posited other strictly by him-
self (the form of love), but we ought to know that God himself is
this entire activity, God is the origin [the cause] ; he does this,
but he is in the same way the end, he is the totality ; and, as total-
ity, God is spirit. God as merely father is not yet the full truth.
(The Jewish religion cognizes him thus, without the son) ; he is, on
the contrary, beginning and end. He is his own presupposition,
he makes himself such (this is only another form of the distinc-
tion), he is the eternal process. The statement that this is the truth,
and the absolute truth, may, perhaps, appear to have the form of a

' Translator's Note. — Hegel takes his similitudes here and elsewhere, at times with
preference, from Goethe's peculiar work on the " Theory of Colors." Goethe considered
Newton's theory erroneous, and beUeved that colors were produced by the joint action of
two elementary principles — light and darkness — that is to say, by an admixture of the two.
A small degree of darkness mingling with light, for instance, produced yellow ; dark-
ness with little light, blue. " To produce color, light and obscurity, darkness and bright-
ness, or, if we wish to use a more general expression, light and non-light are necessary.
Nearest to the light we have the color called yellow ; another, nearest to darkness, we call
blue. . . . These two primary colors, each by itself, may produce new colors, by their
condensation or obscuration. . . . Colors are to be looked upon as half lights, or half
shadows, and thus when mixed together they lose their special qualities and produce a
shade of gray." (" Goethe's Theory of Colors," Introduction.) "Colors are the effect
which colorless, transparent, and opaque bodies have on the light." {Id., iv, 6S8.) " The
dimness of the medium is often the necessary condition {i. c, for light to produce the
phenomenon of color "). {Id., iv, 6,691.) " Every modified light may be looked upon as
colored ; indeed, we may call every light, in so far as it is seen, color. Colorless light,
colorless surfaces, are, in a measure, abstractions." {Id., iv, 690.)

God in his Eternal Idea. 137

postulate. But it is the task and whole content of philosophy to
make it known as tliat which is true in and for itself. In philoso-
phy it is shown that the whole content of nature and of spirit gravi-
tates dialectically towards this centre as its absolute truth. It can-
not be our object here to prove that the dogma, this still mystery,
is the absolute truth, for this is done everywhere in philosophy.
The following may be said in further explanation of these deter-
minations :

A. When it is predicated of God what he is, the attributes are
given first : this is God ; he is thus determined by predicates ; this
is the manner in which the idea is grasped by the image-con-
ception or mental representation, and by the understanding.
Predicates are determinations, particularizations : goodness, om-
nipotence, etc.

These predicates are not, indeed, natural immediateness, but they
have become current through reflection ; and thereby the deter-
mined content has become as immovably fixed as the natural content
is, as which God has been represented in natural religion. The
natural objects, like sun, sea, etc., are ; but the determinations of
reflection are just as identical with themselves as natural imme-
diateness.

The Orientals have the feeling that this is not the true way of
expressing the nature of God, and say, therefore, that he is
'7roXva}vvfx,o^, and that he cannot be exhausted by predicates ; for
names, in this sense, are the same as predicates.

The true defect of this manner of determining God by predi-
cates lies in the circumstance w^iich gives rise to this infinite
number of predicates, namely, that these predicates are particular
determinations only, and that there are many such particular deter-
minations given to a subject which is indeterminable and without
differences in itself. Since they are particular determinations,
and, since these particulars are considered according to their
determinateness, since they are thought, they contain a contrast
and contradiction ; and, in this view, the contradictions are not
cancelled.

The same appears in the assertion that these predicates are to
express the relation of God to the world ; the world is another
thing than God. As particulars they are not adequate to his na-
ture ; in this lies the other manner of regarding them, namely, as

138 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

relations of God to the world — as oiimipresence, omniscience of
God in the world.

They do not contain the true relation of God to himself, but
his relation to something else — the world ; thus they are limited,
and fall into contradiction. We have the consciousness that God
is not represented living and real, when so many particulars are
enumerated in succession. Their contradiction is not truly can-
celled by the abstraction of their determinateness, when the un-
derstanding demands that they should be taken only in sensu
efninentiori. The true cancellation of the contradiction is con-
tained in the idea, which is God's self-determination to be what is
distinct from himself, but the idea is also the eternal cancellation
of this distinction.

The disthiction, if left in this condition, would be contradiction :
if the distinction remained fixed, finiteness would be the result ;
tlie two elements are independent of, and yet in relation to, each
other. It is not the nature of the idea to let this difference remain,
but also to cancel it ; God posits himself in this distinction, and
likewise cancels it.

In asserting predicates of God which are particulars, we en-
deavor first to cancel this contradiction. This is an external
activity ; it is otir reflection, and the circumstance that it is exter-
nal, that it falls within us, implies that the contradictions cannot
be cancelled. The [absolute] idea itself is the cancellation of this
contradiction ; its own content and determination is to posit this
distinction and to cancel it absolutely, and in this lies the life and
animation of the idea itself.

B. In the metaphysical proofs of the existence of God we see
that mode of procedure which, starting from the idea, arrives at
being, and we see that the idea is not only ideal, but that it is;
that it has reality. In this standpoint, which we now occupy,
originates the interest to pass from idea to being.

The divine idea is the pure idea, the idea without any limita-
tion ; the absolute idea involves this : that the idea determines itself,
that it posits itself as what is distinct from itself. This is a phase
(moment) of the divine idea itself, and, since the thinking, reflect-
ing spirit has this content present and before itself, there lies in it
the need of this transition and movement.

The logical element of the transition is contained in those so-

God in his Eternal Idea. 139

called proofs : it is intended to proceed, by means of the idea, from
the idea and throngli the idea itself, to objectivity and being in
the element of thinking. This process, which appears as a sub-
jectiv^e need, is itself content, is one phase (moment) of the divine
idea itself.

When we say God created a world, it is nothing but a transition
from the idea to objectivity, but the world is here determined as
something essentially other than God. It is the negation of God,
and is external to him ; is without or outside of him, is godless.
Since the world is determined as this other thing, we do not have
before us the distinction as inhering in the idea itself, and remain-
ing within the idea ; i. e., being, objectivity, shall be shown to
lie in the idea as activity, consequence, and as the self -determi-
nating process of the idea.

It is demonstrated thereby that this content, in itself, is the same
as the one which is a requirement in the form of the mentioned
proof of the existence of God. God, in the absolute idea, or in
the element of thinking, is this simply concrete universal ; i. e.,
he posits himself as an alien or other thing, but does it in such a
way that this other is immediately and directly posited as God
himself, that the distinction is ideal only, tliat it is cancelled imme-
diately, and that it does not attain the form of externality ; this is
what is meant by saying that the distinction must be demonstrated
by means of and in the idea.

It appears from logic that it is the nature of each determinate
idea to cancel itself, to exist as its own contradiction, to become
in this what is distinct from itself, and to posit itself as such dis-
tinction. Thus the idea itself is still marked with the one-sided-
ness and finitude of being something subjective, since the deter-
minations of the idea, the differences are posited only as ideal, and
not as actual differences. This is the idea which makes itself
objective.

When we say God, we have expressed his abstraction only ; or, if
we say God the father, the universal, we have expressed him only
according to iinitude. His infinity lies in this, that he cancels this
form of abstract universality of immediateness, and by this the
difference is posited. But he is also the cancellation of this differ-
ence. In this alone he becomes true reality, truth, infinity.

This idea is the speculative idea ; i. «., the rational, since it is

140 Tlie Journal of Sj)eGalative Philosophy.

thouglit, since it is the thinking of the rational. On tlio other
liand, tlie non-specnhitive thinking, the thinking of the understand-
ing, stops at the difference as a difference, and in the same way at
the finite and tlie infinite. The quality of being absolute is
ascribed to both [of the latter], and hence relation to each other,
and thus unity [is predicated], and with it contradiction.

C. This speculative idea stands in contrast with the sensuous,
and also with the understanding ; it is, therefore, a secret for both
— for sensuous contemplation and for the understanding. It is
a [xva-TripLov for each; i. e., in regard to the rational element in it.
The nature of God is not a secret in the ordinary sense, and least
so in the Christian religion, for there God has made himself
known, has shown what he is, there he is revealed ; but it is a
secret for sensuous perception, for the image-conception, for the
sensuous mode of contemplation, and for the understanding.

The sensuous has, on the whole, externality for its primal prin-
ciple ; it is being-outside-of-itself ; differences are beside each other
in space, after each other in time ; time and space are the exter-
nality in which differences exist. The sensuous view and mode of
contemplation is accustomed to have before itself such difference
as is outside itself. The basis and presupposition of this view is,
that the differences for themselves thus remain separated from
each other.

That which is [contained] in the idea remains, therefore, a
secret to this mode of contemplation, because the idea has quite
another mode, relation and category, than sensuousness. The idea
is this distinguishing which is at the same time no distinction, and
which does not remain in this distinction. God views himself in
that which is distinguished from hira ; in his other he is allied to
himself only, is only in himself therein, is linked but to himself ;
in his other he sees himself.

This is quite contrary to the sensuous [view]. In the sensuoue?
one thing is here and another is there ; each is looked upon as some-
thing independent ; it is looked upon as not having such a nature
as to have existence by having itself in another. In the sensuous,
two things cannot be in one and the same place ; they exclude each
other.

In the idea these differences are not posited as excluding each
other, but as existing in this connection or joining together only

God in his Eternal Idea. 141

of the one with the other. This is the true supersensuons and not
the ordinary supersensuons, whicli is said to be ahove^ for the lat-
ter is also sensuous ; i. e., it is disjoined, external, and contingent.
Only because God is determined as spirit, externality is cancelled ;
and this is, therefore, a mystery for the senses.

In the same way this idea stands above the understanding, and is
a secret for it. For it is the nature of understanding to remain in
the categories of thinking, to cling to them and to look upon them
as being simply outside of each other, separated from each other,
as being opposed to each other, and as being fixed. The positive
is not what the negative is ; [nor is] effect, cause.

But it is just as true for the idea that these differences cancel each
other. Because they are distinct things they remain finite, and it
is in the nature of the understanding to remain in the finite ; and
even when looking at the infinite, understanding sees on one side
the infinite and on the other the finite.

The true standpoint is, that the finite and the infinite which
stands opposed to the finite, have no truth, are but transi-
tions in themselves. This is, therefore, a secret for the power of
sensuous representation and the understanding, and they rebel
against the rationality of the idea. The opponents of the dogma
of the Trinity are found among those only in whom the sensu-
ous element or the understanding predominates.

Nor can the understanding grasp anything else — that is to say,
the truth of anything else. Even animal life exists as idea, as
the unity of idea, of soul and body. For the understanding each
appears separated, but it is at the same time trae that the differ-
ence is in a process of cancellation ; living is nought but this per-
petual process.

What is living is^ it has impulses, wants, and with this distinction
and difference in itself, they rise in it. Thus it bears a contradic-
tion in it, and the understanding looks upon the differences with
the idea that the contradiction cannot be cancelled, and that,
when these differences are brought in relation to each other,
there subsists nothing but the contradiction which cannot be can-
celled.

This is correct enough ; the contradiction cannot cease when
these are insisted upon as perennial distinctions, but the reason
of it is, that understanding stops at these differences. Whatever

142 The Journal of ISpeculative Philosophy.

is living has needs, and therefore is contra<liction ; but the gratifi-
cation of these wants is the annnhnent of the contradiction.

In my desires, impulses, needs, I am self-distinguished within
myself. But life means the annulment of the contradiction, or
the gratitication of the desire ; it seeks to set it at rest, but in such
a way that this contradiction may rise again. It is the alternate
succession of distinction, contradiction, and the annulment of it.

These phases differ in regard to time ; there is sequence ; one
occurs after the other, and therefore they are finite. But the
understanding, in considering desire and gratification, does not
even comprehend that in the afSrmative [element], in self-con-
sciousness, the negation of self- consciousness, the barrier, the
want, exist at the same time, but that I, as self-consciousness, at
once stretch forth my hand beyond this want.

This is the definite idea of the fivar/jpiov. Mystery is the name
which we also use for the inconceivable or incomprehensible ; that
which is called incomprehensible is the idea itself, the speculative,
the thinking of the rational ; but it is by thinking that the distinc-
tion [or inward diversity of contents] stands out clearly and dis-
tinctly.

If we think an instinct or desire, it is but an analysis of what
the instinct or desire is. Affirmation and, in it, negation, self-
consciousness, gratification, and desire. To think it means to cog-
nize the distinct element that lies in it. When the understanding
approaches this, it says : This is a contradiction, and on this it in-
sists; it adheres to it, quite contrary to the experience that life
means nothing but the annulment of these distinctions.

When the instinct or desire is analyzed, the contradiction ap-
pears, and one might say : The desire is something incompre-
hensible. The nature of God is just as much incomprehensible.
What is called incomprehensible is nothing but the idea itself,
which contains this attribute in it : namely, that it distinguishes,
and the understanding stops at this distinction.

Understanding says : This cannot be comprehended ; for the
principle of the understanding is the abstract identity with itself
and not the concrete identity, where these differences are in one.
God is the One, the being of beings for the understanding. This
identity, which is empty and lacks distinction, is a delusive fabric
of the understanding and of modern theology. God is spirit, that

God in his Eternal Idea. 143

which makes itself objective to itself and knows itself therein ;
this is concrete identity ; and thus the idea is at the same time an
essential phase {moment). But, according to the abstract idea, the
one as well as the other are independent for themselves, and at
the same time they are correlatives, and thus the contradiction is
there.

And this they call the incomprehensible. The idea is the annul-
ment of the contradiction ; understanding can never achieve the
annulment of the contradiction, because it starts from its own
presupposition, namely, that they are and remain simply indepen-
dent of each other.

The saying that the divine idea is incomprehensible may be at-
tributed in part to the fact that, since religion is the truth for all
men, the content of the idea appears in sensuous form, or in the
form of the understanding. It appears in sensuous form, and thus
we have the expressions father and son, expressing a relation ex-
isting in the life of man, a designation taken from sensuous life.

Truth is revealed according to its content in religion, but this
content exists also in the form of the idea of thinking, of the idea
in speculative form. No matter how happy those forms are which
faith possesses, as " son," " begotten son," etc., they are perverted
at once when the understanding begins to meddle with them and
to carry over into them its categories ; it can show contradictions
therein to its full satisfaction whenever it pleases. Understanding
has the power and the right to do this by its distinction of these
forms from their reflection in itself. But it is God, the s^Dirit, who
himself cancels these contradictions. Spirit has not waited for the
understanding to remove the determinations which contain the
contradiction. It is the nature of spirit to remove them. But it
is its nature at the same time to posit those determinations, to dis-
tinguish itself in itself, to produce this diremption.

There is another form which the action of the understanding
takes. "We say : " God in his eternal universality has for his na-
ture that he distinguishes himself, determines himself, that he
posits what is alien or other to himself, and then also that he cancels
the difference so that, in it, he is in himself ; by this self -creation
alone spirit i?." But here understanding steps up and carries with
it its categories of finitude, counts one, two, three, and thus mixes
the unfortunate form of number with it. But number has nothing

144: Tlie Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

to do with this ; counting is here totally empty of thought and
meaning, and thus, if this form is therefore carried over into the
question, there is emptiness and absence of idea in it.

Reason can use all the categories of understanding, but it also
annuls them ; this is what it does in this instance; but this is a
hardship for the understanding, for, because its categories are used,
it believes itself to have gained a right in them ; but they are mis-
used when used as they are in the understanding, in saying: three
are one. It is therefore very easy to point out contradictions in
such ideas, distinctions which are antithetic in form, and the bare
and empty understanding thinks that it is doing something great
when it collects them. All that is concrete, all that is living, bears,
as we have shown, this contradiction in itself ; dead understanding
alone is identical with itself. But, in the idea, the contradiction
is annulled also, and only in this annulment the spiritual unity
exists.

At a first glance it looks as if it were a matter of course, some-
thing natural and artless to count the phases or stages {momente)
of the idea as three and one. And yet if, according to the nature
of number which has thus been mixed up with it, every determina-
tion is fixed as one, and then three ones must be comprehended as
only one one, it becomes, as it seems, the hardest, or, as it may be
expressed, the most unreasonable demand. For the understanding
conceived only of the absolute independence or self-dependence of
the one and absolute separation and disintegration. Logical con-
templation, on the contrary, shows the One to be dialectic in itself
and not truly independent. It is only necessary to think of mat-
ter, which is the real one that offers resistance, but is heavy ; i. e.,
it shows the tendency not to be as one, but to cancel its self-depen-
dent existence, its being for itself, and thus itself pronounces the
latter something nugatory ; of course, since it remains only matter,
this most extreme externality, this remains only a tendency ; mat-
ter is still the poorest, most external, and unspiritual mode of be-
ing ; but gravitation, this cancellation of the one, constitutes the
principle of matter.'

' Tuanslator's Note. — The characteristic of matter is gravitation. Gravitation is the
striving of matter toward the centre of gravity. The centre of gravity is a geometrical
point. A point is immaterial. Thus matter has for its characteristic the tendency
towards and dependency on the immaterial.

God in his Eternal Idea. 145

The one is, in the first place, quite abstract ; these " ones " are
^till more deeply expressed in a spiritual way by being defined as
persons. It is the nature of personality that it is based on free-
dom, on primal, deepest, innermost freedom ; but it is at the same
time the most abstract mode in which the freedom manifests itself
in the subject when the latter knows : I am a person, I am for
myself ; that is simply a fixed and rigid principle.

The determination of these dilferences as each being one, or even
as each being a person, this infinite form in which each phase
{moment) is to be as a subject, seems to bo an insurmountable ob-
stacle to our complying with what the idea demands, namely, that
these distinctions be considered as not distinguished, but as simply
One, as the cancellation of this difference.

Two cannot be one ; each person is something rigid, inflexible,
independent ; each is existence for itself. Logic shows the cate-
gory of One that it is a poor category, that it is One quite abstract.
As regards personality, the contradiction seems to be carried so far
in it that it becomes incapable of any solution ; but the solution
lies, nevertheless, in this, that this threefold person is but One, and
the fact that the personality is posited therewith as a vanishing
phase (Qnoment) only expresses that the antithesis must be taken,
not as a contrast of lower order, but in the absolute sense ; and just
in this extreme it cancels itself. The nature and character of this
person, or rather subject, is so constituted as to cancel its isolation
and separation.

It is the nature of morality and love to give up one's particu-
larity, one's particular personality, and to expand it into univer-
sality. The same is true in the family, in friendship, where this
identity of one with the other exists. In doing what is right
towards the other, I consider him identical with myself. In friend-
ship and in love I give up my abstract personaHty and thereby
gain it, namely, the concrete personality.

The truth of this personality is indeed this, that we gain it by
merging it into the other. Such forms of the understanding prove
themselves immediately in experience such as cancel themselves.
The person retains his identity in love and in friendship ; by love
it has its subjectivity, which is its personality. If the personality
is abstractly retained in religion, in this instance, the result is
three Gods, and in this the infinite form, the absolute negativity,
XV— 10

146 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

is forgotten. If the personality is not severed or dissolved, the
result is the Evil or the Bad, for the personality whicli does not sur-
render itself to, and disappear in, the divine idea, is the evil or had
principle. In the divine unity personality is posited as dissolved,
and the negativity of the personality is only in the phenomenon
distinguished from that by which it is cancelled.

The Trinity has been reduced to the relation of Father, Son,
and Spirit ; this is a childlike relation, a childlike, natural form.
The understanding has no such category, no relation which can be
compared with this in regard to fitness and adequacy, but it must
be remembered that it is only an image, a simile ; spirit does not
clearly enter into this relation. Love would be a still better ex-
pression, but Spirit is the true one.

The abstract God, the father, is the universal, the eternal, com-
prehensive, total particularity. We stand on the basis of spirit ; the
imiversal here comprehends everything in itself ; the other, the
son, is the infinite particularity, the phenomenon ; the third is the
individuality or singularity as such ; but the universal, as totality,
is itself spirit, all Three are the Spirit. Ik the third, we say God
is spirit, but the latter has also a presupposition ; the third is also
the first. This must be remembered as essential. For, when we
say: God in himself, according to the idea, is the immediate, self-
dirempting power which returns into itself, he is this only in so
far as he is Negativity immediately related to itself — i. g., absolute
reflection in itself, which is in itself the determination of spirit. In
wishing, therefore, to speak of God in his first determination ac-
cording to his idea, and then to pass over to the other determina-
tions, we find that we have already spoken of the third ; the last is
the first. If, in order to avoid this, or on account of the imperfection
of the idea, we begin abstractly and speak of the first only according
to its determination, we call it the universal ; then that activity of
creation, or of producing, is in itself a principle differing from the
abstract-universal, and may appear, and appears, as a second princi-
ple, as manifestation or phenomenon (Logos, Sophia), and the first
as the "Abyss." This is explained by the nature of the idea; it ap-
pears in every aim, in every animated principle. Life sustains itself.
To sustain means to proceed to differentiation, to a struggle with
particularity, to find one's self distinguished from inorganic nature.
Life is a result only when it has created itself; it is a product

God in his Eternal Idea. 14T

which, in the second place, continues producing, the product is life
itself ; i. e.^ it is its own presupposition, it passes through its pro-
cess, and nothing new arises ; what is produced has existed from
the beginning. It is the same with love and reciprocating love.
Only because love exists, the beginning, and all further activity is
the coniirmation by which it is at the same time produced and
sustained ; but the product had existence already ; it is a confirma-
tion, and there is no result which was not there at the beginning.
In the same way the spirit presupposes itself. It is the begin-
ning.

The difference through which the divine life passes is not an
external one, but must be determined as an internal one, in such a
way that the first, the father, must be conceived in the same way
as the last. Thus, the process is nothing but a play of self-suste-
nance, the assurance of self-existence.

This determination is important because it forms the criterion by
which many conceptions of God may be judged, and their defi-
ciencies judged and recognized ; the latter are frequently caused by
the fact that this determination is overlooked or misunderstood.

"We consider the idea as it is determined in pure thinking, and
by pure thinking. This idea constitutes all truth, and is the one
truth, and every particular that is to be comprehended as truth
must be comprehended in the form of this idea.

Nature and the finite spirit are the product of God, and there is,
therefore, rationality in them ; that a thing is made by God implies
that it contains truth, divine truth in general — i. e., the determi-
nation of this idea in general.

The form of this idea is found in God as spirit only ; if the
divine idea is given in forms of finitude, it is not posited as it is
in and for itsslf (only in spirit is it so posited), but exists there in
a finite manner ; the world, however, is something created by God,
and, therefore, the divine idea always constitutes the basis of what
it is. To cognize something means to cognize and determine it
according to the form of this idea in general.

In former religions we have traces of this trinity as the true
determination, especially in the Indian religion. Consciousness
there became aware of this threefold existence ; it conceived that
the One could not remain One ; that it is not as it truly should be,
that the One is not the truth, but must be comprehended as this

148 The Journal of Speculative Philosojyhy.

movement, as this differentiation, in general, and as relation. The
T/'imurti is the rudest form of this determination.

But in this the third element is not the spirit, and true concili-
ation, but birth and departure — coming, going, and changing —
which latter category is the union of differences, but a very subor-
dinate union.

The idea is perfect, not as an immediate phenomenon, but be-
comes so when the spirit has finally come to dwell in its church ;
when spirit — the immediate, believing spirit — has risen to thinking.
It is of interest ta consider the fermentations of this idea, and
to learn to recognize its principle in the wonderful phenomena
which present themselves. The defining of God as the Triune
has, at last, been quite discontinued in philosophy, and theology is
no more in earnest with it. In both it has been attemjDted to
belittle the Christian religion by saying that this determination is
older than the Christian religion, and was taken from this or that
source. Such historical matter, in the first place, has no force at
all in regard to inner truth. In the second place, it is quite clear
that those older nations and individuals did not know, themselves,
what they possessed in this idea ; they did not cognize that it con-
tained the absolute consciousness of truth ; hence they possessed
it only [as one] among other predicates or determinations, as some-
thing other than it is. It is a very material point whether such a
determination is the first absolute determination which forms the
basis of all the rest, or whether it is one form which occurs among
many, as, for instance, Brahma, who is One, but is not even the
object of a form of worship. In the religion of beauty and ex-
ternal utility, this form, indeed, could appear last of all ; the limit-
ing, self-returning [symmetrical] means cannot be found in this, in
this multitude and particularization. Still this religion is not with-
out traces of such unity. Aristotle, in speaking of the Pythagorean
numbers, the triad, says : " We do not believe ourselves to have
invoked the gods, if we have not called them thrice." The abstract
basis of this idea is found in the Pythagoreans and in Plato, but
the determinations have remained quite in this abstraction, partly
in the abstraction of one, two, three. In Plato it is found in a
little more concrete form : the nature of the one and of the other,
that which is diff'erent in itself, ^drepov^ and the third, which is
the union of the two.

God in his Eternal Idea. 149

It is found here not in the same form as with the Indians, but
as pure abstraction. These are determinations or categories of
thinking, better than numbers, better than the category of number,
but still they are, as yet, quite abstract categories of thinking.

Especially at the time of Christ, and for several centuries later,
a philosophical conception is seen to arise which is based on the
conception of the relation of the Trinity. It is found either in
philosophical systems like that of Philo, who had familiarized him-
self by study with the Pythagorean and Platonian philosophy,
and, later, in the Alexandrians, or it is found in the intermingling
of the Christian religion with such philosophical conceptions ; this
intermingling tendency constitutes the greater part of the heretical
doctrines, more especially of the Gnostic. On the whole, in these
attempts at grasping the idea of the triune we see that occidental
reality, under the influence of oriental ideality, is converted into
a world of thought. These are, of course, nothing but first at-
tempts, which do not proceed beyond obscure and fantastic image-
concepts. We see in it, however, the struggling of the spirit after
freedom, and this demands recognition.

A countless multitude of forms may be pointed out in this. The
first is the Father, the "Ov, which is designated as the Abyss, the
Depth — i. 6., as the void, inconceivable, incomprehensible, as that
which is beyond all conception.

It must be conceded that the void, the indefinite, is the incon-
ceivable ; it is the negative of the idea, and it is its determination
to be this negative, since it is but a one-sided abstraction, and con-
stitutes but a phase of the idea. The One for itself is not yet the
idea, not yet the truth.

If the first is determined as being universal only, and then the
determinations are given only as a kind of sequel to the universal,
or the "Oy, the latter becomes indeed an incomprehensible thing,
for it is without content. What is conceivable is concrete, and is
conceivable only when determined as a phase {moment). Here,
then, is the deficiency, that the first itself is not grasped as a
totality.

Another representation is that the first is the ^v66<;, the abyss,
the depth, that it is the alcov, the Eternal One, whose abode is in
unspeakable height, who is exalted above all contact with finite
things, out of whom nothing has been developed, who is the prin-

160 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

ciple and Father of all existence, pronator / who is Father only in
mediation, irpodpxv-, before the beginning. This representation
detei-niines this revealing of this abyss, of this hidden God, as self-
contemplation, as relicetion in itself and concrete determination in
general ; self-contemplation is creative, it is the creation of the
only Begotten Son ; the eternal becomes comprehensible therein,
since this depends on determination and realization.

The second (which is the being other or alien, the determination or
the activity of determining in general) is defined in the most uni-
versal determination as X0709, which means the rationally deter-
mining activity, or, as it may be called, the word. The word is
the simple activity of giving utterance to itself, which does not
make any fixed distinction, and does not become a fixed distinction
itself, but rather has been heard im.mediately ; yet the word, im-
mediate as it is, is received by the internal, and thus returns to its
origin ; it [the second] appears also as a-ocjyia, or wisdom, as the
original, entirely pure man, as something existing and other than
the first universal something which is separated and determined.
God is Creator — that is, in the determination of the X0709, as
the self-uttering, self-speaking word, as the opacnf;, the seeing of
God.

By this it has been determined as the archetype of man, as
Adam Cadmon, as the only Begotten One ; there is nothing acci-
dental in this, no contingency, but it is eternal activity, and not
merely at one time ; in God there is but one birth ; activity is as
eternal activity ; it is a determination that belongs essentially to
the universal itself.

In this there is true distinction which concerns the quality of
both ; and yet this latter is one and the same substance, and the
difference is, therefore, only superficial, even when determined as
person.

The essential point is that this ao^la, the only Begotten One, re-
mains in the bosom of God, and that, therefore, the difference is
no real one.

Such are the forms in which the idea has fermented ; the prin-
ciple from which they must be judged is that we must bear in
mind that these phenomena, crude as they are, are rational ; we
must remember this in order to see how they have their ground in
reason, and what reason there is in it. But we should also know

God in his Eternal Idea. 151

how to distinguish the form of rationality which, while it is there,
is not yet adequate to the content.

The idea has frequently been placed above and beyond man, be-
yond and above thought and reason, and has been so contrasted
with the latter that this determination, which is all truth, and
which alone is the truth, has been considered as something which
is peculiar to God alone, as something that remains beyond [man],
and does not reflect itself in the other which appears as world,
nature, or man. From this it appears that the fundamental idea
was not considered as the universal idea.

To Jacob Boehme this secret of the Trinity unfolded itself in
another manner. His mode of thinking, imagining, and conceiv-
ing is rather fantastic and wild ; he never elevated himself to the
pure forms of thinking, but his tendency to see the Trinity in
everything, everywhere, was the ruling principle in the ferment
and struggle of his life [he says], for instance : It must be born in
the heart of man. This [mode of thinking] is the universal basis
of whatever is considered according to truth ; it is in this form a
finite thing, it is true, but, in its iinitude, as [representing] the
truth which is in it. Thus Jacob Boehme tried to represent in
this determination the nature, heart, and spirit of man.

In more recent times the thought of a threefold principle (die
Dreiheit) has been brought forward again by the Kantian philos-
ophy in an external way, as a type, as a schema, so to say, and has
been used in very definite forms of thought. It is a further ad-
vance to know this [Trinity] to be the essential and one nature of
God, to know that it must, therefore, not be taken as something
alien, something far removed, and that the idea must not be taken
as being something beyond [the grasp of our thought]. It is, on
the contrary, the aim of cognition to cognize the idea in the par-
ticular as well, and, if it is cognized, whatever is true in the par-
ticular will be found to contain this determination.

To cognize is to know a thing in its determinateness ; its
nature, however, is the nature of the determinateness itself, and
the latter has found its exposition in the idea. It is the logical
exposition and necessity that this idea is the True in general, and
that all categories are the movements of determination.

152 The Journal of SpeGulative Philosophy.

ON THE SCIENCE OF THE FINE ARTS.

BEING THK FOURTEENTII AND LAST LEOTURK OF F. W. J. SCHELLING ON " THE METHOD
OK ONIVERSITT STUDIES." TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BT MRS. ELLA S. MORGAN.

The science of art may, in the first place, mean the historical
construction of art. In this sense its external condition requires
an actual consideration of the existins; monuments of art. Since
this is possible as regards the art of poetry, this art is explicitly
included among the subjects of academic study as the science of
philology. Nevertheless, philology, in the sense we have defined
it, is scarcely taught at universities — which is not a matter of sur-
j)rise, since it is no less an art than poetry itself, and the philolo-
gist, like the artist, is born, not made.

Still less is the idea of an historical construction of the plastic
arts to be sought at universities ; for they lack the means of study
by actual observation ; even where, as a matter of pride, lectures
are attempted, with the aid of a complete library, they are neces-
sarily confined to presenting a knowledge of the histor}'' of art.

Universities are not schools of art. Still less can they teach
the science of art with a view to practical or technical ends.

There remains, therefore, the purely speculative view, which is
concerned with the intellectual conception of art, and not witli its
empirical development. But this presupposes a philosophical con-
struction of art, in opposition to which serious doubts arise from
the side of philosophy as well as of art.

The philosopher whose intellectual intuition should be directed
to the truth that is open only to the mind, and remains hidden to
the perception of the senses — what has he to do with the science
of art, whose sole object is the creation of a beautiful appearance,
which either deceives with illusive images of truth, or is wholly
directed to the senses ? Most people, indeed, think of art as a de-
light for the senses, as a recreation for the mind fatigued by other
and more serious occupation, or else as an agreeable excitenjent,
whose only advantage is the refined medium v/hich it employs.
To the philosopher this latter quality of art, aside from the flict
that he must regard it as the eft'ect of the sensuous impulse, is the
stamp of its perishable nature, and of its injurious tendencies. If

On the Science of the Fine Arts. 153

this is the idea of art, philosopbj must utterly condemn it in
order to protest against the sensuous tendency to which art seems
to incline.

I speak of art in a more sucred sense, art which, in the words
of the ancients, is an instrument of the gods, the revealer of
divine mysteries, the discoverer of ideas, of that beauty whose
holy light illumines only pure souls, and whose form is as invisi-
ble to the sensuous eye as the form of truth itself The philoso-
pher can have nothing to do with what is called art in the ordi-
nary sense of the word. Art to him is a reflection of the divine,
a necessary and immediate image of the absolute, and only as this
can be shown and proved has it any reality to the philosopher.

"But did not Plato himself condemn imitative art in his 'Re-
public,' banish the poets as not only useless bat dangerous mem-
bers of the ideal state ; can there be more convincino- authoritv
tor the antagonism of art and philosophy than this judgment of
the greatest of philosophers ? "

It is essential for us to recognize from what particular point of
view Plato utters his condemnation of the poets, for he, more than
other philosophers, observed the importance of the point of view
taken, and without this distinction it would be impossible, espe-
cially in regard to this point, to comprehend his complexly related
theories, or to harmonize tlie contradicting statements found in
his works on this same subject. We must first consider that the
higher philosophy, and Plato's in particular, was the peculiar
antithesis involved in Greek civilization, not merely as regards
the sensuous conceptions of religion, but also as regards the ob-
jective and real forms of the state. Is it not possible that, in an
ideal and at the same time unrealized state like Plato's "Re-
public," there could be no other conception of poetry, and that
the limits he assigns to poetry may be necessary from its very
nature? The answer to this question would lead us too far.
This opposition between all public forms and philosophy itself
must necessarily produce such an opposition between the latter
and the former. Plato is neither the first nor the only example.
From Pythagoras and still earlier, down to Plato, philosophy
knows itself to be an exotic on Greek soil, a feeling which is indi-
cated in the universal instinct which led those who were initiated
into higher doctrines, either by the wisdom of earlier philoso-

154 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

pliers or by the mysteries, back to the Orient, the motherland of
ideas.

But, apart from this merely historical, not philosophical, antith-
esis, what is Plato's rejection of the art of poetry, especially when
compared with his praise of "enthusiastic poetry" in other works;
what is it but the natural polemic against poetic realism, a pro-
phecy of the general intellectual tendency of later times and of
poetry in particular? And such a judgment could least of all
apply to Christian' poetry, which as a whole reflects the character
of the eternal as unmistakably as the poetry of the old world re-
flected the iinite. The fact that we are able to determine the
limits of the latter more exactly than could Plato, who did not
know the contrast between the ancient and modern world, the
fact that we can rise to a more comprehensive idea and construc-
tion of poetry than he, and that what he considered the degrada-
tion of the poetry of his time, we see as its beautiful limitation.
This advantage we owe to a riper experience, and it enables us to
see fulfilled what Plato prophesied and missed. The Christian
religion, and with it the whole intellectual tendency, which in
classic poetry could find neither complete satisfaction nor the
means to express it, has created its own poetry and art in which
it finds itself reflected. Hence we see that the objective theory
of art, consequently of classic art itself, is limited by these con-
ditions.

Hence we see that the construction of art is a worthy subject of
the philosopher, but especially of the Christian philosopher, whose
particular business it should be to measure its universal content,
and demonstrate its necessity.

But, to look at the other side of this subject, is the philosopher
able to penetrate to the yery essence of art, and represent it truly ?

I hear one say : " Who dare hope to speak worthily of that
sacred principle which moves the artist, that spiritual breath
which vivifies his work, unless it be one who is himself warmed
by the divine Are? Shall we attempt to subordinate to law that
which is as incomprehensible in its origin as it is wonderful in its
influence? Can we determine and bring under dominion of law
that which in its very nature recognizes no law but itself? Are
not ideas as powerless to comprehend genius as law is to create
it? Who dares to rise in thought above that which is the freest,

On the Science of the Fine Arts. 155

the most absolute thing in the whole universe ; who dares to strain
his sight to the utmost limits of vision, there to find only new
limits?"

These may be the words of an enthusiast, who has only seen
art in its eifects, but who knows not what it is in truth, nor what
the domain of philosophy is in the universe. For, even if we con-
cede that art is not to be conceived as the expression of something
higher than itself, it is still an immutable law of the universe that
everything which is part of it has its type or antitype in other
parts. So absolute is the form of the universal antithesis of the
real and the ideal, tiiat, at tlie limit between the infinite and the
Unite, there, wliere the antitheses of phenomena vanish in pure
universality, the same relationship asserts itself, and returns in the
final potence. This is the relation which exists between philoso-
phy and art.

The latter, although absolute and complete identity of the real
and ideal, is related to philosophy as the real to the ideal. In
philosophy the last antithesis of knowing is resolved into pure
identity, while at the same time it remains ideal in its relation to
art. Thus at the highest point they both meet, and, by means of
the absolute nature common to both, become type and anti-
type. For this reason philosophy penetrates scientifically into the
essential nature of art, and it is even true that the philosopher
sees more clearly into the spirit of art than the artist himself.
As the ideal is a higher reflection of the real, so the philosopher
necessarily has a higher ideal image of that which the artist pos-
sesses as real. From this it is evident that in philosophy art may
become an object of knowing; nay, more, it is clear that, except
through and in philosophy, nothing absolute can be known of the
nature of art.

The artist — since in him the same principle is objective which
in the philosopher is subjectively reflected — stands to the latter,
therefore, not as subjective or conscious, although it is not impos-
sible that through a higher reflection he may become conscious ;
but in the quality of artist he does not become so. As artisr, he is
impelled by this principle, consequently he does not possess it; if
he brings it to the state of ideal reflection, he elevates himself as
artist to a higher power, but still his relation remains objective in
BO far as he remains an artist. That which is subjective in

15G The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

liim becomes objective, just as in the philosopher the objective be-
comes subjective. Hence philosophy, in spite of its essential iden-
tity with art, is always and necessarily science, that is, ideal,
while art is always and necessarily art, that is, real.

How the philosopher is able to follow art even to its secret and
primitive source, to the iirst w^orkshops of its creation, is incom-
prehensible from the purely objective standpoint, and would be
impossible in a philosophy which does not reach the same height
in the ideal that art attains in the real. Tho^c rules which genius
can dispense with are those which are prescribed by the mechani-
cal understanding. Genius is its own law ; it rejects foreign
authority, but acknowledges its own, for it is only genius in so
far as it is the highest law. Philosophy recognizes the fact that
genius is an absolute law unto itself, because it is itself not only
self-governing, but aspires to the principle of all self-government.
It has been seen in all ages that true artists are calm, simple,
great, and necessary, like Nature herself. That enthusiasm which
sees in the artist only genius untrammeled by rules, is a reflection
of the negative side of genius. It is a second-hand enthusiasm,
not of the kind which inspires the artist, and which in its god-
like freedom is at the same time the purest and highest necessity.

But we may ask : If the philosopher is the. ablest to demonstrate
that which is incomprehensible in art, to recognize its absolute
nature, will he be equally skillful in seizing that which is compre-
hensible, and which may be determined by rules? I mean, of
course, the technical side of art. Will philosophy be able to de-
scend to its technical execution, to the means, and the conditions
of its existence as an art ?

Philosophy, whose concern is with ideas alone in respect to the
empirical side of art, must show forth only the universal laws of
phenomena, and this only in the form of ideas, for the forms of
art are the forms of things in and for themselves, as ih%y are in
the archetypes. So far, therefore, as they are universal, and can
be seen independently in the universal, so far their presentation is
a necessary part of the philosophy of art, but not in so far as
these forms contain rules for the execution and practice of art.
Therefore we say that the philosophy of art is a presentation of
the absolute world in the form of art. It is only the theory of
art which is immediately related to the particular (as opposed to

On the Science of the Fine Arts. 157

the universal), and has an end in view. It is the practical means
by which any special work of art can be accomplished. The
philosophy of art, en the contrary, is unconditioned, and has no
end outside of itself. If, in answer to this, an appeal is made to
the fact that the technical part of art is the means by which it re-
flects truth, it devolves on the philosopher to answer that this
truth is itself only empirical. That which the philosopher sees in
it, and which it is his duty to demonstrate, is truth of a higher
kind, is identical with absolute beauty, the truth of ideas.

The condition of antas-onism and conflict, as regards even the
first notions of art, which is inevitable in the art-judgment of an
age which is " ambitious to realize by intellectual reflection the
hidden sources of art, makes it doubly desirable that we should
scientifically investigate the absolute view of art, as well as the
forms through which it is expressed. For, so long as this is not
done, both the criticism and the practical execution of art have
no defense against vulgarity and commonplace, and are subject to
narrow, one-sided, and capricious views.

The construction of art in each of its particular forms down to
the concrete leads of itself to the determination of these forms as
conditioned by each particular age, and, consequently, passes over
into historical construction. And there is little doubt that such a
history is entirely possible, including the whole history of art,
since the duality of the universe, in the contrast between antique
and modern art, has been most thoroughly demonstrated in this
department, partly by means of poetry, partly by criticism.
Since construction in general is the cancellation of antitheses,
those which belong to art being the result of its dependence on
each particular age, they must be like the age itself, temporary
and conventional. But the scientific construction will consist in
the demonstration of their common unity, out of which particular
forms arose, and which, therefore, transcend and comprehend all
particular forms.

Such a construction of art is, of course, not to be compared
with anything which, up to this time, has existed under the name
of aesthetics, theory of the fine arts and sciences, etc. In the gen-
eral principles of the originator of the first designation there was
at least an intimation of the true idea of the beautiful, of the prim-
itive type of the beautiful, reflected in the concrete, phenomenal

158 The Journal of Sjyeoulative Philosojyhy.

world. It gradually became more and more definitely dependent
on the ethical and practical view of the world. In the psycho-
logical theories, its phenomena were explained away as if they
were ghost stories or some other superstition, until the appearance
of Kant's formalism introduced a new and higher insight, in spite
of the fact that it was burdened by manj^ empty theories about art.

The germs of a true science of art, sown by great minds since
the time of Kant, have not yet developed to the scientific whole
of which they give promise. A philosopliy of art is the necessary
aim of the philosopher, who sees the true nature of art in his
science as clearly as if he looked into a magic mirror. As a
science, art is interesting to the philosopher in aiid for itself.
Just as the philosoph}'^ of nature or the construction of the great
products and phenomena of the world, or construction of a world
complete and independent, or as nature itself is interesting and
important. The enthusiastic investigator learns from them the
true archetypes of forms which he finds confused and obscure in
nature, and recognizes them in works of art as sensuous images
which have their origin in nature.

The internal bond which unites art and religion, the impossi-
bility, on the one hand, of any poetic world outside of religion and
through religion, and the impossibility, on the other hand, of
making religion really an objective phenomenon except by means
of art^-these considerations make a scientific knowledge of art a
necessity in genuine religion.

And, finally, let me say that it is a disgrace for those who have
a direct or indirect part in the government of the state to lack
either a real love or a real knowledge of art. For nothing lumors
princes and those in authority more than to prize the arts, to ad-
mire their products, and to encourage their creation ; and there is
no sadder or more disgraceful sight than when those, who have the
means to promote the highest perfection of art, spend tiieir money
to encourage bad taste, barbarity, and insinuating vulgarity.
Even if it cannot be generally understood that art is a necessary
and essential part of a state founded oii ideas, we should at least
heed the example of antiquity, whose festivals, eternal monu-
ments, whose drama, and the acts of whose public life were all
only the various branches of one universal, objective, and living
work of art.

Psycho genesis. 159

PSYCHOGENESIS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF DR. W. PHETER, PROFESSOR OF PHYSIOLOGY, AND
DIRECTOR OF THE PHYSIOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF JENA, BY MISS
MARION TALBOT.

Psychogenesis, or the development of the soul, has been not in-
frequently the object of consideration by prominent investigators
in ancient as well as in modern times. Exhaustive works have
been written on the history of the spiritual development of man-
kind in genera], and on the progress in perception, action, and
knowledge in particular. The whole history of philosophy is
cited as a progressive development of cognition. Psychologists
recognize that it is necessary to compare the spiritual life of man
with that of animals, and to follow it out through all its stages.
Since this requirement has not been met with suiiicient readiness,
modern physical empiricism, strengthened by many great victories
in the contest against speculation, has undertaken the gigantic
enterprise of answering for itself, as its own legitimate property,
even the highest problems of psychology. Doing away with the
extreme dilierences between man and animal, it maintains that all
human spiritual activity is developed gradually and naturally
from the spiritual disposition and instincts of animals.

But whether the privileges of the human race will ever lose
their inner value by such experiments, or will gain by the records
of natural history, these efforts have already brought about this
good, that the psychical indications of animals, their feelings and
instincts, their volition and reflection, are more carefully examined
than formerly. The development of the human soul is certainly
not shown by that of the animal soul alone, however closely con-
nected they may be.

But, in any case, the theory of psychogenesis will receive more
aid from this side than from the cleverest hypotheses of the con-
nection between soul and body. It is not that such hypotheses
are to be rejected because they make use of the imagination ; on
the contrary, they can be very useful, on account of the incitement
which they give to the investigation of facts.

Thus, the remarkable work of the Abbe Condillac, "A Treatise

160 The Journal of Speculative PJillosophy.

on the Sensations,'' which appeared in 1754, and to-day, as then,
exercises a fascinating intinence on the reader, is indeed fantastic
in its suppositions, but it is a powerful stiuiiihis, because of its
uncommon acuteness. A statue, in whose phice the reader must
continually imagine himself to be, first receives only the sense of
smell, next hearing and taste, then sight, and finally touch. At
every stage the spiritual state of the statue is described. But can
we comprehend through this description the mental state of a
man born with one or more senses? Not in the least.

Why give life to artificial images, which are the product of a
human hand, and attribute spiritual properties to them, while the
full natural life, in its entire immediateness, is daily revealed anew
in the closest proximity ?

He who wishes to watch the growth of the human intellect
must, above all, make the mind of the child the object of method-
ical investigation. Even the new-born infant, in all its pitiable
helplessness, is an extraordinarily interesting object for physiol-
ogy, which must furnish the foundation for all empirical psychol-
ogy. And then the young child ! It is almost incomprehensible
that the gradual development of its senses, its will, its understand-
ing, its passions, its virtues, attracts the attention of its relatives
alone. For thousands of years children have been born and lov-
ingly tended and watched by their mothers, and for thousands of
years learned men have disputed over the mental growth of the
child, without even studying the children. As a rule, the experi-
mental physiologist seldom visits the nursery, even when he is a
father. The history of the psychological development of a child,
during the first years of its life, has never yet been scientifically
written.

Physicians have labored much over the diseases and great mor-
tality of infants, over their nourishment, care, and growth, and
many works have been written on the subject. On the contrary,
observations on the spiritual growth are scanty and incomplete.
Several inquirers, indeed, in ancient as well as in modern times,
imparted, in short treatises on the senses of the new-born human
being, some wonderful observations, which acquire a higher value
because they are so few in number, but no right conclusion was
reached with these observations and experiments. The physicists,
physicians, and linguists, who have recently taken part in psycho-

Psychogenesis. 161

genetic investigations of new-born and very young children, have
until now brought forward but little material based on fact for a
history of spiritual development. The same is true of teachers,
at least in respect to the earliest period of life. Before methodical
instruction begins, during the time which belongs to the child's
mother, no tutor speaks a word. But precisely then the bud is
unfolding. The child's brain grows as much in the first year as
in tlie whole of its after-life.

Education is certainly a difficult work, but it is still more diffi-
cult to understand that it is successful. Each one cannot learn
all that another learned before him. Only certain qualities are
born with every man. The true educator must start from the
given, hereditary qualities, and take into account their differences ;
he must not measure all with the same rule, nor dress all after the
sg,me pattern. The one has these capabilities, the other those. So
it is from the practical standpoint of the educator also a matter of
great importance to investigate exactly the very first impressions
and expressions of the child.

On this account it might be desired that more educated men,
thoroughly versed in physiology, should carefully and independ-
ently observe a larger number of young children, and compare the
results, or that fathers should exchange observations made on their
own children, and should supervise and critically arrange those
made on the children of others. A single individual easily falls
into the error of generalizing that which applies only to his own
children. Moreover, every father has his own principles of edu-
cation.

To begin with, it is necessary that each one should keep as exact
a journal as possible concerning his child from its very birth. I
can assert, from my own experience, that during the first two years
hardly a day passes in which there is not an observation to enter
in the diary, which is of -value psychogenetically. This only is
necessary : to busy one's self with the little creature for some
time, at least several hours a day ; to strictly forbid that dis-
cipline of even the youngest children which is to-day, unfor-
tunately, too highly esteemed, and to seek to answer stated
questions by means of constantly repeated observations and harm-
less experiments.

To what these last must relate follows from the consideration
XV— 11

H)2 The Journal of Speculative Philoso2)hy.

of that wliicli in general is tlie indispensable and primary condi-
tion of spiritual expression even in adults.

In every case there must be a free entrance for the senses.
Without them there is no spiritual activity. Im])ressions must be
there, garnered in great numbers; recollections must be stored up
and constantly recalled, before the soul can manifest itself, before
comj}anso7i, the lowest function of the understanding, can take
place. On this account no spiritual activity is recognizable in
deep sleep. The sleeper is blind ; his ears do not hear, the organs
of taste and of smell are at rest. The sensation of touch, every
feeling, is extinct; the muscles of sight asleep; even the silent
mouth is frequently open. It is impossible to distinguish in sleep
the spiritual capabilities of the blind mute from those of the most
intelligent boy. There is, besides, the examination of the manner
and the order in which the senses of the new-born child develop
their activity.

However, the senses are not the first thing, but the motions /
for, before any sense is aw^akened by external impressions, to the
mother's delight, the child moves. The peculiar motions of the
limbs of a new-born child must, like all those of a later period,
have their cause. These causes must be sought for in the first
place. Accordingly, the movements and sentient activity of the
new-born and nursing child make the starting-point. Their chang-
ing relations lead a step farther, and the development of the will
can then begin. When this asserts itself, the understanding ap-
pears, and, finally, united with the wdll, gives the germs for the
control of motion, for the realization of perceptions, and for the
communication of personal opinions by means of speech.

The attempt to follow this ascending psychical development is
attractive and instructive, through the nature of the problems
which it reveals.

The primary conditions of all spiritual life are the child's will,
perception, and thought.

First of all is the development of the will. Screaming, tlie first
expression of life in the new-born child, is pointed out as the first
expression of will. The great Immanuel Kant thought that
screaming had in it the sound of indignation and angry wrath !
Not because something pains him, but because something vexes
him, does the new-born human beiag scream, and the reason is

Psychogenesis. 163

that he wishes to raove, and feels that his inability to do so is a
fetter which takes away his liberty ! On that account the child
loudly proclaims its existence, thinks Kant. Did he perchance,
in his long unmarried life, ever see and hear new-born children ?
He would then surely have judged otherwise.

There is also little value in the general notion that the cause
of the first scream, as if a conscious expression of pain, is a pain-
ful or at least disagreeable sensation, a feeling of cold on the en-
trance of air into the lungs. The older view is as valuable, that
the peeping of the chicken in the egg, before it creeps forth, and
the first scream of the new-born child, are cries for help ; as if
the young being had a suspicion of its helplessness and of any-
tliino; bevond itself!

These and similar hypotheses are untenable, because it must be
seen that children born without understanding can scream precisely
as well as sound children, from indignation and anger, from a feel-
ing of pain and discomfort, in general from a conscious spiritual
state. On the other hand, it is very probable that the reflex
sounds from brainless animals, which occur regularly after slight
irritation — for example, after stroking the back — will give the
key to the explanation. For the question is on the purely reflex
excitations of the voice, just as in laughter, when the nerves of
the skin are excited by tickling. There are frequently new-born
children who do not scream at their first breath, but sneeze. Sneez-
ing is a purely reflex action, conditioned by the excitation of sensi-
ble nasal nerve-fibers, which is transferred to the respiratory nerves
and muscles without the participation of the will, and results me-
chanically in a convulsive breath. Emotion, passion, deliberation,
and intention ordinarily cause or accompany the first scream or
whimper precisely as little as they do the sneeze. It is of no
greater psychical importance than a snore.

But the motions of the limbs of the new-born child ? Are they
not a sign of free-will, or expressions of an uncomfortable state?

The reaching forth of the arms and legs, now slowly, now
quickly ; the spreading out of the fingers and toes; the slow and
then impulsive motions ; the pulling of the feet and hands, as
well as the remaining in a cramped, almost egg-shaped position —
make an impression of aimlessness on every impartial observer.
The repeated frowns and distortions of the face might sooner be

164: The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

taken for voUinttiry contractions of the muscles. But if with these
is compared the helplessness which accompanies all the movements
of the infant, if the fact is considered that it does not prevent its
head from tailing, cannot take hold of anything for some months,
nor make other simple and co-ordinated movements which come
at the will of a grown person, then the tirst peculiar motions of
the extremities will not be taken as the expression of reflection or
free-will.

Of what kind, then, are these muscular contractions which never
reappear in after-life. They seem to take place in a similar man-
ner only in animals suddenly awakened from their winter sleep,
and sometimes in ordinary sleep and on awakening.

There is no external excitation present, which either works as a
direct irritation upon tlie nerves of motion or contractile fibres, or
excites the nerves of sense reflexively, and thus causes the motions.
As the sleeping infant moves like the one awake, only more seldom
and more slowly, nothing can be said about an attempt to imitate
at first. Imitative movements occur for the first time in the sec-
ond half-year of life.

If no external causes for the wonderful movements of new-born
human beings and animals can be found — for the well-fed, warm,
dry, comfortably-placed infant also performs these aimless exer-
cises of its limbs — internal causes must be sought. Such are
either acquired or hereditary.

Acquired causes of motion presuppose a manifold experience.
Whoever moves with forethought, in other words, acts, has been
able to acquire the motive for his action only from many percep-
tions, and from observations on the conduct of others. The new-
born child is wholly incapable of such actions, because it is en-
tirely without experience. It does not act, but only moves.

But there are still other acquired muscular actions, namely, cer-
tain movements of expression — those which arise from imitation
and those which are constantly employed because they show them-
selves to be necessary in the interest of self-preservation. All
such expressive movements, which are characteristic of uncivilized
people and vivacious South-Europeans, presuppose a conception
of one's own existence. They are to express this condition, an-
nounce it to others, or give others a knowledge of one's own self.
Such gesticulations acquire great energy in passion.

Psychogenesis. 165

This incomplete description of them will suffice to show that
the new-born child, who has no idea of its condition and knows no
passion, cannot possibly speak the language of passion. Whether
the stretching out of the little arm appears so much like a cate-
gorical command, whether the withdrawing of the hand, as if be-
fore an invisible power surrounding the little being, seems to be
the result of fright, whether the unconscious demeanor appears so
similar to the symptoms of a desire to act or to the expression of
a wish to free itself from an uncomfortable condition — in no case
does the appearance afford the right explanation. For the little
child has not yet had any experiences of all these conditions and
the means of expressing them. It does not yet know them.

So only direct hereditary causes of action remain. It is not
that the human being moves itself as it does because its father and
ancestors did so when they were .young ; that would only be re-
moving the difficulty another step back ; but it moves itself in this
peculiar way because its principal nervous motor organs, its gan-
glion cells of motion, if they are developed, discharge irregularly
the inherited superfluous stock in itnpulsive movements. The
steam-engine discharges its superfluous steam. The fire of youth
burns at first without need of stirring ; the full life's cup over-
flows.

Because an external cause for the first movements of the new-
born child cannot be found, they have been called instinctive.
But instinct, which is intelligible only when conceived as inherited
memory, has, without exception, a definite aim. It is adapted to
something useful to the organism for many generations. For in-
stance, a new-born child sucks instinctively ; it is not a purely
reflex action, for then the child whose appetite had been appeased
would still suck. On the contrary, the movements of the extremi-
ties of very young animals and children are directed to no specific
purpose. They are neither reflex nor instinctive, but impulsive.
They have also been named automatic and spontaneous. These
expressions, however, can easily be misunderstood. The nerve of
motion, with its muscular fibres, follows the slightest central im-
pulse of the spine in the brainless infant as in the fully developed.
It depends upon the soundness of the spine. New-born children
are spinal beings, as Virchow appropriately remarked. They still
lack the controlling power of the understanding. The controlling

166 The Journal of Speculative PhilosopJuj.

nerves are not yet developed, hence hyperkinesis, the tendency
to convulsions, the vivacity of youth, which never recurs later,
and knows nothinii; of self-control. The more the intellect, and
with it the nnderstanding;, develops, the more restrained will be
the superfluous movements. But, even in later life, only a few
succeed in performing purely useful muscular contractions. In
sound health it is a sign of the highest distinction and most per-
fect education to make, imder all circumstances, no superfluous
motion. This rare degree of self-control and volition forms a
strong contrast to the unrestrained mobility of the child, and shows
the powerful influence which example, firm command, and espe-
cially external impressions, have upon the development of the will
— on the development, not the genesis, of the will. It is an error
to think that the will arises from impressions in youth.

As one cannot put a plant together artificially from the constitu-
ents by which it perfects itself, but can only let it develop itself from
the germ, be it the tiniest seed-corn, so a will can never be created
in a child from external experiences, but can only be suffered to
develop itself from the inborn germ of will. At first the child is
ruled only by its impulses, its bodily needs — for iustance, hunger
— and follows its instinct to satisfy them where and when it can,
without the slightest regard for anything else, without reflection
and without will. The contact of the lips with a finger suffices
to produce sucking, and the reflex action of swallowing follows
regularly upon this instinctive movement.

No will is yet apparent here. After hunger is appeased, the
contact of the lips does not result in sucking. And this state,
too, is neither no expression of will nor volition, but only a sign
that the instinctive impulse has been gratified. When a bird has
built its nest, it does not straightway build a second, because it
has satisfied its instinct by the formation of the first.

The first appearance of the awakening of the child's will seems
to be given rather in the holding of the head than in the move-
ments of the limbs and lips. Even the chicken which has just
left the shell cannot raise its head during the first hour. I have
often noticed this inability. And when it can raise its head, it
cannot yet stand. And when it has half raised itself, it often re-
mains for some time picking at bits of grain near by, or peeping in
a loud voice, without changing its position, before it takes a step^

Psychogenesis. 167

From that to running, the time for exercise is short indeed. But
in the beginning it stumbles frequently. What occurs here within
a day at most requires more than a year in the case of a human
being. If the infant is held upright at first, its head falls forward
or sidewise. It cannot hold it straight. At the end of fourteen
weeks I found that attempts to hold it straight were more often
successful. Here plainly began a voluntary exertion. After four
months the head became well balanced, and no longer fell forward
or backward or sidewise. The cause here is not weakness of the
muscles, because, at a much earlier period, turning motions of the
head were accomplished, conditioned through reflex action. To
be sure, the muscles of the child, which are in many respects like
the tired muscles of an adult, are at first too weak to hold up the
head, but they are no longer so after three months.

The poise of the upper part of the body follows that of the
head. The first successful attempts to sit or get up usually occur
in the second quarter- year. The efforts of the child, which has
been placed in a sitting posture by means of cushions and props,
to maintain this are plainly repeated every day for weeks, to its
own amusement, until finally, at about the tenth month, security
in maintaining equipoise in sitting is attained for the whole fut-
ure life. The will has subdued the muscles, which were disobedi-
ent at first. The advantages of the new position, especially in eat-
ing, have fostered the desire to sit, and thereby strengthened the
will. The child will sit.

Thereupon, it generally learns to stand soon — when healthy, at
the end of the first year. After countless unsuccessful attempts
to stand by chairs, tables, or against the wall in a corner of the
room, it suddenly succeeds in standing for the first time. This
upright position, natural only to man among mammals, is espe-
cially noteworthy, because he appropriates it quite by himself
without any instruction. Let the infant be left to himself, when
he throws himself hither and thither upon a blanket in the great-
est helplessness, then begins to creep, next grasps Hrm objects
which he can reach, let him not be disturbed in his efforts, daily
repeated with wonderful persistence, and undertaken again and
again, in spite of their fruitlessness ; then he will certainly be seen
some day— in his fourth quarter-year — raising himself and stand-
ing upright.

168 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

Whence come these first purely hnmnii expressions of will,
which at a stroke bestow upon the child the majesty of the dig-
nity that belongs to mankind ? Jle stands npright before his hap-
py parents. He does not fall down immediately. He has taken
unspeakable trouble to raise himself, has reached his goal, and has
thereby given proof that his will overcame the weight of his body
and the stiffness of his limbs. Herein lies a further victory of his
soul over matter. An explanation of this cannot at present be
given. For the desire alone for objects above him or for his
friends can as little explain his great efforts to raise himself as im-
itation alone, especially since that desire is satisfied to the fullest
extent by assistance from all sides, and eftorts to imitate ordina-
rily begin later. We can thus only admit that the great advan-
tages which the upright position affords in the universal competi-
tion of living;; beings with each other made it long ago habitual,
so that it became hereditary. But it is not yet clear why the
M'ell-nurtured child, who is in want of nothing, busies his growing
will in this direction j^articularly.

The same holds good for the further acquisition of walking,
which equally makes its appearance by itself even when a child
grows up alone. It is problematical in its beginnings, because no
ground appears for the alternate bending and stretching of the
limbs, when the child first stands upright. Only upon the con-
stantly repeated raising and lowering of the foot of the child, sup-
ported by some one or supporting himself, does the possibility of
learning to walk depend. The same flexions and extensions take
place also when lying down, or in the bath or the cradle, but the
regular alternation of the two, when the child is placed upright,
is something different and probably hereditary, like sucking. Sev-
eral months elapse before the first successful attempt at walking,
and if the child is allowed to creep and move itself hither and
thither, without hindrance, it soon begins to walk without any
instruction. It is impossible to attribute to it the knowledge of
the advantages which walking gives, the understanding that it
will be better able to control its surroundings by eye and ear, and
attain more easily everything desirable ; the will, rather, comes
into account, developing at the same time with the growth of the
muscles and nerve-cells and nerve-fibres of the brain, bringing the
muscles into condition for contraction, as is shown in later life to

Psychogenesis, 169

be most advantageous, and as likewise happened regularly in the
case of its ancestors. So firmly have the marks of that impulse
for motion impressed themselves on the nervous central organ, so
frequently has the will trodden these nerve-paths and no others,
that soon, after the first steps of development in the motor appara-
tus of every new-born child, they show themselves to be the most
customary. In other words, the first movements in walking are
instinctive; the impulse to change one's place is so strong that it
is not satisfied by creeping alone.

It is on this account much to be condemned that in the nursery
special instruction in walking is given, with or without appliances,
such as go-carts and the like. Moreover, this is ordinarily begun
too early — much earlier than is good for the child, on account of
the slow growth of its bones. The frequent occurrence of bow-
legs is, in part at least, attributable to this circumstance. Creep-
ing is too oi'ten forbidden, although it is the natural school pre-
paratory to walking, and contributes much to the child's spiritual
development. For the beginner, longing for new impressions,
should not be deprived of the liberty of moving to a desired ob-
ject, of beholding and touching it, nor of the opportunity of making
countless little journeys of exploration.

The time of the first successful attempts at walking varies, even
with children of the same family. One runs quickly at eight
months; another is still awkward at two years. Much depends
on the surroundings, as is well known. If a child grows up with
other children who can walk, or are learning to do so, it will, as a
rule, walk earlier without support by emulating them than if it
grew up alone. But, in the latter case again, the constant repeti-
tion of artificial instruction or trainino; can considerablv shorten
the natural length of time. In general, the child will first begin
to walk when it wishes to walk. It was at the beginning of the
fifth quarter-y^r that a child, which I was observing carefully,
standing freely on its feet, suddenly and for the first time trotted
around the table, totterino; or sta2:2:erino;, indeed, like an intoxi-
cated person, yet without falling. And from that day on it could
walk, at first only quickly and hastily, little less than trotting,
with arms outstretched, as if it were intent on preventing a tum-
ble forward, then more slowly and surely. Within the following
month it stepped over a threshold an inch high, clinging at the

170 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

same time to tlie wall, ami frequently, at tliis time, it was seen
dangliiii:^ its outstretched foot, or raising it too liiii;!i, or setting it
down with a stani]), like a person sntlering from spinal disease.
The will but imperfectly controlled the muscles of walking. The
impulse to move was at times too strong, and at times too weak.
The proper degree of strength was lacking. Long before this
widely-developed activity of the will is shown, the gradual growth
of the will power can be observed in another spontaneons move-
ment, namely, the first grasping motions. Great attention is re-
quired to follow the development of grasping, because, at times, it
rises at a bound from lower to higher steps, and at other times
advances so slowly that progress is generally seen only after weeks
and months.

In the first quarter-year a pencil placed in the little hand is
grasped by the fingers ; even in the third montii the thumb also
is employed in grasping, not independently, but as if it were
a finger, and the infant, in general, does not notice that it is now
holdnig something in its hand. It holds the little object " me-
chanically " fast, " without knowing anything of it," as we would
say of an older person in the case of absent-mindedness. At this
titne every child when awake moves its arms aimlessly about in
the air. So it naturally happens that a finger of an approaching
hand meets the child's little hand, and is held fast by it with the
help of the thumb, so that it seems as if it liad been grasped ; this
is the more delusive the more passively the captive finger with
the arm is allowed to be led hither and thither. In truth, there
is no trace present here of an intentional grasp; but only acci-
dentally does the little hand hold the objects put in it longer and
more firmly than formerly, without stretching toward them, some-
what as a crab cUngs to a finger placed between its claws.

The introduction of the hand into the mouth, which occurs
regularly during the first months, is likewise wholly involuntary.
If the arms move aimlessly about in the air, a hand easily reaches
the mouth, and the fingers are then sucked like every other prop-
erly-shaped object which comes between the lips, because sucking
is associated from the beginning with an agreeable feeling. So it
comes to pass that this sucking the hands soon becomes a habit,
even before there is any capacity for grasping. The child does not
see its mouth, and is only conscious of it after touching it, and can

Psychogenesis. 171

therefore have no desire at first to reach after it. It is rather the
chance contact with the lips, after the involuntary movement of
the arms, which results in sucking the lingers. The movement of
the hand to the mouth is repeated later, because it has that
agreeable eifect without any knowledge of the causal connection.

In the seventeenth week I saw for the first time eag-er elForts to
grasp an object to which the attention was directed. It was a
small India-rubber ball, which was beyond reach — but the child
reached after it. When the ball was placed in its hand, it held
it for a long time very firmly, put it to its mouth, held it close
to its eyes, and looked at it then with a peculiar new and more
intelligent expression of countenance. On the following day the
awkward but energetic attempts to seize all kinds of objects which
were held out within sight of the child were more frequent.
Thus it fixed its gaze either on the object — e. g., a pencil, and
grasped three times in succession at it when placed twice its arm's
length away, or on its own hands, especially when these had once
grasped successfully.

At the same time the expression of countenance betokened the
most eager attention, like that of the zealous botanist when he
sees a new or peculiar flower. After another day the repeated
reaching out for everything within range of the arms seems to
cause the child pleasure. But wonder is aroused at the same
time, and then a great step forward has occurred. The Greek
philosophers were not wrong in thinking that the child's first
astonishment denoted the awakening of its soul.

In these efforts to grasp objects, even when they fail, the little
fingers are beheld with astonishment by all infants. Probably
the child has expected the contact, and when it takes place
wonders at the novelty of the sense of touch. The object, which
has once been grasped, continues to be held, watched, and put
in the mouth, and passes hither and thither from one hand to the
other. The examination evidently becomes more thorough. But
soon the stretching out of the arms, as if to grasp something, will
be the expression of the strongest desire.

At the end of the fourth month the child, for the first time,
uplifts both arms toward its parents with an indesci'ibable ex-
pression of longing. This transition from reaching after inani-
mate things, in order to get hold of them, to reaching after the

172 The Journal of Speculative PJillosophy.

parents in order to be nearer them, is sudden. On the other hand,
its own arms and feet apjiear to the chihi for months to be
soniothino^ stran^^e, not belonfjing to it, wliich it wonders at,
beliolds attentively, examines like interesting objects. It takes
hold of its own feet with its hands and puts them to its lips;
even in its fifth quarter-year it bites its own arm so that it cries
for pain ; it otJ'ers a cracker to its own feet for a taste just as to
the wooden horses with which it plays. No trace is evident of
self-knowledije or self-consciousness. Still later the child strikes
itself, as if for rebuke, upon the hand which broke the toy, as if
the hand operated in- some sort on its own account. But the
grasping carried on indefatigably leads gradually to handling and
to the knowledge of the individuality and tlie nnity of the ego.
That is to say, the newly discovered fact, that the thing which
has been seen and longed for is also the one which has been
touched and gives new sensations, excites the child's attention.
The light and the dark, the colored, the bright, now appears also
smooth and rough, heavy and light, hard and soft, warm and cold,
and this combination of two and three kinds of sense in one ob-
ject causes satisfaction. It is one and the same apple which
appears red and green, smooth and heavy, cold and hard, and also
smells and tastes agreeably. This nnion of sensations from see-
ing, touching, smelling, and tasting at the same point, excites as-
tonishment and meditation, and awakens the inborn, insatiable
impulse of the human soul for the causes of its sensations.

jS^ourishment is afforded this unconscious instinct of causality
throngh gradual perfection in grasping, especially by means of the
growing sense of tonch. The child scrapes, scratches, rubs the
objects it has seized, tnrns them round and round, takes them
apart and tries to put them together. At the time when it seizes
the candle-flame with its hand, when it puts its bread against
its cheeks, chin, or nose, instead of in its mouth, and wants to
reach out through the window-pane, the connection of sight and
grasping has already been so perfected that the child deliber-
ately puts from one hand into the other a single hair, which has
by chance been found by it on the carpet. It grasps with delib-
eration.

Now the will is developed. If the causes of the sensations of
sight and taste, especially of all the excitations of the sense organs,

Psychogenesis. 173

occasioned by external impressions can be found in part by grasp-
ing objects, then grasping becomes arbitrary. The will has de-
veloped from the original longing. The remembrance of the
satisfactory state of things which followed a successful attempt
at grasping awakens the idea of grasping at the sight of a new
object, and at the same time the psychomotor impulse to efiect
the necessary movement. This impulse is called will. It is, in-
deed, quite weak with the child, for self-control is lacking, but the
stubbornness of early youth shows frequently enough how far the
untrained will-power can deteriorate. In its little sphere the
passionate refusal of the boy often accomplishes more than is
wished by the parents, and, very early, will stands irreconcilably
opposed to will.

But is it not precisely so in later life among grown men ? The
man's will reveals itself in varied modes. He calls to life and
slays, he builds and tears down, he wages war and concludes
peace, he unites and separates, threatens and flatters, wounds and
heals, blesses and crushes. He changes the earth's surface, and
designedly interferes with the natural development of the animal
and plant world ; in the course of his development he constantly
subdues more and more the forces of nature, and constantly con-
trols more and more the most intractable. The will-power is the
mightiest weapon in the struggle for existence. Other men follow
the example of a man with strong will, and he shapes his sur-
roundings according to his own laws.

But even such a one, even the strongest, was once a child, and
had at iirst no will, then a weak one, and not until late could the
strong will be developed from this. This can only be done by
means of opposition to the will of others. Therefore in education
there is nothing of so much consequence as the management of
the child's will while it is still manageable. Simple commands
do not sutfice, and only have the desired effect when they are
conducted with consistency and never violated by him who gives
them. The educator must also'be a pattern to the child, not only
preaching truth, but being sincere; above all, directing the child's
will to the taming of the passions from which it is descended. It
is important, therefore, that the child should see nothing, hear
nothing, and especially perceive nothing, which ^could be detri-
mental to the education of its will. The impressions on the

174r The Jiyurnal of Speculative Philosophy.

ororans of sense must also be regulated. B\it the senses are at
first not very susceptible. How is it with them ?

If the development of the senses in new-born children and in-
fants is observed, the slight sensitiveness of the skin will first
strike the beholder. To be sure, a scream can be caused in the
very first hour of life by means of a blow or a rough touch, but
this scream can hardly be conceived as an expression of a special
ieeling of pain. It is rather reflex, like the first breath, for in-
fants can be handled in all sorts of ways which would be painful
to adults, without reacting in the least. So, when the nose, lip,
or hand is pricked, no sign of discomfort is noticed, frequently
not even a movement ; and yet, to try the sensitiveness of the
skin, a needle was introduced so far that a drop of blood appeared.
(Genzmer.)

I have not tried such experiments with children, but in other
ways I have recognized the slight sensitiveness of infants. When
the eye is touched, they close it much more slowly than they do
later, and also imperfectly. Wetting the eye in the bath, too,
does not cause the lid to close.

These and many similar observations can be carried on with
every infant. After one or two days an increase in the sensitive-
ness of the skin is easily ascertained, and at the very beginning
the child is in the highest degree susceptible to warmth. The
first bath is at the same time the first agreeable sense-impression
which the world afibrds the infant.

But the first perceptions of temperature seem to have much less
of a direct specific psychogenetic meaning than the first percep-
tions of touch. Anaxagoras did not assert too much when he
said that man differs from animals in having hands. A child's
hands are the feelers of its soul. They are the pioneers of its
army of longings, eager for the conquest of the world. By means
of the excitation of the organs of touch — in the finger-tips and the
lips — the infant receives the first intimation of things without him,
and, by means of the difference cff the sensations in touching its
own skin and extraneous objects, the foundation is laid for self-
consciousness on the one side, and for gaining knowledge on the
other. The infant's fingers are in reality the instruments -with
which it strives to investigate everything which comes within
reach. Its methods have the greatest similarity with the methods

Psychogenesis. 175

of natural philosophy. For the investigator isolates, takes to
pieces, observes from all sides, and then endeavors to put together
what he took apart. Every child is a born naturalist, and wishes
to penetrate into the very essence of things. The importance of
the touch appears best from the fact that, in certain cases, persons
who early became blind and deaf, have, with the aid of the sense
of touch alone, attained a relatively high intellectual development.
But these cases are exceedingly rare, and the instruction is ex-
tremely laborious.

No one sense can take the place of another; an exchange is
impossible in man, and one is only imperfectly represented by
another. On the contrary, all the senses, even at the outset of
life, share in the development of perception and sensibility, even
the most undervalued, taste and smell.

In relation to the former, Professor Kussmaul, more than twenty
years ago, in a short but interesting treatise on the " Spiritual
Life in New-Born Children," gave several important observations
which he made for the first time. He found that strong sensa-
tions of taste are distinguished from each other by all infants,
since the effect when the tongue is moistened with a solution of
sugar is quite different from that of quinine, vinegar, or salt. In
these three cases, children, even directly after birth, make all
kinds of grimaces and unmistakable signs of dislike, and the
"sour" face is quite different from the "bitter," while the lively
sucking movements, together with the expression of extreme sat-
isfaction when sugar is offered, leave no room for doubting that
the nerve of taste is endowed with a natural power of discrimina-
tion.

The old opinion, that the new-born child takes everything in-
discriminately which is offered it, is erroneous. This is true only
in the case of fluids with a weak taste. The child takes medicines
without opposition only when they are sugared, as is usually done.
And if some new-born children respond to an intense sweet with
the expression of bitter, as I have observed likewise in older in-
fants, the reason may be found in its surprise at the novelty of
the strong sensation, for after the first trial more is wanted.

Every strong and new impression is disagreeable at the first
instant, a kind of terror. Surprise at the strangeness of it pre-
vents the child from distinguishing whether the feeling was agree-

176 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

able or disagreeable. The adult too often has this experience.
All new-born children take sugar gladly after the first feeling of
surprise has passed. Then it is craved.

I found the same true of new-born animals, which show espe-
cially by their astonishment that, without having had any experi-
ence in tasting, they distinguish the most diverse substances — e. g.,
camphor crystals, thyme, and sugar candy, since they gnaw and
lick the latter alone.

The chicken, too, which has just been hatched, can distinguish
the food which is placed before it by the taste. When I put be-
fore it the white of an e^^ cooked, the yolk cooked, and some
meal, it picked at all three, one after another, as it did at the bits
of egg-shell, grains of sand, spots, and cracks near it, but most
frequently and eagerly at the yolk of the eg^. I took this away,
and when I put it back an hour after the first trial, the chicken
sprang at it immediately and began to eat, persistently scorning
the rest. At the first trial it had only tasted the white of the
egg and swallowed a single grain of the meal. This preference
for the yolk rests, therefore, upon an inborn ability to distinguish
tastes.

The sense of taste, as Sigismund remarks in his delightful essay
on " Child and World," is the first of all the senses to furnish clear
perceptions, which are appropriated. The taste of the first milk
which is taken remains, so that another kind is often only tried
and then refused, after the strange taste and smell are compared
with the first taken.

Memory and judgment first appear with certainty in the realm
of the sense of taste.

But throughout the whole of life, and in its beginning also, the
sensation of smell can not be easily separated from that of taste.
Without any doubt, infants in the first hours of their lives can
have no sensation of smell without taste, at least cannot distin-
guish them. For breathing through the nose, drawing in the air,
and filling the nostrils with air,.are indispensable to the excitation
of the nerves of smell. Neither can be realized in the beginning,
yet most children recognize very soon, after the breath is once
in operation, whether the}' are receiving the same nourishment as
at first, or another kind, and often refuse to make the acquaintance
of a new nurse whose presence is disagreeable to them.

Psychoge7iesis. 1Y7

Otherwise, there are no sure experimental modes of determining
the capability of infants during the first days for distinguishing
fixed smells. The experiments with strong odors which have
been tried in this direction have been uniformly successful only
with sleeping children, and the sensory nerves of the organ of
smell, ending together with the nerves of smell, might easily have
been excited, so that they would have been the chief cause of the
change in the child's physiognomy through a reflex action. It is
known that young animals born blind are led principally by their
sense of smell in seeking their first nourishment, the mother's
milk. Experiments, especially those of Biffi and Gudden, show
the relatively high development which the sense of smell attains
in very young animals. For they show that when the nerves of
smell are cut the little animals no longer succeed in finding their
mother. They have to be nourished artificially. I have, like-
wise, made many observations on new-born animals, and have
found that some substances are extremely repulsive to them,
tobacco-smoke, for example, while others, camphor especially, are
agreeable.

Seventeen hundred years ago Galen carried on a similar experi-
ment. He bronght a young kid, which had never seen its mother,
into a room where several open dishes were standing filled with
wine, oil, honey, meal, and milk. The young and inexperienced
animal soon arose, shook itself, went frOm one dish to another,
smelled of them all, turned to the dish of milk, and drank it up.
In this case the sense of smell alone could have determined the
choice, and the preference for the milk must rest upon an in-
herited remembrance.

Hearing and sight are incomparably more significant for the
further development of the mind than the two lower senses.

In relation to hearing, it is necessary to note that all new-born
human beings are deaf at first. Even the very strongest react
from a loud noise only after six seconds, maiiy not for a day, and
very many not for two or three days. The awakening of the
sense of hearing is recognizable by the trembling of the arms and
the whole body, and then by a quick pulsation of the eyelid,
when a loud noise or tone takes place suddenl}'. These reflex
movements are the same throughout life in excitable people. If
a pistol-shot is unexpectedly fired quite near, everybody winks
XY— 12

178 The Journal of Speoulative Philosophy.

quickly. The ?aine, to be sure, happens from other causes, and a
tone or a sound of slight intensity can be heard without the oc-
currence of the lid pulsation. But the non-appearance in very
little children of any and all responsive movements, after strong
sensations of sound, and their utter indiiference to the same, are
sure signs that the}' cannot hear, because after several days they
respond to every loud noise in the accustomed manner.

The reason for the early deafness is well known. It 'rests on
the fact that the external auditory passage is not yet open — its
partitions are still united — and the middle ear contains too little
air at tirst. The tender little bones of the ear cannot yet move.
By means of breathing and swallowing, air first gets through the
eustachian tubes into the cavities of the drum ; add to this that at
first the tympanum is very slanting — too slanting to be easily set
in motion by the vibrations of the air. Hence comes the ditficulty
of hearing during the first days and weeks, and the profound sleep
which not even loud noises easily interrupt.

But after the ear, through no other sense organ does the child
receive so much that is important for its spiritual development.
The backwardness in intellectual relations of children born deaf
in comparison with those born blind shows the superiority of the
ear over the eye in this relation.

At the beginning of life it is, as a rule, the voice of the mother
and the nearest relatives which furnishes the first impression of
sound. Yery soon these voices are distinguished, tones and noises
responded to differently. It is especially interesting in the second
month to compare the quieting effect of songs and lullabys with
the extraordinary animation at hearing dance-music. Certain
noises too, like sh, st, and a deep man's voice, cause quiet, a ces-
sation of screaming, and a new effort of the attention, and the
infant can be made to scream by a strange, very strong, sharp
noise, such as a locomotive whistle.

All these observations, which might be easily multiplied, show
how early the child distinguishes ear impressions, in spite of its
first deafness.

The same is true for impressions of light ; at first there is a kind
of dread of light, inasmuch as only twilight or a weak artificial
light is endured. When a candle is brought near, the new-born
child squeezes its eyes firmly together. Light and dark, or at

Psychogenesis. 179

least "very light" and "very dark," can be distinguished; in-
deed, the activity of the eye is exhausted by it at first. Colors,
forms, distances, differences in size, motions, are not recognized
at tirst. The movements of the eyes are still quite irregular like
those of the hands. One looks toward the left, the other toward
the right. One is open, the other shut. One is still, the other
moves. It appears natural that among all the manifold move-
ments of the eyes they should be turned simultaneously to the
right and left. The conclusion must not be drawn from this curi-
ous behavior of the first six days that there is a natural symmetry
in the contractions of the eye-muscles. Symmetry is acquired
slowly. The empirical theory of the perception of space, espe-
cially advocated by Helmholtz, receives strong support from the
facts established by me with unusual care. There is no conscious-
ness of space even after three weeks. It is possible only through
experience. At first the field of sight is composed only of light
and dark patches, and there is only a perception of light. Yet
even this excites the attention, so that many children, one day
old, turn their heads toward the window, which I nevertheless
observed for the first time on the sixth day.

Then begins staring, which is frequently but erroneously taken
for seeing. With fixed gaze, the infant looks into vacancy, so
that it might be thought it was locating an object, all the more as
a candle-light is stared at continuously by most children after the
ninth day. But it is easily perceived on a closer examination
that the child does not see. Only when the light is brought in
the direction of the staring does the perception of it seem to exist.
The look is not directed to the light until after the third week,
and then for the first time the inexperienced eye follows it, if it is
moved slowly, partly with movements of the head, and partly
without. But how small a share the understanding has in this
can be seen from the fact that frequently the turning of the head
and the direction of the glance are quite opposed. Longet has
remarked, too, that deaf people without great intelligence follow
with their eyes a candle-light which is moved about. Neverthe-
less, the countenance of a child, a month old, acquires a remark-
ably knowing expression when it looks with both eyes at once on
a slowly moving object like a swinging lamp, and moves them
simultaneously with it. The stupid, almost animal expression

180 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

comes again afterward and disappears only in the second quarter-
year. The appearance of the human spiritualized physiognomy
is really conditioned by the independent location of clear, bright
objects, which is now beginning. Accommodation, or the power
of voluntarily causing plane surfaces standing at unequal dis-
tances from the eye to reflect themselves clearly upon the retina,
one after another, is then in process of development, and the un-
symmetrical movements of the eye gradually cease entirely.

Now, also, begins the ability to distinguish colors. One child
prefers yellow, another red ; but all dislike black and very dark
colors; likewise a dazzlingly bright color. It is difficult to deter-
mine when the finer shades of color and their degrees of brilliancy
are first clearly recognized, and the time varies with individuals.
One child learns to distinguish the tones of the scale very early,
and another not after many years. I know no case of a child who
could always correctly point out the colors red, green, yellow, or
blue, before the beginning of the third year. But in the twenty-
sixth month this degree of knowledge of colors can be attained
by practice, and blue will be the last to be correctly named.

The distinction of forms, too, advances extremely slowly. The
experiences of such as are born blind, but have their sight restored
by operations when they are able to talk, are of remarkable im-
portance here. They show that the ellipse cannot be distinguished
from the square, nor the sphere from the cube, by means of the
eye alone, but only after the touch has been exercised. The same
is true, without doubt, for every little child.

Many observations show how defective is the estimation of dis-
tances during the first years. The attempt to seize the moon is
well known. In this relation even long practice seems to be suc-
cessful only when the child stays a great deal in the open air, and
great mistakes in estimating distances remain throughout life, un-
less special practice is had in the matter.

The same is true for the recognition of differences in size. A
child, even in the third year, attempts to crowd its large play-
things into a small receptacle, to put great pieces of bread into its
little mouth, and to span the largest objects with its tiny hands.

It is further of peculiar importance to every theory of knowl-
edge, that the first perceptions of change of position within the
field of view, the disappearance of a bright surface from the same,

Psychogenesis. 181

as when a lamp is extinguished, and the appearance of a new,
bright object, as when a lamp is lighted, makes a deep impression
on the inexperienced infant every time. During the iirst two
months, even the quickest approach of a hand to the child's face
is not noticed. Only after the third month comes the much dis-
cussed pulsation of the lid, which thereafter throughout life occurs
regularly at the unexpectedly quick approach of any object to
the eye, even when the eye is not touched and a pane of glass is
before it.

The difference between hereditary and acquired actions in see-
ing may be clearly recognized from this behavior. For example,
the contraction of the pupils on the appearance of a bright light,
and their enlargement when the face is shaded, which every infant
shows, are hereditary. On the other hand, the quick opening and
closing of eyes on the sudden approach of the hand are acquired.
It is a defensive motion, conditioned by the disagreeable surprise,
for the child knows nothing of danger at this age. Everv defensive
motion becomes later, through constant repetition, habitual, and
then reflexive, like other defensive contractions of the muscles.

By the multiplication of similar observations and experiments
in very little children, it is possible to follow the advancing devel-
opment of sight in detail. This also applies to the other senses;
only a great deal of material must be collected before the sentient
groundwork of the child's spiritual development can be clearly
manifested. Helmholtz is right in saying that observations on
new-born animals, carried on accurately and critically, are in the
highest degree desirable, in order, above all, to decide on the ad-
missibility of the dominant theories of space. The sense-percep-
tions are the only material from which every human being builds
up its world. Their content, that which is perceived, is likewise
the foundation upon which the feelings and passions grow. The
child's emotions, its likes and dislikes, the awakening of its sense
of duty, the beginnings of its character development, the first
dawn of its talents — all these depend in a direct line on the devel-
opment of its senses. But so little that is legitimate or has any
connection has been as yet discovered in this realm, that an expo-
sition of this side of psychogenesis would result merely in a com-
pilation of disconnected facts.

The only medium of explanation, the child's talk, is to be in-

182 The Journal of Speculative PMlosophij.

vestigated previously. And this study is most important to tlie
knowledge of the child's spiritual condition and the operations of
its intoUifjence. It promises the greatest enlightenment concern-
ing the dark secret of the souFs development. Man announces
the existence of his reason, not only in the safest way, but in the
only safe way, by the independent management of language. I
have therefore spared no trouble to ]nit down on paper daily every-
thing which can be conceived as a lingual ex])ression, every noise
wdiich can be fixed somewhere, within the first two years, and
shall shortly ]niblish in a separate work a history of the develop-
ment of speech, based thereupon. Only single instances of gen
eral interest can be brought forward here.

Above all, the most careful observation of the mien and behavior
of the child who cannot yet talk is important in answering the
question, "How have I learned to talk?" or that associated with
it, " IIow did the nnderstanding develop?"

Too great an influence has been constantly attributed to imita-
tion in explanation of tlie mimical movements and gestures of the
child. The first smile and laugh, for example, are in no wise imi-
tative, but hereditary, like the scream and moan for pain. Many
a gesture, like placing the hands together when making a request
and nodding at being carried out doors, are learned through train-
ing ; affirmative motions of the head are acquired partly through
imitation, partly through training, and partly, apparently, are in-
herited.

It is exceedingly difiicult to exclude from the child the influ-
ence of imitation, one of the mightiest impulses of nature, and to
distinguish it from hereditary transmission when it is not ex-
cluded. The study of the features and gestures of those who are
born blind is of the greatest service here. But persons who are
born totally blind are rare, and those who become blind later show
a less decided play of features than those who have their sight,
because imitation is then lacking ; but the remembrances of imi-
tated looks abide in them, so that it is hard to distinguish inherit-
ance and acquisition.

How is it with talking, with articulate speech, which is recog-
nized by all parties as the single radical difference between man
and animal? It will scarcely be asserted that a child can be born
who can speak immediately, for surely no child can learn to talk

Psijchogenesis. 183

without imitation. But articulate speech should not, therefore,
without further consideration, be absolutely designated as some-
thing acquired and by no means hereditary. For all properties of
the organism (which continually and periodically repeat them-
selves) are finally called hereditary. It can be said that the qual-
ity of being hereditary is one form of the law of inertia, or of the
power of inertness in the realm of organic nature. Whatever
continues regularly through many generations for a long time is
called hereditary. It is a matter of indiiference to the ordinary
understanding whether the question is concerning the organs
which govern the formation of tone, as the larynx and tongue, or
concernino; such actions as screaming and sino-ino- or even the
voice itself. If through hundreds of generations, not language,
indeed, but speech, keeps on, partly improving, partly deteriorat-
ing, there is no reason for not calling it hereditary. Hereditary
and inborn are not synonymous terms. The teeth and the beard
are hereditary, but not inborn ; only a tendency to them is in-
born. So, too, speech is hereditary and not inborn ; but the
tendency, the predisposition, is born in the child. If any part of
the extremely complicated mechanism of speech is lacking or de-
fective— if, for example, thevocal chords or the ear refuse to per-
form their task, or if the tongue is paralyzed — the child does not
learn to speak articulately as is customary ; but a proof that the
tendency to speak exists, lies in the fact that the child often learns
quite the same language as its friends, yet in another way, fre-
quently by indirect methods, such as writing, finger-language, etc.

There is no fact which demonstrates as clearly as this the
original independence of the faculty of speech from the separate
organs of speech, and yet the dependence of the highest develop-
ment of speech on the integrity of the vocal mechanism is recog-
nized, for the slightest defect in the organs is audible. But it is
not the organs which determine speech, but vice versa. The need
of communication created the organs of speech ; these were trans-
mitted, and then had a direct influence upon the child's manner
of speaking.

If the child's utterances are noticed daily from its birth until it
can use the mother-tongue independently, the Ariadne thread will
be found, which leads through the perplexing labyrinth of phe-
nomena. There is hardly any greater intellectual enjoyment for

184 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

the psycliologist than observing tlie early period of human life,
within which speech is developed from tlie first reflex cry, at flrst
indiscernible, gradually flowing slowly and nninterrnptedly from
undiscovered sources; then gradnally gushing fortli more quickly
and with apparent irregularity ; next slowly freed from unneces-
sary accompaniments, more orderlj^ aud plain, clear and fluent,
until finally the quiet stream of coherent speech testities to the
rule of intelligence over instinct, to the victory of the will, and to
the formation of thought.

Whoever holds to observations, independently of any opinion
concerning the origin of speech, will recognize how erroneous in
part the dominant notions are ; as, for example, when the child,
before it learns its parents' or teacher's language, must forget its
own — a peculiarly articulated childish talk, which it found for
itself.

At first only vowels can be uttered, particularly ah and a. But,
in spite of their uniformity, the utterances within the first five
weeks are so dift'erent that from them alone the child's spiritual
state is known. The periodically interrupted screaming, together
with contracted eyelids when hungry, the persistent whimper when
cold, the high, piercing tones when in pain, the laughter at a shin-
ing button, the crowing for joy, the peculiar announcements of a
"wish to change position, connected with animated movements of
the arms, are varied, easily distinguishable, acoustic expressions of
life, partly reflex, partly instinctive.

In the seventh week I heard the first consonant, m. The indis-
tinct utterances of the infant at this time, particularly during the
first half-year, cannot be written down. The child also moves
all the muscles which are at its disposal, without any external
cause. To these belong, above all, the muscles of the larynx,
tongue, and lips. It often happens, w^hen the indefatigable move-
ments of the tongue are made at random, that the mouth is wholly
or partly closed. Then, in breathing, the stream of air makes its
way out, and thus many sounds arise involuntarily, even such as
do not occur in the English language, and in whose repetition the
infant delio-bts. Most of the consonants which arise through the
irregular use of the tongue and lips can be fixed as little as the
movements of the limbs, continually becoming more animated,
continuous, and varied, can be delineated or described. In the

Psychogenesis. 185

seventh month only in, b, d, n, r are plain, occasionally g and h,
and very rarely k in a prattling monologue.

l^ow the voice is gradually modified, so as to be more surely an
expression of the mood. If the child longs for a new object, it
not only points out the direction with outstretched arms and a
glance, but makes known its wish by the same noise which it
utters before taking nourishment. This combination of intricate
movements of the eye, arm, and vocal muscles is a great step for-
ward. At the same time the syllables pa, at, ta, ba, da, ma, na,
which almost all children of all races utter, become plain and oft-
repeated. They have no meaning, and are only the involuntary
result of the gymnastic exercises of the vocal apparatus.

Toward the end of the first year the first imitative sounds usu-
ally begin, but in the most imperfect manner. Many children
are skilled in them earlier. But this early and clever imitation or
mimicry is probably less a sign of intelligence than of lack of
mental mdependence. The latter is, in any case, recognized much
more at this time by the nascent power of distinguishing audible
words. The child turns its head when it is called. It is easily
trained to perform little tricks, such as giving its hand, and the
like. Yet, at the beginning of the second year, the infant's com-
prehension of its nurse's jargon is usually not greater, and its rep-
ertory of words is not richer, than that of a well-trained hound
for its master's utterances. The enormous intellectual difference
between the child and the trained animal is shown less by the fact
that it associates more thoroughly the idea of a certain object or
a certain variation with a sound which it hears than that it can
itself express a syllable, a word, although in a whisper, so that
the corresponding sensation recurs. One of the first expressions
of the kind, with almost all children, is atta. In some coun-
tries the parents train the child so that by "atta" or "atte" it
means one thing, in others it has quite a different meaning. The
association of the syllables "pa" and "ma" with the parents, or
other grown men and women, is taught the child with great pains
months after it has uttered the sjdlables devoid of any meaning.

The imitation of sounds makes considerable progress in the
third half-year. Many objects are now also rightly pointed out
on inquiry, after they have been constantly and repeatedly shown
and named ; the child likewise rightly uses by itself mutilated

186 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

forms of the words it has frequently lieard ; for example, " peas "
for "please," when wishing somethins;, " mik" for "milk." It
does not strike me that sncli primitive attempts of the child to
employ the words it has often heard, like a sudden enlightenment,
stamps it at once as a rational being. Tiie gestures and bear-
ing are still the most important medium of the understanding,
and such distorted syllables, attendant phenomena.

On the other hand, the tirst sign of the nascent formation of
ideas is undoubtedly noticeable in the highest degree because of
its unexpected appearance. The child had formerly regularly said
" atta " when carried off or taken out. Now, when the lamp was
lighted at evening and somewhat protected by a shade, it likewise
said " atta." This happened in the fifteenth month. "VVliether
the word was heard frequently when going out, and appropriated
to that or not, it had never been used in connection with dimming
a light. The formation of the idea is in any case shown in this
wav. The child had itself discovered a similaritvin the strikingly
ditferent incidents of going out and dimming a light. It repre-
sented the disappearance of the most dissimilar impressions of
sight by the same sound. Then the closing of a fan and the
emptying of a glass were soon designated in the same way. There
is, then, reflection without language, for in these cases " atta " was
the only word which the child employed at the time it was form-
ing ideas. Reflection, however, appears much more through
gestures and actions than through sounds, in spite of the fact that
at the beginning of the fourth half-year the articulation had been
very much improved through imitation. To be sure, all the
sounds of the language could not yet, nor even in the third year,
be rightly and voluntarily employed, but they come of themselves
to a certain extent, when the child indulges its inclinations and,
for example, spreads open a newspaper and imitates the reading it
has so often noticed. At this time the intellio;:ent child under-
stands more words than it can repeat, but it repeats many which
it cannot understand in a parrot-like way, without any instruc-
tion and for its own enjoyment, particularly such words as delight
its hearers. The demeanor of the latter is not only of conse-
quence, but prescribes the child's choice of expressions. By this
means the articulation is developed more quickly, and the incredi-
ble activity of the tongue, whose evolutions no adult can imitate,

Psychogenesis. ' 18T

is, at the same time, of use to the child learuin^^ to play. Every
little child of any nationality can learn to speak any language
perfectly — the Italian, Russian, the Esquimau, Arabic — while
in later life the finer shades of pronunciation are no longer easily
acquired. But the child learns its mother-tongue by a different
method from that used by the adult in mastering a foreign idiom.
It begins by understanding the meaning of what is said, and learns
to pronounce the words afterwards. The scholar, on the other
hand, learns the pronunciation of the sounds first, learns the
words by heart, and finally the meaning of strange sentences.
The so-called child's talk is composed of inarticulate sounds, of
gestures and actions, and of distorted fragments of language, mu-
tilated almost beyond recognition, and the child employs only a
few onomatopoetic expressions which represent no language.
Bow-wow, cock-a-doodle-do, mew-mew, are said before children,
and their memory, not yet overladen, is impressed by what is per-
ceptible. The wonderful creative fancy of the child quickly mas-
ters the new animal voices, and makes blocks of wood or paper
dolls talk together, before the child itself can speak.

The preparatory work which the child requires is so manifold that
the process of learning to talk seems incomprehensible even to
the most sharp-witted. The child screams, laughs, hums, sings,
smacks, crows, squeals, etc., and understands what is said to it
long before it speaks. And after it has touched, looked, listened,
and tasted countless times, after it has pleased itself with manifold
attempts at imitation and has then become weary, after the time
when it could not repeat what was said, and later would not —
then it speaks of its own accord. But what it says does not have
a single meaning, but one word stands at the same time for several
entire sentences. " Hot " to-day means " The milk is too w^arm
for me ; " yesterday it was, " The stove is too hot ; I must not
touch it." Next comes the time when two, then three, words are
spoken together. At last comes the first little story of the two-
year-old : " Julia breaked doll." It is still far from this begin-
ning to a correct construction of sentences. The use of preposi-
tions, verbs, and articles is very difficult for many months, but the
way is opened. The child's infinitives and proper names gradu-
ally disappear, the construction gradually becomes more correct,
until finally the child gives more striking evidence of its reasoning

188 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

faculty from sensible questions than from answers. The first ques-
tions rehite to space. The child asks, AVliere? wliitlier ? also
which '{ long before it gives any meaning to When ? Wliy is un-
derstood and nsed later still.

If the poverty of a child's language is compared with that of an
adult who has sutiered from disease, there will be found a parallel
which is uncommonly interesting and surprising because of its
completeness. Yarious kinds of derangements in speech caused
by illness, and not a few in number, are miniatured in the child.
During an illness an adult is no longer in a condition to speak
correctly ; during childhood the undeveloped being is not yet in a
condition to speak correctly. In one tlie existing functions are
disturbed, in the other the functions of the phonetic system and
the vocal organs are not trained. The one state helps to under-
stand the other. I must forego an explanation of this matter in
this place, because the rich material allows of no abridgment. It
was only my wish here to sketch a few of the essential and funda-
mental conditions of the spiritual development of the child apart
from current and fashionable opinions, and to bring into promi-
nence the extraordinary significance in the study of the child's
soul. Its poetry remains untouched. ISTothing of the magic of a
glance from the child's eye will be taken away in the opinion of
the mother if the father interests himself in the movements of this
eye in which pure truth abides.

When I look at my work, at the efil'orts repeated daih^ for years
to fix upon the incidents of development, it seems to me as if I
were standing on the bank of a shining stream which is constantly
widening, constantly flowing on more quickly, and into whose
clear water I look without finding the bottom, even when no
surging waves disturb the surface. We stand amazed and dumb
before the eternal enigma of existence. Before we are aware, the
helpless child is transformed into a being which resembles us.
Our own youth, like that of our children, passes by before we
know it. We are astonished at development, and do not under-
stand it.

Notes and Discussions. 189

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

SENTENCES IN PROSE AND VERSE.

SKLECTKD BY WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING.

III.

Self-limiting diseases should be left to run their course. In some tem-
peraments, action and character fall under this head. There are defects
we cannot cure, errors we cannot atone for.

To know a little, and to know that well, gives a person a certain im-
portance in these diffusively informed times, when each one crams his
cheek like a squirrel with a tout ensemble of nutshells.

External events impress us less as youth retreats ; but the perception
of youth is not obliterated by age. To others, we look old ; to ourselves,
there is no perceptible change, as age is not of the mind, but the body.

Memory is that amber of thought which preserves the flies once buzz-
ing so loudly against the ceiling of our kitchen. Here is a museum with
magic mirrors, whose reflection faithfully repeats long-past illusions. On
this hearth lie the ashes of spent affections, the precipitate of possibilities,
dusty bas-reliefs of a shadowy existence, which this ever-shifting, transpa-
rent varnish recalls to a moment's life.

Certainly J. B. is a woman almost trying to understand what is said to
her ; and what lack of art or nature spills all that Xeres wine from her
cellars ? It came near to be a thought in her, and fades to a feeling,
lively, rapid, and flexible, but without the due assignable limit. All she
asked of this life was the permission to die. When she spoke of this, a
flood of sunbeams transfigured her pale and weary face, as if she were
already smiling at a banquet in the skies.

The total of most men's lives is an unwieldy mass, barely informed by
a flash of expression. They have great faith in dulness to endure it at
the rate they do.

Cold, dry, and self-satisfied persons are of value to the wayward and
susceptible, as mixtures make the best mill-stones.

190 Tlie Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

New books are like new cider : tliey soon grow hard, and next turn to
vinegar.

All things and men flow to the fortunate man. Where he was born or
what he has is a little matter; favors drop down on him like rain from
the sky. The public caress, his private circle worships him. Without
his seeking, the best persons of every class surrender themselves at dis-
cretion to his purposes. He is the wax which receives all impressions,
and is injured by none.

Some prudish, half-developed women are so faithful to falsehood they
cannot even believe that another can offer himself to be their friend ; and
consider it personal disgrace if they are incorrectly supposed to possess
the thinnest mockery of a female heart.

Hold by thyself, since the laws of the moral constitution are believed
by some to owe thee a fit return for self-reliance. Be clad in shreds or
patch, nurtured on a spare fast, alone and unknown, thy own servant and
thy own master. So shalt thou not give way to the vacant air, nor resign
thy surroundings to sun or star. Vines cut low produce a grape.

The coffin-maker is a spare, smiling, gray-haired man, always spoiling
for a corpse. Over his work-bench hangs a bit of pine board, on which
is written in pencil the length, breadth, and height of coffins for persons
of different ages.

The scholar should sit in a serenity as calm and inaccessible as those
beautiful and noble monuments some god has deposited out there, and
which men name Nature !

Can ye make diamonds of granite and pomegranates of corn ? In human
character there is, too, a tough specification. Men develop, they never
change.

Homer is gone ; and where is Jove, and where
The rival cities seven ? His song outlives

Time, tower, and god — all that then was, save Heaven. — Festus.
Think not so fondly as thy foolish race,
Imagining a Heaven from things without;
The picture on the passing wave call Heaven ;
The wavelet, life ; the sands beneath it, death ;
Daily more seen till, lo ! the bed is bare —
This fancy fools the world.

There are points from which we can command our life,
When the soul sweeps the future like a glass ;
And coming things, full-freighted with our fate,
Jut out, dark, on the offing of the mind.

Notes and Discussions. 191

There are no traces to be found of either Rime or Metre in our lan-
guage till some years after the Conquest. And from those old Roman
Poets they took their first lessons in Riming, when Rime was tough and
stringy like the cocoanut rind. — Tyrwhitt.

He is born for a limited sphere who thinks of the people of his own
time. Others will come after him who can judge without offence and
without favor. — Seneca.

Shaking between them the skin suspended between three stakes, and
filled with milk to be thus churned to butter. — Layard [" Nineveh "].

I cannot but think Schiller's turn for philosophy has injured his poetry.
It led him to prefer ideas to nature. — Goethe.

"Do notour lives consist of the four elements?" — "Faith! so they
say ; but I think it rather consists of eating and drinking." — Shakespeare.

Not to know at large of things remote
From use, obscure and subtle, but to know
That which before us lies in daily life
Is the prime wisdom. — Milton.
The instrumental cause is constantly adjoined to the principal cause.
An active, in order to be efiicient, must always have a passive conjoined
with it. — Swedenhorg.

Forms ascend from the lowest to the highest, in ordei and by degrees,
as do also the essences and substances of all things. — Ibid.

In youth, when we either possess nothing, or know not how to value
the tranquil possession of anything, we are democrats ; but when we, in
a long life, have come to possess something of our own, we wish not only
ourselves to be secure of it, but that our children and grandchildren should
be secure of inheriting it. — Goethe.

A score of airy miles will smooth
Rough Monadnoc to a gem. — Emerson.
As sings the pine-tree in the wind.
So sings in the wind a sprig of the pine.

Dear friend, where thy shadow falls.
Beauty sits and music calls;
Where thy form and favor come,
All good creatures have their home.

When thou dost shine, darkness looks white and fair.
Forms turn to music, clouds to smiles and air. — Vaughan.
The light of the understanding is not a dry or pure light, but drenched
in the will and affections, and the intellect forms the sciences accordingly,

192 The Journal of Speculative PhUosophi/.

for what men desire to be true tliey are most inclined to believe. The
understandinix, tliorefore, rejects things difficult, as being impatient of
inc^uiry, things just and solid, because they limit hope, and the deeper
mysteries of nature, through superstition; it rejects the light of experi-
ence, through pride and haughtiness, as disdaining the mind should be
meanly or wavcringly employed, it excludes paradoxes for fear of the
vulgar. And thus the affections tinge and infect the understanding num-
berless ways, and sometimes imperceptibly. — Bacon.

In all their laws and strictest tie of their order, there was but this one
rule to be observed : Do as thou wilt. — Rabelais.

For six weeks their history is of the kind called barren ; which, indeed,
as Philosophy knows, is often the fruitfullest of all. — Carlyle.

Men's words are a poor exponent of their thoughts ; nay, their thought
itself is a poor exponent of the inward, unnamed Mystery wherefrom both
thought and action have their birth. — Ibid.

The forced rolling of sand down a bank under the pressure of water
produces a species of foliaceous development, like buds and leaves, a kind
of sand-plant, or like a system of blood-vessels or intestines. The pres-
sure of the wheels of a railroad train over mud and water upon the rails
produces a like imitation, as well as dripping water partly frozen, frost on
windows, and stalactites, which are all semblances of vegetable shapes.

And whereas Mahomet, that his writings might continue, has forbidden
them to be read, Moses, that his might last, has commanded everybody
to read them. Moses was a very able man ; this is indisputable. — Pascal.

Between us and Heaven or Hell, or Annihilation, there is nothing in-
terposed but life, the most brittle thing in all the world. — Ibid.

Every work of art must show on the face of it that it is such ; and this
can be done only through what we call sensible beauty, or agreeableness.
Plastic art relates especially to the human form. — Goethe.

•Unless we are accustomed to them from early youth, splendid chambers
and elegant furniture had best be left to such as neither have nor can
have thoughts. — Ibid.

Every conception, every mental affection, is followed by changes in the
chemical nature of the secreted fluids ; every thought, every sensation, is
accompanied by a change in the composition of the substance of the
brain. — Liebig.

Whoever considers the final cause of the world will discern a multitude
of uses that enter as parts into that result. They all admit of being

Notes and Discussions. 193

thrown into one of the following classes : commodity, beauty, language,
and discipline. — Emerson.

Truth and goodness and beauty are but different faces of the same all.
Beauty in nature is not ultimate. It is the herald of inward and eternal
beauty. — Ibid.

Nature is that Avhich is in perpetual growth and progress, and which
subsists in continual change of form and internal development. — Cams.

All things unto our flesh are kind
In their descent and being ; to our mind.
In their ascent and cause. — George Herbert.
I ever desired to discern physical phenomena in their widest mutual

connection, and to comprehend nature as a whole, animated and moved

by inward forces. — Humboldt.

For right as she can paint a lily whit.

And red a rose, right with swiche peinture

She peinted hath this noble creature

Er she was borne, upon hire limmes free.

Whereas by right swiche colours shoulden be ;

And Phebus died hath hire tresses grete,

Like to the stremes of his burned hete. — Chaucer.

Flakes of snow form stars upon ice. This is the expansion of radii from
a centre. Drops of water are perfect globes. Undoubtedly these are
radiated. By crystallization they become flakes, and by falling are flat-
tened into superficial spheres, whereof the true circumferences have been
by motion driven into centres. Thus raindrops contain the principles of
the star.

Trees are extended circles, or spirals. The diminution of branches
above, where other branches are sent off, is a division like the opening of
the seed-leaves, and the expansion into twigs and branches resembles
nervous and muscular expansions, or that of blood-vessels.

Whatever is displayed in the outermost, flows from a nature which re-
sides in the innermost. — Swedenborg.

The least in every series comprehends an idea of its universe. — Ibid.

Can lines finite one way be infinite another ? And yet, such is death-
lessness. — Festus.

And earth, like man her son, is half divine.

Can this be the same heart which, when it did sleep, slept from dizzi-
ness, and pure rapidity of passion, like the centre circlet of the whirlpool's
wheel ?

XY— 13

194 The Joui^ial of Speculative Philosophy.

Friendship hatli passed me like a ship at sea.

How strangely fair
Yon round still star ! wliich looks half suffering from,
And half rejoicing in, its own strong fire ;
Making itself a lonelihood of light.

The lakelet now, no longer vexed with gusts,
Replaces on her breast the pictured moon,
Pearled round with stars.

The cloud-like laurel clumps sleep, soft and fast.
Pillowed by their own shadows, . , . the sharp firs
Fringe, like an eyelash, on the faint blue west.
The Avhite owl wheeling from the gray old church.

Dreams are the heart's bright shadow on life's flood.

The world shall rest, and moss itself with peace.

In the tranquil landscape, and especially in the distant line of the hori-
zon, man beholds somewhat as beautiful as his own nature. The simple
perception of natural forms is a delight. — Emerson.

The separation of subject from object, the faith that each creature ex-
ists for its own sake, and that cork-trees do not grow merely that we
may have stopples for our bottles, this, I share with Kant. — Ooethe.

The Mohammedans give their young people for a religious basis this
doctrine, that nothing can happen to man except what was long since
decreed by an overruling providence ; in philosophy, that nothing exists
which does not suppose its contrary. — Ibid.

The stomach has two curvatures or arches, and on its concave surface
respects poles, axes, and foci ; by these through their radii, which are so
many circular forms, circumferences ; and by all points of these again,
their poles, axes, and foci ; and so on, in an everlasting gyre. A similar
form occurs in the intestines, or in the ultimates of the body ; likewise,
in the brains, or in the principles of the body ; and also throughout in the
intermedials. This form must be called the perpetual, circular, or the spi-
ral form — the essential mode of motion, or fluxion of organic substance.
— Swedenborg,

Learn of the little nautilus to sail. — Pope.

Notes and Discussions. 195

TEE PEILOSOPEIGAL SOCIETY OF GEICAOO.

We print the following prospectus of this prosperous society, which
was organized in 1873.

Prospectus for the Season of 1880-1881.

The Philosophical Society of Chicago enters upon the eighth year of its work, and
offers to the public its programme for the coming season. It invites the cooperation of
all the thoughtful people of our city who are interested in the dissemination of truth in
the departments of speculative philosophy, social science, moral science, and of natural
science and history in their philosophical aspects.

The Society has no creed but that put forth in the preamble to its constitution — that
Truth is One, and is of infinite value to mankind ; and that ignorance, prejudice, and
superstition have fearful blinding effects upon the human mind. Upon this basis of
common agreement the Society seeks to bring together earnest, thinking men and
women to listen to, and to share in, discussions of important topics ; to develop clear
views, wise thoughts, and just practice ; to foster a love of philosophy, and a taste for
the discussion of principles.

A society with such purposes must necessarily include persons holding a great variety
of views. It has enrolled in its ranks at the same time materialists and idealists in
philosophy ; orthodox, heterodox, catholics, and atheists in religion ; and scientists of
opposing theoretical views. No one should impute to the Society any opinion or set of
opinions because of doctrines put forth in its lectures, or by its members individually,
or because of questions suggested for discussion. It is our doctrine that the surest way
to destroy error and to make truth illustrious is to bring them both alike into the light
of reason and the fire of discussion. Nowhere can a lecturer find a freer platform, nor
greater surety of various, discriminating, and candid criticism.

The principal exercises are lectures, every Saturday evening from the middle of Octo-
ber in each year to the end of the ensuing April. At the close of each lecture, a dis-
cussion of it is opened by one or more of the members of the Society previously appointed
by the president ; these are followed by such other members as see fit to join in the dis-
cussion ; but no member is allowed more than five minutes in which to discuss the lec-
ture, except the appointees of the chair, who are allowed ten minutes ; the lecturer
himself closes the discussion. In these discussions, adversary and conflicting views are
freely and frankly presented.

An Executive Committee of five persons has charge of the exercises, and is responsible
for the lectures which arc delivered before the Society. Only such persons are invited
to lecture by the Committee as arc believed competent to treat topics with philosophical
candor, learning, and completeness. We avoid " popular " lectures, and, so far as pos-
sible, lectures " which, dealing wholly with details, manifest no perception of the bear-
ings of these details on wider truths." We aim to keep from our platform hot-headed
enthusiasts, people of one idea, and visionary schemers. We do not ask nor care what
views our lecturers hold on controverted questions ; but we expect them to treat adver-
sary views with judicial calmness, and " to be slow to assume that error is more likely
to be on the other side than on their own."

The following list of subjects, carefully prepared by the Executive Committee, and
from which lecturers in the coming course have been invited to choose their themes,

196 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

gives a fair idea of the special field of our work ; but our lecturers are not limited to-
this list, as will be seen in the programme below :

Natiral Science. — 1. Effect of the Destruction of American Forests. 2. Tlie Germ
Theory of Disease. 3. Relation of Brain Nutrition, through Circulation of the Blood,
to Mental Traits. 4. The Relation of Sun-Spots to Meteorology. 5. Transition and
Transmutation of Species. 6. Relation of Cerebral Condition to Jlcntul Delusions. 1.
Specialization of Function in the Brain. 8. Tlie Glacial Theory in its bearing on the
Theory of Early Incandescence and Gradual Refrigeration. 9. Lower Life and its Les-
sons. 10. Light, Heat, and Electricity; are they Identical ? 11. Elements; are they
Many or One ? 12. Astronomical Research ; its Results and Probable Limitations.
13. Philological Researches concerning the Origin of Society. 14. The Present Status
of the Atomic Theory. 15. Fallacies of Physics.

Speculative PniLOsornY. — 1-9. The Philosophies of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle,
Bacon, Hume, Hamilton, Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant. (Lectures presenting synoptically,
critically, and clearly the doctrines of any of the philosophers are suited to our course.)
10. Theories of the Absolute. 11. The Antinomies of Municipal Law. 12. Idealism.
13. The Doctrine of Immortality. 14. Metaphysics in Early and Mediaeval Christian
Theology. 15. The Genesis of Religious Faith. 16. The Value of Faith. 17. Mem-
ory ; its Nature and Education.

Moral Philosophy. — 1. Can Moral Science rest on Intuitions and Experience with-
out Religion ? 2. The Relation of Wealth and Poverty to Morals. 3. The Essential
Characteristics of Right-doing and Wrong-doing. 4. Relation of Art to Morals. 6,
Psychology as the Basis of Morals. 6. Evil ; can it be accounted for without being also
justified ? Y. Relative Moral Influence of the Ascetic or Stoic, the Epicurean or Utili-
tarian, and the Fourieristic or Harmonial Theory of the Passions. 8. Moral Influences
of the Doctrines of Predestination and Free-will. 9. Do the Beneficial Effects of Sects
partly or wholly founded on Delusions compensate for their Evils ? 10. Which of these
two Theories is most promotive of Morals: (1) The Universe is Governed by Inflexible
Law ; (2) The Universe is governed by a Self-Originating Will which Prayer can change
orinfluence? 11. Rationale of Suicide. 12. Spencer's " Data of Ethics." 13. Mallock's
" Is Life Worth Living ? " 14. Belief in Immortality as an Inducement to Virtue. 15.
Spencer's Doctrine of the Unknowable as the Basis of the Religion of the Future.

Current History. — 1. Rationale of Russian Nihilism. 2. The Present and the Future
of the American Indian. 3. The Relation of Imperialism to Democracy. 4. The Ex-
periment of Free Trade in England. 5. The Administration of Andrew Jackson. 6.
The Russo-Turkish War as ended by the Peace of Berlin. 7. The Career of Garibaldi.

8. Causes of the Condition of Ireland. 9. Bismarck. 10. The Future of Egypt. 11.
British Dominion in India. 12. Rise and Probable Future of Mormonism. 13. Pan-
ama Canal. 14. Political Socialism in America. 15. The Present French Republic.
16-20. The Present Condition and Prospects of Russia ; of Italy ; of the Papacy ; of
Austro-Hungary ; of Mexico. 21. Progress of Liberalism in England.

Social Science. — 1. Does Local Self-Government result in the Best Government ? 2.
Should Government seek to promote Industry, or merely to preserve the Peace ? 3.
Ought Government to issue Paper Currency ? 4. Is Compulsory Education feasible ?
5. The Means of preventing Breaches of Trust on the Part of Individuals and of Officers
of Corporations. 6. The Benevolent vs. the Vindictive Method with Crime. 7. What
shall be done with the Morally Insane. 8. Transportation compared with Penitentiary.

9. Prevention of Pauperism. 10. Would Woman Suffrage aid or hinder Good Gov-

Notes and Discussions. 197

eminent ? 11. Is Marriage the Expression of an Etei'nal and Unchangeable Law ? 12.
Has Christianity ameliorated the Social Condition of Woman ? 13. The Relative Health,
Beauty, Strength, and Vitality of the Ancients and the Moderns. 14. Should a Repre-
sentative obey the Will of his Constituents ? 15. Rules of Evidence observed in Courts.
16. Rationale of Political Revolutions. lY. The Value of the Novel. 18. The Elements
of Criticism. 19. Tendency to Formation of Class Distinctions in American Society. ■
20. Sewage in Great Cities. 21. Value and Legitimacy of the Party Principle in Pol-
itics.

The Executive Committee takes pleasure in announcing the following programme :
October 16th — Professor Rodney Welch, Transportation as an Agency in Civilization ;
23d — Rev. Dr. H. W. Thomas, The Past and the Future of the Philosophical Society ;
30th — Austin Bierbower, Esq., Thomas Aquinas, or Scholastic Philosophy in Modern
Theology. November 6th — Rev. Dr. D. S. Gregory, British Dominion in India ; 13th —
Rev. Dr. R. A. Holland, Atomism ; 20th — Dr. H. A. Johnson, The Germ Theory of Dis-
ease ; aTth — Rev. L. P. Mercer, Comparative Mythology and the Origin of Religion.
December 4th — Miss Frances E. Willard, The Temperance Question philosophically and
critically considered ; 11th — Dr. J. S. Jewell, On the Influence of our Present Civiliza-
tion in the Production of Nervous and Mental Diseases ; 18th — James K. Applebee,
Esq., The Philosophy of David Hume ; 27th — W. P. Black, Esq., Socialism as a Factor
in American Society and Politics. January 3d — Fred. P. Powers, Esq., Pi-edestination
in Science and' Religion ; 8th — Dr. D. R. Brewer, Specialization of Function in the Brain ;
15th — Chas. H. Ham, Esq., Tendency to Formation of Class Distinctions in American
Society ; 22d — Professor Samuel Willard, Historical Criticism ; 29th — Mrs. Maria A.
Shorey (subject not announced). February 5th — E- 0. Brown, Esq., The Relation of
the Catholic Church to Scientific Investigation; 12th — Colonel A. N. Waterman, Legal
Reform ; 19th — Dr. Sarah Ilackett Stevenson (subject not announced) ; 26th — Professor
Van Buren Denslow (subject not announced). March 5th — Hon. L. L. Bond, Does Local
Self-Government result in the Best Government ? 12th — Rev. Dr. Galusha Anderson,
Huxley ; 19th — Professor W. S. Haines, The Present State of the Alcohol Question ;
26th — Mrs. Celia P. Wooley (subject not announced). April 2d — Paul Shorey, Esq.,
Schopenhauer and his Critics.

Invitations have also been extended to the following persons, from some of whom
lectures may be expected during the season : Hon. Henry Booth, General I. N. Stiles,
Professor W. T. Harris (Concord, Massachusetts), Mrs. Araalie J. Hathaway, John W.
Ela, Esq., Dr. George M. Beard (New York City), Dr. A. Reeves Jackson, Professor A.
A. Lambert, Dr. Julia H. Smith, Hon. Henry Strong, Hon. John N. Jewett, George P.
Hanson, Esq., Dr. H. W. Boyd.

Tickets are sold at the door on lecture evenings, and may be had of the Treasurer,
Mr. Emmett C. Fisher, office of Continental Fire Insurance Company, No. 30 Lakeside
Building. Price for the course, $2 ; single lectures, 25 cents. Every purchaser of a
course ticket is considered a member of the Society, with all the rights and privileges
of membership. This course of lectures is thus offered at a merely nominal price, the
Society wishing to make its advantages easily obtainable.

The sessions of the Philosophical Society are held every Saturday evening, at eight
o'clock, in the club-room on the parlor floor of the Palmer House.

Mrs. Helen S. Shedd,
JosiAH H. BissELL, Samuel Willard, Executive

Secretary. Edmund Burke, \ Committee.

Mrs. Celia P. Wooley,
George D. Broomell,

19S Tlie Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

ARCHIMEDES.

Although I huikl you engines new,

As to my native city due

When foes surround our citadel,

These endures not Science well ;

Not thus, she would freely use

Archimedes of Syracuse.

He lifts Marcellus' ships on high,

Or fires them with Apollo's eye.

Know, these are mercenary arts —

Of Science but the meaner parts —

Such as the noble mind most fears,

In its own home 'mong stars and spheres.

There, with beauty and subtility,

It knows no mixture of utility.

John Albee.
Newcastle, New Hampshire, December, 1880.

LUCRETIUS ON ''THE NATURE OF THINGS.''

[One of our coiTcspondents, who has been studying Lucretius, sends
us the following analysis of his remarkable poem on " The Nature of
Things." (It is a better analysis than our own in Jour. Spec. Phil.,
April, IS'Za, vol, vii, p, 94.) — The Editor.]

BOOK I.

The entire of things is infinite. Proved by the argument of imagina-
tion. Made up of solid " Atoms," eternal, indivisible, and void " Space,"
also eternal. Atoms have no qualities. The qualities of things are " Con-
junctions.'' History is "-Events." " Time," " from the mind alone pro-
duced."

" Nought from nought by power divine has risen."

All the early theories — Earth, Air, W ater, Fire, Becoming, Noyf , etc.,
criticised and repudiated.

Gravitation and the Antipodes considered quite justly.

BOOK II.

The process of composition of existing things, by the perpetual motion,
contact and reaction, of an infinite number of Atoms, of various kinds,
rough, smooth, fine, coarse, etc., and of various, though not infinite,
shapes. The Immortal Gods dwell apart from man in perpetual peace.
After many efforts, the mass of Atoms formed '' the unchanging rudi-
ments of things sublime." Nature is " self-potent and uninfluenced by the

Notes and Discussions. 199

Gods." The World decays, Colors, Tastes, Odors, etc., arise entirely
from the combinations of Atoms.

" The sire of all is Ether ; he full oft
In dulcet drops descends of genial rain,
And the bland Earth impregnates." — \_Origin of Life. '\

"Perception springs amain and instantaneous,
Wastes again to nought."

He says, " and propagate their kinds," but without explanation.

BOOK HI.

Soul (" Anima") or Mind ("Animus") is a part of body, not a "Har-
mony," as the Greeks say. What we commonly call Mind pervades the
heart and rules the total frame. The remnant soul is diffused through
every part of the body, obeying the mind. Total soul does not always
perceive what Mind is experiencing, but when Mind feels a severe shock,
the whole soul responds and moves the body. Nought can act except by
touch, and nought can touch unless corporeal ; hence Soul, as it acts on
the body, must be corporeal. Mind composed of finest, subtlest Atoms
(Heat, Vapor, Air, and something subtler), hence its rapidity of action
and departure without apparent diminution of bulk of body. Neither
soul nor body can act without the other. Soul (Anima) may be man-
gled and life continue ; but Mind (Animus) must remain entire or we die.
The sympathy of soul and body in disease, their cotemporaneous growth
and decay, the difficulty of the soul's holding together without the pro-
tection of the body, the fact that the soul does not re-endow itself with
new organs after leaving body, or that, if it does, we have no memory of
former life — all prove that soul is born and dies with body.

"Were, too, its date immortal, man no more
At his last hour would mourn the severing blow."

In connection with my study of the law of Real Property, this sen-
tence, turning on legal distinctions, quite amused me :

" and life exists
To none 2l freehold, but a use to all."

BOOK IV.

On Images of Things. The will, aroused by these images, spreads the
commotion through the total soul, which moves the body then. They
are a " steam that from the face of things pours forth perpetual." What
the senses notice must be true.

"Who holds that nought is known, denies he knows
E'en this, thus owning that he nothing knows."

200 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

BOOK V.

Cosmogony. The Gods did not construct the material worki Too
many defects for that. Nature made it, and will destroy.

" jfi'or as the train of causes first uprose,
And the young world its earliest features found.
Things follow tilings in order most exact."

He traces evolution from chaos through physical gradations, and then
moral and social, in accordance with the doctrine of " Natural Selection."
" All reach at length perfection's topmost point." And all will return to
Atoms again.

BOOK VI.

Meteorological phenomena — Disease. Physical changes of all kinds
explained by the combinations and release of Atoms.

The whole poem is an exposition of Democritus and Epicurus, and the
motive stated to be — to take away the fear of death by proving that we
are not immortal. The doctrines of Atoms and Void — of the construction
of the Universe without the interference of the Gods (immortal would
not mix with mortal) — of the corporeal nature of the soul, proven by its
intimate connection with the body, and of the process of Evolution by
Natural Selection, are as conclusively stated as ever they have been since,
I should judge. I find a truer insight as to Time, however, than is found
in modern Materialism, viz., "Time from the mind alone produced." He
unfortunately missed, however, the necessary consequence that the whole
series of development is therefore (Time being the necessary ground of
change) grounded in the Mind. Of course he overlooked, also, the
" Proto " when he took Atom as Protoplasm as the ground. As to the
Gods, he stands on about the same ground as the modern doctrine of
" Unknowable." Have the Moderns any advantage over him in any
respect ?

S. H. E.

Concord, Mass., Kovemher, 1880.

THE TRANSMIORATION OF BRAIN TISSUE.

" The Medical and Surgical Reporter " (of Philadelphia) for June 4,
1881, notices a book, recently published on the subject of Dyspepsia,
which goes so far in the direction of physiological-psychology as to ask :
■ " Is it too visionary to imagine that some of the particles of brain tissue
which, in the mind of Julius Caesar, originated and worked out the details
of military campaigns which resulted in making Rome the master of the
world, may, after centuries of wanderings and vegetable life, and residence

JVotes and Discussions. 201

in minds of inferior calibre — poor pasture, as it were — finally have been
eaten by and assimilated into the brain of Napoleon Bonaparte, and meet-
ing there with conditions and surroundings like to those of their ancient
Roman home, planted in good and well-manured brain soil, they may have
grown vigorously, labored with some of their ancient energy, and enabled
Napoleon, through their agency, to make France mistress of Europe ? "

J)Ii. FBIEDBIGH HARMS ON TEE FORMS OF ETHICAL SYSTEMS}

In a separate reprint from the proceedings of the Royal Academy of
Sciences at Berlin for 1878 we find a lecture of Professor Harms, of Berlin,
read by him before the Academy, in May and July, 1878, The follow-
ing extracts translated from the lecture will prove of interest, and suggest
a field of profitable thinking in the department of ethical studies, now
attracting so much attention on the part of thinkers. The entire treatise
ought to be translated and published in English.

" In the history of philosophy we find five forms of ethics come down
to us : The Greek, the East Indian, the ethics of the Middle Ages, the
ethics of naturalism in modern philosophy before Kant, and the ethics
of the historical point of view which we find in post-Kantian philosophy.
These five forms characterize the epochs in the history of ethics — each
one of these epochs having its own peculiar theory of social or moral
(sittlich) life."

" In Greek ethics we find su.bordinate tendencies ; on the one hand the
ethics of the Stoics and Epicureans, which asks whether the object of life
is for happiness or for activity, supposing that the one or the other — hap-
piness (Epicureans) or activity (Stoics) — will suffice for the explanation of
life without the other. The Stoics and Epicureans form together one
side of Greek ethics in antithesis to the system of Plato and Aristotle. , . .
In this general antithesis the question is this : Whether the active or the
happiness-seeking life is to find its true place in the isolated life of the
individual, or in social combination. . . . Incontestably the standpoint of
Plato and Aristotle is higher than that of the Stoics and Epicureans, be-
cause it takes ethics as a science of the life of man as it is found in the
social community in the state and the family, and not in the personal life
of the isolated individual. Even down to the present time that view of
the Stoics and Epicureans has prevailed and limited ethical theories to
mere collections of examples of all sorts of curious questions of dispute. . . .
It is quite recently, in the post-Kantian philosophy, that this individual-

' Die Formen der Ethik. Von Friedrich Harms. (Aus den Abhandlungen der
koenigl. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1878.) Berlin: G. Vogt. 1878.

202 The Journal of Speculative PhUotiophij.

istic form of ethics has been given up, and, tlirough the labors of Fichte,
a return has boon niado to the form of treatment whicli was set up by
Phito and Aristotle. . . . Schloierniachor's Ethics, llogers riiilosophy of
Spirit, and llorbart's Practical Philosophy — all three works agree in
treating together all phases of spiritual and ethical life as constituting one
whole.

" The East Indian ethical system has a different basis from the Greek,
Tlie Greek ethics took shape in a polemic against the sophists regarding
the foundation of science. The East Indian ethics, on the other hand,
sets out from the principle that all life is an evil, full of pain and sorrow.
It seeks in science the means through which the soul can free itself from
the might of pain which oppresses its life. This relief from pain can be
found only in science and self-knowledge. This self-knowledge consists
in the knowledge that the soul does nothing for itself, produces nothing,
but merely contemplates ; that all that is, is produced by matter, corpo-
real nature.

" All that happens in the world is produced by nature ; the soul is only
the spectator of the event. . . . When the soul comes to recognize all
events as produced by nature, and to be alien to itself, it becomes indiffer-
ent to all, and contemplates all in quiet. ... It recognizes itself as free
from external events and as self-subsisting. This oblivion to the external
is attained only for brief intervals in life, but perfectly in death. All pain
and suffering in life arises through the union of the soul with nature.
The soul gets emancipation through the knowledge that all phenomena
are only a spectacle for the soul in order that it may learn science and
self-knowledge. H does nothing ; the world is only an illusion which
does not touch the soul. . . . This view of the East Indians is in direct
opposition to that of the Greek. The relation of matter to spirit is com-
pletely changed. To the Greek, matter is the passive principle, and spirit
the active principle. According to the Indian ethics, matter is the ac-
tive, and spirit only passive contemplation. The mind only contemplates
and is lame, while matter is only blind. From this arises a difference
in the value which they set upon life as a means of attaining the object
of the soul. The pessimistic Indian finds life utterly worthless as a means
for attaining his ends, for it is only through the negation of life and
its torments — pain, suffering, and sorrow — that the soul reaches its rest.
For the Greek, life has a positive value, and Greek ethics do not seek
the removal of life but only its regulation. Ethical life to the Greek
means life in conformity to the principle of moderation. . . . The Greek
believes life to be not merely for contemplation, but for action also."

" As a third to these two forms may be added the ethics of the Middle

Notes and Discussions. 203

Ages — including under this liead the scholastic and patristic writers.
(The patristic are, of course, not included in the Middle Ages if the
classification is strict.) In this system of ethics we find a new idea added
to that of the Greeks and Hindoos — an idea of the history of the human
race. For the Christian fathers hold that there is a plan in the history
of the race — it is the education of the race through divine revelation ;
this is an ethical process. In India this thought cannot appear ; for life
is an evil, and a greater evil the longer it endures ; the Indian idea is
well expressed in the utterance of Schopenhauer : ' History is an eternal
monotony — it is only the long and confused dream of humanity.' But,
according to the Christian fathers, life in its totality is a valuable means
for the realization of its purpose in the history of the human race. Even
the Greeks did not conceive this universal destiny of the human race,
although they conceived (in the system of Plato and Aristotle) a personal
life and a life in the community. This idea takes two forms in the Mid-
dle Ages : the ethics of the Church and the ethics of the secular life in
the state. The Church takes the form of an universal, all-inclusive com-
munity, while the state assumes the form of a limited and narrow com-
munity by the side of the Church. The state cannot give peace to the
soul ; it can give only justice in a province of external action. A sepa-
ration arises between Church and state, between political and religious
life, such as never appeared in the ancient world. . . . The concept of sin
stands in conti'ast with the Indian idea of life as the source of all evil
and pain. It is not physical, nor metaphysical, but something moral —
something that springs from a deed. Sin presupposes a normal form
which may be realized, and from which there is a departure by the one
who sins. (In the Indian ethics there is no such ideal presupposed, but
all form is abnormal.) The antithesis of Church and state, and the an-
tithesis of sin and holiness, both enter as determining elements into the
ethics of the Middle Ages. . . . Hence, too, the ethics of the Christian
fathers makes the will the principle of the world and of spiritual life. . . .
The problem of the freedom of the will becomes the chief object of inves-
tigation. In the will lies the explanation of the ethical world, ... In the
will, Saint Augustine finds the true being and essence of man and the
cause of all his works. Thomas Aquinas defines that as good which all
will. An absolute will is, according to Duns Scotus, the ground of the
creation of the world. Hence, too, the will of God is the norm of all
ethical life, the latter being judged by its conformity to the will of God»
. . . God's will is conceived as without change or variableness, as an
eternal law, as impressed upon all being — the world being regarded as a
divine work and as a revelation of God's will, and hence throughout as an.

204 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

ethical process. Angjustine presents these contrasts of secular life and
religious life, of sin and holiness, of grace and depravity, in such a man-
lier as to hring out strongly their incompatibility. The secular and
theoloii-ioal virtues are contrasted : the secular are the four cardinal vir-
tues of the Greeks ; the theological virtues are faith, hope, and love. The
heathen virtues are the negative of the celestial. . . . The secular state
arose from the fall ; Cain murdered his brother Abel, and so, too, Romu-
lus murdered his brother Remus ; but the city of God is in contrast with
this. . . . Albertus Magnus reaches the highest form of ethics in the Mid-
dle Ages ; with him the secular life is esteemed fiir more highly than
with Saint Augustine. . . . Every individual being something special and
limited, the division of labor arises in the secular world. The spiritual
life compensates with its wholeness for the division and partiality of the
secular vocations. Faith, hope, and charity do not come from the natural
exercise of the soul, but from divine grace. Each one shall be and have
all that the other is and has (in the secular, each takes only his share,
but in the spiritual each has the whole, undivided), for what the one
knows all may know, and herein the limitation of individuality which
prevails in secular life is abrogated. The secular life becomes a means
for the spiritual life, and the performance of the cardinal virtues a prepa-
ration for the celestial virtues."

" A fourth form of ethics is found in the modern philosophy before
Kant. It offers us the naturalistic point of view in opposition to the
supernaturalistic view of the Middle Ages, which made the will of God
the principle of the world and the norm of life. 'The nature of things'
is assumed as the ground for all events and as the norm of life. To this
belongs 'natural theology,' which proposes to explain the religions of
the world by natural religion. ' Natural rights ' are in like manner to ex-
plain the laws of the state. . . . According to Hobbes, the law of nature is
self-preservation ; and this is the condition of all well-being. All natural
impulses are egoistic, and seek the pleasure of the individual. Accord-
ing to Spinoza, nature is the power of the absolute, and each individual
that strives to preserve itself is only a part and mode of the absolute,
which is the power and working force in all individuals. This leads to
quietism. Shaftesbury holds nature to be natural impulse that produces
all — is social, benevolent, useful, and directed to the general happiness.

" In the ethics of the historical point of view, ethics and the philoso-
phy of history are united ; Lessing and Herder on the one hand, and
Kant on the other, contributed to it. Fichte combined the two modes of
view. Schelling and Hegel sought the same end in their philosophy of
spirit ; Schleiermacher and Herbart also. Freedom, says Fichte, is the

Notes and Discussions. 205

highest good, and the temporal life has worth only as it is free. The
sole aim of life is to achieve freedom, and temporal life is a struggle for
freedom. Only through freedom is man a member of the true world and
born into true being. The will is the absolute origin of being, and there
is nothing higher than the will. It might appear as if Schelling had de-
parted from this standpoint, and had made a principle of material nature
the ground of all existence. This is not the case ; for, though the prin-
ciple of freedom seemed to be subordinated in his system for a long
period, yet it came forth at last as the true and higher principle — phi-
losophy, according to Schelling, having to do with the problem of free-
dom as a reconciliation of necessity and freedom. He endeavors to show
how freedom can be joined with the necessity which it encounters in
nature ; while Kant and Fichte attempt to treat freedom apart by itself
as negative to the world. The world could not be God's creation or
revelation if there were no freedom in it. In freedom alone is to be
found independence and responsibility ; all being is in its last and highest
instance a will. ... It is the same with Hegel. According to him, free-
dom is the essence of mind ; and the vocation of spirit is to give objective
realization to its freedom in the sphere of civil laws, morality, the family,
civil society, and the state, and still further to reach a consciousness of
this freedom in art, religion, and science. It is a great merit of Hegel
that he has shown how freedom and law do not exclude each other, but
mutually imply each other. He says that laws are the forms in which
external objective freedom expresses itself. Schleiermacher has called
attention to the fact that freedom is not only the self-legislation of the
will, but at the same time individual fulfilment of law. There must be
individual recognition of its self-determination on the part of the special
person, or else the freedom is not complete. . . . According to Herbart's
practical philosophy, the internal freedom is not only the first but the
highest ethical idea in spiritualized society. It includes within it the
actualization of the other ethical ideas which Herbart places beside it,
and is, therefore, the principle of the whole, and gives the normal stand-
ard and the guide for all the others.

" The five forms of ethics correspond to their epochs of historical de-
velopment : The Indian ethics as well as the ethics of naturalism are the
widest departures from the true idea of ethics, inasmuch as they lack
practical deeds, and recognize only subjective aims of the will. Both are
anti-historic — both deny historic evolution of ethical life. The Greek
and the mediaeval ethics have decisive advantages in their setting a high
value upon the uses of life and in the place which they give to conscious-
ness in human life. The Greek ethical system seeks to regulate life ac-

206 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

cording to rational insight. The mediaeval ethics adds to the idea of
ethics that of human history as a constituent, but it remains in a discord
Avithin itself (not reconciling the secular and the religious). Ethics, since
Kant, has become universal in its scope, like that of Plato and Aristotle,
since it has the social life for its content ; but, in addition to this, it has
also an ethical historical element, for in history freedom attains objectiv-
ity in the realization of its ends. It is not involved in a mere process of
becoming without attainment of being, but it has found the way that

leads to the goal."

The Editor.

SOCIAL SCIENCE.— INFANT EDUCATION

[In our January number we printed the circular of Mrs. Talbot, Secre-
tary of the Educational Committee of the American Social Science Asso-
ciation. The following letter has been received from Mr. Darwin on the
subject of interest. — Editor.]

Bbckbnham, Kent, Railway Station, Orpington, )

8.-E. R., July 19, 18S1. (

Dear Madam : I;i response to your wish, I liave much pleasure in expressing the
interest which I feel in your proposed investigation on the mental and bodily develop-
ment of infants. V^ery liitle is at present accurately known on this subject, and I be-
lieve that isolated observations will add but little to our knowledge; whereas, tabulated
results from a very larj^e number of observations systematically made would probably
throw much li^ht on the sequence and period of development of the several faculties.

This knowledge would probably give a foundation for some improvement in our
education of young children, and would show us whether the same system ought to be
followed in all cases.

I will venture to specify a few points of inquiry which, as it seems to me, possess
some scientific interest. For instance, does the education of the parents influence the
ment il powers of their children at any age, either at a very early or somewhat more
advanced stage ? This could, perhaps, be learned by schoolmasters or mistresses, if
a large number of children were first classed according to age and their mfntal attain-
ments, and afterward in accordance with the education of their parents, as far as this
could be discovered.

As observation is one of the earliest faculties developed in young children, and as
this power would probably be exercised in an equal degree by the children of educated
and iinermcated persons, it seems not impossible that any transmitted effect from edu-
cation could be displa\ed only at a somewhat advanced agp. It would be desirable to
test statistically in a similar manner the truth of the often-repeated statement that col-
ored children at first learn as quickly as white cliildren, but that they afterward fall
off ill progress.

II it could be proved that education acted not only on the individual, but by trans-
mission on the race — thit; wouid be a great encouragement to all working on this all-
important subject. It is well known that children sometimes exhibit at a very early
age str-ong special tastes, for which no cause can be assigned, although occasionally

Notes and Discussions. 20 Y

they may be accounted for by reversion to the taste or occupation of some progenitor;
and it would be interesting to learn liow far such early tastes are persistent and influ-
ence the future career of the individual.- In some instances such tastes die away with-
out apparently leaving any after-effect ; but it would be desirable to know how far this
is commoniy the case, as we should then know whether it were important to direct, as
far as this is possible, the early tastes of our children. It may be more beneficial that
a child should follow energetically some pursuit of however trifling a nature, and thus
acquire perseverance, than that he should be turned from it, because of no future ad-
vantage to him.

I will mention one other small point of inquiry iu relation to very young children
which may possibly prove important with respect to the origin of language ; but it
could be investigated only by persons possessing an accurate musical ear. Children,
even before they can articulate, express some of their feelings and desires by noises
uttered in different notes. For instance, they make an interrogative noise and others
of assent and dissent in different tones ; and it would, I think, be worth while to ascer-
tain whether there is any uniformity in different children in the pitch of their voices
under various frames of mind.

I fear that this letter can be of no use to you ; but it will serve to show my sym-
pathy and good wishes in your researches.

I beg leave to remain, dear madam, yours faithfully,

Charles Darvtin.
To Mrs. Emilt Talbot.

TEE PEILOSOPEY OF RELIGION.

The Philosophy of Religion must be acknowledged on all hands as the
most important work of the human intellect. In explaining religion as a
phenomenon of human life, it is found necessary to expound the idea of
the first principle of the world — the absolute. In defining his idea of the
absolute, man defines his idea of his own origin and destiny, and the idea
of the relation which he holds to nature and to the absolute. All practi-
cal activity of man is conditioned through this idea of the absolute.
Man's immortality and freedom are conditioned directly through the
nature of God. If God is an unconscious natural power, man can have
no other destiny than to be absorbed at some time into this unconscious
power, and lose his individual being. Indeed, on the hypothesis of an
unconscious first principle, it is impossible to explain how a conscious
being ever came to exist at all. For consciousness is directive power,
and the rationality which manifests itself in consciousness is an indefi-
nitely growing potency in the control of the world, perpetually imposing
its own forms on brute matter, and subordinating it to the service of man
just as if man had made it originally for his own use. The hasty and
general outlook is sufficient to give the presumption that the absolute is
not only an all-powerful might, but an all-knowing might. The one most
important truth of all is the truth in regard to the resemblance or differ-

208 The Journal of Sjyeculative Philosophy.

ence of this lirst principle from man. If man, as consciousness, is in its
image, then the trend of the universe is in the direction of the triumph
of man's cause. His development will be an ascent towards the divine.
In knowing himself, man will know with some degree of adequacy the
divine.

Another consideration of equal importance following from this is the
doctrine that God is a revealed God, if He is a conscious Being. His
works reveal Him. His creation is a manifestation of His will, and in the
creation of intelligent beings He reveals His own intelligence. Hegel has
laid great stress upon this thought in his " Philosophy of Religion." In
the third part of that treatise he expounds the religion of the revealed
God,' calling it "The Absolute Religion," conceiving Christianity to be
this absolute religion, and showing by strict analyses of the contents of
the other religions that no one of them makes God a revealed God, and
that the reason for this is that the idea of God in the pantheistic and
polytheistic religions is the idea of a first principle which cannot be re-
vealed in a created world. Neither man nor nature can reveal Brahm,
because Brahm is utterly transcendent, not only to the world, but to man
in his highest development. Brahm has no form, but transcends con-
sciousness as much as he does material form. With this we have the
world of nature and the world of man, not as creations of Brahm, not as
revelations of that principle, but as pure illusion — Maya. This illusion is
to be accounted for on the hypothesis of the fall of man into individual
consciousness, wherein he distinguishes himself from the all. It is " the
dream of the drop that hath withdrawn itself from the primal ocean of
being," and which colors all its seeing with the defect of its own finitude
— consciousness being regarded as the origin of all division and particu-
larity. Its form is that of subject-objectivity ; i. c, of a subject which is
its own object, and yet a subject which looks upon the object as a world
of alien existence — " It says ' thou ' to the rest of creation." What mo-
mentous import this theory has for the people who believe it we know
through the history of the Oriental world — a history which Hegel prefers
to exclude from the world-history as being a history that contains no
principle of secular progress within it. For it looks upon all as negative

1 See page 10 of this volume of the Jour. Spec. Phil., where the translator renders
the word "ofFenbare" by "manifest" and "obvious," which is ccrtainlj' the ordinary
signification of " offenbare." But Hegel had in mind the word " OfFenbaruiig," which
signifies " revelation " in the technical sense of the term. It is as if Hegel would have
used the word "revelate" had he been writing in English, so as to suggest that his
" offenbare Religion " is the religion of a God that reveals Himself in His creation as
well as in a special " revealed word."

Notes and Discussions. 209

to the divine, and hence as not being capable of improvement, but only
fit for anniliilation. The highest is Nirvana, or the rest of unconscious-
ness. Progress towards the annihilation of conscious being is progress
towards the divine, as understood in the Orient. Such progress as that
we call decay and decease.

With the idea of a revealed God we discover a radically different solu-
tion to the world. We find that man has a positive work to do ; an ac-
tive stage of civilization takes the place of Oriental quietism. Man has
the vocation to render himself divine by learning the form of God's will
as revealed, and then forming his own will in its pattern — adopting God's
will as the form of his human will. He must learn the divine will, and
make an utter sacrifice of his own will to it, so that his deeds shall be
inspired through the divine will, all finitude of the creature being offered
up by renunciatory act to the divine, so that the conflict between the
divine and human shall be ended by the self-devotion, the utter sacrifice
of all selfishness on the part of the individual. The sacrifice of the Orien-
tal devotee relates to the substance of his consciousness, and ends in anni-
hilation, if he can achieve so much as he aspires for. The Christian
renunciation does not go so far; it recognizes in God the Absolute form,
instead of an absolute formlessness. God has the form of Consciousness,
of Personality. Hence, with this idea of the divine, the sacrifice of the
individual for the divine is no annihilation of individuality, but rather
the putting on the form of the freest and highest individuality. The sac-
rifice which the Christian devotee makes is no sacrifice of his human form,
but only of its content; he takes into the form of his will and knowing a
divine substance, the substance revealed as the will of God, and by this
he preserves his individuality, and yet removes the barrier between him-
self and the divine throuo;h utter abandonment of self to the will of the
divine will, which, being the will of a conscious personality, restores to
man his sacrificed individuality in a transfigured form. Man, by his
religious sacrifice, therefore, gains all and loses nothing but finitude and
defect. The docti'ine of Grace, as the highest principle of divine action
towards the world of man and nature, is the only doctrine in harmony
with the idea of a revelation of God through creation. Were God any
other than conscious personality, man and nature would reveal something
essentially different from Him. A world which offers us a series of
beings ascending from the inorganic to the organic, and crowns all with a
human race, reveals a conscious first principle by pointing towards it as
the final cause of its progressive series. It points towards such a divine
principle, and only towards it.

Man, too, is a being who can develop within himself — he can collect
XY— 14

210 The JournaJ of Speculative Philosophy.

experience tVoiii tho individuals of his species and redistribute this expe-
rience to the individual — thus elevating the life of the individual into
the life of the species, and without destroying the latter's individuality,
but, on the contrary, increasing it. For in our human affairs the man
goes for most who has taken up into himsrlf the life and experience of
his fellow-men most effectually. Shakespeare and Goethe, Homer and
Dante — these are vast individualities, comprehending human nature al-
most entire within each. Man is great when he avails himself of the
power of his species. Even the Caesar or the Napoleon is great through
his representative character — summing up in his will the will-power of
his nation and distributing it again to them as directive power. Each
humble individual, too, who serves under the Cassar or the Napoleon
participates to some extent in the greatness of individuality of the great
leader, because he is led out of and beyond himself to live for others
and through others and in others. Thus each one gains individuality
while he gives it to others. Here, in secular affairs, is the same principle
which the doctrine of Grace enunciates for the religious consciousness.
Since the day of Saint Augustine, who was the first to see the absoluteness
of the principle of Grace (among the Christian Fathers), we have had, as
the chief interest in the history of the Church, the attempt to realize this
principle in all its consequences.

It is possible to seize the principle of Grace in an abstract manner, and
set it over against other principles, such as justice and free-will. Or it is
possible to misunderstand it altogether, as in the case of naturalistic theories
which can think of no possible view of interrelation except the material-
istic one, which admits of no participation but only of exclusion. Justice
is not a principle which is to be thought as limiting grace ; grace itself
assumes the form of justice in proportion as it meets the free responsi-
bility of the individual. Without responsibility there can be no justice ;
for justice returns upon the individual only what he has uttered in free-
dom. But the principle of grace extends below the realm of free respon-
sibility to the lowest manifestation of the creation. It is grace that
draws up all creation towards the highest, and endows beings with pro-
gressive degrees of individuality and realization of the divine image. The
animal, it is true, is not immortal, but so much life as it has is the life of
the species, and is a gift of grace which gives him the light of life, not for
his having a right to it, but for the sake of divine love which pours itself
out in creation, from freedom and the desire of good. When the human
being arrives, he progresses into knowledge and will-power, and this
brings responsibility, and with it the principle of justice. Justice is the
principle of grace applied to free beings, because justice is respect shown

Notes and Discussions. 211

to the responsibility of the individual who acts. Justice assumes the
actor to be self-determined and free and to own his deed ; whatever his
deed is, it is returned to him. To return the deed of an irresponsible
being upon it would be to annihilate it. To treat a free being as though
it did not own its deeds would be to offer indignity to it and annihilate
its freedom. But freedom is itself the last and highest gift of grace, and
grace will preserve that before all else. Freedom is self-determination, but
not the self-determination of a mere particular individual in its isolation,
but rather as participation in the life of the species — in the life of God,
rather. Freedom, which should energize to will only its particularity,
apart from the divine and from the human race, would merely set up for
itself a limit in the race and in God. This would be the hell which
selfishness makes for itself. Even grace, which seeks to give to others,
receiving naught in return, would be the highest pain to the isolated will
that seeks to find itself alone in the universe. Dante makes his " Inferno "
to be caused by the fall of Lucifer, through pride, he striking the earth
and hollowing out the vortex with its terraces on which sinners are pun-
ished. Pride is the worst of mortal sins, because it loves only itself and
repels God and man and all that is valued by them. Grace is the most
repugnant to pride. Next to pride is the sin of envy. But envy is not
so deadly as pride in that it does not hate all that is from others. It
hates God and man, but it loves the temporal blessings which they possess,
and desires to possess them exclusively itself. Next above envy is anger,
or that which does violence to its fellows and against God. Anger is not
so deep a sin as envy or as pride ; for it strikes the particular individual
or special persons, but not the foundation of all society and of all union
with God, while pride and envy are hostile to all association whether with
man or with God.

Christianity defines the " mortal sins " from this view of divine grace.
Freedom is turned against itself for its own annihilation in these sins,
because it wills against participation in the life of the species as well as
in the divine life. It is the principle of grace, which Goethe, in the sec-
ond part of his " Faust," calls the eternal-feminine, " Das Ewig-Weibliche,"
which is the moving principle of all progress towards the goal. Goethe,
like Dante, makes divine love or grace the very element that is most
painful to the devils who undertake to seize Faust's soul. Association is
the most destructive agency which fiendishness can come in contact with.
The angels appear in the clouds strewing roses (of love), which the devils
find to be the most exquisite torture when they are struck by them.
Even the association of devils for a purpose is liable to undermine the
absolute hate which is the ideal of the perfect devil. Slavery would

212 The Journal of Speculative Philosophi/.

undermine it, for the slave wonUi be forced into submission of his will to
another; and to toil for another is to sacriiicc one's self for that other,
and to some extent to realize the principle of Ljrace. So if Mcphistopheles
controls other devils he realizes his purposes in and throuo;h them, and
they subordinate their individual wills to his will — thus simulatino; the
principle of ijrace — thus deep is the principle of grace constitutive of the
nature of the htiinan world and of the forms of human life. Even slavery
has a positive side to it, which is medicative towards those worst of spiritual
ills — pride and envy. Goethe had come to this view of grace during his
life, starting with the pantheistic theory, and finding its consequences
inhuman ; not even devils could live under such a theory. There was a
glimpse 'of the true theory of the world in his mind quite early in life,.
and he tells us that he saw the Faust problem then in its entirety, first and
second parts. He had seen that the universe is based in its deepest laws
on the principle of " saving grace." The three phases of holiness in the
Christian church are portrayed by him in the last scene of " Faust."
There comes first the Pater Ecstaticus, who calls upon arrows to transfix
him (as they did St. Sebastian), and for lances, bludgeons, and lightnings
to martyr him, so that his " pining breast " may be rid of its " vain unre-
alities, and see only the star of everlasting love." This view is simply
negative to the finite and eai'thly. Pater Profundus comes next as the
representative of a more perfect state of holiness. He looks upon nature
and sees it as the spectacle of God's love forming and preserving created
beings. Not only this, but he sees that even the lightning and the terri-
ble mountain torrent are messengers of love, bringing fertility to the vale
and purity to the air ; he sees the world as instrument for the realization
of spirit. There is next Pater Seraphicus, who is a higher saint, because
he does not spurn the world and seek only his own bliss in ecstatic con-
templation, nor see merely the mediatorial process in creation, like the
Pater Profundus, but he " takes up into himself the blessed boys . . .
brought forth at midnight hour, with a soul and sense half shut, lost im
mediate to the parents, by the angels straightway gained . . ." ; lets them
see the world through his eyes, and, by allowing them participation in his
human experience, equalizes their fate which had denied them earthly
life. Here we see that the soul is represented as gaining something posi-
tive from the earthly life which must be made up to it by the gracious
aid of some Pater Seraphicus if too early death has deprived it of human
experience. But Dr. Marianus ("in the highest, purest cell") sees the
Virgin as the symbol of divine grace (as the feminine is especially the
bearer of human tenderness and mercy on earth, so it becomes properly
a symbol of divine grace), and thus celebrates divine grace as the deep-

Notes mid Discussions. 213

est principle of the divine nature, and as containing all other principles
within it.

Milton, in representing the fallen angels as having society and combi-
nation, in the form of a hellish commonwealth, with a legislative assembly-
over which Satan " exalted sat," has painted the demoniac as possessing
divine elements. It is Dante alone who has consistently presented to us
the symbolic portraiture of the degrees of sin in its effects upon the soul,
and has shown us Lucifer " immersed to his midst in ice," his pride repel-
ling all the universe, and thus freezing him with isolation — for warmth is
the symbol of association — even our clothing warms us by contact, and
we warm our spiritual capacities into activity by association, contact with
other souls, so that love is regarded as spiritual warmth. The institution of
"the State and of Civil society, of the family, and still more the institution
of the Church, weave for human life a spiritual clothing — the universal
enwrapping the particular — and preserve vital heat within it.

If these views are correct, it is not wonderful that the great fathers of
the Christian church, who have seen this principle of grace revealed as
the ground of true life and the solvent word that alone explains creation,
have laid so much stress upon it as to make it seem often as the exclusive
principle rather than the inclusive principle. Hence justice has been
opposed to grace and stern legality made to stand over against grace, sim-
ply because the principle of grace was interpreted in a one-sided manner.
Then, too, freedom has been thrust back as if it had been impossible with
divine sovereignty ; when, in fact, it is grace alone that makes free-
dom possible. For freedom is participation in the form of the absolute,
and hence the realization of independence which alone can be conceived
through the idea of love or grace which freely imparts itself to others
and lives in their living.

Even the knowing or consciousness is made possible through the partici-
pation in the divine. " We see all things in God," says Malebranche,
but the remark is not original with him, for it is simply a statement of
the doctrine that he had learned in the Catholic teaching of the college
of La Marche and of the Sorbonne. For four hundred years the Catholic
schools had been teaching the doctrines of Aquinas and Albertus Magnus,
which taught that the very simplest form of knowing, the simple sensu-
ous certitude, is a consciousness that the me and the not-me are united in
one predicate — that of BEING — which is perceived to be both subjective
and objective at once, the ground of the me and of the not-me. This is
■'' lux intelligibilis " which Aquinas speaks of (in librum Boet. de Trin., Qu.
1). He says that this intuition of Being in the first act of sense-percep-
tion is an intuition of God (in an imperfect manner it is true, but still)

214 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

the knowing of tlint wliioh is utterly universal as regards any mere sub-
jective point of view, lie calls tins knowing of tlie jirinial intuition
wliercby all knowing of things hecomes possible INTELLIGERE. (Ob-
jcctuni intcUectus est ens vcl verum coninuine. — Quaest. Iv, Art. I, Sumnia
I.) This common or universal principle which is the criterion of truth
is that through which we reduce the unknown objects to known ones —
resolving them by means of this common principle which is both subject-
ive and objective (Illud quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum,
et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens. — Quaest. Disp., quaest, I^
De Veritate, Art. I).

This primary category of the mind through which we cognize (see
Jour. Spec. Phil, for Jan., 18V9, page 90; also Introd. to Phil., Chap, iii^
page 115 of Jour. Spec. Phil., Vol. I) is, according to Italian philosophy,
a divine light, the intuition of God as the Absolute, although, of course,
only the most incomplete act of knowing possible, because it cognizes
merely the abstract being and not the concrete nature of the divine. Yet
it is grace, inasmuch as it imparts itself, reveals itself to the mind, and
makes the mind see itself and its object in the light (lumen) thus given
it. The retention of this insight by the Italians has kept them from the
tendency to subjective idealism, like that of Berkeley and Hume, and has
made the German philosophy proceeding from Kant seem to them a most
unwarranted procedure, for the reason that it solves a difficulty that is
itself purely imaginary. For why should it solve subjective idealism by
admitting it and then proceeding to construct the world according to it,.
when all subjective idealism rests on a mistake in regard to the first and
most simple act of knowing ? For, according to the psychology of the
school that comes down from Thomas Aquinas, the category of Being is
seen to be both subjective and objective at once, and this perception is
what constitutes cognition. Hence cognition cannot be merely subjective
when it relates to the recognition of objects.

Connected with this idea in psychology is the ontological proof of the
existence of God by Saint Anselm. This sets out by showing that in all
cognition there is implied the idea of a Totality to which all our ideas
are referred, as a norm. " Illud quo majus cogitari non potest " is the
thought of the totality and the thought of God as to its general form, but
an inadequate thought, only the true first condition in the thought of
God. This thought of the totality becomes the thought of God, ade-
quately, in proportion as the determining thoughts are added which make
our idea clear as to the attributes of God. The idea of totality involves
that of independence and freedom, as well as that of self-determination ;
and self-determination involves, again, that of self-consciousness and will.

Notes and Discussions. 215

It is true that the concreter ideas of coBscioiisness and will are not directly
involved, so that one can see them immediately following from the state-
ment of the former, but, nevertheless, they follow as strictly, though by
many intermediate steps. The opponents of the ontological proof of
God always assume the same standpoint that the proof assumes, but
naively overlook the fact and make the proof to be merely fanciful.
Gaunilo asserts that the thought of the lost island in the Atlantic does
not prove its real existence, wherefore Anselm's " Than which no greater
can be thought " is a concept which does not imply necessary existence.
But this very objection rests on the assumption that Anselm's concept
may be a merely subjective one, and that there may be an objective
which transcends it, and that the objective plus the subjective make up
the totality. He would not find it possible to think a greater than the
totality, nor to think the totality otherwise than as existent. " The All
exists," is the purport of Anselm's assertion. To this he adds that the
All is perfect (because it lacks nothing, there being nothing outside it for
it to need ; and, besides this, it is no becoming or process of development
because it is total and has arrived at its goal — only finite time can sepa-
rate that which is potential from its realization, and in a totality this time
has been long since transcended). He concludes, too, that the All is
good (for good implies self-end and self-mediation for that end, and in
the totality there can be no conflict of end and means with the self). The
totality is God, therefore, and the thought of it underlies all thinking — even
the thinking of the fool, who says in his heart that there is no God. But
the All must not be taken in the sense of a mere collection — a " tout en-
semble," as the French call it. Such a totality would be only quantitative
unity, which would, however, be soon modified in thought into the idea
of a process of determination of each part by the influence of the totality
of conditions in the world. This would result in the idea of fate or blind
Power, which, as a universal might, destroyed the particular beings of the
world. The further thought upon the nature of fate would discover that
self-determination was the basis to any possible form of totality, and
hence that the totality must be personal and free, and that a world of
particular beings with origination, change and decay, was to be explained,
not as a part of the totality, but as its manifestation, as its creation. Then
Avould follow the thought of the creation of beinofs which reflect the total
or absolute person, and finally thought would begin to ' understand the
world in which it finds itself. The Editor.

216 The Journal of Speculative Pldlomphy.

BOOK NOTICES.

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. By John Caird, D. D., Principal
and Vice-Clianccllor of the University of Glasgow. Glasgow : James Maclehose,
1880.

The substance of this book, as the author tells us, was delivered as the " Croall Lec-
ture " for 1878-79. He acknowledges obligations to many works bearing on his
theme, but "Above all, to Hegel's rhilosophie der Religion, a work to which he has
been more largely indebted than to any other book." Thoughtful readers of this book
will express equally warm obligations to this labor of Principal Caird, if we mistake
not. It is a work which will find its place in the hands of sober-minded men and
women in all English-speaking countries, for the unrest of scepticism has affected so
many that there is no longer a demand for religious books of simple devotion, but there
must be something to appeal to the intellect. The theoretical soul must not be divorced
from religious participation. And is this not good — that tliere should be a wholeness
in religion, that the intellect, too, should arrive at piety, as well as the will and the aifec-
tions ? If the intellect thinks materialism, while the heart loves God the Spirit, the
mind will be like that house swept and garnished, which, however, is soon to be filled
with the devils which scepticism brings along with it. There never was a greater mis-
take than that which supposes that religion may exist in the heart, while impiety of
thought flourishes side by side. The Christian religion is a religion which carries with
it a view of the world (the Germans call it a "Welt-Anschauung"), and it is impossible
to separate this view of the world, or intellectual religion, from that feeling which the
heart is to have, and which is to be the essential part of religion. For example, let us
suppose a pious man who reads and believes Professor Bain's books on the brain as the
producer of mind, and who comes to hold that there is no hereafter for the soul — that
there is no soul, but only a function of brain and nerves. What can his heart say to
itself in view of this conviction ? Certainly nothing that can sound like Christianity. Or,
suppose that one reads Feuerbach and Strauss, and comes to think that the entire Chris-
tian history is a myth — in short, that all religious histories base themselves upon nat-
ural phenomena, if not on " sun-myths," then on histoiieal experiences. The Christian
world is responsible for the perpetual readjustment of its theoretical view of the world
so that there shall be no error without its refutation, no unworthy view of the soul
without the true view grounded in its place. The intellect is not to be regarded,
either, as a bete noire — as something which is unessential to religion, and flhich were
better avoided altogether in religion if possible. Such a view would look upon theol-
ogy as only a necessary evil, and would, in fact, imply a theory whicli made God not an
intellect, not a God of truth, but only a God of goodness and love, only a blind good-
ness and love. This view forgets, when it thinks of piety in ancient times — of piety
which said "Credo ut intelligam," or even " credo'quia impossibile" — how that such
piety took its view of the world from Christianity, and thought nature as perpetually
the theatre of divine manifestation, and human history as immediate revelation of
divine providence. If we in modern times have come to look upon nature as manifes-
tation of Law, it is indispensable that we shall readjust our view of the world and learn
to recognize the conscious personality of God in the world of laws, just as our fellow-
Christians of the ninth century did recognize him in the immediate events of daily life.

Book Notices. 217

In the ten chapters of this work Principal Caird treats first of the function of philoso-
phy and the criticism of the organ of knowledge ; next of the objections to the scien-
tific treatment of religion, with especial reference to the theories of the unknowable
and the relativity of knowledge ; with further reference to the theory of immediate or
intuitive knowledge versus logical or mediated knowing ; and, further, with reference
to the view which holds that revelation excludes the activity of reason. (The very ac-
ceptance of a revelation implies the activity of the intellect, and that the intellect be
guided in its interpretation by consistent intellectual views. Without the highest ex-
ercise of the reason the revelation may be misunderstood — in fact, is certain to be mis-
understood.) The necessity of religion is shown to be the necessity, which underlies
the intellect, of tracing out " the steps of that process by which the finite spirit tran-
scends its own fiiiitude and rises into communion with the things unseen and eternal" —
to show, in other words, how it is necessary to mind, to relate itself to God, and to de-
termine that idea of God which its religious experienc3 involves. He next discusses
the proofs of the existence of God, and shows the real significance of the famous proofs
that satisfied the intellect once, but are now not regarded with favor. In his sixth chap-
ter he comes to treat of the nature ofilie religious conscii'usnfss, as containing feeling,
and knowledge as well. He proceeds to show the defects of the representative or fig-
urative form of knowledge — how it proves to be inadequate for grasping the unity of
spiritual subjects and for solving their seeming contradictions. In Chapter VIII he
examines the expedients of the discursive intellect for giving unity to knowledge, and
shows the falsity of pantheism and anthropomorphism as theories of the relation of the
human to the divine. He defines the province of morality, distinguishing it from re-
ligion, and closes his treatise with showing the relation of the transient to the perma-
nent in religion — the contribution of history to religion, and the contribution cf pliiloso-
phy to it. We give the following quotations :

" Morality is, and from its nature can be, only the partial solution of the contradic-
tion between the natural and the spiritual; and its partial or incomplete character may
be said, in general, to arise from this, that while the end aimed at is the realization of
an infinite ideal, the highest result of morality is only a never-ending approximation to
that ideal. It gives us, instead of the infinite, only the negation of the finite." " The
spiritual life of man, as we have said, rests on the fact that reason or self-consciousness
is the form of an infinite content, and has in it the never-ceasing impulse to make the
actual life adequate to its ideal form." "I am not one individual in a world of indi-
viduals, having a will of my own which is not theirs, as they have wills which are not
mine, so that where n^y will ends their will begins; but, on the contrary, it is in ceasing
to have a will of my own — to will only what pertains to my private, exclusive self, in
entering into the life, identifying my will with the will and welfare of others — that I re-
alize my own spiritual nature and become actually what, as possessed of a moral will,
I am potentially. A'.l truth is knowable as my knowledge, all good is willable as my
will ; and in the impossibility of being determined by anything foreign to my thought
and will, of being negated by any thing or being in which I am not at the same time
afiirmed, lies the infinitude of man's spiritual nature." " Religion rises above morality
in this, that while the ideal of morality is only progressively realized, the ideal of relig-
ion is realized here and now. In that act which constitutes the beginning of the relig-
ious life — call it faith, or trust, or selfsurrender, or by whatever name you will — there
is involved the identification of the finite with a life which is eternally realized." "For
religion is the surrender of the finite will to the infinite, the abnegation of all desire,
inclination, volition, that pertain to me as this private individual self, the giving up of

218 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

every aim or activity tliat points only to my exclusive {ileasiirc or interest, the absolute-
identification of my will with the will of God. Oneness of mind and will with the di-
vine mind and will is not the future hope and aim of religion, but its very beginning
and birth in the soul."

The Republic op God : an Institute of Thsology. By Elisha Miilford, LL. D. Bos-
ton : Houghton, Mifllin & Co. The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1881.

Spinoza has left as his most important contribution to the history of philosophy a
few technical expressions, such as causa sui, injinilum adu, infinilum iniaffiiiationis, sub
specie efernitaiis, and the like, some of which are borrowed from earlier writers — as
Giordano Bruno, for example. The ]>h rase " sub epecie eternitatis" is not only de-
scriptive of the form in whicli all universal and necessary ideas appear to us, but it
paints for us the subjective state of mind in which such ideas are contemplated. The
book of Dr. Mulford on Theology, named above, is one which may he said to be "sub
specie eternit.itis," in that it fixes its mind on the contemplation of God, and proceeds
from the first page to the last without distracting itself by consideration of the stand-
points of finite, discursive reasoning. It, therefore, appears to the latter standpoint as
if it were wholly dogmatic, and even lacking in proper respect for the difficulties of
concept'on which the latter finds in studying Christian the(>logy. Notwithstanding this
appearance, we must protest tliat this book contitins more illumination of the dark and
diflScult points in theology than any other book of its epoch. It is one of the fruits of
slow growth, from the mind of a man wlio ponders his subject for a decade, looking at
its various pliases from every conceivable standpoint, and looking quite through all the
partial views before he begins to put his own thoughts into shape as a book. He has
found a point of view whence the infinitely various attitudes of discursive reflection
may all be seen at one glance, and harmonized by the larger synthesis which comple-
ments them, and thus refutes them as theories of the subject. Dr. Mulford's book on
our national form of government, published many years since (" The Nation,'" IBYO),
is a book of the same style and method of composition, and of a like elevation in in-
sight. It treats all partial views from the standpoint of the ideal nation, and is able to
criticise the one-sidedness of imperfect theories from that view sub specie eternitatis.

Truth is not something that can be immediately received as soon as it is expressed
in language. There is not such a thing as expressing profound philosophic or religious
truth in language " so clear and simple " that the fool {insipiens) can understand it.
It is true enough that he who runs may read — many things, doubtless, but of all that
he reads he may not understand one jot or one tittle. The seeing of truth sub specie
eternitatis requires the third stage of knowing. There is sense-perception, reflection,
speculative knowing. The sense-perception knows things out of their relations; re-
flection knows them only in their relativity and dependence; the speculative knows
thi-m in the totality of their relations, and this alone is true knowing.

Dr. Mulford reviews, in his first chapter, the arguments for the being of God, and
points out the defects of tlie reasoning as usually conducted. This is done, however,
not in a negative manner, but in view of the true insight which sees that the being of
God is a postulate of all knowing whatsoever. (See the article on " The Philosophy of
Religion," in this number, in the Notes and Discussions.) For the first act of cognition
is one that recognizes Being as the common predicate for both subject and object, and
therefore recognizes Being as an Absolute category, valid to the extent of the reality of
the absolute; for it transcends the mere subject which is opposed to an object, and
likewise transcends the object as a mere alterum of consciousness. Hence the category

Booh Notices. 21^

of Being postulates an Absolute which is neither me nor not-me in limited identity, but
which is the identity of both as regards being the totality in which each participates,
but which both do not constitute. " Man is conscious of the being of God, and lives
and acts in this consciousness, and the reality of the being of God so comes to him."
He dismisses Kant's refutation of Saint Anselm's ontological proof in a quiet way, with
the remark that Kant assumes the difference between thought and being, a difference
which holds only in case of finite things — "imperfect and incomplete things." The
idea of God differs from the idea of things, inasmuch as it is the idea of that, than
which there can be none greater, using the language of Anselm. God is totality, not a
being over against some other. It is true that other beings exist, but only in so far as
He. gives them being and sustains them. There are thus two orders of Being — primi-
tive and independent, and secondary or dependent. God alone belongs to the first, and
his creation to the second. He gives to some a mere transient existence (sub specie
temporis), and to others the form of spiritual beings with freedom and progressive real-
ization of himself (sub specie eternitatis). "The idea and the being of God are one.
In Him is the oneness of the ideal and the real." The ideal and real in God are one
simply because of his totality. Any being whose ideal or potentiality is different from
his reality cannot be an abiding form, but only a transient being which is in a state of
change or development. But such a being would not be God, but would presuppose
God as the ground of its possibility.

The style of Dr. Mulford is that of Aristotle, the review and criticism of the stand-
points of reflection from the insight into the comprehension of the totality. The true
itself is that which furnishes the only basis for criticism. Everywhere the book gives
evidence that its author knows well the great affirmative results of German philosophy.
Any one who possesses the thought of Aristotle can easily get at the secret of Hegel,
but those who fail to see the Greek solution, and who miss the Christian idea, will not
get more than pantheism from the German philosophy.

In his second cliapter Dr. Mulford comes to the consideration of the nature of God.
God is self-determined, and is therefore personal. The thought of God as qiio majus
cogiiari non potest, or as the total, implies his self-determination. His determination
can come from no other source, for there is no other source than the total, and He is
therefore determined by himself, or else altogether undetermined. But an altogether
undetermined God would be unconscious, and without attributes of any sort — a Brahm
whose being is formless, so that he is neither good nor bad, holy nor wicked — an utter
indifference to himself and to whatever else there may be. God is self-determined or
else nothing. "The personality of God does not involve limitation; the only limita-
tion is self-limitation — the limit which it sets in its own self-limitation." " Personality
does not involve limitation. . . . Personality with God is the same as peisonality in
man, . . . the personality of God, however, being infinite. Thought and will with
him are one. God suffers the limitations of the finite that man miiy rise to the life
that is infinite." " The personality of man has its foundation in the personality of
God." Personality grounds also the relation of man to God, and is the condition of
the communion of man with God. " The realization of personality brings man nearer
to God. Through the deeper knowledge of himself, through self-knowlege, man comes
to the knowledge of God." " Tfie personality of God is also the foundation and the
condition of the freedom of man. The self-determination of God in righteousness and
freedom is the ground of the self-determination of man." Immortality, too, is con-
ditioned on this personality of God. "The personality of God is the ground of the,
continuous being of the personality of man."

220 The Jonrnal of Sjx'culative I*hllosophy.

So, too, the divine attributes are involved in tlie fnct of his personality. " God is
person ; the chiefest attribute of (lod is freedom ; lie is the self-deterniincd one, his
determination is the perfect manifestation of himself; this is the sij^nificance of the will .
of God; the holiness of God is the central principle in that will, the principle in which
he cannot become other than himself; the righteousness of God is the assertion of
that will on the earth ; the love of God is the expression of a person toward those who
arc persons.''

In chapter third Dr. Mulford discusses the precedent relations of religion and
philosophy to the revelation of God. He quotes the definitions of religion given
by Van Osterzee, Kant, Fichtc, Seheliing, Hagenbdch, and others, and then proceeds
to discriminate philosophy from religion : "The process of the one is in thought, of tlie
other in worship; tlie one moves through reflection, the other through emotion ; but
each, in its development, involves the other, as it has for its aim the truth." Hegel
had said : " The object in philosophy is upon the whole the same as in religion. In
both, the object is truth, in that supreme sense in which God, and God only, is truth."
He now comes to his great distinction: " The Revelation of and in Christ is not a reli-
gion, and it is not a philosophy." This paradox turns out to be the expression of a
■very important truth. He distinguishes religion from a revelation in the fact that reli-
gion means a ritual rather than a revelation. Maurice is quoted as saying : " In other
books you have the records of a religion. You are told how a people introduced this
worship and that ceremony; how their priests enforced new propitiations ; how their
soothsayers told them of services that they had neglected. Here you have nothing of
the kind. All tlie religion which the priests of the people introduced — the worship on
hills and in groves, the calves, the altars to a Baal — is noticed to be denounced : a
righteous king proves his righteousness by sweeping it away." Both the Old Testa-
ment and the New reveal God, and do not set up a ritual merely. "Not here nor at
Jerusalem ; they that worship the father must worship him in spirit and in truth."
"He that doeth the will shall know the doctrine." " Christ institutes no cultus of
worship, and prescribes no system of dogma. There is no suggestion of form of wor-
ship or formula of doctrine. The blessing which he gives is of those who act and suf-
fer in the life of humanity. It is of the gentle, of those who mourn, of those who suf-
fer persecution for righteousness, of those who hunger after righteousness." "The
difference between the revelation of the Christ and all religions is ultimate. But it
consists with the fact that this revelation is manifested to and in humanity."

In succeeding chapters he speaks of The Revelation of God, of His Revelation in the
Christ, of The Conviction of the World, of the Revelation of Heaven to the World, the
World's Justification and Redemption, and The Life of the Spirit.

"This revelation is the revelation of God ; it is from God, but primarily it is 0/ God."
So that God is no longer a far-off being, transcending consciousness and unknowable by
man; He reveals his own being and will to man. " It says : ' Fear not ; there is noth-
ing hidden which shall not be known.' " " Its revelation is through the light which
lighteth every man that cometh into the world."

This revelation comes as a person in Christ. " This revelation is not in a life that is
external to God, or external to man."

" The consequence of wickedness is eternal punishment, and this is the assertion of
an immutable principle. The punishment is eternal. But to identify this with an ir-
revocable doom is to set a finite limit to the divine redemption and to its perfect reali-
zation. It brings a section of the human race into an ultimate condition of fate, and

Booh Notices. 221

not of freedom. The spiritual law is eternal, but not the necessary continuance in sin
of one child of earth and time."

" To the enquiry, ' Are there few that be saved ? ' the answer is : Strive to enter in
at the strait gate. ... It asserts that he that believeth shall be saved ; and he that
believeth not shall be condemned. . . . It does not assert in any monnent, for any man,
in the here or in the hereafter, nn irrevocable doom. Its end is to save man from sin
and from the doom involved in sin. It does nol place any without hope ; it makes
hope a virtue, difficult as all virtue is in this world, but still one with faith and love;
and if illusive, then also faith and love, for which the same ground and end is revealed,
are illusive."

Kant and his English Critics : a Comparison of Critical and Empirical Phi-
losophy. By John Watson, M. A., LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queen's
University, Kingston, Canada. Glasgow : James Maclehose, St. Vincent Street Pub-
lisher to the University. 1881.

This being the centennial year of the publication of the Kantian Critique, we have
many books relating to the famous critical system, as well as celebrations, in a more
formal manner, of that great event in the history of modern philosophy. The study of
Kant is being cultivated by the schools of thinkers who have close affinity to material-
ism, as well as by the spiritualistic thinkers. The physiological psychologists must
needs try their skill at refuting the supposed demonstrations of the Critique of Pure
Reason in order to disarm tlieir opponents, the believers in the soul as a separate
entity apart from the body. But all who are interested in moral philosophy arc bound
to study Kant as the founder of ethics on a stable foundation. The philosophy of
ethics is the only positive result of the Kantian system.

This work by Professor Watson may be divided into three parts — which, however,
are not formally separated from one another — viz. : a statement and defence of Kant's
Theory of Knowledge, a criticism of English empirical philosophy, as represented by
Spencer and Lewes, and an examination of Kant's own theory, conceived in the spirit
of the Hegelian philosophy. The first 'chapter contains an exposition of the problem
and method of the Critique of Pure Reason, and also a defence of the critical or
"transcendental" method against the animadversions of Mr. A. J. Balfour, whose
Defence of Philosophic Doubt will be familiar to some of our readers. The prob-
lem of philosophy, according to Mr. Balfour, is to show "how much of what jore.'cwfZs to
be knowledge we must accept as such, and why ? " and the transcendental method con-
sists in showing that we cannot admit the reality of the simplest perception without
seeing that such principles as those of substance and causality are "involved " in them.
To this view our author replies that Mr. Balfour has failed to see that Kant does not
admit the superior validity of immediate perception, but, on the contrary, argues that a
purely immediate perception is not a constituent in the intelligible world at all, and
hence that to attempt any deduction of a philosophic principle from such a datum is
absurd. The force of the critical argument is, therelore, altogether missed when it is
supposed to lie in reasoning from immediate sensation to universal principles ! Kant
rather maintains that, as immediate sensation is not knowledge, but only an element in
knowledge, intelligence must inform sensation before there can be any knowable world
for us. In the second chapter the basis of mathematical truth, as expounded by Kant
in the Critique and the Prolegomena, is stated, and it is contended, as against
Mr. Henry Sidgwick, that Kont has only one method of refuting psychological idealism,
his argument in both cases being that, on the supposition that knowledge is reducible

222 The Journal of Speculative PhUosophij.

to a mere series of passing; feeling.-^, we should not have a knowledge even of the self
as the subject of sueh feelings, since the self can only be known as an object iu so far
as we contrast with it a permanent world in space. Chapter III contains a full
statement of the Deduction of the Categories and the Schematism of the Understand-
ing, and points out what, in Kant's view, is llie philosophical justification of the
absoluteness of the laws of nature as embodied in the special sciences. In the
next chapter Lewes's conception of Psychology is compared with that of Kant,
ami a full examination of the empirical origin of knowledge, as held by the former,
is made. In contrast to Lpwcs's view, that sensation and consciousness are functions
of the organism, it is pointed out tiiat, unless by an abuse of terms, tlie organism can-
not be regarded as the subject of knowledge, but only connotes physical and physio-
logical proi)erties. The "psychogeny" of Lewes is also held to rest upon a confusion
between the transmission in a modified form of organic structure with the transmission
of self-consciousness. The author then goes on to indicate Kant's reason for distin-
guishing between '' mathematical " and " dynamical " principles, and contends, as
against Dr. Stirling, tliat the principles of judgment are not subsequent to actual
knowledge, but logically prior to it. The half unconscious evolution of those princi-
ples, as set forth by Kant, is pointed out, the progress being from the less to the more
complex of them. Chapter VI contains a statement of the " proofs " of tlie principles
of judgment, and a good deal of space is devoted to the accurate characterization of
tlie proofs of substances and causality, about which there has been so much controversy
of late. The next chapter is a further illustration of the same subject, and contains
replies to the olyections advanced to the proofs of Suhstance and Cause by Balfour and
Stirling. Those objections are held to arise from an imperfect conception of the
critical character of the proofs — i. e., from not seeing the transformation in the ordi-
nary dualism of intelligence and nature effected by Kant. The following chapter is
devoted to Kant's niefaph\sic of nature, or categories of reflection, and contains the
fullest statement of the contents of the Meiapliysuclic Anfangsyrundc der Naturwisse7i-
^chaft that has as yet appeared in English. In Chapter IX a comparison is drawn be-
tween the third chapter of Spencer's First Principles and the treatise analyzed iu the
preceding chapter. The method of Spencer is shown to be analvtic or dogmatic, while
the method of Kant is synthetic or critical. The comparison of Kant and Spencer is
continued in the next chapter, in which theNoumenon of the one and the Unknowable
of the other are shown to have only a superficial resemblance. Spencer's self-contra-
dictory doctrine of the relativity of knowledge is carefully examined, and its source in his
imperfect psychology is pointed out. The third part of the work, as contained in the
last two chapters, consists of an examination of Kant's own theory of Knowledge. The
provisional character of the contrast of the " manifold " as " given " and the " forms "
as " originated," and oi a posteriori and a priori Knowledge ; the want of development
iu Kant's general theory ; the absence of connection in the system of categories, and
especially in those of Substance, Cause, and Reciprocity, and the untenability of the
contrast of "pure" and "mixed" categories — forms the subject of the first of these
chapters. The last chapter of all contains a very complete examination of the vaiious
.elements of Knowledge distinguished by Kant, and endeavors to show in what points
his doctrine, while right in principle, is burdened by " incoherent elements incompatible
with its unity and completeness."

We think that Dr. Watson has done well in taking up Kant's metaphysic of nature
and in discussing it in the light of the criticism from the standpoint of the physiolc-

Booh Notices. 223

-gists. The views of Kant are In themselves of the greatest interest, but as related to
the subjective idealist^, as well as to the evolutionists, they are a sufficient fortress.
The minute analysris of the fundamental concepts of nature and the physical world of
matter and force, furnishes the best field on which to overthrow the tlieories of Ma-
terialism, and to discomfit mere idealism, so-called. The conception of matter as a
synthesis of attractive and repulsive forces ; the refutation of the atomists ; the correct
■idea of quantity of matter, as correlative of quantity of motion ; the three laws of Me-
chanics ; the relativity of motion and what follows from this fact — all this relates
vitally to the labors of the English school of evolutionists in so far as they have under-
taken to treat of first principles. Dr. Watson has presented these things with great
clearness, and, we think, opened a new and very important phase of the Kantian doc-
trine for discussion.

DiK Philosophie der Geschichte. Von C. L. Michelet. 2 Bande. Berlin, 1881.

This is the final work in Professor Michelet's extensive System der Fhilosojyhie ah
exacter Wissenschaft. The publication of the system was begun five years ago, and
three volumes have appeared before the present, viz. : Logik, Naturpliilosophie, and
Geistesphilosophie. The first of the two volumes composing the Philosophy of His-
tory is devoted to the primeval world, the Orient and Greece ; the second to Rome,
Christian Europe, America, and the future. The brief introduction contains Pro-
fessor Michelet's definition of Ids work, an interesting discussion of the literature of
the subject, or, rather, of the conceptions of history held by the author's great pre-
decessors in this field — Montesquieu, Lessing, Herder, Hegel, etc. — and an explanation
of his principle of division. The absolute purpose or goal of history Professor Michelet
pronounces the full realization of truth and freedom. In the working out of this he is
greatly influenced by the conception most clearly stated by Schiller, that the object of
man in history is the recovery by reason of what he possessed unconsciously as instinct
in his primitive condition, and from which he i'ell. The process is from a state of nat-
ure, an Eden, through a period of struggle, the present to a future golden age, in which
the moral conflict shall be ended and the race shall rest in the enjoyment of perfect
social relations. This process is pronounced to be in accordance with a certain geo-
graphical principle — and it is in the elaboration of this that most readers will think
Professor Michelet fanciful, true as the general principle seems to be that " Westward
the course of empire takes its way." According to him, Japan must have been the
cradle of the race, and Australia is to be the Utopia towards which " Sanct-Humanus "
is irresistibly pressing. This will certainly stir up the local pride of the good people
of Melbourne and Sydney. Meantime we Americans can take genuine satisfaction in
the high place which Professor Michelet assigns us for the present and the immediate
future. We have certainly seen no work emanating from Germany in which the sig-
nificance of America has been more fully recognized and more intelligently discussed.
America is the land of the present, and here the principle of political freedom seems
to Professor Michelet to have been first realized in institutions. " America has attained
full political majority, which is true of no European nation. In Europe it is still
heroes and statesmen who rise, push to the front, and draw to themselves the majority
of the people. In America the majority controls the statesman. The statesman is not
the controller, but the servant of public opinion, as President Lincoln expressly declared
■of himself. 'A European village,' says Philarete Chasles, 'cannot govern itself; there
is the priest, the land-owner.; there are the heads of the old historical parties. Royal-

224 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

jsts, Republicans, Bonapartists, who manage everything ! ' Under the American pclf-
government, on the other hand, nothing is expected of the state, but everything from
the pcopU'V own initiative. Tliis is tlie true democracy." Professor Michclet discusses
the social ami faiuily life of America — education, the relation of church and state, and
the leading principles of our constitution — everywhere with clear iufight and hearty
sympathy, touching with enthusiasm upon the general educating influence of our pol-
ity, and 1 utting in some words of defence for us against some common charges, such,
for instance, as that of our absorbing devotion to money-making. Europe, he says,
can scarcely claim to be free from the passion ; and this is certainly true of the rich
man in America, that, far more generally than in Europe, he is not an idler, but em-
ploj-s his money in active enterprises which promote the common weal. Indeed, Pro-
fessor Michelet's praises of us altogether are so unstinted that in self-satisfied erjoy-
ment of them we have, perhaps, been seduced into dwelling upon them to the neglect
of more important features of his work. Yet, on the whole, we do not think that there
is anything more important in it than its clear recognition of America's political signi-
ficance ; and those who may be prompted to read it for this will find what of importance
there is besides. E. D. Mead.

Boston, Mass.

Faith and Freedom. By Stopford Brooke. Edited, with an Introduction upon Mr.
Brooke's Life and Works, and the significance of his New Movement, by Edwin D.
Mead. Boston : Geo. H. Ellis, 1881.

Stopford Brooke's " Life of Robertson of Brighton," and his volumes upon " Christ
in Modern Life," and " Theology in the Engliih Poets," have already secured for him a
large circle of readers in America, and recognition everywhere as one of the finest
religious thinkers of our time. The editor of the present volume pronounces him
the greatest preacher that the Church of England has had since Robertson of Brighton ;
and this high praise does not seem too high. It has not been in the pulpit that Stanley
has exerted his greatest influence, and perhaps it was not there that Maurice was most
powerful. This new volume, selected chiefly from Brooke's later works, has been pre-
pared for the special purpose of illustrating his theology, and the general character of
his religious thought, which have now become matters of such peculiar interest by
reason of his sepaiatiou from the Ciiurch i.>f England. An appendix contains the
much-discussed Letter to the Congregation of Bedford Chapel, in which Mr. Brooke
announced his withdrawal from the Church, and the sermon, "Salt without Savor,''
in which he more fully stated his reasons for the stt-p. The casual reader will natur-
ally turn first to these, and the latter, with its lofty conception of the doctrine of the
Incarnation, and its stirring plea for sincerity, liberty, and the democratic idea, is cer-
tainly most iniercsting. But the real value of the book lies in such sermons as the
second, entitled, " God is Spirit," that upon " The Light of God in Man," the two upon
" The Fitness of Christianity for Mankind," and the series upon " Immortality." These
last are very great sermons. Their discussions of Comtism and Secularism, of the
dangers of an absorption in secondary causes, and of those peculiar conditions of our
present intellectual and social life which have so weakened the belief in immortality
in so many, ouglit to have a wide reading. Mr. Brooke is very much of a Fichtean in
philosophy, and owns his obligation for very much in his argument for immortality
from the consciousness of the moral law to the Vocation of Man. Mr. Mead's Intro-
duction is excellent. E.

THE JOURNAL

OF

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

YoL. XY.] July, 1881. [No. S,

THE KAXT CENTENXIAL.

DELIVERED AT TEE CENTENNIAL OF KANt'S " KRITIK,"' AT THE CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHI-
LOSOPHY, AUGUST 4, 1881, BY JOHN W. MEARS.

It is certainly rather to the partiality and over-kindly estimate
of my services, than to their intrinsic merit, that I owe my pres-
ence and place to-day amid this distinguished group of lecturers
and savants. Most happy, indeed, am I to be among them, to
breathe the inspiring atmosphere of this home of American medi-
tation, to share the repose of this centre of idealism in American
literature, and to dwell under the roof-tree where once a beautiful
idyl of a domestic life was enacted, and where now is transpiring-
that combination of profound and definite thinking, that harmon-
izing of faith with philosophy, of which the scientific world has
been in chronic need from the beginning until now. Mine is the
privilege, the advantage is mine. Yours may be the suffering and
the penalty, which ought to be endured solely by the over-indul-
gent managers who have drawn me within this charming environ-
ment.

For it is no profound knowledge of the illustrious thiid^er whose

first great work we are here to commemorate, no subtle criticism

of his splendid achievements, no comprehensive study of his lofty

place in the history of philosophy, no athletic wrestle in his spirit

XY— 15

22G The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

with tlie deep problems of tliouiilit, wliich I can contribute to tlie
grand cnnuilus ( f treasures wliich are gathered and laid at the
feet of the learners in this Concord School of Philosophy. Mine
has been the humbler task of calling the attention of American
thinkers to the fact that a suitable time had arrived for bringing
into general notice, and subjecting to a fresh investigation, the in-
estimable services of Immajiuel Kant. A type of thinking so
wholesome in its limitations, and yet so inspiring in its impulses,
so satisfying to all who sought depth and thoroughness in contrast
with the superficial, the sensational, and the presuming, seemed to
me eminently worthy of a wider celebrity and of a more urgent
commendation to the leaders of thought and of education than it
yet enjoyed, at least in our own country. Now, evidently, was the
time ; the centennial of the publication of the "Kritik" appeared
to be the supreme opportunity for rendering tliis service to the
memory of the philosopher, and for rendering to the American
mind the service of unfolding to it as fully as possible the grandeur
of the man and the primacy and originality of his methods.
American thought had been slowly growing into a state of com-
petency, preparedness, and especial need of this service. Heralds
of Kant had been crying in the wilderness. Hamilton and Edin-
burgh had actually merged the Scottish School of Psychology into
a kind of semi-Kantianism, so that we in America, receiving as we
so generally did our instruction in philosophy through the Scottish
schools, imbibed a Kantian atmosphere without knowing it by name.
De Quincey and Carlyle in literature, Coleridge in vague rhapsodiz-
ing, and Wordsworth, in whom Sir William Hamilton detected
Kantian ideas, have aided mightily in this preliminary work of
casting up a highway, of removing obstacles, or of indicating the
time and better direction which thouerht must travel. Meikle-
John, with his really meritorious and intelligible translation, put
the " Kritik " itself in reach of English readers. While Professor
Hedge in Harvard, Professor Marsh in the University of Ver-
mont, and Professor Hickok of Auburn Seminary and of Union
College, had, in various w^ays, labored to introduce into the cur-
riculum of metaphysical study the Kantian principles and methods.
Dr. Hickok, who is now enjoying a green old age in the classic
retreat of Amherst, Massachusetts, deserves special mention as the
constructor of a comprehensive system of philosoph}^, embracing

The Kant Centennial. 227

psychology, morals, metaphysics, and the elements of natural the-
ology, in which the impulse and impress of Kant is everywhere
perceptible, and whose students of the not remote past unite a
reverence for their teacher with an enthusiasm for Kant ; in fact,
forming an early anticipation of the feeling now diffusing wher-
ever advanced learning lias a foothold in America. These were
isolated workers with no common understanding or systematic
educational plan.

The era of ripeness in America for the general study of Kant
was rapidly hastened by the appearance of the " Journal of Specu-
lative Philosophy " and the truly extraordinary amount and qual-
ity of the work which was steadily put into that bold, that heroic
literary venture. In that journal the West answered the East :
St. Louis responded to Concord, and it is a fair question whether
the oracular transcendentalists of Massachusetts were not them-
selves transcended by the clean-cut but profound speculators of
Missouri and Illinois. It was a happy omen for philosophy in
America when they came together and harmonized so beautifully
in this Concord School of Philosophy. When I received from the
li})s of the venerable but buoyant Alcott on the one hand, and
deciphered from the chirography of Dr. Harris on the other, a
hearty approval of the proposal to celebrate the centennial of
Kant's " Kritik," you will not wonder if I felt that no further en-
dorsement was necessary, and that a certain fulness of time indi-
cated by these coincidences for the emphatic recommendation of
the study and the teaching of Kant among all our higher educa-
tional circles in America had arrived.

A sudden and timely increase \\\ the number and character of
the specific helps to the study of Kant now also appeared, the
work of those earlier students who meanwhile had been pioneer-
ing their way little aided by their predecessors. For it seems to
me those who first accomplished the great task ot fairly compre-
hending the " Kritik " must have been men of nearly the same
acumen and metaphysical endurance as the author himself. And
great is our indebtedness to these predecessors and guides, who
save us so much of our time, though they deprive us of some of
the discipline which would be derived from making our unassisted
way into the entirely new world of thought created by the author
of the " Kritik," But art is long and life is fleeting, and we who

228 Tlie Journal of Specidative Philosophy.

wish to know something heside Kant, thankfully accept the aid
of such efHcient helpers as was Kant himself in his " Prolego-
mena," as M'ell as MahaflPy, of the Dublin University, in his as
3'et unfinished translation, condensation, and annotation of the
"Prolegomena" and the " Kritik," the latter of which is as y'et
unfinished ; of Monck, of the same institution, whose " Introduc-
tion " I was sorry to find out of prip.t when I tried to get a copy ;
of Edward Caird, through whose enlarged Hegelian vision we get
a wonderfully attractive, readable, and intelligible view and criti-
cism of the " Kritik," and finally of Professor Watson, of Queen's
University, Kingston, Canada, Ilis book just published is art
octavo of four hundred pages, entitled " Kant and his English
Critic?," in which Kant himself is explained in that most lively
method by the way of contrast and vindication, in the line of
refutation of his opponents, in which Kant's opinions are set in
bold relief against the contrary opinions of every school of thought
with which he can be placed in contrast. A rich fund of informa-
tion upon these schools is thus advantageously grouped with the
Kantian investigation, and the book becomes one of the most valu-
able of modern additions to the history of philosophy in the
latter half of the nineteenth century.

The article proposing a centennial of the "Kiitik" was pub-
lished in the " Penn Montlily " of Philadelphia, and was promptly
and favorably responded to, among others by Mr. Libbey of the
" Princeton Review," by the "Boston Advertiser," the " Utica
Herald," and the " New York Evangelist." The article was re-
printed as a circular and sent to all the leading collegiate institu-
tions of the country as well as to the managers of the Concord
School. Most pleasing and abundant were the I'esponses which
the circular drew forth. They came from Harvard, and Amherst,
and Yale, and Brown, and Vermont ; from Johns Hopkins, from
Union, from Madison, from Cornell, from the University of the
City of jSTew York, from Syracuse, from Lafayette and the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, from Grinnell in Iowa, from the Univer-
sity of California, from the United States Government Survey in
Washington, from the Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario,
and the McGill University in Montreal.

Already at Saratoga a celebration of the centennial has been
held, and papers of importance and interest upon Kant have been

The Kant Centennial. 229

read. But here, in this atmosphere of philosophic repose, in
this Academe of the western world, you, by devoting thrice the
time and thrice the discussion to the great German, are more
nearly approaching that adequate treatment of the " Kritik "
which the hundredth anniversary of its appearance justifies and
demands.

My standpoint is one of purely practical interest. I address, or
aim to address, an audience which, unlike many of my present
hearers, has not waked up sufficiently or at all to the commanding
importance of the study of the " Kritik," and has not gone into
or through those preliminary studies which would qualify them
for understanding, far less for criticising, the work of Kant. I
would if possible, through this celebration, infuse a wholesome
discontent through the minds of those instructors in philosophy
wlio have hitherto dispensed with the speculative element in their
teaching. I go upon the analogy of the new convert to Christi-
anity, who, even before he has learned by any extensive experience
the nature of his new position, is zealous and enthusiastic that
others, too, shall enjoy his deliverance and share his happiness in
the enlargement of his mental vision and the elevation and fresh-
ness of his new consciousness. This is my view of the significance
of the centennial.

Immanuel Kant (born 1724, died 1804) during his whole life of
eighty years travelled scarcely out of the shadows of the paternal
roof-tree. His famous book, " The Kritik," fell nearly dead from
tthe press. Yet to-day, one hundred years since that issue, and
here, three thousand miles from Konigsberg, we are met to cele-
brate the appearance of the "Kritik" in the world. We are
assembled to ponder the work of a philosopher who has thrown
doubt upon the reality of time and space, and to whom things in
themselves stood in broad contrast with phenomena. How unreal
are time and space in their relation to his reputation and influence,
and how deceiving were the phenomena which attended upon the
publication of the " Kritik." "We may safely affirm that nowhere
in the history of philosophy has the contradiction between ap-
pearance and fact been so striking and overwhelming. Certainly
at no point in the history of modern philosophy is an epoch more
delinitely marked and a new departure more clearly determined
than has been done by the " Kritik," which for two years gave

230 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

scarcely a sign of animation, and seemed destined to pass away
without recognition by the public.

AV'hat, then, is the secret of the interest which attends the name
of Kant, which has brought together this group of American
thinkers and educators, and inclined them to stamp the year as
worthy of commemoration ? It is not that Eno-land and Scotland
and France and America have no honored names in their lists
of philosophers. It is not that a more elegant phraseology than
the downright technical and even uncouth style of the German has
not been found to clothe profound thoughts. It is not that the
higher problems of philosophy have been avoided by such thinkers
as Jonathan Edwards, Sir Wilh'am Hamilton, and Cousin. It is
not that profundity and subtlety and thoroughness and scientific
clearness died with Kant, in the land of his birth. If Kant him-
self was a marvel, equally was the line of thinkers that followed
Kant a marvel — a resplendent procession of the crowned kings
of philosophy. It is not that we blindly bow to the authorit)' of
Kant, and make him who was the most searching critic of authority
an object of indiscriminate reverence. It is not because we derive
from Kant new and valuable material which we may incorporate
and weave into the old web of our thoughts. It is because we
tind in Kant and his " Kritik " a real beginning from which the
age and from which we oui-selves may recommence and recon-
struct our thinking upon a higher plane. It is because the great
questions which give to philosophy its reality, its undying charm,
its incalculable value, when on the point of being betrayed by
errorists, or surrendered by a shallow advocacy, were rescued at
vast labor and pains by Kant. It is because he restored the
brightness and legibility of the divine inscription upon the nature
of man, which asserted the everlasting primacy and supremacy
of mind over matter in the universe, but which an earthly-minded
and perverse speculation sought and still seeks to obliterate, and
had at least succeeded in grievously obscuring. It is because the
philosopher of the year 1781 after Christ reasserts in substance
the positions of the philosopher of 381 years before Christ — Kant
making good against the materialists what Plato had maintained
against the atheists, viz., the cause of all impiety and ii-religion
among men is that, reversing in themselves the relative subordi-
nation of mind and body, they have in like manner in the uni-

The Kant Centennial. 231

verse made that to be first which is second ; and that to be second
which is first ; for while, in the generation of all things, intelli-
gence and final causes precede matter and efficient causes, they,,
on the contrary, have viewed matter and material things as abso-
lutely prior in the order of existence to intelligence and design,
and thus departing from an original error in themselves, they have
ended in the subversion of the Godhead.

The conscious purpose of Kant was not, indeed, to combat athe-
ism or materialism, but sensationalism, Locke, in his reckoning
of the furniture of the mind, had overlooked the inherent quali-
ties and the very nature of the mind itself. It was a piece of
white paper, and all its acquisitions were but records inscribed
upon it from without. This assuredly was the impression which
Locke made upon the minds of his contemporaries, whatever may
have been sugo-ested to more careful students bv later utterances
of the philosophers. Hume showed that sensationalism, as thus
taught by Locke, had no place for the idea of cause; the pen of
experience could not write upon the mind that which it did not
possess. The characterless and void intellect was only the passive
recipient of knowledge, and if sensationalism were true, then
necessary, a priori ideas were pure illusions, no better than dreams.
The ideas of Plato, the forms of Aristotle, the supersensual reali-
ties which had filled the souls of philosophers and sages and saints,
were groundless fancies. Metaphysics was discredited or driven
to dogmatism as a last resource. The queen of the sciences
was disenthroned. Kant compares her position to that of He-
cuba, quoting the lines of Ovid : " Once mightiest of things, pow-
erful in progeny and in connections, now a poor exile stripped
of her resources, an object of contempt and scorn."

No matter what specific doctrines Kant taught, or in how many
respects his work may be open to criticism, and exception and
criticism is what we are called to exercise on this occasion, it re-
mains true that Kant achieved the grand work of arresting the
sensationalists, and of vindicating to mind its lofty prerogatives of
spontaneous and independent powers and possessions. He turned
the tables on the sensationalists by showing that experience itself
must depend upon those powers and possessions in order to its very
existence and meaning as experience, to a thinking being. And
this he did, not by treading over again the worn pathway of dog-

232 The Journal of Speculative PJnlosophy.

matie assertion, not hy unscientific appeals to consciousness, but
by the keenest research amid the obscure and intricate processes
of tliouglit, wlicre he was the lieroic pioneer vv^ithout a blaze or a
footprint to guide his steps. lie has turned to us tlie other side,
the inside, the underside of the mind, llis maryellous penetra-
tion and luminous intellect have made mental tacts not before de-
tected glow with an inherent distinctness and originality. If
philosophy be admitted the most effective gymnastic of the mind,
Kant has raised this discipline to the highest potency by teach-
ing us the philosophy of our philosophizing, by teaching us to
think systematically ui)on our systematic thinking; by leading us
to trace to their source, to transcend our first principles, owv a priori
ideas.

Locke and his school have taught us abundantly what it is to
compare and associate objects ; Kant has taught us to compare the
\QYy processes of comparison themselves. We had learned what
it was to classify objects, and again to classify classes of objects to
the utmost range of the universe ; Kant has taught us to classify
and to unify the acts of classification, to tliink ourselves thinking
abstractly, to behold the thinking faculty evolving and imposing
its own laws upon its own thinking.

Before Copernicus, students of natural science and mankind
generally regarded the material universe, the starry heavens, as
revolving around the earth, and in a certain sense dependent upon
it. Before Kant, philosophy showed a marked tendency to regard
the mind as little more than an observer of the external world
around which it revolved, and a mere recipient of sensations im-
pressed upon it from without. As with Copernicus the supposed
relative position of earth and heaven was reversed, and the earth
was found to revolve and to be subordinate, while heaven was
independent and stable, so with Kant mind became central and
gave law, while the external world moved around it and showed
its conformity to the laws which the mind, from its own spontane-
eous activity, proposed as alone valid and explanatory of the pro-
cesses of the material universe.

It was no servile pupilage of nature which acquainted Kepler
and Galileo and Torricelli and Faraday and Agassiz with the
great physical discoveries connected with their names. It was the
application of principles evolved from the fertile sources of their

The Kant Centennial. 233

own versatile minds. Even Tjndall in our day demands the ex-
ercise of scientific imagination as the herald of discovery, and
President Porter, in his "Human Intellect" and "Elements,"
clearly vindicates a place for the imagination in the domain of
physics. (See p. xxvii, Bohn's edition.) Reason, says Kant,
must approach Nature with her own principles, which alone can
pass for laws in one hand, and with the experiment which she has
planned in the other, to be instructed, indeed, by Nature — not as
a pupil who is to accept everything the master chooses to say,
but as a judge who requires the witness simply to answer the
■questions which he proposes.

Thus, according to Kant, reason had already taken the central
position relatively to the material universe in the progress of
physical discovery, and had indicated its supremacy, although the
discoverers themselves were unconscious of the fact. And it was
a great, though only preliminary, service rendered by Kant to
philosophy, and a heavy blow already dealt at sensationalism,
w^hen he pointed out the changed position of mind when purely
mental conceptions were applied successfully to the solution of the
problems of the physical universe, and when he led men to I'ecog-
nize the fact.

And Kant's triumph in metaphysics is his extension of this
principle from the brilliant instances of discovery in physics to
the wide field of experience in general. He is the greater Coper-
nicus who shows the elements of experience in the humble rela-
tion of satellite, revolving around and obeving the native con-
ceptions of the understanding, which are the real centre of the
universe of knowledge. Instead of an inner life, built up of im-
pressions borne in upon us from without, the inner life is the
active, incessant manipulation, the artistic transformation of the
raw unmeaning materials presented to us by the inner and the
outer seuse. These materials are not objects, and their presence
does not constitute them experience, until they have passed
through the pre-existing moulds of the mind and have taken their
shape. They are not in space or in time of themselves; they are
neither one, nor many, nor all ; they are neither like nor unlike ;
they are neither substance nor qualities, neither cause nor effect ;
they have, in fact, no being, except as the mind by its own insight
recognizes or affirms it of them. They are not qualified to bring

234 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

sucli report of themselves to tlie mind. Above all, they do not
possess in themselves that unity, either in subordinate groups or
as a whole, of experience which it is the prerogative of conscious-
ness alone to bestow and to enforce upon them.

Intuitions as Kant names thoni, original perceptions as we
might call them, are, indeed, the indispensable raw materials of ex-
perience, but of themselves they are no more experience than gold
and silver bullion of themselves are coin of the realm. Concep-
tions without intuitions are empty, but intuitions without con-
ceptions are blind. Blind sensationalism ! we are done with that
since Kant, and it is worth while to celebrate our deliverance and
the deliverer once in a liundred years at least.

The centennial of our own national existence only preceded the
centennial of the " Kritik " five years. We celebrated the hun-
dredth year of our national life with a pomp and an eclat that
have faded as yet but little from our memories. But the victory of
Kant over sensationalism, the centennial of which victory we
celebrate to-day, involves principles that cannot be too urgently
commended to the nation now well entered upon its second cen-
tury. AYe demand a pure and an elevated philosophy for the
youth of America. We seek to emphasize the best elements of
Kant's teaching as an invaluable wholesome tonic and stimulus
to the minds of our students.

The value of the study of the " Kritik" as a mental gymnastic
is too evident to be discussed here. If Mr. Gustave Masson, in his
"Recent British Philosophy," could fairly applaud Sir William
Hamilton for " doing more than any other man to reinstate the
worship of Difficulty in the higher minds of Great Britain," much
more may we esteem and welcome the " Kritik " as an instrument
of mental training, Mr. Mahaffy, in fact, declares that " apart
from the actual knowledge attained by the acute analysis and
large insight of such a thinker as Kant, the mastering of his sys-
tem implies a mental gymnastic superior to that which can be
obtained even from the study of higher mathematics." ("Prince-
ton Review," July, 1878.) Mr. Mahaffy falls into a fashion, be-
coming quite too fashionable just now, of disparaging the merits
of Sir William Hamilton. Not satisfied with declarinuj that his

CD

teachings may be called extinct, he asserts with a discourtesy that
must cause a reaction in those who hear it: "It will be difficult

The Kant Centennial. 235

in the history of philosophy to find a man more overrated while
he lived, and despised as soon as he was nnable to defend his own
opinions." With similar unpardonable rudeness he speaks of a
doctrine " more like old Reid's than anything else." On the con-
trary, we wish just liere to emphasize the njerit of Sir William
Hamilton (if for nothing else) as preparing the way by his teach-
ings for the reception of Kantian ideas in the minds of multitudes
of English and American thinkers. Trained as the great majority
of us have been, under the influence of the Scottish school, the
teaching of Sir WilHam formed a necessary transition from the
psychological speculations of his predecessors to the grapple in
dead earnest with the higher and subtler problems of philosophy.
One might say that all that is difficult and aspiring in Sir Wil-
liam was appropriated more or less consciously from Kant, and
those who have drilled themselves thoroughly on the former pass
without a shock, and by a process already made familiar, into the
likeness of the latter. As long as there are minds which need to
be led across the same intervening ground, the teaching of Hamil-
ton will not be extinct, even with those who esteem the " Kritik "
as an instrument of intellectual trainins; as highlv as does Mr.
Mahaffy. We shall look in vain for a better means of raising the
ordinary thought of Great Britain and America to the plane of
Kantian than the philosophy of Sir William. Or does any one
suppose it possible to begin with Kant or with advanced Kantian
ideas?

For an individual mind of a peculiar mould, as determined by
race and training, to remould and modify its own habits of thought
so far as to recognize, appreciate, and in part adopt a style and
method of thought belonging to quite another type of mind only
remotely connected in race with its own, and that style of thought
really original and peculiar in the race to which it belonged, is an
achievement costing an immense amount of mental effort. Even
the most active and laborious of Scotch and English thinkers re-
fused at first to undergo the prolonged and patient endeavor
which was necessary to the understanding of the " Kritik." It
was a struggle for them to admit the possibility of any other than
their wonted methods of psychological analysis and dogmatic treat-
ment of first or ultimate truths. And then to bring into play
unused powers of thought, gradually to work themselves to the.

236 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

utterly novel standpoint of Kant, to catch first a mere glimmer
of the meaning of his highly technical nomenclature ; after gain-
ing detached parts of his meaning to begin again in the hope of
making an intelligible synthesis of the fragments; to gradually
see that a great, a valuable, and yet a never suspected truth is
there if you can only get a firm hold of it — this is a process which
gives unwonted suppleness to the process of meditation and ob-
servation, which widens the grasp and enlarges the vision and
deepens the insight of the mind. And if one seeks those equally
high, perhaps higher, grades of discipline to be found in the study
of Kant's successors, and in the subsequent epochs of German
speculation down to our day, and including even schools of dis-
tinctly opposite tendency, let him understand that the only intro-
duction to those studies is through the "Kritik" audits accom-
panying treatise, the " Prolegomena."

2. In the powerful current which sets towards physical studies,
and which is too likely to end in the vortex of materialism, Ameri-
can students, in order to maintain their footing, need to be thor-
oughly versed in the chief doctrines of the " Kritik." They need
not and cannot be drawn away from the pursuit of physical
sciences, but they must be made to see that there is no conflict
between those branches and a true philosophy. They must be
shown that the true spirit in which to study the physical is the
metaphysical. We must seek to permeate the physical with the
metaphysical as its proper and wholesome atmosphere. We must
learn to appreciate the discovery of Kant, that the knowledge of
.the empirical is not itself empirical knowledge ; that the empiri-
cal, as such, cannot be known at all ; that the metaphysical is
fundamental, and the physical is derivative ; that the very assault
upon the metaphysical must start from metaphysical premises;
that materialism itself is compelled to make assumptions which
are essentially metaphysical, and can scarcely construct a defini-
tion of matter except with material derived from metaphysics.

" To proceed from sense to consciousness," says Caird, " and to
explain consciousness by sense, is a gigantic hysteron-proteron; for
it is only in relation to consciousness that sense, like every other
object, becomes intelligible. To explain time and space psychologi-
cally or physiologically is to explain them by phenomena which are
known only under conditions of time and space. The ' physiologist

The Kant Centennial. 23T

of mind,' who asserts that mind is essentially a function of the ma-
terial organism, may fairly be met bj the objection of Kant, that
his objection is transcendent. To go beyond the intelligence in
order to explain the intelligence is to cut away the ground on
which we are standing. So, again, when the psychologist applies
the laws of association to the genesis of mind he is obliged to pre-
suppose a fixed and definite world of objects, acting under condi-
tions of space and time upon the sensitive subject, in order by
this means to explain how the ideas of the world and of himself
may be awakened on that subject. The theory is stated in terms
of the consciousness if he pretends to explain." (" Caird's Criti-
cism," p. 398.)

In a recent work of fiction one of the leading characters is made
to speak in the positivist and sceptical tone frequently heard now-
adays. " For my life I cannot get beyond what I see and hear,
smell, taste and feel. Nature is big enough and beautiful enough
for me. I cannot get beyond it, and I do not wish to. When-
ever I hear people wrangling about things unseen, about what is
called spiritual things, it reminds me of children. Did you ever
hold out your hands, when a child, and whirl round and round
until you were so dizzy you could not walk straight when you
stopped ? I find too much to do without going into that, and I
won't do it." On the contrary, as we are taught best of all by
Kant, it is the unseen and the spiritual which gives to the seen
and the material its entire sio-nificance. We do and we must sret
beyond nature in order to know it as " nature," and in order to
measure and to value it as "big" or as "beautiful." It may,
indeed, at first confuse us to attempt to see ourselves exercising
those wonderful spiritual functions, but when our admirable
teacher has once pointed them out; to us, we see that it is the
positivist and the materialist who has no footing except as he bor-
rows it from the metaphysician and the transcendentalist. And
as the first principles of the " Kritik" enter into the teaching of
our age and country, we shall cease to hear such ignorant assump-
tions in educated circles, and shall find a nobler estimate of the
nature and works of the thinking faculty generally dilFused even
among the masses.

3. Mr. Mahafiy makes it a great point against the Scotch phi-
losophers before Hamilton, that they laid stress upon the supposed

238 The Journal of Speculative Philosojphij.

injurious tendencies of systems wliicli, as he says, they conlJ not
otherwise discredit. " Any one," lie says, " who is familiar with
the works of that time will remember how much more frequently
alarming conclusions are avoided than false ones refuted. Pro-
vided, in fact, that a theory could be shown alarming^ it had been
sulHciently answered." (" P. R.," July, 1 878, p. 225.) This is in the
spirit of Mr. Buckle's assault upon Reid (3, 348), whom he accuses
of timidity '' amounting almost to moral cowardice," because he
took into account not only the question of the falsity, but that of
the danger, of Hume's opinion. A philosopher, he claims, " should
refuse to estimate the practical tendency of his speculations." In
a similar spirit, M. Taine criticises M. Cousin, and would even
deny to him the title of philosopher, because he allows considera-
tions of hunum welfare to influence his philosophical speculations.
The claim that the scientiflc spirit is utterly indifferent to and
unconcerned about results is in fact heard everywhere to-day.
The gospel idea, and the prevalent and instinctive idea, of testing
a tree by its fruits is scouted as inapplicable in the field of pure
science. The good or the evil which plainly results from a specu-
lative system is not recognized as a leading or as a subordinate
test of its truth.

We cannot subscribe to this dogma in its length and breadth,
nor do we believe that it can ever prevail. The highest good can-
not thus be separated from the highest truth. The man who
earnestly seeks the one necessarily embraces the other from any
fairly chosen point of view. The practical and the speculative
share a common life. Speculation will annihilate itself when it
severs the vital cord which connects it with practical issues.
Intellectual philosophy must advance, if it advances at all, in
view of the best results of moral philosophy.

If this is not true of professional thinkers and theorists, it is
doubtless true of teachers and of those who would recommend
and propagate any speculative system or doctrine. They must
expect to be confronted at once with questions as to results and
tendencies. To deny the validity or pertinency of such questions
would be ill-humored and futile. Certainly a gathering like this
must expect to be closely questioned. A centennial of Kant's
" Kritik ! " Cui hono f Was not Kant, and especially Kant's
" Kritik," the beginning of the cui'se of rationalism, the signal

The Kant Centennial. 239

for the drying up of the rehgions sentiment and the disappearance
•of spirituality from the inner life of Germany, turning it into a
dreary waste? Did it not give the signal for that movement of
German chouglit which, through the whole century, has startled
the sober portion of mankind with the unparalleled audacity of
its claims to absolute knowledge, and which now, as if the wings
with which it promised to mount the throne of day were of wax,
tumbles ignominiously into the Serbonian bog of pessimism, with
the deeper depth of nihilism yawning beneath it? Did not Kant
turn religion out by the front door, and then try to bring it in by
the back door of speculation ? Surely such questions are not alto-
gether unnatural, and it is idle in any one, in the name of pure
science, to attempt to brush them aside.

The absurdity of the charge, that such questions are unscientific
and to be left unnoticed by the genuine seeker of truth, is proved
by the example of the master of scientific thinkers, Kant himself.
Anticipating and deeply concerned for the possible evil results of
his speculations, if left as they stood in the " Kritik," he imposed
upon himself supplementary tasks only second in importance to
the " Kritik " itself.

One need only cursorily examine the latter part of the preface
to the second edition of the "Kritik" to see how honestly and
ingenuously the author was concerned for the practical aspects of
hisi work. He there (p. xxxvi) speaks of the important service
which it will render to reason, to the inquiring mind of youth,
and especially of the inestimable benefit it will confer upon moral-
ity and religion. This it will do by showing that all the objec-
tions urged against them may be silenced forever by the Socratic
method — that is to say, by proving the ignorance of the objector.
Criticism alone, he claims, can strike a blow at the root of mate-
rialism, atheism, free thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which
are universally injurious, as well as of idealism and scepticism,
which are dangerous to the school.

I am aware of the accusation made against the second edition of
the "Kritik" — an accusation inspired probably by the same spirit
which dictated the dogma already referred to, requiring the abso-
lute divorce of the speculative and the practical. It is the accu-
sation of Schopenhauer that the alterations in the second edition
were the result of unworthy motives, and are a proof of servile

240 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

weakness. If Schopenhauor meant only to affirm that a reference
to practical ends is unworthy of a scientist and a proof of weak-
ness, we can let it pass. The objection will not in the least hinder
our celebration, but rather add a new element to oar enthusiasm.
Kant himself encourages us to enjoin upon tlie thinkers and stu-
dents of America the duty of weighing the practical objections
to the "Kritik." We urge it as one of the important disciplinary
advantages of the study, that it thus suggests and invites to dis-
passionate investigation of its true tendencies. It is an element
in the impulse which we wish by this celebration to give to Kant-
ian studies in this age and country.

But, first of all, let us labor to understand the "Kritik." That
is our first business. Objections and tendencies can be fairly
weighed only after we have made ourselves thorougldy acquainted
with the work. Superficial and cursory examination will start
suspicions and prejudices without yielding any of the grand ad-
vantages which we ought to and can derive from the study. And
while we cannot give assurance that the fairest and most careful
study will clear up difficulties and relieve the "Kritik" of every
particle of the opprobrium which has fallen to its lot in the course
of the century, yet the dear-bought experience of the century is
at our command to guard us against a repetition of its errors, and
we may hope, in a shorter time and with less toil, to reach a clear
air and a firm ground of speculation.

Aside, therefore, from the purely scientific interest involved in
such a celebration, we wish our centennial to promote the study
of the "Kritik:" (1) as a mental gymnastic of the higliest effi-
ciency; (2) as an effective mental tonic against the relaxing and
del)ilitating tendencies of sensationalism and materialism, and (3)
as itself inviting enquiry into its own practical tendencies and
pointing to the means of testing them in further works of its
author, and to the splendid attempts which have been made by
his successors to supplement and to develop his doctrines.

Kant and Hegel in the History of Philosophy. 241

KANT /VND HEGEL IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOS-
OPHY.

BEAD AT SARATOGA, N. T., JULY 7tH, AND AT CONCORD, MASS.. AUGUST 2d,

1881, BY WILLIAM T. HARRIS,

That Immanuel Kant is tlie greatest figure in modern philoso-
pLy tiiere can be no doubt. One would say, in the same sense,
that Socrates is the greatest figure in ancient philosopTiy. Not
that the ideas of Socrates were not very immature compared with
those of Plato and Aristotle, but that Socrates alone gives the
immense impulse and the true direction, and the method which
Plato and Aristotle elaborate and make fruitful. So Aristotle
comes after Plato in greatness if we regard this matter of original
discovery of ideas — but Aristotle towers much higher in the per-
spective of time as we look back down the ages of human thought.
All scientific thinking in our Christian civilization is Aristotelian,
and Aristotle is '* The father of all those who know," as Dante
says in his "Inferno."

So it is with Kant. We should not find in him the world-his-
torical personage that we do if he had not been the impulse to
raise up widely differing schools of thought, and carry philosophy
far above and beyond the limits of the sj'stem which he presented
to us in person. Socrates, according to the trustworthy portrait-
ure of Xenophon, only practised dialectic, and sought to bring to
consciousness the wide distinction between universal and particu-
lar coo-nitions and show the substantialitv of what is universal.
His endeavor was for the most part negative — a breaking down of
the conceited wisdom of the Athenian professors. Plato made
this arrival at general ideas something positive — an arrival at the
eternal forms of created things — a reaching of the Divine.

Aristotle seized the standpoint which Plato reached in a few of
his writings as his highest thought — that of the creative Intellect
and Will — the identity of the Good and the Pure Thought, and
with it, as his principle, consistently explained the worlds of Nature
and Man as they presented themselves in the fourth century before
our era to the Greek consciousness. Kant's significance in the
world arises from the discoveries which he made in the realm of
XV— 16

242 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

Psychology, especially as regards the antithesis of Subject and
Object in consciousness and their mutual limitations and interpen-
etrations. The importance of this investigation on the part of
Kant depends upon the fact that modern consciousness is a move-
ment, as a whole, towards inwardness and subjectivity, and, accord-
ingly, modern philosophy is bound first of all to ask itself: " What
is the criterion of certitude?" The Greek asked: "What is
Truth ? " If he could lind tho abiding, it was sufKcient. Thales,
for example, set np the principle that water or moisture is the fun-
damental abiding whence all originates and whither all goes. An-
axagoras set up Nov? — Reason — or the principle of the universal
— as this abiding somewhat. The psychology of Plato and Aris-
totle is a sort of objective affair, treating the mind like the world,
and finding within it what is transitory and fleeting and what is
abiding. Aristotle discovers that the eternal substance of mind,
its true form, is Nov<i TIoii^rLKO'i — Self-active Reason.

Aristotle and Plato both classify correctly the various powers or
faculties of the soul, and leave us correct statements of the scope
of those faculties. Sense-perception, opinion, discursive reasoning,
theoretical insight by aid of pure ideas — the " Seeing by totali-
ties " (as Plato calls it) — these are expounded and their limits de-
fined.

Aristotle's great distinction of the phases of life or soyl into
vegetative, feeling and rational, is the solid basis of all that has
been thought on the subject.

But the problem of certitude could not be a problem to the
ancient mind, though ancient philosophy gave the impulse that
developed into this subjectivity in consciousness which now needs
to enquire for the criterion of certainty. The Christian religion
moves the soul in the same direction towards the learning to know
the constitution of the soul as subject.

This subjective tendency of thought, which is the characteristic
of modern times, leads to a peculiar species of scepticism — a scep-
ticism based on a partial insight into method. Method is the form
of activity. The modern tendency seeks to know the form of the
mind's activity — all faculties of mind exist only as active. Hence
the problem of certitude arises only when the mind is directed
upon its own method or form of activity. If the insight into
method is partial it cannot be sure of the results of mental activ-

Kant and Hegel in the History of Philosophy. 243

ity. All wrong views of method lead to wrong philosophical
views.

Not to dwell upon this position, but assuming it as granted, let
us define the position of the work of Imnnanuel Kant as the Co-
lumbus in the voyage of discovery into the realm of method, using
" method," in the largest sense of the term, as the form of all men-
tal activity — the will, the intellect, and the heart, or emotional
nature. Understanding the importance of method, and the fact
that any glimpse into the forms of activity will give a basis of
scepticism that no amount of objective philosophizing can remove,
we see at once the significance of that philosophy which will ex-
plore method in its entire extent — map out the provinces of all
mental activity. The Critique of Pure Reason attempts this work
as regards the intellectual faculties, and accomplishes a vast result.
The Critique of Practical Peason defines the forms of the Will,
and the Critique of Judgment one of the functions of the emo-
tional nature.

This insight into method, which is the want and necessity of
the modern mind, is the object which Kant successfully pursues.
It relates essentially to the antithesis already named — the subjec-
tive and objective — what pertains to the ego and constitutes its
forms, and what pertains to the object as object. It regards all
cognition as composed of two factors, and it investigates and de-
fines them. The ancient thinking also had two factors to investi-
gate in cognition, but it did not regard the one as subjective and
the other objective. It defined one factor as the universal and
the other as the particular; hence arose the structure of formal
logic of Aristotle as the chief contribution on the part of ancient
philosophy to the world's science.

All modern philosophy has sought to bring together in some
way these two antitheses — (Su))jective versus Objective, and Par-
ticular versus Universal) — and show their relation. The move-
ment of modern philosophy developed negative results at first.
The distinction of subjective versus objective seemed to destroy
that of particular versus universal, and to reduce the universal to
an arbitrary aggregate, or to a mere flatus vocis. The war be-
tween Pealism and Nominalism has this great meaning in the
history of philosophy and in Christian Theology — it is the first
attempt to assert subjective versus objective against the Greek par-

244 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

ticular versus universal which tradition had brought down to the
Middle Ai^es as the heirloom of speculative scioice. This accounts
also for the great place which Aristotle's I)e Anima held in the
controversy. The great Arabian commentators taught that the
human mind is essentially iVoO? na6ijTiK6<;^ and hence not immor-
tal,.as individual human soul of John or James. That which dif-
ferentiates— that which belongs to the particular— is ])erishable ;
the species lives, but the individual dies. Aristotle had shown
how an individual may become an entelechy — that is to say, how
a particular may unite witliin itself the attributes of the universal
as a totality. Change and perishability happen because the par-
ticular is not adequate to the universal — the universal has many
particular attributes or phases, while the special individual real-
izes only one, or at best some, of those phases. The process of
the universal — and all true universals are active processes — annuls
some of the particulars and realizes others; this changes the in-
dividuality, and it perishes or becomes another. Aristotle's entel-
echy is an individual that has realized within itself all of the po-
tentialities, or phases, of the universal, and hence it possesses self-
identity ; its change does not change it ; its activity is only the con-
tinuance of its function — a circular movement — what Hegel calls
" a return into itself." The " lirst entelechy " possesses this im-
mortal individuality, and yet has not realized the universal within
itself by self-development. The acorn possesses individuality —
the universality or species of the oak is in it, but only potentially.
When the acorn grows, it realizes all the phases of the oak that
were potential in the acorn and becomes a ^^ second entelechy" or
species realized in the individual, so far as this can take ])lace in
the vegetable realm, or, as Aristotle calls it, in the " Nutritive
Soul." Such ascent from " iirst entelechy " to " second entele-
chy " is not as a fact possible except to the human soul, although
the vegetable and animal souls manifest ?k semblance of it — a mere
appearance of it in a sort of mimetic spectacle — the dramatic play
simulating the ascent of the individual into the species — which is,
however, only a play, and does not constitute an immortal indi-
vidual as in the case of man. The great scholastic "fathers,"
commencing with Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, gained
this insight of Aristotle, and were able to defend Christianity
against the Moslem pantheism which denied true universality to

Kant and Hegel in the History of Philosophy. 245

linman personality, or, in other words, denied that man as a sub-
jective being could be essentially universal, and hence an immor-
tal individual. The distinction of subject versus object had ap-
peared only in the obscure form of nominalism at that early peri-
od. With tlie close of that period of the history of thought nom-
inalism seems to have gained the ascendancy, and "William of
Occam marks its triumph. He also marks the utter eclipse of the
great insight of Aristotle in theology, and a divorce of faith and
reason.

It is one of the most mysterious phases in the history of Philos-
ophy, this triumph of nominalism at the close of a most wonderful
and most triumphant career of profound thinking — realistic think-
ing. Christian theology had been almost completed. Yery little
has been added, or is likely to be added, to the wonderful system
left us b}^ Thomas Aquinas — familiar to more people through
Dante's Divina Cominedia than through St. Thomas's Summa.
The mystery clears up when we consider the momentous impor-
tance of seizing in its entire compass this antithesis of subjective
verstis objective, in philosophy. We discern the providential pur-
pose in what seems to us at iirst dark and inscrutable. Christian-
ity, alone among world-religions, makes the individual man worthy
of immortal life in a continued human existence of growth in in-
tellect, will, and love. For Christianity holds that God himself
is Divine-Human. Hence the human being need not lose his
humanity in approaching the absolute, or when he is placed
"undsr the form of eternity " — Suh specie eternitatis — as Spinoza
describes it.

If the human form is divine — the human mind being the image
of the divine mind — it follows that to know the nature of the mind
is to know in some sense the nature of God. In the two worlds —
the world of man and the world of nature — we may find a revela-
tion of God. In man — in our minds — we may find the adequate
revelation in each individual — but not in each individual of na-
ture ; there it is found only in species and genera. The Christian
doctrine of the infinite importance of each human soul and of the
transcendence of the soul over all merely natural existences,
through the fact of its immortal destiny, generates the impulse
towards subjectivity as already asserted. It sets human conscious-
ness over ao:ainst nature : I am above and beyond nature — a soul

246 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

belonging to the supernatural order of existences. This leads to
the perpetual recurrence of the antithesis of subjective versus ob-
jective, and by and by to the unfolding of all its negative phases,
Nominalism, or the denial o^ the existence of universals, is the
complete sum of all that is negative and sceptical in philosophy.
It makes all that possesses abiding in the form of genera and spe-
cies a product of the subjective synthesis of thought — a classifica-
tion only for convenience. The reality consists of isolated indi-
viduals, each valid over against the other. The result of this i&
atomism, and the principle that " composition does not affect the
parts or atoms of which things are composed." AVhen once
reached it is impossible to explain anything by atomism without
inducting a principle from the outside, a directing, arranging,
combining intelligence which produces all that we find in the two
worlds of nature and man. The atoms become pure simples —
without properties in their isolation — and thus everything is trans-
ferred to the other factor in the world — to the ordering intelli-
gence. Then the atoms become an empty fiction, utterly useless.

The only thing positive about nominalism is its attribution of
all universality — of all abiding and substantial being to the sub-
jective mind. It implies a great deal, but does not itself become
aware of this wonderful endowment which it claims for the sub-
jective mind.

It is wonderful to see how the most negative phases, the scep-
ticisms, the heretical doctrines, the most revolutionary phases in
history, all proceed from the same great principle of thought as
the most positive and conservative doctrines, and that all of these
negative things are destructive only in their undeveloped state
and when partially seized. By and by they are di-awn within the
great positive movement, and we see how useful they are become.
Through these negative and sceptical tendencies, arising from this
great antithetic object of thought, the subjective versus the objec-
tive, we ascend into a knowledge of self-determining activity as it
is in Mind, and this knowledge is far in advance of the old objec-
tive view of mind such as the world has inherited it trom the
Greeks. It is a proximate insight into the nature of the divine
creative process itself. We ascend through a philosophic mastery
of the relation between the modern and ancient antitheses — sub-
ject versus object and universal versus particular — to the plane

Kant and Hegel in the History of Philosophy, 247

that is above all scepticism. Scepticism is directed only against
method — this is its essential nature. With the sceptics of old, as
Hegel points out, the doubt was objective, and touched the method
(or transition) between the particular objects of sense and the uni-
versals cognized by reason. Modern scepticism touches the meth-
od (or transition) between subjectivity and objectivity. The an-
cient sceptic doubted or despaired of the truth of the objects of
sense-perception. It seemed that they wore out and perished in
the course of their process. They were all in a flux, becoming
each moment something else, presenting new phases of their uni-
versals (or their total processes). Modern sceptics doubt the
truth of the objects of reason — the universals — species and gen-
era— and are unwilling to accord real being to aught but the ob-
jects of sense-perception — to the very objects which ancient scep-
ticism doubted. A strange inversion of standpoints within the
history of scepticism !

But the cause of this is the turning of the mind in upon itself
for the truth — a partial movement in this direction producing
doctrines in which there is utter disharmony between the two an-
titheses, respectively the objects of ancient and modern thought.
It is a movement that justifies and will justify the doctrine of a
Providence in History — a true Theodicy.

Up to the time of David Hume the outlook might have been
dubious enough to the realistic thinker. Nominalism had begun '
to see the ultimate consequences of its subjective point of view.
There is no causality in the world, so far as we know — onl3' se-
quence in time. " All our knowledge consists of impressions of
the senses, and the faint images of these impressions called up in
memory and in thinking." Even the Ego is only a subjective no-
tion— a unity of the series of impressions called "myself." This
is the subjectivity q/" subjectivity.

This is the point in the development of modern philosophy at
whicli Kant rises and olfers his more complete sketch of our sub-
jective nature as an explanation of the world of man, and the
world in Time and Space.

His sketch of the nature of mind has become familiar to all
persons who make a pretence of cultivating philosophy.

The Subjectivity of man, as Will, Emotion, or Intellect, has na-
tive forms of its own — forms not derived from experience or from

248 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

anvthing external. These forms make up the constitution of the
mind itself. If we wish to know the truth we must be aware of
the subjective factor in knowledge and make due allowance for
it. Things-in-themselves are moditied (in our cognition of them)
through the constitution of the mental faculties that know them.
What we actually know of things-in-themselves will be ascertained
only after we eliminate from our cognitions the subjective element
due to our mental forms.

All this was so simple and in accordance with the spirit of the
subjective scepticism of the pre-Kantian period that it would have
recommended itself at once as the best of good sense.

But who can paint the amazement of subjective scepticism when
it first begins to comprehend the Critique of Pure Reason! It
looks over the inventory of the possessions of our Subjectivity —
" the forms of our mind " — and sees

Time, Space, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Modality, God,
Freedom, Immortality, the Beautiful, the Just, and the True I
It takes away one's breath to see such things written down in the
inventory of what is our subjective constitution. How rich we
are!! "Ah, but all these are only subjective." " They do not
apply to any object in itself, whatever ; not even to the Ego-in-
itself." " You cannot think your Ego as an object-in-itself because
you cannot think it except in these categories. These categories
apply to objects thought, but not to the subject thinking, as a
thing-in-itself."

Well, we reply, what of that? What is the net result when we
take all this into account ?

To take this into account it was necessary to recall the great
insight of Aristotle, and review ancient philosophy in the light of
this Kantian discovery of the nature of subjectivity. After Soc-
rates, came first Plato and then Aristotle ; the third philosopher
could use the philosophical insight which the first and second had
jointly discovered and elaborated. So it was this time. Fichte
and Schelling developed respectively the practical and esthetic
phases of Kantianism, Fichte unfolding those subtle phases of
mental activity by which the mind determines itself as universal
categories or forms of thought — Time, Space, Causality, and Sub-
stantiality— the fourfold form of reflection superinduced upon
mere feeling or sensation. Schelling devoted his attention to the

Ka7it and Hegel in the History of PJdlosophy . 249

explanation of the world as a phenomenon of which the constitu-
tion of our mind is the noumenon. Here the pure Kantian move-
ment begins to impinge upon the ancient view of the world — the
classic world of Art and Philosophy. In the school of Schelling,
Hegel first appeared. He is the first one of the post-Kantians to
take up the Aristotelian philosophy and perceive its profound
truth. He is the first one to draw parallels from the psychologi-
cal, subjective basis of Kantianism to the vast objective, world-
comprehending system of Aristotle. It is Hegel's advice that has
been followed in Germany, now that in each university of that
country there are from one to five courses on Aristotle's philoso-
phy given each semester! Even the attacks against Hegelianism
which have arisen in Germany came chiefly from the Aristotelian
studies inaugurated by Hegel, and not a single new insight or
great idea in Aristotle has been added by any one of Hegel's
Aristotelian opponents to the list of those ideas and insights in-
ventoried by Hegel himself in his History of Philosophy ! Even
Trendelenburg, who blamed Hegel for using Bewegung — (which
we may in English translate by the word "activity") — in his
logical treatment of the categories of " Pure thought," and accused
him of borrowing the idea from experience, and yet tried to estab-
lish Bewegung as a category of pure thought in his own system,
has no acknowledgment to make for assistance obtained through
Hegel's explanation of Aristotle, and often, indeed, fails himself
to see Aristotle's deep thoughts where they have been fully ex-
pounded !

Hegel's significance in the history of philosophy consists in the
fact that he mastered the Greek philosophy, and did not, at the
same time, recede from the Kantian.

Hegel ascends to a standpoint wherein are united the two an-
titheses which lead, respectively, the ancient and the modern
worlds of thought — the antithesis of subjective versus objective,
and the other antithesis of the universal versus particular. Hegel
does not reconcile the two antitheses by omission or suppression;
he finds that Kant maintains a subjective result simply through
an inconsistent application of his own principles, by which he sur-
reptitiously made objective use of his categories, while claiming
for them subjective application exclusively. If made consistent
throughout, and the Fichtean discovery of the deduction of the

250 Tlie Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

categories superadded, the Kantian system falls into perfect har-
mony with the system of ancient thought, and philosophy be-
comes doubly iirni on its twofold foundation of psychology and
ontology.

The insight into Aristotle's thought of the unity of all ])oten-
tialities in the true actuality, the thought of the entelechies,
makes for Hegel the great luminous principle to which he always
returns for light to explain all problems. With it he newly
defines the thought of Begriff (German word for what the Eng-
lish call the "Notion," and we Americans "the logical concept,"
or simply " the concept") as the total of form of a thing or being.
The " Begriff" is the complex of the entire round of potentialities,
and signifies much the same as Aristotle's to tI ^)v elvai.. Having
the Begriff 9A signifying the Totality of Form, he finds the high-
est category to be the self-determining Reason, which he calls
Idea (German Idee). Here is Aristotle's v67jcn<i vor]a€co<;. as He-
gel himself tells us.

In other wor-ds, Hegel has discovered that Kant's Subjective
constitution of the Mind is only hypothetically Subjective. In
reality it is subjective, and objective too. For considering the
wonderful character possessed by those categories which Kant
inventories as the forms of the mind, it is almost impossible to
regard Kant's claim of pure subjectivity for them as other than a
deep piece of irony. As if he had said :

"Scepticism is right. We can never get at the Truth and
know things as they really are — things-in-themselves.

" We can know only what is radically modified through our
own subjective spectra; but look and behold what these subjec-
tive forms are, and learn to subtract them and find the remainder,
which is the true Thing-in-itself.

" In the first place there are Time and Space : these are the forms
of the Sensory, and are purely subjective. It is true that they are
the logical conditions of the existence of what we call the World
of Nature. They are more objective than the world of nature is,
because they are its logical condition. That is the way we know
Time and Space to be Subjective, and to belong to our raind
only.

" This makes the science of mathematics possible. The world
in-time-and-space, it seems, then, is subjective because the very

Kant and Hegel in the History of Hhilosophy. 251

logical condition of it is subjective. True, we have called it 'ob-
jective,' and have been satisfied if our subjectivity attained valid-
ity throughout all time and space. Nevertheless, if we are to
make serious business of inventorying our subjective ]iossessions,
we must begin with writing down Time and Space at the head of
the list.

"True enough, things - in - themselves, deprived of time and
space, will never trouble ns nor anybody else — for, jou see, they
cannot have extension nor change. Yes, it is worse ofi' for them
than that. They cannot have unity, nor plurality, nor totality,
hence they cannot be spoken of as 'they' — it is a courtes}' on
our part to lend them our subjective category of ' plurality ' to
which they are not entitled. Nor can the thing in itself (singular
or plural) have quality or existence for anything else — nor rela-
tion, nor mode of being either as possibility or necessity, or even
as Existence. The ' thino;-in-itself ' cannot exist without borrow-
ing one of our subjective categories (found under ' modality'). As
for the objective, then, which is opposed to our subjectivity and
unknowable by us, it cannot be found in the world of nature or
in the world of man. It is a pure figment of the imagination, and
cannot exist in any possible world without becoming ' subjective '
at once."

In fact, Kant's subjective has taken up within it the entire an-
tithesis of subjective and objective as understood by scepticism,
and has become purely universal through the fact that its forms
are universals. Such a subjective mind is Aristotle's i/oT/crt? vot^-
(766)9 and a Self-Knowing Being. Whether Kant intended it or
not, his remarks on things-in-themselves and on the limits of our
knowledge make no sense unless they are taken as ironical.

Hegel has treated again and again the system of Kant in the
course of his works, praising its wonderful features and criticising
its inconsistencies and its mechanical presumptions. In his his-
tory of Philosophy he does justice to the significance of the system
in relation to preceding ones. In his large logic he discusses in
appropriate places (a) Kant's idea of the construction of matter
out of Attraction and Repulsion ; (b) Kant's theory of Time, Space,
and Matter as regards divisibility or indivisibility ; (c) The applica-
tion of degree, or intensive quantity to the soul ; (d) The so-called
"Synthetic judgments a priori ; " (e) The limitation of the world

252 Tlie Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

in space; (f) Kant's " Thing-in-itself " ; (g) Infinite divisibility or
atomic nature of matter ; (h) Tiie beginning of the world in Time ;
(i) The paralogism involved in the proof of the nature of the soul.
In his philosophy of Religion he discusses in full the Kantian refu-
tation of St. Anselm's famous proof of the Existence of a God.
Hegel's thought of the "Begriff" as the totality of ])otentialities,
and of the Idee^ as the absolute Totality, enables him to rescue St.
Anselm's proof from the Kantian objections (which are not nnlike
the objections brought up bj Gaunilo in the lifetime of St. An-
selm himself).

For convenience, as it seems, Ilegel has brought together his
chief criticisms on Kant in the " Second Attitude of Thought to-
wards the Objective World," contained in his Introduction to his
Logic in the Micyclopwdia, and so admirably rendered into ver-
nacular English by Mr. Wallace.

The limits of my paper prevent me from quoting largely from
Hegel's own writings, and from attempting to expound some of
his more subtle polemics.

I must refer to one more thought of Hegel — and it is also a
thought of Aristotle : it is that universality is always self-particu-
larizincr, for it is self-determination, lie always condemns the
indefinite, indeterminate Absolute as empty. Hence his thought
does full justice to European, Christian philosophy as against
all orientalism and pantheism.

With a general reference to the full details of Hegel's critique
of Kant, found in Wallace's translation above referred to, I must
close this paper without attempting more than this statement of
Kant's Significance in the struggle between ancient and modern
thought, and of Hegel's position as the one who harmonizes Greek
and German thought.

Kanfs Transcendental Deduction of Categories. 253

KANT'S TEANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF CATE-

GOEIES.

READ AT THE CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, AUGUST 5, 1881, BY GEORGE S. MOREIS.

The "transcendental exposition" of space and time, in the
"Esthetic " of Kant, consists in showing how, on the supposition
— and only on the supposition — that time and space were of the
nature indicated in his " metaphysical exposition," pure mathe-
matical science, with its universal and necessary propositions, was
possible; and so answer w'as given to the lirst general inquiry
raised by the Critique.

The " transcendental deduction " of the categories consists, in
like manner, in showing that on the supposition — and only on the
supposition — that the categories are a lyriori^ or universal and
necessary, synthetic conceptions of the understanding, knowledge
through sensible experience, or pure physical science, which is
nothing but "determinate knowledge of phenomena in time and
space," is possible; and so the second question of the Critique is
answered.

The question of fact has been settled. The categories, as pure
conceptions of the understanding which " borrow nothing from
experience," have been demonstrated to exist as elements which
enter, with form-determining influence, into the whole structure
of our experimental knowledge. There remains only the question
of right. By what right does the non-experimental mix with the
experimental and constrain the latter to obey its laws? And the
answer is, that on no other conceivable condition than this can
the "experimental" be in any way known, or, which amounts to
the same thing, possess reality for us. The result is that the
psychological empiricist's conception of experience and of ex-
perimental knowledge has to be radically revised and extended.

First we had to ask. What is that, common to all sensible con-
sciousness, and consequently to all "objects" revealed in sensi-
ble consciousness, by virtue and on account of which both it
and they are all alike called sensible? And the answer was,
Sensible consciousness and sensible objects are such by virtue of

'254 The Journal of Speculative Phllofiophy.

their all wearing, necessarily and Tinivcrsally, a garment woven
lor them by mind out of relations of space and time, themselves
its own creation.

But does sensible consciousness hnov: itself and its objects sim-
]>ly in virtue of this ideal garment that it wears? No; for we
have been seeing that what is called sensible consciousness is but
the receptive condition of knowledge, and not knowdedgo or intel-
ligence itself. Strictly speaking, sensible consciousness is an ab-
straction and a misnomer. Pure sensible consciousness is the
same as no consciousness. It is not sense^ but self\ or mind, or
^' understanding," that is conscious or knows in and by means of
•what is called sensible consciousness. This is what has been in-
cipiently, yet distinctly enough, implied in the result of the analy-
sis of space and time. These are not "ideas" received by us
through sensation, but forms of perception, due to the productive
activity of the imagination, which, as Kant perceives and declares,
is a manifestation of one and the same spontaneous, mental, self-
activity, which manifests itself otherwise in the functions of the
understanding. But imagination and all its works are, as we have
seen, blind, and for us as good as naught, until distinguished by
the understanding. It is the understanding, then, which makes
sensible consciousness and sensible ol>jects real for us, and under-
standing, as we are about to see, is nothing apart from the unity
and identity of ^e^Z-consciousness. There is no real consciousness,
accordingly, which is not self-consciousness, and no real " experi-
ence" which is not self-experience. If, then, we now ask, What
is that, common to all sensible or experimental knowledge, by vir-
tue and on account of which alone it is really knowledge for us?
the answer is that, since all such knowledge must take the form
of distinct ideas or conceptions, and since no conceptions are pos-
sible except in agreement with those master-forms, the " catego-
ries," which determine the nature and form of all our conceptions,
therefore no experimental knowledge, no knowledge of " objects,"
no experience, is possible for us, except, as a predetermining con-
dition, it be clad in the forms of the categories as pure concep-
tions of the understanding or of the self-centred, and self-knowing,
and spontaneously active human mind. Just, therefore, as mind,
working under the guise of imagination, creates in space and time
the fixed form and condition or the only intelligible element ot

Karifs Transcendental Deduction of Categories. 255

■sense, so, working under the guise of understanding or intellect,
it creates the like form and condition, or the truly intelligible ele-
ment in experimental knowledge — the element by virtue of which
it is indeed knowledge. The understanding is thus the " author
of experience" and of its objects, in any sense in which these lat-
ter are intelligible, are real objects for us. It is thus the author
of "nature, regarded as the sum of all phenomena," and prescribes
to it a priori its universal and necessary, if not its particular laws ;
it prescribes to nature the laws to which all its special laws must
conform.

In order, now, fully to understand Kant's " deduction " of these
truths, it is specially necessary to bear in mind just what sensible
consciousness, taken purely by itself, as a series of passive states
or impressions, is, and what are its limitations. The truth in re-
gard to this matter Kant learned through Hume, and we are to
consider Kant as having this constantly in mind as he proceeds
with his deduction. The relevant facts of the case have been
repeatedly alluded to elsewhere. It is enough to repeat here
that the states or impressions — for the whole aggregate of which
sensible consciousness is but the collective name — are, in Hume's
phrase, so many atomically " distinct existences," and that, if
these make up the whole of "mind," knowledge is impossible.
For (1) these impressions or states are passive and can do nothing;
but knowing is an activity ; (2) had they the power to know, each
could know only itself, since each is distinct from and out of " real
connection " with the other ; but (3) one impression — to say noth-
ing of the other absurdities of the supposition — could not even
know itself, for the reason that every original impression is atomic-
ally simple ; it is not only out of relation to all other impressions,
but is void of relation or distinction in itself; and where there is
no distinction there is no knowledge. But now let us suppose that
these impressions are not the whole of mind, but that there is, as
Hume practically assumes, an indefinable mental power, or, better,
sye^ to which impressions — otherwise called " objects " — are simply
presented for observation, and that all that this " eye " does is
languidly and inertly to view the impressions as, with " incon-
ceivable rapidity," they pass before it. This " eye " or " mind "
could still never be aware of more than one impression at a time,
and each impression as it came would immediately vanish, leav-

256 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

ing no trace behind it, and be followed by another quite " dis-
tinct'' from it. Still there would be no knowled2;e — not even a
conscious " picture'' or " image '' of an " object," For to such an
image a simultaneous combination of several simple impressions
is necessary, and to such combination an active loorjc of mind,
called remeiriberlng.^ would be necessary in order to keep the
evanescent impressions from completely vanishing, and so to hold
them together in one mental embrace or view. But to suppose-
such a power and reality of active mind as memory is to add
something to the data of sensible consciousness, and the necessity
of making this addition — which sensational psychology always,
but surreptitiously, makes, and which Hume thus made — is the
first and simplest, and the universal historic, proof that a purely
sensational psychology and a purely sensational theory or ex-
planation of knowledge are absolutely impossible.

A summary name, therefore, for that which sense, or sensuous
consciousness, with its purely receptive nature, does not include,
is combination or " synthesis." Sense furnishes a multiplicity of
elements (" impressions ") for the material of knowledge, but these
elements, as they are simply given and received, absolutely lack
that connection, which is, as matter of fact, necessary to render
them really conscious objects of knowledge. This deficiency of
sense is perceived and declared by Kant, who adds that, of all our
ideas, the idea of combination, union, or synthesis among the
manifold elements of our sensible consciousness is the only one
which is not and can never be immediately furnished us by such
consciousness. It " can never come into us through the senses,'^
or be ''given" us through impressions. Combination, relation,
synthesis, is not a mere inert, finished, objective, and observable
"fact," impressed upon us from without through the action of
" objects " upon our " minds," nor is it a " conscious state " in-
duced upon us through the like agency. It is not a " fact ; " it is
an act., a synthetic, or combining, or relationing act, accomplished
by the spontaneous and independent activity of "the knowing
subject itself." A line, for example, is a combination or " synthesis
of manifold elements" or p!:irts, which is not seen by the eye of
the body or by the imaginary eye of sensuous consciousness, but
only by the eye of the mind, which is the understanding. The
line is not seen till it is thought, and "we can not think it with-

Kanfs Transcendental Deduction of Categories. 257

out drawing it in thought." We can — to make this clear — and,
from the fictitious point of view of mere sensuous consciousness,
we must imagine the line as made up of an indefinite number of
points joined to each other. For sense each of these points gives
ofi" its separate impression, and these are received, not simulta-
neonsly, but in succession. Physically speaking, we cannot see
all of the points together ; we can only see one at a time. There
is and can be no physical or sensuous vision of the line. The
physical organ and its function, or, in the case of the ideally per-
fect lines of georaetr}^, space, which is the pure form of external
sense, are only the condition of vision, which is a synthetic act
performed by the intellect, the mind's true eye. The intellect,
namely, or " understanding," attends to the multitudinous impres-
sions in their order, and brings them to a stand, keeps them from
fleeting, fixes them in the field of mental vision, which is memory,
and so holds them together in a true synthesis or union, whereby
the impression oi their multitiidinousness is lost in the clear and
distinct thought of the unity, or one mental object, whicli (for
sense) tliey seem to compose. This thought, as such, is strictly the
product of our thinking, or of the " spontaneity of our under-
standings." The line is no object of thought or knowledge until,
by actively " drawing the line in thought," we really think and
so know it. And the like is true for all sensible objects of knowl-
edge. For in all of them there is involved a like combination or
synthesis of multitudinous parts or "impressions."

But to say that all synthesis in sensible knowle Ige is the work
of the understanding is the same as to say that all distinction in
knowledge and all unity are to be ascribed to the same active and
efiicient source. For synthesis is nothing but viewing that which
is intrinsically, or at least sensibly, manifold as one. So Kant de-
clares that " the conception of combination involves, in addition
to the notion of multitudinous elements and their synthesis, the
notion of their unity. Combination may be abstractly defined as
the idea of the synthetic unity of the manifold."

Let it not now {a) be said or imagined, after the manner of the
uncritical descriptive psychologist, that this idea of complex unity
is not original, but derived and transferred from an idea of simple
unity, which is involved in the idea of a simple impression, and is
conveyed, along with the impression, through the senses into the
' XV— 17

258 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

mind. For we liave seen, abundantly, that there can be no such
conveyance of the single, simple impression itself, and, conse-
quently, of the mathematical in* numerical unity which alone
belongs to it. On the contrary, the simple impression and its
unity are, in the order of our knowledge or conception, late
products of analytic abstraction. All sensible objects of knowl-
edge are synthetic wholes, and it is we who having, by the very
act and process of our knowing, made them such wholes, after-
wards analyze them into imaginary elementary units. Nor, on
the other hand, (5) can the idea of this unity be logically or his-
torically posterior to the idea of combination. On the contrary,
as Kant declares, it is the very superinduction of this idea upon
the multitudinous elements to be combined which first makes
combination possible; so that the idea of unity is logically prior
to, or the condition of, the idea of combination. And, finally, (c)
the unity in question is not identical with the mathematical
"unity" mentioned in the table of categories. The latter unity
is essentially the same with that contemplated nnder " (ff)." It
results from a " logical function," or process of thought, in which
such combination of ideas is presupposed, as, according to " (Z>),"
must follow and depend on — not precede and condition — the
" qualitative " unity under discussion. The origin of this unity
must be sought, Kant declares, " in a higher region ; namel_y, in
that which itself first renders the understanding, as a judging
faculty, possible, by rendering possible the union of different con-
ceptions in one and the same judgment." The unity in question
must transcend all other unities, and must be at once their uni-
versal condition, and, as such, present and discoverable in them
all.

This unity is none other than the unity of pure self -conscious-
ness. Where there is thinking, " having of ideas," or being con-
scious in any shape, there is a someiohat that thinks, has the ideas,
or is conscious. This somewhat calls itself self a self, one iden-
tical self or person. It was the pronoun of the first person, and
says: "/think, have ideas, or am conscious;" or "All these
thoughts and ideas are mineP Accordingly, Kant declares the
condition of all thought and real or completed consciousness to be
this: that it be either explicitly and actually accompanied by the
reflection expressed in the phrase " I am thinking," or that it be

Kanfs Transcendental Deduction of Categories. 259

possible for tliis reflection so to accompany it, I need not, of
course, stop to reflect that all the thoughts, ideas, or " objects of
consciousness," of which I am aware, belong to me ; but unless it
were true that, if I did then reflect, I should find that they were
indeed thus all mine., fhey would have no existence for me; and,
not existing for me, they would not exist at all. The one com-
mon aspect, then, that belongs so essentially to all thoughts or
ideas, that without it there would be no thoughts or ideas at all,
is this: that they all belong to a me — to a me whose nature is to
be always one and the same, or identical. So that I may say that
the " common expression " for " all my ideas " is, that ''Z am
thinking." The consciousness thus expressed is pure self-con-
sciousness. The unity involved in it maybe termed the "tran-
scendental unitv of self-consciousness," inasmuch as it conditions,
and so explains, as we shall see, the possibility of certain forms of
knowledge a yriori.

The unity of pure self-consciousness, it is seen, is present in and
comprehends all other consciousness. It is the true and original
unity, without which no other unity in knowledge is possible.
It is the synthetic or comprehensive unity in which all other
syntheses are strictly included, and on which they depend. What-
ever may be necessary to this unity, or intrinsically involved in it,
will bear a like relation to all our knowledge whatsoever.

Pure self-consciousness is distinguished from all other conscious-
ness. The "I" who thinks, regards all his thoughts as belonging
to him, but not identical with him ; as being his possessions, but
not himself. The expression "I" denotes nothing which is
sensibly perceived, no conscious image like that of a tree, for
example. It is not definable or describable in terms of sensible
consciousness. The idea is not received., and no object corre-
sponding to it is presented. It can, therefore, originate only in
tlie pure "spontaneity " of mind. It denotes a pure, ideal, strictly
continuous, self-originating and self-illuminating act or activity,
and no "substance" — in which latter case it would have to be
sensibly perceived, presented in the fornjs of space and time, and
exist before it was perceived. And the context shows that it is a
synthetic activity, since it draws within its embrace all otiier
activities and holds them together in an organic whole.

On the other hand, and from another point of view, self-con-

260 The Joxirnal of Speculative I^h'dosophy.

seiousness is identical with all consciousness. Whatever may be
our tiiouo-hts or ideas, whatever our consciousness and its "ob-
jects," the consciousness of "the identical self" is in them all, and
they arc all in it. It permeates all other consciousness, and, by
makino- the latter its own, at the same time makes it to be real
consciousness. Thus pure self-consciousness (^ives itself a content
which it makes practically identical with itself, while it remains
master of the content, and so ideallv distino-uishable from it. In
short, consciousness in general, and self-consciousness in particular,
reveal themselves as organically one, separable only through ab-
straction, bound np in a living, actively synthetic and complex
unity, of which the determining element or original unity is that
universal " act of spontaneity " expressed in the phrase, " I am
thinking." Thus we see that, at least in some sense, all con-
sciousness is necessarily, or contains, self-consciousness, and the
former cannot be conceived, even in abstraction, except as sub-
ject to the forms which the latter imposes.

All combination of ideas or of their elements in unities, in
wholes, or in " objects," is, then, a work of the understanding,
and is consequently a priori^ or primarily, independent of the
elements combined; and the understandino- "is itself nothino; but
the faculty of thus combining," The original and master com-
bination on which all other combination depends is the union of
all consciousness in the synthetic embrace, or " under the synthetic
unity" of self-consciousness. "Thus the synthetic unity of self-
consciousness is the highest point of all, on which all use of the
understanding, even all logic, and, after it, all transcendental phi-
losophy, must depend ; nay, the faculty of such unity is the under-
standing itself." And the " highest principle in all human
knowledge" (Kant means here especially sensible knowledge) is,
that the manifold elements presented in sensible consciousness
must, in order to become elements of a real consciousness, be in
relation to " the original synthetic unity of self-consciousness," and
conformed to the conditions of the latter.

Now let us look, by way of recapitulation, at the ground as it
lies at present before us. The deficiency of sensible consciousness
consisted in the utter unrelation and absence of union among its-
elements. Owing to this dehciency, sensible consciousness could
not furnish, since, as such, it did not contain, any ideas of things

Kanfs Transcendental Deduction of Categories. 261

or objects; for such ideas always consist of a definite and orderly
combination of elements. Still less conld it furnish or account
for our ideas of relations among different ideas of objects, such as
causation, interaction, etc. Yet we have such ideas, of both kinds,
or, what amounts to the same thino;, we are aware of what we call
objects as existing, and of fixed and even necessary relations as
subsisting among them. Or, in other words, combination, botli
among the elements of our ideas and among our ideas themselves,
is a fact, and this combination exists in determinate forms, with-
out which it would be indefinable and unrecognizable. Now we
have found an explaining source of apparent combination in the
peculiar activity of the understanding, which is nothing but a
;i3ure, combining activity, effectuating a reduction of the cha-
otically multitudinous (viz., elementary sensuous "impressions")
under the synthetic unity of orderly wholes (ideas of objects and
their relations) ; and, further, as a -work absolutely essential to the
completeness and effectiveness of the foregoing, bringing all these
wholes under the all-comprehending unity of one identical self-
consciousness which permeates and dominates them all. So essen-
tial, indeed, and so fundamental has this latter work appeared,
that we have been enabled to recognize in it the characteristic
nature, nay, the very essence, of the understanding itself, and to
perceive that, instead of the grand synthesis of self-consciousness
being simply incidentally necessary to all other syntheses, all
other syntheses were the rather but necessary and incidental parts
of the synthesis of self-consciousness, and must accordingly adapt
themselves to its requirements.

On what condition, then, is sensible experience, and the knowl-
edge thus derived, of what we call nature possible? Or, on what
condition is " pure physical science " possible ? The condition is
obviously an important one, and has been plainly indicated in
the foregoing. It is that our consciousness of nature be, at least
in form, strictly a consciousness of self —a s<3^/'- consciousness — or
necessarily involved in and determined by that combining activity
of the understanding, whose highest and original and essential and
universal potency is manifested in the realization of self-conscious-
ness. Would we know an object, it is not enough that we simply
feel or have the impressions it produces. Indeed, simply to feel
them is impossible. In order to know the object we must also

262 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

think it. But to tliink it is simply to combine the elements suited
to compose it in the synthetic, conscious unity of an idea, and to
do this implies the combination of this idea, with various others
of similar nature, in the grander unity of one unbroken and unin-
terrupted consciousness, which latter, again, is impossible, except
it be brought under the one central and all-pervading- light and
activity of self-consciousness. The activity by which an object is
thought is part and parcel of the activity whereby consciousness
is made and continues one ; and the latter, again, is but part and
parcel of the activity whereby self-consciousness constantly creates
and sustains itself. Objective reality — or that an object should
be real for us, or really enter into our consciousness — depends on
the '' union, in the notion corresponding to it, of the manifold ele-
ments contained in a given perception." This union is effectu-
ated by the understanding, and that only under, within, and by
means of the synthetic unity of self-consciousness. Consequently,
this unity is the determining source of all unity in objects as
known by us, and so of the " objective validity," truth, or reality
of all our ideas of objects. " The transcendental unity of self-
consciousness is that unity through which all the manifold ele-
ments given in a perception are united so as to form the notion of
an object. It is, therefore, to be called objective'''' — or, this unity
is identical with the unity of consciousness, regarded as a con-
sciousness of " objects^

So, then, whatever a natural object definitely is for us — namely,
its distinguishing form and relations — is determined, at least in its
larger and vital lineaments, by the nature of the combining activ-
itv of the understanding, as centrino; in and radiatins; out from
self-consciousness. The very notion of "object" is, a priori., cre-
ated from within and not received from without, and whatever is
essential to the notion of an object, as such, or of objects as exist-
ing in relations of coexistence and sequence, must, in like manner,
be, on the one hand, a priori, and, on the other, enter into and
form the condition of the very possibility of all our experimental
knowledge, however otherwise determined. The " categories "
express whatever is thus essential.

Our ideas of natural objects are considered witii reference ta
their matter and not to their form, sensuous perceptions, contain-
ing multitudinous elemental impressions of phenomena in space

KanCs Transcendental Deduction of Categories. 263

and time. When the understanding combines them, it exercises
what, logically described, is an act or function of judgment.
Through this act it puts that perception in one of those determin-
ate but universally synthetic forms which it must have in order
to become a part of real consciousness. These forms are, as we
have already seen, nothing but forms of syntheses, or combina-
tions and relations, in space and time, wrought by the imag-
ination under the determining influence of the understanding.
They are essential to the respective forms of logical judgments, in
which they are employed, determining their characteristic nature
and alone rendering them possible. They are called categories,
or pure and primary conceptions of the understanding. So, then,
the elements of perception can be combined only by the under-
standing; the understanding can combine only by judging ; and
it can judge only through the use and application of the catego-
ries. Consequently, " all sensuous perceptions are subject to the
categories, as conditions, under which alone their diverse elements
can be united and enter into any consciousness whatever."

The " transcendental deduction " is now completed. It is
shown that, and how, sensible experience, or the foundation of
pure physical science, which is the determinate knowledge ot
phenomena in space and time, is impossible except through the
categories as pure a priori conceptions of the understanding ; and
it is shown that, and how, these conceptions all depend on " the
original synthetic unity of self -consciousness, which is the form
that the understanding assumes in relation to space or time, as
original forms of sensible consciousness." If we would know a
sensible or physical object, it must fii'st be clad in that form of
thought which thought supplies, and without which it cannot
enter into the presence-chamber of thought or be known. In other
words, it must take the form of a substance. Onlv as a substance
can it be conceived, and, on the other hand, it is only in conse-
quence of our conceiving it, or operating upon it with the syn-
thetic activity of the understanding, that it appears to us as a sub-
stance. We do not perceive substances: we only conceive them ;
the notion of substance is not introduced into our minds through
the senses. But it is a necessary and universal notion for sensible
knowledge, or physical science, and that because it is, in the way
indicated in the transcendental deduction, a priori and an essen-

2t>4 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

tial form of the activity of the understanding; in creating sensible
or " natural'' objects of knowledge out of the confused elements
of sensuous consciousness.

\\\ like manner, the notion of a causal relation as existing be-
tween successive phenomena, or between successive aspects of the
same phenomenon, is the result, not of our perception, but of our
conception. Hume is right in saying that we never '''■perceive''''
any necessary, nor any other real, connection between phenomena
or " objects." We do not, and cannot, as has been pointed out,
even perceive the phenomena themselves, unless we also conceive
them. And so the " causal connection " which we recognize be-
tween them is but a form which they must necessarily assume in
our conception and consequent knowledge of them. This relation
of cause and effect, which is but a relation of necessary and
irreversible order in time, is necessarily conceived by us as uni-
versal, because the category of causation is one of those a 2)riori
mind-determined forms of our conception of sensible objects
which the latter must adopt in order to be known at all. And
the demonstration of the necessity and universality of this relation
among phenomena is only tantamount to a demonstration from a
particular ]>oint of view, that no knowledge of a universe of sen-
sible objects in time is possible unless the relation among these
objects be one of necessary and fixed " law " or order.

Thus it is that, in Kant's language, it is our general conceptions
of objects which render objects, as such, possible for us, and not
objects which i-ender these conceptions possil^le. And thus, too,
it is we who, incapable, through sensuous consciousness — the only
wav in which "^Nature " affects us or communicates herself to us
— of reaching Kature herself and deciphering any laws which may
belong to Nature as a complex of " things-in-themselves," " ])re-
scribe laws to Nature a pi'iori^'' compelling her, in our knowledge
of her, to conform herself to them, and not allowing her to dictate
them to us. Indeed, the notion of Nature itself is a priori ', it is
our notion, our creation ; and the categories which determine the
form of the universal laws of Nature are but the constituent ele-
ments of this mind-created notion itself.

Should this result still seem incredible and enigmatic to the
reader, Kant replies by reminding him anew of that common-
place of sensational psychology which the transcendental aesthetic

Kanfs Transcendental Deduction of Categories. 265

las reaffirmed, viz., that all our knowledge of sensible nature is,
after all, only a knowledge, not of things in themselves, but of
things as they appear in our ideas of them — i. e.^ of phenomena.
It is no more difficult, he declares, to understand how the laws of
phenomena (thus understood) in nature should agree with the a
priori combinatory forms of the understanding, than how phenom-
ena themselves should agree with the «^r«oW forms of sensible
perception. "Laws do not exist in phenomena; they only exist
relatively to the understanding mind or subject, in which the
phenomena inhere ; just as, also, phenomena themselves have no
independent existence, but exist only relatively to a being endowed
with senses through which he may be affected. If things in them-
selves have laws, these laws no doubt belong to them necessarily
and inherently, and without reference to any understanding that
may know them. But phenomena are only ideas of things, of
which latter it is impossible for us to say what they may be in
themselves. But, as mere ideas, they are subject to no law of com-
bination whatever, except that which the combining faculty pre-
scribes for them." Then follows a very brief recapitulation of the
joints involved in the general argument of this chapter, from
which it results that "all phenomena of wdiat we call ' nature'
are, with respect to their combinations and relations, under the
law of the categories, in which is the original source of necessary
law in nature — if we consider Kature, not in her more particular
and accidental, but in her universal lineaments. . . . Particular
laws, which relate to the contingent, and not to the universal,
qualifications of phenomena can, for this very reason, not be com-
pletely deduced from the laws of the categories, although they
must all be in conformity with the latter. To become informed
respecting them, we must have particular experience of them ; but
as to what experience, as such, or viewed in its essential and uni-
versal character, is, and as to what must be the universal nature
of any object in order that it may be known through experience,
the laws of the categories, and these laws alone, give us a priori
information."

The general result of the " transcendental deduction " is summed
up by Kant as follows :

" We cannot think an object, except through categories ; we
cannot know the object of our thought, except through percep-

266 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

tions, which conform to the categories. Now all our perceptions
are sensuous, and all our knowledge, relating, as it therefore does,
to objects which, on their particular, sensuous side, we do not create,
is empirical. But empirical knowledge is experience. Hence na
a priori knowledge is possible for us, except in relation to objects
of possible, sensible experience."

The operation of our understanding, namely, for the purposes
of real knowledge, is limited to cases in which material of knowl-
edge is independently supplied, in the shape of sensuous impres-
sions subject to the forms of space in time. Our understandings
can only think ; they cannot perceive ; and it is only what we per-
ceive that we objectively or really know. Kant repeatedly sup-
poses the case of an understanding not subject to this condition
— an understanding through whose own independent, purely self-
conscious operation the multitudinous elements of perception
should be created — an understanding which should have but to
think or imagine {vorstellen) in order to have the object of its
thought "exist." Such an understanding, he declares, would per-
ceive ; its possessor would be favored with the power of " intellect-
ual perception." But our understandings can only think. It is
not necessary to discuss, at this point, all that may be implied in
the case here supposed by Kant. It is only necessary to remind
the reader that he has here before him another of those suggestions
of Kant's which were developed at length by the post-Kantian
philosophers.

It is enough if we perceive, as we easily may do, that, much as
Kant has accomplished in the way of demonstrating the nature
and conditions of physical knowledge, his assumption that such
are also the nature and conditions of all real knowledge, or of all
knowledge of reality, is purely dogmatic, and hence a delusion
and a snare, as well as a source of needless confusion.

Notwithstanding that Kant has signally demonstrated that na
sensible consciousness, no consciousness of sensible objects is pos-
sible, unless it be thoroughly permeated, moulded, and sustained
by a self-conscious activity of mind, which creates for it its uni-
versal forms and, through these conditions, all its particular ones;,
and notwithstanding that he has thus shown that the point of view
of mere sensible consciousness, as distinguished and separated from
self-consciousness, is an artificial and really impossible abstraction..

Kant'S Transcendental Deduction of Categories. 26T

and that any assumptions respecting the nature or being of sub-
ject or object, which this exckisive point of view suggests, are nec-
essarily premature, if not absurd ; yet, in commenting on the con-
ditions of all knowledge, he uncritically adopts and proceeds upon
these very assumptions. To sensuous consciousness — as we have
seen elsewhere — unmindful of its organic dependence on and in-
volution in self-consciousness, its true objects appear as something
wholly foreign in nature to itself. It is one thing, they are some-
thing else wholly different from it, though possessing the purely
mechanical, but absolutely miraculous and inscrutable, power of
affecting it or producing impressions upon it. The having of the
impressions is called perceiving the objects, but sensuous conscious-
ness soon becomes aware, on reflection, that, in and through the
impressions, it perceives, not the alleged foreign objects, but simply
the impressions themselves. So it is compelled to give up all pre-
tence of knowing the objects, though still clinging to the inde-
monstrable assertion that they nevertheless exist " in themselves,"
and that, too, in the possession of a nature so wonderful and so
utterly incommensurate with our own, that, if the knowledge of it
could enter into the earthen vessels of our consciousness, it would
unquestionably shatter them, " Such knowledge is too wonderful
for us ! "

And to this absolute prejudice Kant, instead of " correcting it
altogether," still clings ! While thoroughly undermining it, he
yet continues to assert it ! The very notion of thing, substance,
or object, he shows to be a creation of self-conscious mind, operat-
ing in forms of space and time, which, too, are the mind's own
creation. The very notion of cause, as applied to " sensible ob-
jects," he shows to be of like origin. The objects themselves,
therefore, apart from our knowledge of them, are not objects, sub-
stances, or things at all, nor can they cause the impressions which
we ascribe to them. AVhy, then, continue to assert what can nei-
ther be known nor imagined ? The appearances — which by com-
mon consent are all that we can know through sensible conscious-
ness— are saved, even if we deny the inconceivable things.

All this confusion and inconsistency result from failure or neg-
lect to correct the hasty inferences of sensuous consciousness re-
specting the nature of objective reality, in the light of that self-
consciousness, through which alone sensuous consciousness is seeii

268 The Journal of Sjyeculative Philosophi/.

to exist, and of wliicli it is but an organic or dependent func-
tion. In this brighter and truer light the apparent opposition in
nature between subject and object in consciousness gives place to
organic identity.

Suppose, for example, the hand endowed with sensuous con-
sciousness to receive the mental impression or image of the head.
The hand would be the " subject," the head the "object" of con-
sciousness. Tlie hand would view the impression of the object
within itself, and, shaking its own imaginary head, would say,
wisely, " Ah, here is an impression of what I call a head, which
doubtless denotes what I mav term a head-in-itself. But this im-
pression in my manual consciousness I perceive to be wholly
determined in form by the nature of my consciousness, and the
impression itself is nothing but a modification of myself, and so
only shows me how I may be modified or ' affected,' but not what
is the essential nature of that head-in-itself which causes the affec-
tion. Plainly, the head-in-itself possesses a wonderful and inscru-
table nature. In it is lodged true reality, and it, whatever it may
be, and although it is forever unknowable to me^ must doubtless
furnish the type of true reality, while I am nothing but a fragile
mirror; or, rather, I cannot distinguish myself apart from the
wholly insubstantial hand-form, which determines and perverts the
form of my consciousness — as being anything in particular other
than the images of true, but, alas ! unknowable objects, which
are reflected in me." Should we, from our larger point of view.
«all these oracular utterances of "the hand " wisdom ? Should
we not the rather term them pitiable nonsense ? And should we
not be constrained to say to the hand, " O hand, the hard and fast
opposition which thou, as conscious subject, pretendest to find
existing between thyself and that nominal object cf thy conscious-
ness, which thou termest the head-in-itself, so that the true knowl-
edge of the latter can never enter thy poor consciousness, is wholly
an alfair of thy own creation, and thy show of meekness, in re-
ducing thyself to the quality of a mere shadow and exalting the
' unknown ' object of thy consciousness to the position of sole oc-
cupant of the throne of being, or sole possessor of absolute reality,
is wholly uncalled for, and hence ridiculous. Thou beginnest by
wilfully cutting thyself ofi", in imagination, from all relation to
a,ught but thyself. Thou arbitrarily viewest thyself as one dis-

Katifs Transcendental Deduction of Categories. 26^

tinct and independent thing, self, or subject of consciousness, com-
plete in thyself, a wholly individual and self -included entity, atom-
ically separate from all other existences, and not needing them
in order to thine own existence. Upon this supposition, any im-
pressions which other existences may make upon thee must neces-
sarily appear mechanical and inscrutable. Thou, as individual^
canst not go out of thyself to see whence they come and know
what reality lies back of them. On reflection, thou findest also
that all thou knowest or canst know of thyself, in the way in
which thou hast determined to look upon thyself, is conflned to
the consciousness thou hast of the ati'ections or impressions pro-
duced in thee by objects other than thyself. It is no wonder,
therefore, that in place of thy original supposition of thyself as
something, thou art now led to regard thyself or thy conscious-
ness as but the insubstantial and inexplicable shadow of other
things, which must lie forever hidden from thy view. But all
this helplessness of knowledge, this conversion of knowledge into
ignorance, results only from the circumstance that thou hast arbi-
trarily chosen to consider the case from the lowest and narrowest,
and not from the highest and most commanding, point of view
within thy reach. I, who occupy this latter point of view, per-
ceive that thou art not a distinct and independent individual,
complete in thyself, nor is thy consciousness a mere shadow. In
like manner I see that the head, the object of thy consciousness,
is not simply a distinct and independent thing in and by itself.
Both thou and it may indeed be thus regarded, but, when thus re-
garded, each is viewed only in a light which is partial and incom-
plete, and hence may and does mislead. Thou, O hand ! and thy
fancied distinct object, the head, are both inseparably bound to-
gether as co-ordinate members of a complex, but organic and ' syn-
thetic,' unity or whole, viz., the human body. In this whole you
and all other members are so intimately and vitally united that
the complete separation of any one of you from the rest would
involve the complete and immediate extinction of your true and
real and characteristic nature or being. The whole necessarily
implies each one of you, and each of you necessarily implies the
whole; while all of you, through your relation to the whole, are
necessarily related to and imply each other. Since, therefore, to
the true existence and function of each one of you, the whole, to

270 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

which you belong, and all its other members are necessary, no
one of yon, in your purely individual and separate aspect, can
claim to be a true and completed and independent self or entity.
On the contrary, you are an individual self, or your distinct nature
is what it is, only by virtue of your inclusiou and participation in
a universal self or idea — the self or idea of the whole body. The
universal 'self (the idea of the whole body) is the key to unlock
the mystery of your particular self. It is in this sense your self,
and you are its, and all you different members strictly belong to
and are a part of each other. Thus, O hand ! thou seest that the
idea of the head — the special object of thy present consciousness
— is but a part of the completed idea of thine om'u self, since thou
canst not adequately think of thyself except as involving the head
and all other members of the one body, to which you all belong,
as essential to thine own completeness. You all are in one and
one idea, one life; one indiscerptible power and light of soul is in
all of you. Thou wilt see, therefore, that thou art what thou art,
not solely nor principally by that which makes thee numerically
distinct from the head and the rest of the body, but by virtue of
thy participating in and having as thine own a universal life, an
ideal quality, a spiritual force, which is present in every member.
Thus, so far as thou art concerned, existence is obviously not
purely atomic, individualistic, separated off by impassable gulfs
into wholly unrelated and unlike realms. And so, if thou, my
friend, wilt cease to fix thy stupid, staring gaz3 exclusively upon
thine own individual impressions, and wilt rise to such a com-
pleted and universal self -consciousness as thou mayest easily attain,
thou wilt see that that previously inscrutable object, the head, is
indeed thy twin-brother, thine alter ego, or, better, a true and
complementar}' part of thyself, and no more m3'sterious than
thou thyself art. Moreover, this sense-begotten mystery, which
has shrouded for thee thine own existence, will disappear. Thou
seest, indeed, already that thou existest only through, by, and for
an idea, a use, a purpose, which is but an integral part of a larger
idea. This idea does not exist as an inert, lonely, sensible object,
but as a spiritual force, all-comprehensive, all-permeating, and all-
sustaining within its range. Through thy participation in and
identification with it thou seest how thou art able to go out of thy
separate iivdividual sphere, as a mere hand, and to know the head

Kanfs Transcendental Deduction of Categories. 271

iind all the other members of the body as a part of thy larger and
completer self. And thou must now see that it is primarily in this
ideal force, this effective power of spirit — which is not inscrutable,
but self-revealing and translucent as the light of day — that true
being and reality for thee reside. In this reality, as thou per-
ceivest, both thou and thine ' object ' alike participate. Through
it you both exist and are what you are. The talk of a head-in-
itself, as a separate and independent entity, was, therefore, non-
sense, and the impressions which led thee to postulate its exist-
ence, were notliing but the form of thy knowledge of the head,
considered on what we now perceive to be its relatively nnreal
side, namely, the side of its apparent, but in fact nnreal and im-
possible, independence and distinction from the knowing 'hand.'
Thus tl\y 'impressions,' or sensuous perceptions, pointed to that
which is accidental rather than truly substantial, or independently
and abidingly real, or to that which is unknowable because it is
absolutely and independently considered non-existent, and not be-
cause it is transcendently exalted above or removed beyond the
reach of 'knowledge.'"

It is in a strain similar to the foregoing that we must address
Kant when he treats the limitations of sensible consciousness and
of physical science, which is but the accurate deciphering of the
letters and syllables of such consciousness, as universal limitations
of all "theoretical " or real knowledge. Individual, sensible con-
sciousness, which is a panorama of so-called impressions, or " in-
ternal " states of appearance, is, as Kant himself has shown us,
absolutely dependent on individual self-consciousness, which is a
purely ideal, but none the less real and synthetic or combining
activity. But even this larger interpretation of consciousness,
true and supremely significant as far as it goes, falls short of the
true and complete interpretation. Individual or unipersonal self-
consciousness reveals itself as not merely numerically one and self-
identical, but as the one which pervades the many, the individual
which is one with the universal, and which makes or has the many
.and the universal as an organic part of the consciousness of itself.
The self-consciousness of the individual thus leads him directly
away from the mere consciousness of himself as purely individual
and sets him down in a land in which he at first appears to him-
self as a stranger, but where he quickly realizes that he is at home.

272 The Journal of Speculative Pldlosophij.

This liuid is his land ; it is the land of his larger self, or of his self
on the side of its universality. It is the land of universal self,
reason, or spirit. It is his land, it belongs to liiui, just as, in our
illustration above, the whole idea or " land" of the body belonged
to and was involved in the completed consciousness of the hand.
Individual self-consciousness thusfiiuls that in that synthetic, com-
bining, universalizing activity whereby alone it grasps objects, it
is throwing about them simply the threads of that larger self, in
which both itself and they are included — tbe self whicb lives in
tliem, as they too all "live and move and have their being" only
in it. This larger self is divine, it is universal, living, effective
reason — it is Absolute Spirit. The individuaPs sufficiency " to
think anything of himself" is, thus, " of God." It comes from
his participation in a light which can be, in its completeness, no
less all-embracitio; and all-creative than divine reason.

In this view all reality or absolute "being" is living and spir-
itual, not dead and " substantial." The appearance of the latter
is a mere appearance, arising from the natural operation of the
former, but possible, as appearance, only for a consciousness which
is naturally restricted, or voluntarily restricts itself, to the purely
individualistic point of view of "sensible" consciousness. Every
self is a self-realizing intelligence — its peculiarities resulting only
from the peculiar, onh^ from its special place or function, in point
of view of its place in the universal realm of spiritual power and
reality. All of it8 " objects " are manifestations or " phenomena "
of what must in the last resort be regarded as similar intelligences
(of higher or lower degree) or " energies of mind."

In this view, too, the distinction to which Kant adheres be-
tween subjective and objective falls away. The subjective and
objective are organically one. The same ideal life and power are
in and constitute them both. The "forms of thought" are not
simply oiLV forms, having no ontological significance, and serving
merely to bind sensuous perceptions together in "objects" for our
convenience. They are the true life and reality of the ol)jects, as
well as of ourselves. We and they are organically one in that
Logos, in expressed power of divine spirit, which is not only
"above all," but also "in and through all," and without which
nothing was or is " made."

" To this complexion " the collective body of Kant's three Cri-

Kant's Transcendental Deduction of Categories. 273

tiques, as a whole, effectively point, but, at most, only " practically "
come. It was necessary here to develop, at least to the foregoing
extent, the outlines of the positive philosophical theory of knowl-
edge, which Kant's discussions imply, and which subsequent phi-
losophers more clearly exhibited, in order that we might- see that
the limitations, which Kant places on all " theoretical " knowledge
in the " Transcendental Deduction," were dogmatically asserted,
and hence to be looked upon with absolute distrust. When Kant,
therefore, declares that the " identical self," the " I," which asserts
itself in the activity of self-consciousness, knows not what itself is,
but only that it is, and this, too, simply because of that which is
expressed by the prononn " I," we have, and, from the nature of
the case, can have, no sensible impression, perception, or image;
when he says that we can "think," but not "know," ourselves,
and implies that effective reality or true being belongs only to un-
knowable things which appear, and yet do not appear, in those
sensible perceptions which we call phenomena ; when he says all
this, we shall, let it now be hoped, be able to take his utterances
at their true worth — or worthlessness. We shall decline to adopt
as solemn truth the mere prejudices of that phantom which imag-
ines and terms itself purely and merely individual, sensible con-
sciousness.

And, finallv. we shall see that the extension of the aforesaid
"limitations" to the whole field of knowledge is irrelevant to the
immediate subject of discussion. The question was, How is pure
physical science, or sensible knowledge of objects, possible? And
the answer was, substantially, Such knowledge is not possible
without fixed and definite conceptions and invariable relations or
" laws," which can be traced to no other source than the synthetic
activitv of self-conscious mind. From this source is derived the
universal and necessary form of sensible knowledge. Its mate-
rial, on the other hand, must all be given in the shape of con-
scious perceptions, appearances, or phenomena. These, on the
one hand, must be given ; and, on the other, beyond them physi-
cal science, through its necessary organ, sensible consciousness,
cannot go. Thus the question is answered. To go further, and-
assert that all knowledge is strictly confined to the same condi-
tions, is, compared with the requirements of the discussion, sim-
ply a work of supererogation. Still, this might be endured were
XY-18

274 The Journal of Speculative Pldlosophy.

the assertion proven. Not being proven, it is a source of double
confusion. It diverts attention from the immediate problem in
hand, and lands it in a bog of sophistry.

We may recognize, however, with gratitude, and study with
proiit, the positive work which Kant has accomplished. lie has
determined the nature, conditions, and limitations of pure physical
or sensible knowledge. lie has shown that the knowledge of the
human spirit is not to be compassed by the methods of such science
or by any mere analysis accomplished through empirical psychol-
ogy. And by showing that knowledge, even upon its lowest,
sensible terms, implies a combining and illuminating activity of
mind, he has done the work of a hero in undermining sensational
psychology, and even the dogmatic metaphj^sics which rest on it,
and in which, too, Kant himself continues, in too great a measure,
complacently to rest ; he is really, however unconsciously, point-
ing all the while, in a way which is most significant for the thought-
fully observant mind, to the philosophic conception of being, as
ideal, universal, spiritual, and self-knowing power, and not atomic,
impenetrable, and unknowable " substance."

THE KESULTS OF THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

BY MRS. JULIA WARD HOWE. [rEAD AT THE CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHT, AUGUST

5, 1881.]

When this topic was first assigned me by an officer of this
school, I felt great pleasure at the thought that I might be able
to render a most willing homage to a master to whose great ser-
vices I have long felt myself personally much indebted. This
feeling of pleasure was followed by one of dismay when I consid-
ered the historic scope of the task to be undertaken. Our own
study of an author may give us a satisfactory idea of his merits.
But to analyze the intellectual history of the last hundred years
and find the Kantian element wherever it was present, would re-
quire a very voluminous course of reading, and an assured judg-
ment. I happen also to have read very few comments upon him,
or on the modern German philosophy generally. Difficult as is

The Besults of the Kantian Philosophy. 2Y5

the study of these profound thinkers, I have always found it easier
to understand them at first hand than with the help of some other
metaphysician's interpretation. With the author himself, we read
and reread. Presently the sense and coherence of his statements
explain themselves to us. But the commentator, especially if he
have any original metaphysics of his own, will be very apt to mix
them with the essence of the master of whom he treats.

In approaching this subject, I have made such use of comment
and history as my limited time would permit. I have ascertained
that the Kantian philosophy has been little known at first hand
in England. Coleridge and Sir William Hamilton have been
its chief expositors. Of these, the first certainly transmitted
it in a form modified by his own mental peculiarities, while it is
hardly to be supposed that the second gave it exactly as it gives
itself. In France, Degerando has given the best exposition of it
in his " History of Philosophical Systems."

I do not know how far it may have been read and commented
upon in Italy. The only metaphysics that I have known of in
that country are those of Aristotle and the scholastics among con-
servative thinkers, and the little knot of Hegelians who reside in
or emanate from Naples. In Germany itself, Kant has been much
laid out of sight beneath the voluminous and varied writings of his
successors. The watchword of the foremost philosophy of to-day
in that country is: "Back to Kant." Nor is there anj^thing
shameful in this retrogression to the ^hes of a master long dead
and sometimes forgotten. The soul of such a master is a deep
source of life and light. Society uses and wastes such intellectual
capital as she has. She must often return to kindle her torch at
the fires by which she lighted it. A true and deep philosophy,
moreover, weaves itself but slowlj' into the life of the world. It
may be received with quick enthusiasm, but even if this should
spread to the four corners of the globe, the understanding and
application of its principles might be the work of centuries. It
oftener happens that the appearance of a new philosophy is hailed
by no such outburst of good-will, but is greeted more after the
manner in which the London "Punch" represents two colliers as
treating a stranger who happened to pass near them.

"D'ye know 'un. Bill \ " says one.

" No, I don't," says the other.

276 The Journal of Speculative Philosoj)hy.

" 'Eave 'arf a brick at 'un, then," rejoins the first.

It is, perhaps, through this very savagery that pliilosophy is
most largely introduced to the knowledge that most people get of
it. A\'ith more polite habits of thought we sliall rather take tor
our motto the line of Hamlet :

"Then, as a stranger, give it welcome.'"

In this country, I find that the early Unitarian divines were
not students of Kant, nor even of German literature. Drs. Kirk-
land, Buckminster, Norton, and Channing drew none of their in-
spiration immediately from this source. I opine that Dr. Hedge
and the historian Bancroft are the only well-known Americans
who were familiar with the Kantian philosophy fifty years ago.
Both of those gentlemen received their early education in Ger-
many, and brought this acquisition back with them, bringing also
a knowledge of its value. The Massachusetts Transcendentalists
were inspired by an enthusiasm for German literature, which some
of them studied in its own tongue, and more, probably, in transla-
tions. Among these, Mr. Kipley was certainly a reader of phi-
losophies, although to him metaphysics were more valuable as an
element of general culture than congenial as a special pursuit. To
the greater number, even among the Transcendentalists, the Ger-
man philosophy was best known through that mediative ofiice of
poetry, of which Mr. Alcott spoke so aptly the other day. Goethe,
himself a student and admirer of Kant, was the medium throuo-h
which the Germanic influence flowed most largely into the mind
of this country. Margaret Fuller was especially a reader of Goethe.
Theodore Parker no doubt perceived the importance of German
literature at an early period of his culture. It was interesting for
ns to learn from Mr. Sanborn, the other day, that an article, writ-
ten by Parker, in " The Dial," first directed the attention of Mr.
Harris to the study of the German philosophers. But the merit
of first introducing Kant to students in America belongs to Dr..
Hedge, who in 1833 published in the " Christian Examiner" an
article on Coleridge in which he had much to say concerning
German philosophy. Dr. Hedge, in a letter lately written to me,
tells me of this, and adds that, long after the appearance of this
paper, Parker wrote to him asking for information on the subject.

I myself remember in my early youth to have heard the late

The Results of the Kantian Philosophy. 277

Rev. Leonard Woods speak with great glee of a commencement
part at Harvard in which it was suggested that the German Kant
should have a C, instead of a K, for his initial. This truly medi-
a3val man never got beyond the philosophy of the schoolmen.
Such logic as was in them led him to the conclusion that the Pope
of Rome was Christ's true representative on earth, and though he
remained outwardly a Gongregationalist, and the president of a
Congregation alist college, his ideal millennium would have been
the supremacy everywhere of a stolid and shaven priesthood.

I remember also an Episcopal divine, very prominent in his time,
who frowned with great severity upon my early study of the Ger-
man lano;uao;e. He assured me that modern German literature
had done more to undermine the religion of the community than
any other known agent. "Avoid it, turn from it, and pass away ! "
was his exhortation. I asked him if he understood the German
language. He replied : "Not at all." I could not help further
asking how he could possibly form an opinion concerning a litera-
ture whose language was unknown to him, and of which, as he
also told me, he knew little through translations. I need not say
that he found my question very impertinent.

In the impossibility of ascertaining by historical data when,
where, and how the philosophy of Kant has penetrated into the
world of modern thought, I may, perhaps, be allowed to follow
the method of general induction, and to say briefly where I see
his influence and where I do not see it. To begin, I am quite
sure that the statesmen and politicians of Christendom are very
little acquainted with it, and only less with one other thing, viz. :
the true meaning of the Christian religion. I am also sure that
Kant has been but little studied in England, Much that is irra-
tional and illogical in English politics and in English society
w^ould by this time begin to resolve itself into true order and
harmony if the Kantian philosophy were well understood by the
teachers of that country.

If Kant's philosophy had been understood in France, that coun-
try would liave been spared both Napoleons. The revolution
would have been intelligent and bloodless. But, oh ! where can
it be less understood than in Germany itself, where to-day men of
education say : " Give us the sword in preference to the tribunal."

What an " if" was that which I mentioned just now ! If every

278 Tin; Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

country were f^overned upon principles of true pliilosoplij, where
would be war and crime, the scourges of the human race?

And here we may ask what the influence of any pliilosopher
can be in liis own time, and after it ? Truly, the influence of
phik)sophical opinions is very wonderful when one considers the
thou<;-htless stupidity of masses of men, the ineptitude even of the
studious for abstract considerations, and the difficult and involved
character of metaphysical procedures. There must be subtle and
intangible processes, whereby, as in the invisible fertilization of
plants, the fine effluvium of philosophic minds penetrates the
common thought of the age, and is likely even to modify the men-
tal operations of the classes who never heard of philosopher or
philosophy.

History furnislies much to justify this assertion. I at least learn,
from it that very important social and political results can often
be traced to the teaching of certain philosophers. Wisdom crieth
in the streets, and no one gives heed to her warnings. The city
melts away, the race is exiled. Wisdom survives, and her warn-
ing is handed down to later generations by those who in their time
could not profit by it. Here I must quote the inspired line of

Mr. Emerson :

" One accent of the Holy Ghost
The heedless world has never lost."

AVonderful truth! The Divine, knowing the value of its own
utterances, appoints for each some abiding-place, from which, in
due time, it reappears, is recognized, and remembered.

One of the visible and tangible results of Kant's philosophy
was to beget a series of doctrinaires, whose list, already long, is
by no means to be considered as ended in our time. These think-
ers seem to have given especial heed to the master's declaration
that a true student of philosophy must, above all, learn to phi-
losophize for himself After Kant, and from him, sprang Fichte^
Hegel, Schelling. From these fathers, sons too of such a father,
what widespread ramifications may be traced in the world of
thought to-day ! In the domain of philosophy proper, behold
St. Louis and Concord clasping hands across the Western Con-
tinent.

Philosophy produces some of its most important effects outside of
its own immediate domain. It is a leaven which leavens the whole

The Results of the Kantian Philosophy. 279

lump, and while we descant upon its mischievous innovations, our
own bread, jnst drawn from the oven, is full of them. The de-
struction of the mythical shams and assumptions which have been
so long imposed upon the world in the guise of religious truth
was assured from the day on which Kant made evident the utter
futility of the postulates upon which they were made to rest. The
strong, simple, indisputable truths which he dared to utter have
largely freed religion from the venerable falsities which were once
installed and homao;ed evervwhere. From the east to the west of
this vast continent, from its northern to its southern limit, wher-
ever liberal Christianity or free religion is preached, the work of
this great master is multiplied and perpetuaterl. Those who igno-
rantly deride him know not that they owe to hiai a great, an ines-
timable boon, viz. : the philosophical confirmation of their religious
freedom. Praise and thanks are due to him, in sceculd scBCidorum.
For philosophy is she that shutteth and no man openeth, that
openeth and no man shutteth. And Kant's logic of limitations
closes the door of spurious authority, and opens that of candid
enquirj' leading to true judgment.

The world that knows Kant is very different from that which
knows him not. The present age has been said to be " nothing
if not philosophical." Most people whom we know, perhaps, rea-
son more or less, affirming, denying, inventing, supplementing,
with a mingling of good faith, activity, and intelligence which
belongs to this time.

Where question runs into scepticism, and belief into enthusi-
asm, there we feel the sequence of the great master, Kant, to be
broken. Of the materialists and agnostics of to-day, the hrst
have iornored and the second have misunderstood him. He be-
longs in the Christian sequence, not out of it.

To think at all for one's self is an act of freedom. Descartes
said : " Coglto, ergo sumP He might better have said : Delihero,
ergo liheror. Consistent, harmonious freedom comes out of
thought trained and disciplined, square set upon square, and cor-
ner fitted to corner. An intelligent world will give us a world of
equalized conditions, a world in which human values shall be
recognized, and human labor wisely apportioned and duly hon-
ored. Christ, and the Christ-like souls who culminated in him,
have given us the devout, prophetic vision of this world, the New

280 The Journul of Speculative l^IiUosopJiy.

Jeriisaleni coniini>; down from heaven. But Kant has surveyed it
before ns with tlie square and jihunniot of philosopliy. And
having received both the ideal vision, and the practical plan and
measurement of a truly wise society, mankind can now begin to
labor intelligently for a happiness which shall at once be compre-
hensive and consistent with itself.

I find in Degerando's account of the Kantian philosophy the
statement that it was at first received with comparative indiffer-
ence, and was afterwards adopted with unexampled enthusiasm,
creating a revolution in the whole domain of philosophy. A
third stage still awaited it, in which it gave rise to a new and
violent polemic, friends and foes meeting each other with singular
acerbity, when one considers the abstract character of the proposi-
tions contended for and against. The most intelligent of its friends,
Fichte, Schelling, and Reinhold, while standing by it with their
might, yet added much of their own to complete, each in his own
way, what appeared to them wanting in the work of the master.
As Deorerando has ffiven a much better account of the Kantian
philosophy than has as yet appeared in our own language, I will
venture to quote one or two of his judgments concerning it, which
are interesting as coming from so admirable a Frenchman, writing
at a time so near the life of his subject. He says, then :

" The Professor of Konigsberg united in himself the greater part
of the qualities essential to the author of a great revolution in phi-
losophy : the vast coup cPoeil which enables one to gather and to
arrange a great variety of information ; the art of finding for
one's self new points of view even in ideas already familiar ; the
power of analysis which leads to the most subtle distinctions ; the
strength of combination which establishes systems ; the boldness
which puts unexpected questions ; the address which avoids great
difficulties ; the regularity which delights in classifications ; the se-
verity which commands the respect and confidence of men ; finally,
the habits of a mind familiar with the depths of ail departments
of learning, the encyclopsiedic genius which, in an enlightened age,
is indispensable for giving laws to the motive science upon which
all others depend.''

Degerando is not a Kantian. His sense of justice compels him
to give Kant so much praise as this. But, seeking for a pe?' contra,
he remarks that, while the Kantian doctrine satisfied some of the

The Results of the Kantian Philosophy . 281

legitimate needs of the human mind, it also, and still more promi-
nently, flattered the weaknesses of human nature. The vanity of
neophytes was gratified, he thinks, by the use of the obscure and
difficult nomenclature of Kant, and ordinary minds lost sight of
their own mediocrity when they found themselves summoned to
exercise the lofty functions which he assigns to human thought.
This praise and this dispraise are alike interesting. The tirst is
just, the second I think most undeserved. A smattering of phi-
losophy is as dangerous as are all the illusions of a fancied knowl-
edge. But the Kantian writings seem to me as little calculated
as any that I know of to feed the self-love of sciolists. They are
a dead letter to those who do not study them deeply, and the
vanity of the student is not flattered by the difiiiculty of mastering
a subject, Degerando mentions various reasons which would tend
to keep a Kantian student always faithful to the traditions of his
master. One of these will make us smile. He says that the
greater number of those who have mastered the system will, in so
doing, exhaust their intellectual faculties to such a degree that
they will not possess the energy necessary to a critical judgment
of its doctrines. And this suggests a danger which this school of
philosophy would do well to keep in mind. Are the minds of
pupils here to be so exhausted in following the thoughts of others
that no man shall have power left to know what he thinks him-
self? Do let me, then, suggest that, as the physician stands b}',
in cases of flogging, to see that the vital energies of the person
suffering punishment shall not sink too low under the operation ;
do then, I pray, let there always be here a jpsychiatros who, after
a ditiicult exposition of Kant or Hegel, shall go about among the
hearers and ascertain what sense they have left.

" I wrong myself and them to jest."

This French apergu seems to me to miss the whole honest, helpful
intention which pervades the Kantian writings — the democratic
desire that all who care to investigate the mysteries of thought
shall really be guided to their simplest solution, the conservative
warning that this solution cannot avail in any case without labori-
ous study. The categorical imperative of duty does not commend
itself as a statement to the Frenchman's mind. But here, perhaps,
we come upon a national difference. The Germanic idea of right

282 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

is the hammer of Thor — simple, direct, absohite. The Gallic idea
lias a vairue enthusiasm, and a more vague conviction.

It will not be expected that I should here attempt any detailed
exposition either of the Kantian system or of those which FichtCy
Schelling-, and Hec^el founded upon it. I suppose that the depart-
ment of historical metaphysics is well looked to in this school of phi-
losophy, and that most of my hearers are well up in these matters.

I am unwilling to speak at all of Hegel's philosophy in this
place, because you have quite recently had a very full account of
it from one who is himself an expert in the use of its difficult
methods. It is now many years since I have wrestled with an
Hegelian book. I remember having read with great interest the
^Esthetik. I remember also Hegel's Logic, which I borrowed
from Theodore Parker, and over which I made many despairing
eiforts. Parker himself told me at last that he thought the work
scarcely worth the great trouble of studying, or, as he said, of
enucleating it. I found it impossible to get any clear idea of a
system of thought from the Hegelian books, and so relinquished
them with a sigh of incapacity. Possibly if I had studied them
in their true order, after reading Kant and Fichte, I might have
understood them better.

Having made this confession with regard to Hegel, I will only
say two things more about him. One of them is, that I find in
one of Schellino;'s works, in which Kant and Fichte are much
appreciated, the mention of a philosophy "much more mechanical
and less genial than that of Fichte," and of a dialectic so difficult
that a considerable number of Germans in following it "had come
to seek no longer the grist at the mill, but only the clatter of the
mill-wheel."

I will only add to those unimportant remarks a brief reminis-
cence of a conversation which I held twenty years ago with Fran-
cis Lieber, well known as a college dignitary, and eminent as a
writer on political economy. He had attended Hegel's lectures in
his youth, remembered his unpleasant accent and manner, and
particularly recalled the acerbity with which he on one occasion
desired " those foolish young men who had latterly taken part in a
battle against the French forces " to leave his lecture-room, and re-
turn there no more. Lieber thought, as I did, that Kant was the
greater man of the two, and shared the general impression that

The Results of the Kantian Philosophy. 283

Hegel had never desired to make himself clearly understood. I
mention this conversation because one does not every day receive
so near or so clear an impression of an eminent philosopher.

Concerning Fichte, I will trust myself to say something, very
briefly, and with no attempt to reason either for or against his
well-known system. When I first took up the Fichtean writings
I felt utterly amazed and puzzled at the strangeness of their im-
mediate object, which seemed to be the dissolution of the world
of sight and sense. The proposition that all which I can see,,
hear, and perceive is but the creation of my own mind, seemed to
me both objectless and senseless. At the same time, I could not
but feel in Fichte himself the presence of an intellectual grasp, of
a moral power which commanded my attention, and compelled
me to follow his fine-spun and complex reasoning with interest
and attention. I felt, too, that, while dating from Kant, Fichte
had added to the work of the former an original conception of his
own. Kant had asserted and proved that our objective knowledge
is simply that of appearances and impressions. Fichte went much
further, and made their very appearances and impressions the re-
flection of our own mode of being. The ego thus became an ab^o-
\\\ie prius, and was shown to be not only prior but sole.

I cannot but think that Kant's agnosticism had an immediate
relation to the thought of his age. It was, I think, a philosophic
protest against the dogmatism of the then popular theology and
the irresponsible assumptions of the metaphysical systems then in
vogue. Schoolmen and divines enforced their own conclusions
upon the believing and thinking world as the dicta of absolute
knowledge. Kant denies them the authority of any such knowl-
edge. Their irov (ttm assumed to be not only without the sensi-
ble world, but within the unseen world. Kant asserted that they
had no such position, while he still held to religious ideas as the
substance of things hoped for, and to the moral law by the evi-
dence of things not seen.

Fichte's more advanced position is justified by Schelling as the
logical perfecting of the Kantian theory. In his view, Kant's
reasoning failed in its explanation of the thing in itself, which we
might, perhaps, translate as the object absolute. This object ab-
solute, source and end of all knowledge, is, in Kant's view, an
algebraic x, an absolutely unknown quantity. He places it be-

284 The Journal of Sj^eculatlve Philosophy.

yond the region of the categories, wliile we, obliged to think of it
as existino- and real, must a])i)ly to it the conditions of those very
categories. Fichte explains this x as the ego, and, indeed, as the
ego of human consciousness. The I am, the awakening to con-
sciousness of every rational being, determines for him the whole
s^vstem of outward appearances. Thus, nothing exists but the
human race. As Fichte explicitly states, all else has no existence
save in the necessary representations which the ego makes to
itself.

As I do not wish to place either myself or my audience in the
acrobatic attitude necessary for the entertainment of this theory,
1 will dismiss it at once as a metaphysical fiction which, like some
mathematical iictions, may have or may have had its use in reme-
dying the excess of other logical or psychological statements. A
moral truth it undoubtedly has. We are a prioi'i to our lives.
Our predominant affections, and the relation of those to our hu-
man will, do, indeed, create for us all that is intrinsic in our ex-
periences, and much which might pass as the result of adventitious
circumstance. So much I find in the Kantian doctrine. Fichte's
negation of external things is for me simply dialectic, and affords
no rule by which to live.

In Fichte's other writings we find the noblest ideals of public
and of private life. The spirit of self-sacrifice is with him the
central point of obligation, inducing in the individual devotion to
ideal right and the interests of the race, and rendering possible
the coordination of the state. It is human, he allows, to pursue
one's own advantao-e and. neglect that of others as far as the insti-
tutions of society will allow. But it is also and still more human
to suffer for the right, to put wealth and reputation out of sight
for conscience' sake, and to lay down one's life for one's friends.

In his theory of the state, the predominant maxim is this sacri-
fice of the individual to the interests of the rape, which the state
is supposed to represent. In this sacrifice he recognizes no limits
— he presents it as absolute and universal. Every individual in
the state should take part in it, and recognize the right of the
state not only to a part but to the whole of his life and power.
The dignity of citizenship then becomes the right of all, since
each bears his part in the general sacrifice out of which the state
<;omes. The as-ents of government are not the state. Princes

The Results of the Kantian Philosophy. 285

and rulers are only citizens. The poorest man is not less, nor the
greatest more. The natural aim of the individual is enjoyment..
The aim of the state is culture. And this aim is assigned to it by
what Fichte calls " the art of nature." He elsewhere describes
this as a zwechmdssig direction in higher nature — ^'. e., in the des-
tiny of the human race — through which the race, without its own
knowledgeor desire, is led towards the legitimate ends of its being.
In such a statement the feudal theory of the state disappears like
a dissolving view. The saying of Louis XIV, " L'etat c'est moi^''
would make one laugh, if it did not recall the tears and blood
which wiped it out forever, " I am the state ! " Well, then,,
might thy successor say, "After me, the deluge." Fichte's theory
of the state will hardly be adopted among us without some con-
troversy. It is, indeed, an over-statement, and has so much the
tone of a compulsory abnegation of personal considerations that
it may appear to us tyrannical. " Life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness " is a more congenial statement. But this is defective,,
because it does not mention among its objects the promotion of
the common good. The idea of self-sacritice, made so prominent
by Fichte, belongs to the working of the state, and, without it, no
state can long endure. Our greatest danger in America is lest
this idea should vanish, as the "lost arts" have done. Fichte
further insists that from the earliest times there must have existed
a normal society, whose manners and customs were in strong con-
trast with the barbarous life which surrounded it. The growth
of civilization, according to him, could only have come out of the
encounter of those opposite forms of society, since this growth
consists in the gradual conquest of barbarism by culture, out of
which come improved laws and stable institutions. Whether
Fichte in this adopted as his normal group the Greek or the He-
braic people does not appear, since he omits to name the ideal
race, whose historical existence he assumes as an inevitable fact.

The philosopher Schelling comes next in the order of our pres-
ent considerations, and must be mentioned, though within very
brief limits. This eminent man seems somehow to have been
dropped by the studious public between Kant and Hegel. His
name is familiar to all who know the names of German philoso-
phers, but his doctrines are so little discussed even among studi-
ous people that I was surprised at hearing Dr. Hedge say, quite

2S6 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

lately, that he considered him a more remarkable and original man
than either Ficlite or Hegel. The reason for giving in this con-
nection more tlian a passing mention of Schelling is in the fact
that, more than Fichte, perhaps, he founds n])()n Kant, and that
his comments upon both of these philosophers are acute and inter-
esting.

Schelling has left among his published writings a brief paper
entitled " Immanuel Kant," in which he has more to say concern-
ing the master himself than concerning his doctrines, of which he
treats very fully in his lectures on " The Philosophj' of Revelation,"
and possibly elsewhere, lie recognizes the naivete and personal
excellence of the master, and finds in the perfection of his work
and the elegance of his simple tastes some confirmation of his
supposed French descent.

Schelling couples in thought the revolution made by Kant in
philosophy with the French Revolution. He ascribes to this ter-
rific agency the rapid spread of the Kantian doctrines, and explains
the simultaneous decline of the two revolutions b}' the fact of
their negative character, and of their having attempted to settle
the controversy between the abstract and the actual — a contro-
versy which, he says, Kant found as irreconcilable in speculative
thought as the fathers of the French Revolution found it in politi-
cal action.

Schelling calls his own work on " The Philosophy of Revela-
tion " the grounding of a positive philosophy. He, perhaps, hoped
to do what Kant had left undone, and, taking the work of his
predecessor as purely critical, designed to supplement its negations
by a system of positive authority and acceptance. His rehabili-
tation of Bacon and the Empirics tends in this direction, and
many in the present day will be grateful to him for the justice
which he renders to the intentions of the Experimentalists, Yet
I demur at the interpretation by which Schelling considers the
system of Kant to be one of pure negation. For these terms,
negative and positive, are terms of interchangeable significance.
Were I, for example, in chains, the chains would be positive, and
my freedom negative. Should some one break my chain for me,
his action might be called negative, so far as regards the chain,
but in relation to my freedom it would be positive. A system of
thought which limits the spontaneous and normal action of the

The Results of the Kantian Philosophy. 287

human mind is negative. A system which forbids the imposition
of relative concepts as absolute truths I must consider as positive
in its results, even if negative in its procedure. The corrective
negations of philosopliy are like the breaking of the chain which
I have imagined. They rectify the errors which accompany hu-
man thought, and which often in their accumulation so obscure
the truth that nothing positive can be taught until they are sw^ept
away.

Schelling says that Kant's table of categories had in Germany
for twenty years an authority as absolute as that of the ten com-
mandments. Writing, perhaps in the neighborliood of 1830, he
speaks of Kant, and even of Fichte, as already superseded in the
philosophical predilection of the time. He yet abides by his belief
in the permanent value of their work, and in the great and lasting
service wdiich the greater man and the lesser had rendered to the
cause of philosophy.

Leaving for the moment this question of the negative and posi-
tive aspects of philosophy, it will perhaps be important to explain
here the way in which, according to Schelling, the French Revo-
lution was helpful to the spreading of Kant's philosophy. This
philosophy, he avers, led the German nation to an earlier recogni-
tion of the true features of the Revolution, and this recognition
brought with it a renew^ed conviction of the eternal, self-sustain-
ing power of right and of the social order. Kant's work was
recognized as establishing the groundwork of their steadfast and
immutable principles, and it thus became a work of universal
acceptance, available to world's people and statesmen. This we
must call a positive service.

One more result of an availing study of Kant will be that the
student will be induced by it to part with certain cherished cob-
webs which the ingenious brain is apt to weave for its own delec-
tation, and in which the mind itself becomes entangled, like a
spider caught in his own web.

Among these cobwebs we may class such devices as Sweden-
borg's spirits, degrees, and localities of the unseen world. Now,
if Kant teach us nothing else, he will teach us that all this me-
chanical construction of circles, of ranks, of entities, of shelves
upon which spiritual things are laid away in their order — he will
teach us, I say, that systems of this sort have neither foundation

288 The Journal of Speculative Pliilosopliy.

nor place in tnie pliilosoplij, whose first principle is that we can
have no sensible perce}>tions xq^^\'<\\\\^ nomnena. 'Akin to this is
the saying of Holy AVrit that spiritual thin^js must he spiritually
discerned.

I am zealous aij-ainst these inventions because their imagined
mechanism in the end materializes the mind that gives it room.
All manner of nnverifiable and unsubstantial hypotheses may
come to us with these baseless visions, and claim entertainment
and authority.

The equilibrium of thought, it is true, appears to have a certain
mechanical character, and we all make large use of similes bor-
rowed from the action of visible things, such as moral rising and
falling, imaginative soaring, floating, weaving, and the like. But
this mechanical expression should always be held for what it is —
a mere subjective self-help for the mind, not binding on other
minds, and having nothing to do with the essentials either of rea
son or experience.

I remember that the studies in philosophy which I made before
I became acquainted with the Kantian writings induced or
allowed me to consider most of the evils of society as constant
factors in the economy of individual and national life. In my
mind I made vai'ious efforts to explain and illustrate the working
of the great social machinery, and so to dispose of the seeming
evils as to give them the office of weight and retardation in move-
ments which without them mio-ht run into indefinite and fatal
acceleration. Among the mystics whom I mentioned the other
day, Swedenborg and Spinoza had, I think, established me in this
idea. The eternal hells of the one, and the massive passivity of
the other, led me to look upon wrong and suffering as permanent
institutions.

In Kant's writino;s I heard the eternal " Thou shalt " in its
trumpet tone of victory. No longer did it seem a command of
transcendent excellence, which mankind would probably always
continue to evade. Its positive command Avould enforce obedi-
ence in virtue of its very beauty and perfection. The reason of
mankind, nobly appealed to, would nobly res])ond. The motto of
Constantine, "■ tovtw vUa^'' "By this thou shalt conquer," gave
the cross a certain subservience to his personal ambitions. " This
shall conquer thee by thy heart's best love " is a more fitting pre-

The Results of the Kantian Philosojyhy. 289

diction. And that trumpet sound which I liave just described
brought me out of the ranks of those who praj, and suffer, and
scarcely hoi)e, into view at least of the array of great hearts who
so trust the great command that hope itself becomes confirmed
into certainty.

The chiims of original creation in all departments of literature
may be more or less contested, because much that literature ex-
presses was in the minds of men already, and philosophers inherit
much from each other and from antiquity; but I do think that
no philosopher has stated so simply or so strongly as Kant has
done the proper relation of the moral law to man, no one has
made so clear the universal heritage of the race in the domain of
unbounded and undying good.

The world does move. There is a good deal of philosophizing
done in Kant's direction, though few heads are strong enough to
entirely explore and repeat his analysis of hum.an faculties, and
his synthesis of human life. Kant was certainly a metaphysician
par excellence^ and felt the joy of an athlete or an artist in strug-
gling with difficulties which he felt sure of overcoming. Yet his
humanity was larger even than his philosophy, and he held most
dear the very objects which the apostles of progress write on their
programmes, or emblazon on their shields. Peace, universal and
enduring, was in his thoughts and in his heart. He saw that it
could only come through obedience to law ; but the law to which
he did homage was that of every man's right, everywhere secured
and respected. His conception of human nature was noble,
hopeful, inspiring. He possibly underrated the power of com-
mon sense in the great community at large, which cannot be
thought of as a community of philosophers. But in his day and
in his country free institutions and popular education had not
done what they have to-day to raise the whole intellectual aver-
age of the community. We may say to-day that while students
of philosophy are not many, and philosophers are very few, many
of the best results of philosophy are becoming adopted and embod-
ied in the administration of society. The possibility of a rational
solution of social and national difficulties, the superiority of reason
over force, and the applicability of the first to what has been
always generally deemed the province of the latter — are not these
the results of applied philosophy ? Again, the association of groups
XY— 19

290 The Journal of Speculative Philosophrj.

of the most tliouglitt'iil j)eople with tlie object of studjino; the
needs of humanity and meeting them with its resources, the peace-
ful coming together of men and women of opposite opinions for
the [)nrpose of reasoning out their ditferences, and building upon
the tinal harmony a common house of faith — what are those but
philosopliical procedures ?

On a late occasion I ex'in-essed to Dr. Hedge the extraordinary
sense of emancipation which I had felt after reading the principal
Kantian writings. The learned man confessed to a similar expe-
rience, and the conversation ran upon the reason to be assigned
for it.

The moral reason for this sense of enfranchisement I conceive
to reside in Kant's positive assertion of the niorj^-l power and obli-
gation of man. Its intellectual reason I find in the a priori atti-
tude of the mind to the world of perception which is so marked a
feature of the Kantian philosophy.

Margaret Fuller once said that she accepted the nniverse, and
Clarlyle laughed heartily on hearing of it, and said, " I think she'd
better." But each of us has an attitude towards the universe. We
partly accept and partly' make ourselves accepted by it. It seems
to me important to set us before this great problem of life, this
great plexus of interwoven forces, with a weapon in our hand,
viz. : the inborn human judgment to which all the phenomena of
experience are to be referred.

When Christ said, '' I have overcome the world," did He not
tell us that He had so stood before it, and decided what of it He
would accept and what should accept Him ?

This is a practical question, because this faculty of judgment, so
precious in man, may be lost or perverted through defective train-
ing or false education. I think I may say that the downright
ignorance of one who has labored but not studied is less likely to
pervert or destroy this faculty than are the forms of mental train-
ing which we may call absolute and tyrannical. I know whole
classes of people whose merit in the eyes of their spiritual direc-
tors is precisely this, that they have abjured all spontaneous exer-
cise of their own power of judgment. How^ trite is this statement !
Is not the right of private judgment still a debatable question in
polite circles ?

The Results of the Kantian Philosophy. 291

I know others, women especially, who glide along through life
under the influence only of its surface impressions. The haut ton
of fashion in mv voutli had much of this indifferentism. The age
preceding must have had, I think, still more, since old plays and
novels represent fur us that high-bred languor which had no an-
swer for the most important announcement but to adjust its eye-
glass and drawl out : " Is it so, indeed ? How very singular ! "

The pedagogic attitude of the Kantian philosophy to such per-
sons is that of a master with a rod in his hand. He says : " Do
not play the fool. You are no such ninny as you pretend to be.
Lordly reason is your birth-gift. Assert its dignity, and govern
yourself accordingly."

I wish that I could sum up in a more satisfactory manner the
appreciable results of Kant's labors. I will do this, however, as
well as I can, a'sking you, first of all, to remember that he who is
now an inhabitant of the book-shelf was once a living, breathing
man, who passed many years in the exercise of a laborious profes-
sion. Many a set of pupils met him face to face, heard his brave
words, and followed his profound teachings. He took part also
in the general literary work of his time, and printed in divers
periodicals bis views of the writers whose works came within his
extended observation. He has left us in his lesser writings keen
apergus of manners and of character. His views of woinankind
were neither adequate nor prophetic ; but we must remember that
the woman of the present day was not invented in Kant's day,
or, if she was, he never saw her in Konigsberg.

From what I have just said we may infer, to begin with, that
Kant was, in his own sphere and place of living, a person of great
influence, sure to leave his mark upon those who came in contact
with him. Then we must remember that his doctrine, coldly re-
ceived at first, was soon widely embraced throughout his native
country as the surest antidote to the wild confusion and reign of
terror which in his day fell upon Europe. Then let us recall the
fact that a trio of eminent pliilosophers took his work for their
starting-point, and, though diverging from him and from each
other, yet wrought, each and all, as they could not have wrought
if they had not had his legacy to work by. Then remember that
Coleridge and Sir William Hamilton made him somewhat known
in England; that Yillers translated his works into French; that

292 The Jourmal of Speculative Philosophy.

Degerando gave an admirable synopsis of his system in his " Com-
parative History of Philosophy"; and that Victor Cousin recog-
nized and proclaimed his merits. Remember that Italy, which
has Hegel, has in him a man who passed over the Kantian bridge.
Remember that in this country a few ripe scholars as long as
iifty years ago were intimately acquainted with his doctrine, and
that this acquaintance has grown slowly but solidly among the
studious public. Can you add up the sum now ? Can you meas-
ure the extent of the debt we owe to this great thinker, who has,
beyond any man of modern times, resolved doubt, confirmed
faith, repressed dogmatism, and vindicated humanity ? No.
Such debts cannot be measured. One little vista opens to us
when we see that Theodore Parker received his instruction, and
added it to that great wisdom and culture out of wdiich he fed a
hungering multitude, and judged the men and manners of his
day. William T. Harris, in turn, receives from Parker some ink-
ling of Kant's value, and himself becomes first a disciple and then
a teacher of philosophies, In all this, remember, there is follow-
ing and leading; and he who can follow intelligently can also
lead. Perhaps our last and briefest word about him may be that,
having produced a work which remains one of the wonders and
treasures of philosophy, he understood and helped to direct the
progress of humanity, and, by influencing the noblest minds of
modern times, has left his impress upon the fate and history of the
world.

Notes and Discussions. 293

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

TBF CENTENNIAL OF RANTS KRITIK AT SARATOGA, N. T.

Hamilton College, Ju!;/ SO, 1681.

Wm. T, Harris, LL.D., Editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy.
Dear Sir: In response to your request, I herewith enclose a brief
account of the celebration of the Centennial of Kant's Kritik, observed at
Saratoga, N. Y., July 6th and Vth, as prepared chiefly by the Secretary,
Mr. Taylor. John W. Mears.

proceedings at the centennial of " kant's kritik."

Temple Grove parlor, Saratoga, witnessed, on the 6th of July, a select
gathering intended to honor the memory of the great German philosopher,
Kant, in this the hundredth anniversary of the publication of his greatest
work, " The Kritik of the Pure Reason." There were present President
Seelye, of Amherst College, who was chosen chairman ; President Bas-
com, of Wisconsin University ; Professors Morris, of Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity; Mears, of Hamilton College; Bennett, of Syracuse University;
Bliss, of Vermont University ; and A. S. Lyman, of Yale College ; also
Dr. Herrick Johnson and lady, of Chicago ; Mr. Libbey, of the " Prince-
ton Review " ; Mr. Thomas H. Pease and lady, of New Haven ; Rev. C.
E. Lindsey and lady, of New Rochelle ; Mr. A. L. Blair, of Troy ; Mr. E.
M. Wheeler, of Dover, Delaware ; Miss Eliza A. Youmans, of New York
City ; Messrs. A. C. White, Frank S. Williams, F. W. Palmer, and R. W.
Hughes, of the graduating class of Hamilton College ; Rev. C. F. Dowd,
Rev. Dr. Stryker and Miss Stryker, with others from Saratoga and other
places.

The company joined in the Lord's Prayer, led by Dr. Stryker. Presi-
dent Seelye was elected chairman, and W, C. Taylor, of Saratoga, secre-
tary. A large number of letters endorsing the proposed Centennial were
read by Professor Mears (as given below).

The chairman called upon Professor Mears to read his paper on the
" Significance of the Centennial," in which the writer showed how the
philosopher, who had scarcely wandered from the shadow of the paternal
roof, and whose work — The Kritik — fell almost dead from the press,
now, at the end of a hundred years, and four thousand miles from Konigs-

294 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

berg, was honored l»y this group of thinkers and educators. He claimed,.
1, that the study of The Kritik was a grand mental gymnastic; 2,
would prove an effectual antidote to materialism ; and 3, led to the cor-
rection of its own errors by inviting us to study the further supplementary
works of the author.

He was followed by Professor George S. Morris, on " The Higher Prob-
lems of Philosophy." These are the true theory of knowledge and the
true theory of being. The immediate problem of philosophy is to cor-
rect the narrowness of sensational psychology and the narrow conception
of " being " expressed by the word " substance."

President Bascom read a paper on Kant's distinction between specula-
tive and practical reason. He took the ground that Kant did more for
true philosophy by his dogmatism than by his logical reasonings.

The paper of Professor Josiah Royce, of the University of California,,
was read in part by Mr. F. S. Williams, and in part by Mr. A, C. White,
both of the graduating class of Hamilton College. Professor Royce ar-
gued that philosophical progress could be best secured by a reform of
The Kritik, in its definition of experience. He proposed three " forms "
of thought in the place of Kant's " Categories," viz. : memory, anticipa-
tion, and a recognition of the existence of an external universe, with every
separate sensation. This paper was discussed by Professors Mears and
Morris and by President Bascom.

The paper of Lester F. Ward, of the United States Geological Survey,,
on " The Antinomies of Kant in Relation to Modern Science," was read
by Mr. R. W. Hughes. Mr. Ward endeavored to show that modern
science had given the preponderance to the negative and rationalistic side
of the famous antinomies of The Kritik.

Dr. W. T. Harris's paper on " The Relations of Kant's Kritik to
Ancient and Modern Thought," having arrived by express on the 7th inst,
was read by Dr. Mears on the evening of that day in the Temple Grove
parlor. The ancients doubted of objective reality ; the moderns doubt
the reality of their subjective affirmations. True philosophy must solve
both these forms of doubt. The course of philosophical speculation is
under the guidance of Providence. A novel turn was given to the dis-
cussion by attributing to Kant's subjectivity an ironical significance, which
was combated by Professors Bennett and Mears. References to Trendel-
enburg in the essay called forth reminiscences of this great thinker by
Dr. Bennett, who had studied philosophy under his lectures in Germany.
A vote of thanks was given to Dr. Mears for his success in bringing
about the Centennial, and to Mr. Dowd, of Temple Grove, for the use of
his parlor, and for his invitation to use it for similar purposes at any fu-

Notes and Discussions. 295

ture time. Dr. Mears, President Seelye, and Professor Morris were made
a committee to consider the expediency of arranging for future meetings
in the interest of philosophy, after which the meeting adjourned.

CORRESPONDENCE.

From Professor R. E. Thompson, of the University of Pennsylvania..

We should be most happy to have your paper for The Penn Monthly..
I am glad to hear that you are working so hard at Kant. 1 have not
had much time for him of late years, but I shall never cease to value
what I learned from him, and I can imatjine no better service for a col-
lege student than to make him familiar with the man who cleared the
way for the new philosophy.

I have read part of Kuno Fischer's great work on Kant in the transla-
tion, and I think it most admirable. I have only his Vorlesungen on
Kant's Life and Doctrine (a small book), and his Anti-Trendelenhurg,
which turns on his interpretation of the Critique. Mahaflfy I have only
seen, and that in the old edition. I have (1) Mirbt's Kant und seine
Nachfolger, an incomplete work on the history of the controversies ;
(2) Herder's Metakritik ; (3) Renk's Mo.ncherley zur . . . Metakritik,
showing that Herder cribbed from Hamann ; (4) F. Baader's JJeher Kanfs
Deduction des practischen Vernunft und die absolute Blindheit der letzten
(1809), which seems to me to hit the Aveakest point in the system; (5)
Hartenstein's first edition of Kant's Werke, excepting vols. 2 and 3, and
Born's Latin translation excepting vol. 3, and Semple's translation of the
Metaphysic of Ethics ; (6) Paul's Kanfs Lehre v. radik. Boese ; (7) Jach-
mann's Prufung der Kantische Religions]jhilosophie (1800) ; (8) Erd-
mann's Entwickelung der deutschen Speculation (I, 25-414) ; (9) C. L.
Michelet^ s Geschichte der letzten systemeder Philosophic (I, 37-178) ; (10)
E. Reinhold's Geschichte der Philosophic (H, 3-67) ; (11) H. C. W. Sig-
wart's Geschichte der Philosophie (HI, 21-165) ; (12) C. Fortlage's Gesch.
d. Philosophie seit Kant (10—84). These books and all I have are Thomp-
sonii et Amicorum.

I know nothing of Meiklejohn, and little of Mahaffy. The latter seems
always to do good work and yet to come short of the best. Kant is not
strong among the English at present. Hegel has more disciples, but
the greater part are taken up with Evolution, pro or con. The weak-
ness of Kant's philosophy is exactly that which Herder felt with a poet's
instinct but could not express adequately. It is also the weakness which
alienates the modern naturalistic school from him. It is his unnatural
dualism — "Nature spiritless, spirit natureless, and both lifeless." And

29(3 The Journal of Speculative PJtllosojy/iy.

yet the truth he did see most clearly — the tnitli of huiu.in freedom, and
responsibility based on freedom — is just the trutli our age needs and Eze-
kiel taught before Kant.

From Mr. James M. Libboj, Editor of the " Princeton Review.^^

I have just read your suggestion in The Penn Monthly in reference to
the Kantian philosophy, etc. T am delighted that some one should have
spoken out upon the subject of a demonstration next year, and I hope
that such a convention of scholars as you propose may be effected.

I believe that much power now latent could be brought into play by
such a meeting. I believe also that there is in America a genuine, wide-
spread, and rapidly-growing interest in philosophical matters, but which,
on account of peculiar political and commercial conditions, has not yet
fully realized itself.

I believe that if you could get some eminent man of thought and ac-
tion, such as Dr. Harris, interested in this matter, you would be doing a
great service to the " American School of Philosophy " so called.

From Professor Francis Bowen, of Harvard College.

Your letter reminds me that just a century has elapsed since the pub-
lication of Kant's great work. And during that time what an influence
it has had over opinions in philosophy and theology throughout the civil-
ized world! Most of that influence, however, has been indirect, for up
to 1850 how few persons out of Germany really knew anything about the
^' Critique of Pure Reason " ! And even now I doubt whether there are
more than a dozen scholars in the United States who really know and un-
derstand Kant in the original. Hence I fear that the public are not
numerous enough to make a celebration successful.

I wish you all success in your undertaking, but I cannot promise any
active cooperation with it. Solve senescentem equum. With my advanced
years and declining strength, I shrink nervously from any new engage-
ments, and confine myself entirely to my necessary college work.

From Rev. Dr. Hickoh, of Amherst, Mass,

Yours of the 7th instant was duly received, and I thank you for the
communication. I have not read your article relative to a Kantian Cen-
tennial, but think there must be a growing number who may favor such a
movement.

I have nearly recovered from a successful operation for cataract, and
find on hand some unfinished undertakings w4iich press too strenuously
to permit that I should let in any outside work.

Notes and Discussions. 297

I shall watch with interest any movement in the proposed direction,
:and commend most cordially your good attempt to your best judgment
^nd effort.

From Dr. Noah Porter^ President of Yale College.

Your circular is before me proposing a conference in honor of Kant,
to be held at some time during the present year.

I am very much interested in the return to Kant in modern thinking.
I have made a considerable collection of the essays which are occupied
with him in the last few years. I am free to say that Kant has treated
more questions than any philosopher of the last century, although I am
far from thinking that he has answered all these questions satisfactorily.
Indeed, the critical philosophy is open itself to the second criticism on
many fundamental points and many points of detail. No writer repays
study so well, and no writer needs to be studied more than he in order
to be understood. I should be glad to aid in any practicable scheme in
the way of accomplishing what you propose, but cannot with my present
engagements promise anything very definite for myself, nor propose any-
thing very definite for others. I see a plenty of topics in your list which
I would like to have discussed.

From Lester F. Ward, of the U. S. Coast Survey.

I intended sooner to have expressed my approval of your proposed
Centennial of Kant's Kritik, made in the Penn Monthly for December,
1880, which I read with pleasure and interest. In case a convention
is held, I would be glad to receive notice of it at least, even though I
should not be able to attend. If I contributed anything, it would prob-
ably fall under your second rubric, and treat of the Antinomies in the
light of modern science. I am acquainted only with The Kritik and
the " Theorie des Himmels," which I have read in the original and anno-
tated somewhat. Everywhere I felt that I was communing with a master
.mind, whatever might have been its objective deficiencies.

From Rev. Nelson Millard, of Syracuse.

Your able and admirable circular in reo;ard to the " Kant Centennial "
is at hand. I heartily hope the Centennial will be held, and shall esteem
it a privilege should my duties be such as to admit of my being present
.and enjoying its discussions.

From Dr. Albert B. Watkins, of Adams, N. Y.

Your circular regarding the " Kant Centennial " is at hand.

AVhile I can get time neither to write nor to attend, I feel like writing

298 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

to say that I think you are doing a good and riglit thing, and one which,.
I hope, will do much to promote interest in metaphysical study in this
country.

From Dr. J. H. Seel?/e, President of Amherst College.

President Seelye desires me to acknowledge his receipt of your circu-
lar respecting the Centennial of Kant's Kritik, and to say that, while
his other engagenients are at present so engrossing that it will be impos-
sible for him to prepare any paper for such an observance, he is heartily
in sympathy with the proposed measure, and would be glad, if it were in
his power, to contribute towards its success. (^Private Secretary.)

From Dr. E. G. Robinson^ President of Brown University, R. I.

Your circular relating to a proposed celebration of the Centennial
of the publication of Kant's " Critique of Pure Reason " has been re-
ceived.

The revival of attention to Kant in Germany, England, and this coun-
try is certainly one of the significant signs of our time. And it is hardly
possible to overstate the necessity of a riglit understanding of Kant on
the part of any one who would criticise modern thought intelligently.

It seems to me you have well stated the aspects under which the Cri-
tique, and, in fact, the whole philosophy of Kant, might be viewed in
different papers. There are several of them to which the attention of
every well-read man must have been drawn.

From Dr. E. Dodge, President of Madison University, Hamilton^ N. Y.

Your circular reached me some days ago, and would have been an-
swered at once but for a severe indisposition.

I am in full sympathy with you in regard to all you suggest with re-
gard to Kant's philosophy, except I would not like to speak as you have
done of the " proton pseudos." I should Avant to be present at any
gathering in Kant's honor. But do not attempt too much. Do not have
too many papers and too little discussion of them. I would have absolute
liberty of thought.

From Mr. John P. Coyle, Princeton, N. J.

Dear Sir: A circular in reference to a Kant Centennial has fallen into
my hands. My name is of no account to it, but a sense of obligation to the
author of The Kritik, as well as a deep interest in the future of American
thought, constrains me to record my vote, however insignificant, in its favor.
I belong to that class of young men, not small I believe, yet too small,.

Notes and Discussions. 29^

who Lave been rescued by the study of Kant from intellectual chaos,
from utter distraction. I know I am expressing the opinion of a respect-
able proportion of the younger Princeton men when I say that the one
movement that will most benefit philosophy, and thus theology and all
higher thought in America, is a revival of the zealous study of Kant, not
as an authority — I hope we are beyond that — but as a propaedeutic. He
is the Euclid of modern thought.

From Dr. George F. Magoun^ President of loioa College^ Grinnell, Iowa.

I received some days since the Kant circular, but sickness prevented
my replying. The matter of a celebration of the Centennial of The Kritik
has awakened very great interest in my mind, and I heartily hope it will
succeed. It would give me very great pleasure to be present and read
one of the proposed papers, I presume the time will be the summer vaca-
tion of the colleges. My recent ill health makes it possible that I may
be abroad then, but nothing definite can now be anticipated about this ;
and so I write to assure you that all the reasons for the Centennial which
you have named strike me with great force, and I entirely approve of the
movement. I am specially gratified at the broad plan of discussion which
you propose. It ought to promote not only interest in " divine philos-
ophy " and in Kant, but also most vital and necessary truth.

From Dr. J. Clark Murray, President of Gill University, Montreal.

Your circular has been handed to me by Principal Dawson. I am glad
to know that some movement is being made to celebrate the Centennial
of the K. d. r. V.

On Friday evening last I delivered a popular lecture on Kant in the
city, with immediate reference to the Centennial, and at the close of our
University session I intended to gather a few friends at my house for a
quiet celebration of the occasion.

I shall be happy to hear from you about the place of your meeting, and
other arrangements. As a Scotsman, a pupil of Hamilton, and an ex-
positor of his philosophy, I should like especially to know who will take
up the fourth of the subjects in your list.

From Professor Benjamin JV, Martin, New York University.

In reply to your enquiry about my own interest in the Centenary, I
have only to say that I should feel a certain interest in it, but not per-
haps of the deepest kind. As the initiator of a great movement he will
always have a claim on the world's respect; but the incompleteness of

300 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

his work forms so great a drawback upon its usefulness that I can never
refer to it with anj' entliusiasm. I am afraid that I cannot promise any
important aid in the matter. At the same time I do not like to say this
to one who is assuming the laboring oar in so honorable and public-
spirited a work. Your list, too, of topics is so suggestive and fruitful that
it seems as though I might certainly find opportunity for a brief paper on
some one of those topics. You make us all your debtors by so earnest
and fifenerous a labor.

»"

From Dr. W. C. Cattell, of Lafayette College, Easton, Pa.

Your circular, anent the proposed celebration of the Centennial of Kant's
Kritik, is at hand. It strikes me favorably, but I leave for Europe this
month, and shall not be back until the close of the year. I cannot, there-
fore, aid in the aiiair, as you suggest ; but please use my name in whatever
connection you see fit with those who are heartily in accord with the ob-
ject you have in view.

From Professor John Watson, LL. D., of Queen's University, Kingston,

Canada.

I think your idea of a Centennial celebration of The Kritik a good
one, but, unfortunately, I fear I cannot personally take part in it. I sup-
pose you are not aware that I have in the English press a work on " Kant
.and his English Critics ; a Comparison of Critical and Empirical Philos-
ophy," which I expect to be published (by Macmillan & Co., London and
New York) towards the end of this month. Should the proposed cele-
bration take place, I should be glad to submit a copy of that work to the
convention.

From Professor H. A. P. Torrey, of the University of Vermont.

I feel great interest in your proposal to celebrate the Centennial of
Kant's Kritik, and heartily approve of it.

I am the more interested because the philosophy which has been taught
at Burlington since the days of President James Marsh has been so largely
derived from the metaphysical writings of German philosophers, par-
ticularly from Kant. I should be very glad to attend such a celebra-
tion. There are undoubtedly a sufficient number of American scholars
versed in The Kritik whose presence and contributions would make
such a celebration memorable and of great service in the promotion of
sound philosophy.

Notes and Discussions. 301

From Dr. M. B. Anderson, President of the University of Rochester, N. Y..

I have been absent, or very much pressed with work, since I received
your note.

So far as I understand your views regarding the importance of the
labors of Kant, I am in sympathy with them. It is true that both the
strength and the weakness of Sir William Hamilton's thinking were due
to his studies of Kant. I should be glad to emphasize in any way within
my power the value of Kant's metaphysical labors. All adequate criti-
cism of the modern materialistic schools must start out from the Kantian
methods so far as the necessary laws of thought are concerned. The
defects of his system you refer to, and they are obvious to every student.

From Professor Borden P. Bowne, of Boston University, Mass.

I was away from home when your letter arrived. I am inclined to
think the proposed Centennial of Kant's Kritik more to be desired
than to be expected. If a survey of the philosophical field, and especially
of the problem of knowledge and its implications, could be had, it would
be of great use. Such a survey, however, must be had from a standpoint
which Kant has made possible rather than from Kant's own position.
The advance of philosophy is possible only along the way which Kant
opened, but a return to Kant in himself would be a regress rather than
a progress. Hence I cannot regard the recent Kantian revival in Ger-
many as likely to produce any good fruit. It is too uncritical and pas-
sive.

The desirability of such a meeting as you suggest is evident ; but I can
form no opinion as to its probability. The most of our teachers of phi-
losophy have only a hearsay knowledge of Kant ; and the students of
Kant very often read their own views into him. If the discussion were
confined to strictly Kantian views, rather than to more general problems
suggested by Kant, there would be a risk of turning a philosophical dis-
cussion into one of exegesis and interpretation. This would be deplor-
able, but it is no uncommon result of Kantian studies. The advantage
of the meeting would consist, I think, entirely in calling the attention of
thinkers, alleged or otherwise, to the problem of knowledge and its mani-
fest implications. It would thus serve as a protest against the shallow
confidence of our present speculators, who think that philosophy is to be
constructed from the side of physiology.

From Professor George P. Fisher, of Yale Theological Seminary.
I owe you an apology for my slowness in answering your printed letter
respecting a proposed meeting in honor of Kant.

302 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

I should cordially approve of some such method as that which you

suiigest of paying honor to the illustrious philosopher, and, at the same

time, of lendino- some stimulus to the prosecution of philosophical studies.

I could not, however, count upon the privilege of personally taking part

in it.

From Dr. W. T. Harris, of Concord, Mass.

.... I am very glad of your undertaking the Kant's Centennial. I
had not seen your article in The Penn Monthly .... Although we shall
do something to commemorate the anniversary in the Concord School
(devote a week to discussions of topics relating to Kant), yet I think
that the anniversary should be kept by American philosophers in an in-
dependent celebration, as suggested by Professor Morris. It ought to be
held in such a manner that it will not imply an endorsement of any spe-
cial institution. I shall notice your circular in " The Journal of Specula-
tive Philosophy." . . . Our celebration of Kant is not in any sense a
fulfillment of the plan you proposed, but only a contribution of a humble
sort, undertaken by a few individuals interested in a special phase of
philosophy.

I shall cooperate in your enterprise in any way you find me useful, and
do whatever you ask of me. The January number of my Journal is very
much delayed. My trip to Europe has cost me delay in all my work.

From Dr. James McCosh, President of the College of New Jersey, Princeton.

I had arranged months ago to go to San Francisco this summer, and
I am just setting out. In these circumstances it is not in my power to
show my reverence for Kant and his philosophy by attending the cele-
bration on the 6th of Ju^^y. You know that I hold the opinion that the
American student should labor to take from Kant all that is natural and
true, and reject all that is artificial and false.

From Professor Jerome Allen, President of the New York State

Teachers^ Association.

You and your associates will have all the privileges of the rest of us in
all respects. [This refers to reduction in fares on the railroads to dele-
gates coming and going, and to reduced rates at hotels.] I will attend to
that personally.

From Mr. Charles N. Doiod, of Temple Grove [Hotel), Saratoga, N. Y.

We should be pleased to see you at Temple Grove during the conven-
tion of the New York State Teachers' Association. The parlor of Temple
•Grove will be placed at the disposal of the Kant Centennial, July 6th.

Notes and Discussions. 303

THE KANT CENTENNIAL AT CONCORD.

[The following verbatim report of the discussions at the Concord
;School of Philosophy on occasion of the Kant Centennial has been re-
ceived from the secretary, Mr. Sanborn :]

CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY.

Saturday, August 6, 1881.
The session opened at nine a. m. with a poem by Mrs. Julia Ward
Howe, who explained that the poem was written many years ago (dated
1866), and that she now presented it "as a little offering to the Centen-
nial of the great master."

ON LEAVING FOR A TIME THE STUDY OF KANT.

Dull seems the day that brings no hour with thee,

0 Master ! lapsed to eternity.

1 am as loath to leave thy guiding hand

As babes to quit the mother's knee and stand.
My memory shows the rude chaotic ways
Wherein I walked ere thou re-form'dst my days.

Truth was the airy palace that I sought.

Through many a wild adventure dreamed or wrought.

Lo ! at thy touch its crystal turrets rise,

Set in the golden gloom of evening skies.

Experience widening Wisdom's sacred scope.

The fixed ideal, the everlasting hope.

[Dr. Kedney then read Professor Porter's paper on " The Relation of
Kant's Philosophy to Ethics and Religion."]

DISCUSSION.

Mrs. Julia Ward Howe — If any comment upon the essay is desired or
permitted, and I might venture to suggest a criticism, it is an effort to
make the theory carry too much theological baggage. It seems to me to
put theology and philosophy too much together, as if the one was bound
to do all the work of both. I do not think that they are. I suppose dif-
ferent people see very different things in their philosophy. But I see in'
Kant one good thing, that while he shows what is the domain of phi-
losophy pure and simple, he does not at all go into the province of theo-
logy, which is a province by itself.

Mr. Emery — Do you mean, Mrs. Howe, that Kant considered his

304 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy,

"Critique of Pure Reason" as covering tlic whole domain of philosophy
proper, or would you include his "Critique of the Practical Reason" in
the statonicnt that he did not intend to consider questions of theology ?

Mrs. IIowc — I confess I realize a little of Avhat I quoted last night
from a French author : that it requires too much effort to follow such a
discourse to be ahlc to do much in criticising it afterwards. I do not
think that Kant in the " Critique of Pure Reason " assumed to exhaust
philosophy any more than any man can. I do not think he attempted
to shut the door. We see that, because those who followed him and
added so much have felt rather invited to do so than forbidden by his
attitude.

Dr. Jones — There are people who seem to expect to find as a result of
philosophic thought something consummated, round finished marbles or
balls of conclusion, that we can fill our pockets of memory with, and
carry with us as a result. The greatness of this thinker appears in the
fact that he raised to view the never-ended problems of human life and
human society ; that his thinhing is his philosophy ; not his result of
thinking, but his thinking itself. His is the force that acts upon the
thouo-ht of the world ; that moves us ao;ain to think, and not to the van-
ity of seeking to clutch some result of thought, some last word, some
completed philosophy that will Supersede all philosophic thinking. He
is the great philosopher who, by thinking most regally, moves the philo-
sophic thought of the race, not unto consummations and conclusions. For
these themes of philosophy, we must remember, are universal. Is man
to exhaust the thought of the universe ? He may find the key ; he may
find the process of thinking ; but shall we have a system of thought in
the world which shall consummate and end the philosophic thinking of
mankind? No such thing has ever appeared, or shall appear. He is the
greatest thinker who most impresses and moves to thought those who
think. And, after all, philosophy, as a body and unity of philosophic
thought, is not an abstraction. It is not an abstract unity ; it is a concrete
unity. It is comprehensive of all schools of thought in the history of
philosophizing. And when we shall have received and comprehended
these impulses of those various great thinkers, and shall have incorpo-
rated them into our processes, we shall have made our use of them. They
will have contributed their light, their treasure, to the thought of the
world in that form.

So I am occupied but very little with the question of the deficiencies,
the limitations, the want of " consummation " in this thinker. What does
he say that is true ? That is my interest in the able paper that we have
heard this morning. Neither Aristotle, nor Plato, nor Kant, nor Schel-

Notes and Discussions. 305

ling, nor Hegel is to be looked to as having spoken the last word, as hav-
ing given us the consummation of philosophic thought. They are all too
wise to think that, and we should accept their contributions without do-
ing them that injustice.

Mr. Alcott — So far as I have been able to comprehend Kant's distinc-
tion between the Pure Reason and the Practical, I should say that in the
first treatise he was endeavoring to explore the possibilities, the reach of
the pure intellect, or the reason unilluminated by faith, or, by what he
calls the " categorical imperative," the conscience. So I will take these
two terms — reason and conscience — as expressing, in a generalized form,
the two phases of Kant's thinking.

In the first treatise he does not seem to have taken into his thought
what he called the Practical Reason in the other ; he uses " reason " in
two senses. But really does he not mean faith, or the necessary influence
which the affections have upon reason, or which the moral sense or con-
science within us has upon reason ? He finds in this first treatise that
the reason cannot solve moral questions, and, as our essayist has said, he
becomes confused because he is seeking to find depths by the pure reason
Avhich of itself it cannot fathom. He finds he can come to no sure con-
clusions, and he ends in the unknowable, and must be classed as an ag-
nostic with Spencer and Huxley and all that class. The Free Religionists
largely, and even Unitarians to some extent, appear to have fallen into
that error, and may quote Kant as authority.

Thus he settles nothing satisfactorily. He merely shows the infirm-
ity of reason by itself Then taking it up again in his- Practical treatise,
he speaks of the Categorical Imperative. " You ought," he says.
" There is ought." There is something more in that ought than in pure
reason. Pure reason is not sufficient. The conscience, the moral sen-
timent, ascends above it. All that we can do is to strive to find it, to
find in the conscience the voice of God, the Holy Spirit descending and
taking possession of the human s'oul, and thus empowering the reason
to make new discoveries, extend its horizon wider and wider under the
illumination, the inspiration of faith.

Now, putting those two facts together — conscience and reason — and try-
ing to find a term which will express all that can be thus received or con-
ceived, we say revelation. For, unless a revelation is made to the heart,
the love in us, and also to the reason through the moral sentiment, reve-
lation is incomplete ; it is but a doctrine, a dogma.

So, treating Kant with all hospitality, I conceive of him as a Columbus
exploring unknown regions. We might say to-day, after the essay we
have heard, that here was a grand mind to whom we are all indebted ;
XY— 20

306 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

and we shall no longer go into that realm where went the deists and that
class of people, and tried to solve the riddle of the world through their
senses. Kant lifted us from that, and showed us that there is something
in our minds not derived from the senses, that the senses can only reflect
what is in the mind. What a step that was ! to take us out of our senses
and show us that these can only reflect in images the ideas in the mind ;
which are innate, eternal ; that we brought them with us here at birth as
truth, justice, love, mercy, and beauty, being all revelations and intuitions.
They are the counters by which we measure everything we know. Take
.any act. AVe have an idea of justice in our minds; no act comes up to
it in our senses. We never see beauty itself with our eyes ; we see it in
our minds. Where did we get it, then ? We never saw perfect holiness
out there, save in one divine instance. The perfect holiness, then, is a
revelation in one being in human form. And so the Church is planted
on that faith alone.

Thus, I conceive Kant says nothing contrary to that. Kant is an ex-
plorer; he goes onto unfold relations, and tells us, with an absolute hon-
esty of conviction, what he saw, and no more. When he saw anything, he
has reported it to us ; and when he put out his sounding-lines and brought
up nothing, he said so. Is not that what he did, this Columbus ? That
is the man w^e are here celebrating in this chapel. And have not all the
lecturers shown that he was a splendid genius ? Though he does not speak
in Biblical phrase or theological, but ethically ; where our teaching has its
root and grounds, we need ethics to interpret the revelation. W^e need
life to inspire the reason, the heart, and make the will docile and obedi-
ent— our will, our reason, and our affections all precipitating themselves
into a righteous and perfect deed.

Mr. Colin — If I may venture to offer a criticism, I would say that not
enough attention is generally paid to the titles of Kant's two greatest works.
I come, after all, exactly to the same conclusion as Mr. Alcott. Kant
wrote first the " Critique of Pure Reason," then the " Critique of Prac-
tical Reason." I want to call attention to that word "practical," the mean-
ing of which includes action ; in Greek, Trpdrreiv, to do, to act, to make.
It seems to me that the great philosophical discovery of Kant is this :
As long as we remain in the domain of pure thinking, our mind criticis-
ing itself, we fatally come to u'ter scepticism. But we are in a world of
action ; we cannot withdn,w ourselves from it. We have to act, and so
truth is to be found not in the abstract simplicity of thinking, but in the
-concrete complexity of life, so that we must not go from philosophy to
ethics, but from ethics to philosophy. That is why Kant comes to more
definite conclusions in his " Critique of Practical Reason " than in the

Notes and Discussions. 307

■" Critique of Pure Reason," altliougli the conclusions at whicli lie arrives
may be criticised. The whole is a question of method.

Professor Harris — I think we call Kant the Columbus, not because he
■was like the three wise men of Gotham who went to sea in a bowl, and
lost his adventurous craft in the deep, but because he went through the
voyage and discovered something. He did not drop his line in and catch
nothing ; he found something. It is possible he did not know what he
found; did not know what to call it, and made a mistake as to its value
and that the philosophers of later times know how to appreciate the re-
sults and the greatness of his discoveries better than he did. I would
venture to say that, in order to appreciate the results of Kant and the
results of the whole German school, we should remember the conclusions
that we had given us in the essay of Professor Morris yesterday morning :
that we are to interpret those results by aid of the Greek philosophy,
and not by the German philosophy, German philosophy being not well
able to state itself in terms of ontology.

I would like to repeat and emphasize Dr. Jones's statement that phi-
losophy does not come to give a finality to things. Even if a philosopher
has found an absolute system of philosophy, that is not the last word.
That is the first word. When he has found a solution of things, he must
now begin to apply it, for it is a solution which may be applied to ex-
plain the world, and nobody pretends that the world is finite. It is a
perpetual evolution in fact ; and if you explain all that there is to-day,
you would have more to explain to-morrow, because it is an infinite rev-
elation of the Infinite Being. And therefore the solution or result which
may have explained to the Greek the world in which he lived, may not
be an explanation to-day ; because each philosophy has not only to ex-
plain, the world, but it has to explain the world plus the explanations
made by the previous philosophers, and the effect of those philosophies
upon the w^orld. The general tendency of our papers for the past three
days has been in the direction of an attempt to explain the great influ-
ence of the Kantian philosophy upon the history of the world since his
time.

Now philosophy, we must remember, seeks to find one principle with
which to explain what is. If that one principle is not central, is not fun-
damental, of course its explanations will be imperfect. But in propor-
tion as that principle is central, it will give us rational explanations and
reduce the many to the one, and show that the many belong to a system,
because the finding of the one in the many is reducing the many to a
system — not as with a rope of sand, but reducing the many to an organic
whole, through the discovery of dependence and essential relation.

308 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

Philosophy is in possession of this one principle, and has not arrived
at it in this ejeneration, but arrived at it long ago. The whole Oriental
world celebrates the fact that the universal is the nature of the divine,
though it has failed, according to our standards, in explaining how the
particular is to be reconciled to the universal. It seems to me they were
unable to do that. It must be confessed, however, that the Greek philoso-
phy succeeded where the Oriental failed, and that it has left in eternal
forms that solution, the relation of the universal to the particular ; it has
shown how the universal is an activity (as was emphasized in Professor
Morris's paper yesterday) — is an activity of some independent being.
The universal is no abstract generality ; it is a concrete process. All mind
is concrete, individual, and appears in no other way. There is no gen-
eral mind which is not at the same time individual. That has been said
by Aristotle.

We have, too, the principle of participation, the iJ,t^e^tg of Plato.
That is the greatest principle, because in it lies all freedom, all devel-
opment of society in modern times — the development of free republics,
the separation of the functions of government, so that from one despotic
whole we have by and by a republic, with local self-government, and the
functions of government divided among independent departments — the
legislative, judiciary, and executive — each perfectly independent, but
forming one organic whole. That is the l,varoLxici- Then we have the
first and second entelechies, explaining how there can be a being which
comes out of nature, and is first a natural being — which stands there as a
product of nature — totally depraved you may say as an outcome of nat-
ure, because everything in nature is determined from outside. lie is there
as a first entelechy, and he must realize his ideal, and must become the
second entelechy. Then he has realized the divine within himself, and
attained real independence where before he had only potential independ-
ence as first entelechy. When he begins his being, potential independ-
ence is there. There is spontaneity. He may will anything ; he may will
a contradiction ; he may put himself into the meshes of fate by sin, be-
cause the worst fate that comes to any one is the fate that comes of a
misuse of his will, twining ropes around his neck and destroying himself ;.
that is the worst fate which arises, that from the misuse of the human
will — sin and immorality.

He is then to realize his ideal. That ideal will enable him to put his
freedom into the form of consistency, and then he will grow into inde-
pendence ; not that independence which he uses to injure himself, to re-
duce himself to dependence, to fetter his soul, to "nail it to the body."
Therefore we say that this first entelechy must realize in itself the divine

Notes and Discussions. 309

idea of the universe in order to become really free, or the second entele-
chy ; that is, to make its freedom into actuality, to make its indepen-
dence perfect. This is the view of the world that Aristotle gives us, the
growth from the first entelechy to the second entelechy — to that evepyeia
— energy, which we have borrowed in our English as a word expressing
so much.

This is ontology without any thought of the distinction of siibjective
and objective, but the subjective and the objective will loom up with the
development of Christianity, which holds to the infinite importance of
the human soul. Not to the soul as an abstraction ; but the importance
of each individual soul ; for each has a destiny which he can solve only
by his own activity. Nobody can endow him with a divine being or
with holiness ; he cannot be made good by external additions. He can
only be developed through his own freedom. And with the idea of free-
dom comes out the great problem of philosophy in modern times. The
old problem was the resolution of the universal and the particular ; in
modern times it is that of the mediation between the objective and the
subjective. This problein looms up and develops into the scepticism of
Hume. Then Kant conies and takes this inventory of the subjective. And
the inventory of the subjective contributes what ? It finds all those things
that the Greek thought found to be the substantial principles ; it finds
that they are the frame of the mind itself. Kant found all that. He did
not drop his line into the sea and bring up nothing ; he brought up the
same treasures that the Greeks found. And so we see how Kant came
to the same results as Aristotle did. Aristotle's process was a logical one,
taking up time and space in his physics, and then in his metaphysics taking
up the various categories and leading them out to their ultimate premise s
What is the ultimate presupposition of this world as a whole — man, nature
— what is it? This presupposes something. It is not complete in itself.
You see in this the great meaning implied in the Platonic idea — namely,
that the realities of nature are not fully realities ; they are only partial
realities, because they only realize a part of their own definition. It is
only man that has all the potentialities and becomes an entelechy. Other
things only participate in their archetype ; they have to go through a pro-
-cess of change in which they lose their individuality ; but here is man
who can complete himself in himself. His change and development can
go on within himself The wise man who has the experience of life in
himself is more free, more intellectual, has more within himself, is more
independent, and more of a revelation of the divine Being, than the child
or the savage. They are potentially free ; he is actually free. This, then,
is the problem before Aristotle : man and nature. What is the ultimate

310 The Journal of Speculative Philosophij.

presupposition ? He takes it up in common, natural objects, and then va
man ; and he does it wonderfully, taking up the categories which the
Greek language had worked out so remarkably. (A philologist of insight
would know when he saw the Greek language, and the form of its sen-
tences, that there was a nation designed under Providence to solve the
theoretical problem of the world.) He carries these things back to the
idea of a self-active being whose self-activity is pure intellect. Herbert
Spencer has grown to the idea of an ultimate Force which is no particular
force, although it makes all particular forces. It is an Energy acting in
itself. Therefore its activity is self-determination. Mr. Spencer does not
say that ; but it lies in the thought of persistent force, and there is no
escape from it. That is Plato's Idea, and Aristotle's Actus purus, Yoa
can identify self-determination with intellect, because that which makes
self-limitation objectifies itself, and both limits and annuls the limit ; but
when it annuls limit, as you do when you remove that limit out of your
mind, the limit is no hard limit; but when you remove the object of your
thought, you return to yourself. And the only possible being that can
do that — the only realization of that process — is mind. Mind does that all
the time. That which is able utterly to annul this limit, as well as to make
it, transcends time and space. When you annul the thought of the things
of sense, and form in the mind the thought of the genus or species, you
transcend time and space utterly and totally. And the being that can da
that has a subjectivity elevated above time and space, and, therefore, a
personality that does not descend into change and decay.

Just think of natural science and what it has to do to elaborate this
thought of Aristotle, and to see it throughout nature in every direction.
Talk about philosophy being a finality ! Why, its work has only begun^
I cannot help thinking of the fine image which Mrs. Howe's poem of this
morning suggested. I was reminded also of that hymn of Coleridge be-
fore Mont Blanc, in the Valley of Chamouni, when he sees those majestic
forms rising there in eternal light above the clouds, above change and
decay. All around us below, as in Church's " Heart of the Andes," we
see growth, multiplicity, and vegetation, and evidences of human life in
the villages and cultivated fields ; and then we see the stream that pro-
duces this fertility of the valley. Whence does it come ? It springs from
the glacier up there, where the conflict between the sun-God and the ice-
God takes place. It is there that this principle of fertility and variety
is produced.

So philosophy does not come as something that is abstract and has no
relation to concrete life ; but it has come for the very purpose of explain-
ing things as they are, and of directing them to their ideal forms. And.

N'otes and Discussions. 311

so we look up above the valley and see what sends down this multiplying,
fructifying impulse, and we see Primal Philosophy and Theology — the
sources of rational insight and directive power in human life. Those
lines of Tennyson come into my mind where he speaks of the sunshine

land :

'* And then I looked up toward a mountain tract

That girt the region with high cliflPand lawn ;
I saw that every morning far withdrawn,
Beyond the darkness and the cataract,
God made himself an awful rose of dawn."

But what shall we think of the technique of philosophy ? Why should
philosophy have technique at all? It has been objected to as being un-
necessary and pedantic. The language which speaks of finite things and
their relations speaks of fragments of the universe broken off and con-
sidered apart ; is that language adequate to define and describe the to-
tality and its unchangeable conditions, its eternal verities ?

" But on the limits far withdrawn

God made himself an awful rose of dawn."

Far above change and decay we see the great shining light that streams
from those lofty heights of Being inviting us up, but which we cannot
ascend in a capricious and arbitrary mood ; we can ascend only with those
celestial virtues of faith, hope, and charity. And when we become in-
spired with those virtues we shall be ready to receive the language of
philosophy and theology which states those things adequately, although
it states them in a language unfamiliar with sense. Will not, in fact, the
spiritual insight demand other and more adequate terms in which to de-
scribe the eternal verities than this style of gossip and prating of the
vanities of the day ? The thoughts of fragmentary reality must be mend-
ed by synthesis in order to be adequate to the real of all reals. So must
the expression be mended, and we must have a technique for philosophy.

The voice that cries up the slope its questions of destiny wdll not hear
the reply in the language of village tattle. To such it will be as to those
in The Vision of Sin,

" To whom an answer pealed from that high land,
But in a tongue they could not understand,
Though on the glimmering limit far withdrawn,
God made himself an awful rose of dawn."

Dr. Mears — My interest in this Kant celebration is a practical one as
a teacher, desiring that our teaching in philosophy should take a higher

312 The Journal of Speculative Philonophy.

platform than it has done. One difficulty about teaching Kant has been,
not, as Mrs. Howe has intimated, that he had " too much theological bag-
gage," but that he had too much iniidel baggage. We could not get the
people to study him, because they thought he was the father and source
of all the so-called rationalism of Germany. Now I am indebted to Presi-
dent Porter for bringing out the fact that that sort of thing was there
before Kant, but that Kant gave it its death-blow. Now if we can get
men to take that view — and I do not know any man in the country that
is better able to dispose and persuade our teachers to take hold of Kant
— we have done the best thing we could in this Centennial celebration.

AFTERNOON SESSION.

Professor Bascom read a paper on " The Freedom of the Will, Empiric-
ally Considered," prefacing it with some criticisms of Kant, and also some
remarks upon philosophical technique, in which he contended that ter-
minology should be capable of translation into common language. If
philosophy be ultimately a settling of the limits of authority of human
knowledge, then it must take hold of human knowledge where it exists in
the minds of the mass of men and explain it there, aad apply all its limi-
tations and principles there and not elsewhere."

DISCUSSION.

Immediately following the paper Mr. Emery said : There are two points
in that paper which I want to speak of while somebody else is getting
ready to speak. The lirst one is the striking instance which President
Bascom has furnished of the true criticism of the Kantian philosophy. It
does not differ in result from the criticism which we have heard several
times this week. It calls attention again to the trouble which Kant got
himself, or us following him, into when he called space and time and the
categories subjective. The criticism of President Bascom, as I under-
stand him, is that if the term " subjective " is used there as meaning indi-
vidual— which is the only sense in which it can be used to make it cor-
respond with any true antithesis between subjective and objective — then
no experience at all would be really possible. If each individual mind
itself creates space and time and the categories, there is no conjunction
between his experience and mind. It might be doubted whether Kant
intended to be taken exactly in that way ; but if he did not, why not say
that space and time are objective ? Indeed, Kant did say that the Cate-
gories are objective also. But the criticism directed against Kant's sys-
tem was, as I understand it, if space and time are not objective, then no
experience is possible. And that point struck me as being a point of

Notes and Discussions. 813

criticism which had been developed before and reached by rather a differ-
ent method.

Then in regard to the second part of the lecture — that is, the paper
on liberty — I was particularly struck by the way in which President Bas-
com comes to his positive results. I never happened to read or hear
before a treatment of freedom by exactly this method, and yet the re-
sult arrived at is exactly the result which I have been accustomed to
consider the true one. The illustration in regard to Aladdin is a very
forcible one. There could be but one Aladdin. That is to say, such lib-
erty as Aladdin's destroys itself. There is no such thing as liberty in
that sense. Liberty which does not make itself into law is not liberty, as
the lecturer well said.

Professor Harris — I would point out also that there was a very close
agreement with the paper yesterday of Professor Morris on the point that
a higher advance in knowledge is an advance away from form. The word
" form " has a thousand technical meanings. Of course he (Dr. Bascom)
means " shape." The Platonists and Aristotelians would say the mind
goes towards pure " form " in another sense from that in which President
Bascom says it moves away from it. " Form" is also an Aristotelian tech-
nical term ; but the Aristotelian would hold that going towards pure form
is the same as going towards the pure " act ; " because they hold that the
pure form is the same thing as pure energy. It is a process of going
away from determination or shape and the lower finite categories, and
towards the Absolute, which is pure intelligence and will, I could not help
thinking carefully, as Professor Bascom was reading, about the point he
made in regard to technical terms, and which I could not quite understand.
Because the paper used technical terms derived from a good many systems,
and it is evident, therefore, that there could have been no intentional
disparagement of technique, although it appeared so in his first state-
ments. Technique is absolutely necessary in philosophy, because phi-
losophy undertakes to look at the world in a different way from common
sense. Common sense gets hold of facts and generalizes, but it does not
generalize to the same extent that philosophy does. Philosophy under-
takes to reach the universal and the one, or, rather, to explain the world
by one principle. It is very interesting in the history of philosophy to
see how many different techniques have been made, and it is also inter-
esting to see how each language has its own way of cutting up the world
into concepts, and expressing it in different classes. No two nations
take the same view of the world ; each one classifies objects in its own
way, and hence the words do not exactly cover the words of another
j)eople. And it is very interesting to go from one language to another,

314 The Journal of Sjyeculative Philosophy.

and get to understand the different standards of looking at the world
used by different peoples. And so in philosophy these technical expres-
sions may seem to be walls which hide one man's thinking from another.
Our only refuge is to translate each technique into others. We shall find
something in each technique that has a certain advantage. In the history
of philosophy we meet hundreds of different techniques, and each one
can give us some aid. Each philosopher started out with some special
view of the world, and colored his whole philosophical system v.'ith the
tinge of the peculiar technique that he used. Of course, if we seek to
adopt a technique for ourselves, we must look for that of the philosophical
system that is the most perfect, and this would be the Aristotelian tech-
nique. And yet it is desirable that every one should study many systems
of philosophy, and should endeavor to find the equivalent of these tech-
nical terms in the Aristotelian system as being the one that has most
widely spread and entered into all languages, and has expressed and sys-
tematized the bulk of the thinking in all modern languages. I doubt if
natural science has an advantage over philosophy in avoiding technique,
or whether it can possibly get along and state its conclusions in common
language. The technical term used in the paper, " molecular changes,"
talks about that of which common sense knows nothing. So when
natural science talks about " atoms," and about "laws," and "matter,"
and " force," it uses those words in a sense that the unscientific mind
does not understand at all. The unscientific mind confounds all the time
iiniversals and particulars. As President Bascom knows well in his long
experience of teaching philosophy, one has all the time to call attention
to the fact that often a person thinks he uses common sense and is
speaking of particular things, and yet is using universal terms. I think
he will agree with me that the most fearful technique in philosophy is
that of the person who us^s a common term in a special sense and yet
leaves the reader to think that he is using it in the ordinary sense ; for
the common language differs from the scientific in using terms vaguely,
being unconscious of most of the specific content. It is as if a dwarf
should put on clothes that were made for a giant, using only a small
part of the room in them. Philosophical culture has to draw out the
grasp and meaning of words, and make common sense conscious of those
universals. Socrates did this by showing that the person who used those
words without appreciating them is all the time contradicting himself.
Socrates finds a person going about Athens with one of these great
words on his tongue ; he draws him on step by step, and makes him
conscious what a great world of meaning is contained in the word, and
the person finds that the meaning of the word is wide enough to contain

Notes and Discussions. 315

many contradictory meanings of siicli a narrow scope as his little mind
harbors.

So in regard to the use of common terms. If there are words express-
ing familiar ideas, the mere common sense has a right to those words,
and they should not be taken away from it. Therefore, too, if in the
language there are these general terms, which the spirit of the language
has made to express higher thoughts of great compass and depth, we
can find them out and use them for technique in philosophy. It makes
a better philosophical technique to use these rarer words than those com-
mon, familiar words whose meaning is so shallow — for, when they come
to the ear, the person does not say, " I know all that that means." He
sees that it is a little larger than his habitual thought; it calls out reflec-
tion ; it shocks him, as it4Svere ; it makes him come back again and again
to it. I know the experience of reading Kant, after reading Cousin, who
writes in a popular style, though very excellent in its way. Coming to
Kant's Critique, the person reads a sentence and strikes his head, and*
says : " I am sleepy ; I don't know what the matter is with me." And he
tries another sentence then and there, and he reads on down to the bot-
tom of the page, and finds that he does not know at all what it means.
That was my experience. I read Kant for ten months, and couldn't
understand anything he was talking about. The words seemed to be put
together all right, nouns and verbs ; but what the sentences meant I
didn't know. I found out in the progress of my study this curious fact,
that whereas before I commenced the study I had been subject to hypo-
chondria when I went into a library, saying, " I never shall be able to
master all these books ; it will take me a whole lifetime to read a single
alcove," I found that I was gaining greatly in power to get through a
book in a short time. I found that there were some books that would
have taken me three weeks before that I could now read in three min-
utes. I could take the table of contents and find what the author was
driving at, and all that he could tell me.

But by and by the thought of Kant began to dawn on my intellect ;
and by and by I saw also the results that flow from it, and which have
been mentioned. With regard to the view of this paper, I would like to
suggest it as a question : Whether we may not take a different standpoint
in regard to mind, and say that mind is not individual mind in the sense
of being special mind ; whether, in fact, the knowing consciousness does
not deal with universals, the principle of mind being that of participa-
tion (the Platonic thought) ; so that this mind, John's, for instance, in
knowing takes hold on the same things and participates in knowing with
all the rest of mankind. That is, throughout it is participation and uni-

310 Tlie Journal of Speculative PJiilosopln/.

versal all the time. Therefore it makes it possible with that view of the
mind to sec how the Kantian philosophy may be true, if it is expounded
through the idea of participation. If we know through illumination from
the divine Mind, and He makes the world so that time and space are
his forms creating it, and he endows us so much above other beings in
nature that wc can enter, as it were, into his creative act by which he
makes tlie world; that we can see time and space as forms of our mind ;
it is not the form of our particular, individual, special mind ; it is the
form of the divine Mind, So we would say that time and space are ex-
ternal to us. But we could say, on the other hand, that time and space
are internal to iis, and that we hold that which is common to each other,
because each of us has this divine element in the form and matter of
knowing. And in participating in that, we find the world, as it were, with-
in us ; within that subjectivity. That is, we find within us rationality,
time and space, the categories, and universality ; and we find them
through the fact that God has made us in his own image. If we include
the world of ideas as logical conditions of this world of extension, we
include the world of atom and matter and fact. Therefore the world
stands to us as based upon mind, because all its logical conditions are
ideal, therefore it is knowable. But mind, as the divine Mind, is the ab-
solute real.

Thus some of us have been trying to show how, if rightly interpreted,
Kant's subjective philosophy falls into harmony with Aristotle's objective
philosophy, wherein he showed that divine reason makes the world, and,
therefore, reason or mind is the substance of things, of matter, and of
everything else, not in the pantheistic sense, but in the creative sense. So
that, on the one hand, looking at it ontologically, we trace it back to
Mind as the fundamental presupposition of everything; and Kant, on the
other hand, comes to the same conclusion. He comes to it, not as his
individual mind — the private property of Immanuel Kant, though he
comes to it subjectively — but as mind which has an infinite form to it.
And so we say that absolute Mind and Reason is the foundation of
things.

I am satisfied myself with the Greek basis. I should not fall into the
subjective scepticism in any case. But those who do take that subjective
basis and reach scepticism have been answered by Kant. Kant says:
■" Just take a good inventory of your subjective mind, and see what comes
of it." And so he takes that thorough inventory, and without seeino-
liimself clearly what he had arrived at, he comes to the same result as
Aristotle, and therefore he solves that antithesis, and bridges the chasm
between subjective and objective.

Notes and Discussions. 31 T

Mr. Sanborn — I have not had the pleasure of hearing all the papers
and discussions of this week touching upon the life and philosophy of
Kant. Many things have been said, some of which I may perhaps repeat.
I would say a word on a subject of which Professor Harris and others
have spoken — terminology and of method — and to remind the school of
what one or two great poets have said on this subject.

Mention has been made, and very properly, of the interest which
Goethe took in the philosophy of Kant. No doubt it was real and pro-
found. Yet, when he came to review his life, after he had reached the
age of seventy or eighty years, he said to Eckermann that he had given
too much attention to the study of philosophy ; and he thought that
Schiller had occupied himself and his friends rather too much with the
study of metaphysics. And he made this remark in 1829, in another con-
nection— he was then eighty years old — " Schubert's book is chiefly in-
tended to prove that there is a standpoint without philosophy — that of
the healthy human understanding ; and that art and science have always
thriven best independent of philosophy. This is water for our mill. For
my part I have always kept aloof from philosophy ; the standpoint of the
natural human understanding was the one I preferred." There is a great
element of truth in this, and also in what President Bascom has said this
afternoon in regard to the practical value of philosophy — that it must deal
with the things and facts of life as they are. Not the outside material
existence or the ordinary events of life; but it must deal with the experi-
ences that come to men in this world, otherwise it is not of much impor-
tance. Now a poet like Goethe, who was both poet and philosopher, and
our own poet here (Mr. Emerson), who is also poet and philosopher, but
Avhose preeminence lies in his poetic faculty — these men are to be excused
from following very long and very steadily in the path of philosophic
method, because they have a path of their own by which they reach their
results in a more natural and effective way.

Many just tributes have been paid here to the influence of Kant's phi-
losophy ; we can see what a prodigious influence it exerted ; not, how-
ever, so much directly as indirectly. Reference has been made to his
successors — to Fichte — concerning whom we shall hear a paper next week
by Mr. Mead — and to Schelling ; and of course we have heard much of
the Hegelian philosophy. Now I incline to think that up to this time,
when perhaps the condition of things may be changing, the spirit of the
Kantian movement in Europe — 1 mean by that its higher and more active
spirit (not dwelling upon those secondary results to which Dr. Porter
called our attention this morning) — has more affected America through
Mr. Emerson than it has through all other persons combined. For Em-

318 The Journal of Speculat'i've Philosophy.

erson, like Goetlie and unlike Kant, has been one of those men who di-
rectly and by their own personality aflPect mankind. Wherever Goethe
appeared, wherever his personal presence was seen or felt, or his works
were read, he excited a very warm interest — sometimes for him, some-
times ao'ainst him, but always a direct and profound influence. The effect
has been sometimes a repugnant one, stimulating hostility, or, at any rate,
a collision of some kind ; but it, has also produced a very favorable feel-
ing towards him, and an interest in the things which he stood for. Now,
so far as I can observe, such influences proceeding from Mr. Emerson are
the strongest literary and poetic and spiritual influences — without includ-
ing the interest attaching to systems of religion — which have heretofore
existed in America. Emerson himself was strongly influenced, no doubt,
by the German thought ; not so much directly by Kant as through Goethe,
and also through Fichte, and Emerson's influence, extending to the friends
immediately about him — to Theodore Parker, who was very much awak-
ened by Mr. Emerson, to Dr. Hedge (who, notwithstanding his early
•studies in German philosophy, I fancy, was quickened more by his per-
sonal friendship for Mr. Emerson than by anything that happened to him
in Germany), to Margaret Fuller, and others — -the influence, I say, radiat-
ing from these persons who lighted their torch at Emerson's, has affected
our country very much.

I would also refer to a matter which has been mentioned here, but
which needs to be mentioned more directly — the fact that Mr. Emerson,
through The Dial, communicated to the American public their most dis-
tinct knowledge of what Schelling was doing in those later years when he
was brought to Berlin, at the instance of the Prussian king, an opponent
of the Hegelian philosophy. In July and October, 1842, and in January,
1843 — the number is dated then, but really relates to the year 1842 —
Mr. Emerson called attention to what was going on in Berlin in these
words: " The King is discontented with the Hegel influence which has
predominated at Berlin, and with this view he summons the great Schel-
ling, now nearly seventy years old, to lecture on the Philosophy of Rev-
elation. These lectures began in November, 1841. The lecture-room
Avas crowded to suffocation ; the pale Professor, whose face resembles that
of Socrates, was greeted with thunders of acclamation ; but he remained
pale and unmoved, as if in his own study."

Mr. Emerson, I think, was indebted for that information to Mr. Elliot
Cabot and Mr. Charles Stearns Wheeler, both of them graduates of Har-
vard College, who had gone abroad to study in Germany. This intro-
ductory lecture was described by Mr. Cabot in a letter and translated by
Mr. Wheeler, and the translation is published here. In this letter of Mr,

Notes and Discussions. 319

'Cabot there is a description of Schelling's course after lecturing at Berlin
in 1841-'42.

In a subsequent letter he gives Mr. Wheeler's translation of the intro-
ductory lecture itself. I will read one or two passages in this lecture as
having some bearing upon the remarks which have been made here dur-
inff this week.

"At no time," said Schelling, at Berlin, in November, 1841, "has phi
losophy encountered so mighty a reaction from the side of life as at this
moment, a proof that it has penetrated to those life-questions in relation
to which indifference is neither lawful nor possible to any. Philosophy
at present affirms itself religious in its conclusions, while the world denies
that it is so, and regards particularly its deductions of Christian dogmas
as mere illusions. Such is even the confession of many of its faithful or
unfaithful disciples. ... It is a great thing that philosophy in these
days has become a universal concern. The very opposition that I have
mentioned shows that philosophy has ceased to be an affair of the schools,
and has become the business of the nation. The history of German phi-
losophy is, from the beginning, inwrought with the history of the German
people. In a time of deepest debasement, philosophy held the German
erect. In the schools of philosophy — who in this connection remem-
bers not Fichte, Schleiermacher ? — many found in philosophical contests
the resolution, the courage, the self-possession, which in far other battle-
fields were afterwards put to the test."

Schelling referred here to that extraordinary scene at the close of the
Napoleonic wars, when the philosophers of Germany, headed by Fichte,
were in fact the leaders of the German people, and contributed more than
any political combination to the overthrow of Napoleon, that pest and
scourge of Europe.

Mr. Alcott — Human faculties are differently cast into different types. It
is in vain for persons of a certain type to attempt, without very long effort
and a probable failure, to look at things in a purely philosophical manner ;
and it is equally impossible, ordinarily, for those of another type to look
at them in any other than a poetic manner. For, if imagination and
fancy predominate in us, we look at things symbolically, and adopt a sym-
bolical language by which to express our ideas. Such is the poet. He is
■so cast. He does his work so. For, although he may study philosophy,
and possibly put himself into that predicament, seeing things as the phi-
losopher does, logically — by the reason and the understanding — yet these
not being his strongest faculties, he does not succeed. So, on the other
hand, one who has the logical faculty and the understanding, and wants
to put things into strong logical speech and formulas, will not succeed

320 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

ordiiiarilv in writing poems, or in looking at things poetically. Do not
seek to put vour minds, those of you who are not logical, into logical
forms, thinking that you must learn that alphabet to know anything ;
neither shall I say to you who are logical. Put your thoughts into poetic
forms. The good God who has sent us here gives ditferent types, and
our methods are ditferent. There can he no enthusiasm or great work
in the world that is not done in harmony with our faculties as we receive
them from God himself and as we follow out their law. So we should be
very much disappointed if persons should go away from the teaching
here and suppose that they must necessarily do their work in a certain
Avay. Goethe and Emerson and Shakespeare and Dante, and the great
poets of the past, occupy a wide space in the world's history, and interest
a large class of people in their manner. So do the great thinkers, Aris-
totle, Plato, Kant, Ilcgel, Schelling, and Fichte. But do you not see
that you could not put each one into the other's brains ? It could not be
done. Put a poet into a logician's head, or a logician into a poet's head,
and see what he will do with those faculties. They do not work so.

The beauty of this school is that we have those who speak from these
different aspects, so that we gather an idea of the different modes in
which thought works. We call it a School of Philosophy, it is true.
Mr. Emerson puts his philosophy into warm tropes, and paints pictures
with his words. But Hegel and that class of thinkers strip off the
image and give you the pure, absolute truth as it lies in their minds.
Mr. Emerson could not have had his influence on the Avorld had he en-
deavored to do his work as Hegel did. Indeed, he reads those books
very little ; he has no success in reading them. He dips into them and
gets the substance of them ; but to follow out any logical method would
not be his way. This is the poetic side, the light side ; that is the logical
side, the darker side, which is to be brought out into the light. Imagi-
nation and reason are the opposite poles of one sphere. The poet and
the philosopher work differently, but they do the same work.

LETTER OF DR. S. E. HODGSON.

To the Editor of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy,

Sir : When Mr. CoUyns Simon, your correspondent in the number for
January last, characterizes Hegel, M. Renouvier, and myself, as Mate-
rialists^ he shows either an incapacity, or shall I say, a perversity, of
judgment so great as to disqualify him for being profitably argued with.
It is ludicrous to call Hegel a materialist. Equally so to call M. Renou-
vier one. As to myself, I hold that I am protected from the appellation

Notes and Discussions. 321

by my fundamental distinction between Nature and History (see, among
other passages, "Philosophy of Reflection," Vol. I, pp. 225-227), as
well as by my " Constructive Branch of Philosophy." But Mr. Simon
apparently calls everything materialism which is not Berkeleyanism.
His " New Materialism " is a pure mare's nest. I do not imagine he will
induce any metaphysician to discuss the question with him. Certainly
not myself. I am, sir, faithfully yours,

Shadworth H. Hodgson.

London, July, 1881.

[The pages referred to by Dr. Hodgson are quoted below from his
work on Reflection. — Editor.]

" But it will be asked — fairly, and, indeed, necessarily asked — Where do you look for
the cause, the substance, the agent, the conscious thing (call it what you will) of con-
sciousness ? If you refuse to put together cause and consciousness into one thing,
you can have no conscious soul or mind, as well as no conscious transcendental apper-
ception or ego ; or, in order to place the causal nexus somewhere, do you call the soul
or the ego a series of coTiscious states becoming conscious of itself as a series ? For, if
you do, you will only be again attributing causality to consciousness in the words
' becoming conscious,' and it will be just the same essentially as if you fairly adopted
the expression soul, or ego, or transcendental apperception.

" I fully admit the necessity of the question and the justice of the last remark, and
my reply is this : I put the enquiry into cause, agent, source, force, or however may be
expressed the notion of what makes, into a separate and a subordinate department of
the enquiry. I place first subjective analysis, an enquiry into the nature, the ri iimv of
things ; and, secondly and subordinately, I place the enquiry into the genesis and the
history, the ttoDs irapayiuerat of things. The first enquiry is a branch of philosophy,
the second and subordinate one is a branch of science ; the first is, in the case of con-
sciousness, metaphysic, the second psychology.

"This premised (and the distinction between nature and history is one of the most
fundamental in my whole theory), I proceed with my answer. The nominal definition
I would give of the soul or mind is a series of conscious states, among which is the
state of self-consciousness. And the agent or substance which becomes conscious, or
in which resides the force of becoming so, or which has the states of consciousness, is
not the series or any one or more of the states which compose it, but (in man) the
brain or nerve substance. When we draw the above necessary distinction between
nature and history, then the question so often put, Materialist or Idealist ? is to be
answered, in the first place, by the further question, Do you mean in philosophy or in
psychology? For the two domains are essentially different ; and those who answer
this question with me will probably reply alijo with me to the first question. Idealist (or
rather reflectionist) in philosophy, materialist in psychology, and, indeed, in all the
sciences. The causes and the genesis of this and that individual conscious being, as
well us of each and all the states and processes of his consciousnesy, depend upon mat-
ter in motion. And if you tell me that matter in motion is nothing but sensations in
coexistence and sequence, I reply that this is an analysis of the nature of matter, not
an account of its genesis or history. The first cause that we can discover anywhere is

XV— 21

322 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

matter in motion ; and that we can analyze tbis cause subjectively, only shows the
truth of my assertion that the domain of genesis, of history, of science, is subordinate
to the larger domain of nature and philosophy. I do not profess to assign the prior
condition, the substantia, or cause or agent, of consciousness at large. I exclude that
question from metaphysic. And I say that if a piior condition of that combination of
states of consciousness which we call matter could be assigned (which smaller ques-
tion is not necessarily unanswerable), it would be by an insight into the unseen world
— by a theorem belonging to the constructive branch of philosophy. Materialism, then,
which is worthless as philosophy, inasmuch as it gives no account of what matter and
motion are, or in what the eflicieucy of physical causation consists, is the only sure
standing ground in science, where the problem is, assuming these phenomena as given,
to measure, weigh, and predict their sequences and coexistences.

" Now, to take congciousness and its phenomena to examine, as if they were objects
of direct, and not, as they are, of primary and reflective consciousness, is to treat them
as objects of science and not of philosophy, is to clump together causality and con-
sciousness, is to assume that they have force or causal efficiency in them. This would
lead, and has led over and over again, to an a priori psychology. And with an a
priori psychology (to say nothing of an a priori philosophy) metaphysic has henceforth
nothing to do. Fortunately, we possess a genuine a posteriori experimental psychol-
ogy, a true science, which is daily yielding results of the highest value to many able
and distinguished investigators — fortunately for the world, and fortunately also for
metaphysic ; for metaphysic will derive from thut psychology an independent support
and verification."

ROMAN LOVERS.

Not that I loved her more

Than he could claim bis store ;

Not that she showed him sign

That was outranked by mine.

No, neither could claim it all,

Its splendor could forestall,

Which like some broad river flowing,

For either bank no pref rence showing,

Bending toward one awhile,

Blessing other with its smile,

Ever bearing on its course

Toward heaven from heavenly source.

Ah ! too small is man's estate,

Cares not woman for its fate.

Pour from your flagon in my cup.

Thou lovely one! and fill it up ;

And fill again, to him, my peer,

Without envy, without fear.

The cup, it holds but all it can —

Too small for thee, enough for man.

John Albeb.

Newcastle, N. H.

JVotes and Discussions. 323

SCHOPENHAUER'S SELECT ESSAYS.

Two admirers of Schopenhauer have ventured to test the public
appreciation of their favorite philosopher by publishing an excellent
translation of five of the best of his brilliant essays. They have selected
the following : 1. The Misery of Life. 2. Metaphysics of Love. 3. Gen-
ius. 4. Esthetics of Poetry. 5. Education. To these articles they
have prefixed a " Biographical Sketch," which, as they inform us, is
" Mainly an excerpt from Gwinner's Life of Schopenhauer." Hoping that
many will buy this book, we print the following extracts from the au-
thor's circular :

"the select essays of ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.

{I'ranslated from the German, xvith a biographical sketch, by C. A. P. Dachsel and
Garritt Droppers. In one volume. Price, $1.25.)

" Schopenhauer, though comparatively new to fame, stands to-day acknowledged one
of the greatest philosophers of all times. In combining depth of thought with clear-
ness of expression and conciseness of style, he is without a rival among German
thinl^ers.

"No translation of his works has ever appeared. Our aim in selecting these essays
has been to enable the general reader to gain a clear conception of those peculiar views
which distinguish him from all other writers.

" 'No philosophical author of ancient or modern times is so frequently alluded to ;
none so frequently plagiarized. . . . Ideas are so abundant, especially in Schopenhauer,
that it seems no great crime to steal a few of them. . . . His chapters are brilliant
apper9us, in some of which he anticipated important discoveries of modern physiolo-
gists. . . . Goethe is the only one of his countrymen who can be compared with him
as a literary artist. If any one doubts this, he will be convinced by reading the wonder-
ful chapter on genius. . . . And Schopenhauer, although he never wrote any verse,
must yet, like Hawthorne, be ranked as a great poet.' " — The Nation, December 23, 1880,

It can be obtained from Sentinel Co., publishers, or Des Forges & Co., Milwaukee,
Wisconsin.

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY FOR ENGLISH READERS

[We have received the following prospectus from the enterprising pub-
lishers, and we rejoice at the impulse which is promised to the cause of
philosophy in this country by the series of philosophical classics herein
named. — The Editor.]

PROSPECTUS.

Messrs. S. C. Griggs & Co., Chicago, announce that they will begin,
early in the year 1882, the publication of a series of "German Philo-
sophical Classics for English Readers and Students," under the general
editorial supervision of George S. Morris, Ph. D., Professor of Logic,
Ethics, and the History of Philosophy in the University of Michigan, and

324 Tlie Journal of tipeculative Philosophy.

Lecturer on Pliilosophy at the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, and
with tlie co-operation of the eminent scholars named below.

Each volume will be devoted to the critical exposition of some one
masterpiece belonging to the history of German philosophy. The aim in
each case will be to furnish a clear and attractive statement of the special
substance and purport of the original author's argument, to interj)ret and
elucidate the same by reference to the historic and acknowledged results
of philosophic inquiry, to give an independent estimate of merits and de-
ficiencies, and especially to show, as occasion may require, in what way
German thought contains the natural complement, or the much-needed
corrective, of British speculation.

It is intended that the series, when completed, shall consist of ten or
twelve volumes, founded on the works of Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling,
and Hegel. It will thus furnish in effect a history of the most conspicu-
ous and permanently influential movement in the history of German
thought, and its general object may be stated to be to render reasonably
accessible to the intelligent English reader a knowledge of German philo-
sophic thought in its leading outlines, and at the same time to furnish
the special student with a valuable introduction and guide to more com-
prehensive studies in the same direction.

The volumes now contemplated, together with the names of their au-
thors, as far as at present determined, are as follows :

Leibnitz's "New Essays Concerning Human Understanding,"

Kant's " Critique of Pure Reason," The Editor.

Kant's " Ethics," President Porter, of Yale College,

Kant's "Critique of Judgment" (Esthetics and Natural Theology).
Professor Robert Adamson, of the Victoria University, Manchester, Eng-
land.

Fichte's " Science of Knowledge."

Schelling's " Transcendental Idealism," Professor John Watson, of
Queen's University, Kingston, Canada,

Hegel's " Logic." Dr. W. T. Harris, editor of " The Journal of Specu-
lative Philosophy."

Hegel's " Philosophy of Religion."

Hegel's " Esthetics." Professor J, S, Kidney, of the Seabury Divinity
School at Faribault, Minnesota,

Hegel's " Philosophy of History and of the State,"

The volumes will not necessarily be published in the order above given.
The first one, on Kant, will be issued early in the spring of 1882, and the
others at convenient intervals thereafter.

Probable price per volume, $1.26.

Book Notices. 326

TEE SADDEST OF THOUGHTS.

The saddest tliought that ever found its way

Into the curious chamber of the mind,
Is, that to close the latest earthly day

Sums all of life ; that all is final blind.
Dispose of elements, nor shall we find

Rest other than the dusty remnants have
Which were our bodies and the soul enshrined,

Then to be parted like th' unmeaning wave.

The friendly atoms all, forth wandering from the grave!

R. R. BULKLBT.
Chicago, November 30, 1878.

BOOK NOTICES.

Illusions: a Psychological Study. By James Sully. "The International Scien-
tific Series." Vol. XXXIV. London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1881. New York:
D. Appleton & Co.

Mr. Sully's book will be welcomed as the latest contribution to "The International
Scientific Series " by those who have, perhaps, been inclined to feel that psychical and
speculative sciences have not as yet been quite fairly represented in the development
of the publishers' undertaking. Out of thirty-four volumes now extant, there have
been only nine or ten dealing with subjects other than physical. The present volume,
apart from its intrinsic merits, which are great, has this relative value : that it is one
more weight in the higher scale, and goes to restore the balance of the series as sym-
metrically mirroring the encyclopasdia of science.

It deals with illusions, not of external perception merely, as most treatises do, but
also of introspection or reilection, memory and belief, and concludes with an epilogue
of considerable length and fulness, which will have special interest for the readers of
■"The Journal of Speculative Philosophy," inasmuch as it points the way from the sci-
ence to the philosophy of illusion — a speculative critique and review of the whole
field of error. This interest will be the greater that thia contribution to the philosophy
of illusion is from the hand of a man of science, and shows in him much breadth of
culture and openmindedness of regard.

In a modest way he apologizes for his intrusion, as he takes it, into the field of
*"■ divine philosophy " ! But we shall say nothing about that, and only take what he
gives us with gratitude, though not without discrimlnatiou.

Science is description, classification, and explanation by psychical and physical con-
•ditions. Science assumes a great deal to begin with. It is for philosophy, he says, to

326 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy^

deal with thc?e faiths and assumptions, and to justify them if it can. This distinction
between science and philosophy, which is his immanent and latent guide in the first
eleven chapters, directing and limiting therein the strictly scientific treatment of his
subject, is brought out by him in the last chapter, and set forth with articulate perspi-
cuity.

To teachers and scholars the educative value of the book is great, as showing how
much need we have to watch ourselves living, lest we fall from sanity of thought and
life through the devious ways of error and illusion into insanity. The lesson of the
book is that there is no line of demarcation — nothing to pull us up in our too easy
descent.

The sum of his first chapter is that illusions are fallacies that have gone together
into themselves and assumed the mask of immediacy and self-evidence. He goes some
way towards admitting tliat all knowledge is mediated. In the second chapter he has
to consider his classification. He sees well enough that a thorough scientific classifi-
cation would be one based on derivation, and, therefore, according to origins. But he
chooses to reject this ideal, because illusions, as immediately given, may be diverse,
though possessing a common origin in the same false process of reasoning.

He also rejects the distinction of Hallucination and Illusion as a ground of classing
because it concerns degrees and not kinds. In the superposition of fiction upon fact,
when the superstructure becomes exorbitantly great relatively to the sense-stimulus
or initial percept at its base, we call the result hallucination ; but, though the initia-
tive sense-impression may be minimized, it may be doubted whether it is ever quite
absent — and so the question between hallucination and illusion proper remains one of
degree only. Accordingly, he adopts the popular division as above given; a good
working one, though, no doubt, Mr. Sully could have written a book more recondite
and thoroughgoing, and more suggestive to experts, on the derivative basis. Such a
perfectly symmetrical rationale of the genesis of illusion remains a desideratum,.

When in the chapter on " perception" our author proposes " to distinguish between
a sensational image, e. g., the representation of a color, and a perceptional image, as
the representation of a colored object," one is a little inclined to take exception to the
phraseology. Is not a color that you can make an image of both an "object" and a
percept? And how can you have either a presentation or representation of a " sensa-
tion" or feeling which is only an inchoate element of a percept — distinguishable in
reflection but not separable? — not an object or existent that can be perceived and
imaged ? Apparently by a " sensation " Mr. Sully here means a single initial (ultimate
in analysis) percept, like the vision of one homogeneous piece of color ; and by a " per-
cept " a complex of such percepts. Yet he goes right to ignoring the thought-element
in every least percept. In this chapter he describes the probable " physical basis " of
perception. But when he tells us that the nervous process underlying a sensation oc-
cupies the same region as that which underlies the interpretative image, and that the
two processes differ in degree of energy only, and that the peripheral regions of the
nerve organism may come to be involved just as much in the one case as in the other,
one cannot help seeing that the physics or physiology of perception, while explaining,
as Mr. Sully shows with the latest and most lucid exposition, many subsidiary points,
fails to give us that difference in kind which subsists between true and illusory percep-
tion. When the molecular movements that are represented as the physical bases of
the interpretative image on the one hand, and of the sensation on the other, become
assimilated in momentum, as they are supposed to do at the instant v,'hen " pre-per-

Book Notices. 327

ception " becomes " perception proper," nothing remains to distinguish them. They
occupy exactly the same time and space, and representation has actually become, in its
physical aspect, presentation. Imagination and perception, according to this physical
interpretation of them, are all one and indiscernible. But this is the ground of differ-
ence between illusion and truth in sense-perception, obliterated. Physiology, therefore,
affords us no criterion of illusion, and is irrelevant.

Mr. Sully, however, soon disengages himself and his readers from the toils of phys-
ics and other such entanglements. The recoil and return to sanity of view are quick and
sure. Thus, " Illusion is deviation from the common and collective experience." In
short, solidarity and consistency is criterion. Illusion is dislocation or isolation. That
is the drift of his doctrine, and it tends towards the recognition of a universal conscious-
ness or reason. It is in him to come to that eventually. And, meantime, the tendency
gives a certain philosophical quality and tone to his writings. When a man of science
can say, " What we call a ' sensation' is really compounded of a purely passive impres-
sion and the mental activity involved in attending to this and classing it," you can see
he is on the right road, though he may not have gone very far. A Uttle farther, and
he will discern that " sensation " without thought is simply pure nonsense. Take an-
other strikingly suggestive utterance, considering the quarter it comes from. He is
speaking of the frequent organic unity and coherency of dreams, and trying to account
for it by "the intellectual sentiment of consistency," the synthetic instinct, and he ends
by saying: "In toucliing on this intellectual impulse to connect the disconnected, we
are, it is plain, approaching the question of the very foundations of our intellectual
structure ! " Such an one is not far from the kingdom of philosophy.

His treatment of the question of " personal identity " is empirical, and from the
standpoint of the imagination and " understanding." It is, therefore, not quite satis-
factory as speculation. What the radical notion of selfsameness is, he leaves us still
to conjecture.

Is the continuous intuition of Time its basis? We have to place every phase and
moment of our changing empirical selves in this time-continuum. Does its continu-
ousness compel us to fill up any lacunae with similar tracts of empirical consciousness ?
Mr. Sully says we may do so, or " manage " to do so ; but the question is. Must we ?
And, if we rmtst, then the time-continuum and the continuous selfsame act of reflection
filling it up are the obverse aspects of what we call personal identity and continuity.
The image of continuous selfsame time, and not the " collective image " of the empirical
ego, would be the true Vorstellung or " idea " of personal continuance and oneness. He
endeavors, in the chapter on belief, to establish a thoroughgoing distinction between
memories and expectations or forecasts. He says anticipation need not be grounded
on memory, and, in proof, " anticipation is pretty certainly in advance of memory in
early life." Granting this, what of his " prenatal memories" or ancestral experi-
ences wrought into the infant's brain, and determining its instinctive expectations?
Again he says," As a mode oi assurance, expectation is clearly marked off from memory,
and is not explainable by means of this." Certainly, as modes of assurance they
differ — i. e., in their emotional aspect. The emotional accompaniments of forecast and
those of memory are different. But have they any other differentia ? I think not.
As representation, forecast, or expectant belief, is made up of memories and percepts.

The epilogue begins with some paragraphs, rather liesitating, yet fairly, and on the
whole indicating that, as already suggested, illusions are fallacies collapsed, and that
what is phenomenally for the individual consciousness immediate knowledge is, in

328 Tlie Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

truth, mediated knowledf^e masquerading. To be sure Mr. Sully says that illusions can
only be so described " bv a kind of fiction." But a " fiction " cannot be the basis of a
eciencc. ITow could there be any science of illusion, such as his own, if illusion could
not be exhibited as a process, in very truth ? There could ouly be cataloguing and
"natural history."

But the main question of this last chapter is, What prospect of deliverance from
error and illusion? What does science answer to that? "There is tlie familiar
method of the evolutionist." "It might seem possible to prove by it tliat ro??imon cog-
nition must in general be true cognition." Mr. Sully has his doubts. There are others
the reader may have. The evolution of true cognition is " an incident of the great
process of adaptation, physical and psychical, of organism to environment." But
"organism" and "environment" are both highly complex and abstract representations
of Mr. Spencer's. Why may these not, as represented, be illusions? At lease we do
not seem to be entitled, for the purpose of a comforting argument, to assume that they
are not. If, in order to show that all knowledge is gradually being freed from error
and delusion, we assume that our whole department of all knowledge — that relating to
*' organism " and " environment," and Spencerian evolution-theories generally — is already
free, it looks very much like begging the question. Moreover, if "evolution-theory "
be true, itself is a product of evolution; and, unless the force of evolution has spent
and happily consummated itself in evolving Mr. Spencer and his theory as a _y?wa/ effort,
then " evolution-theory," like theories innumerable gone before, is only a transient mo-
ment in the process of approximation to " perfect adjustment." What will be left of
It when its illusions have been eliminated in the course of evolutions? How can we
trust that which, on its own showing, must be a thing provisional and passing away ?

" Experience, like a sea, soaks all-efifacing in 1 "

Then when we are told that " all correspondence means practical efficiency," and
that the practically efficient individuals and communities will of course survive in the
struggle, and so illusion come to be eliminated by natural selection, it occurs to us to
ask whether " practical efficiency " is anything more than adjustment of one hemisphere
of human consciousness to the other ? All is within consciousness. Hence, from the
wider imaginative point of view, in the face of possible worlds of knowledge and intelli-
gence beyond humanity, the doubt still stands, and the survival of the "efficients" and
of their happy " consensus " does not exclude the possibility of persistent common illu-
sion. But to come back to " the strictly scientific standpoint," let us see whether " all
want of correspondence means practical incompetence." Mr. Sully admits, on the con-
trary, that the illusion of self-esteem mostly helps men in the race for life and survival.
And again, shall I certainly come to grief by obstinately insisting on believing in the
Ptolemean or the Mosaic Cosmogony ? Will it affect my success as a shipmaster or
practical miner? As a practical breeder of cattle, does it matter one whit whether I
hold with Darwin or " special creation" ? Then there is " the direct process of adapta-
tion." "External relations that are permanent will stamp themselves on cur nervous
and mental structure." But what about Galileo and Copernicus ? The " permanent
r<?lations" were all for Ptolemy and against Copernicus. Everybody had always seen
sun, moon, and stars rise and set, and go round, and the earth had been perennially a
fixture. Just as often as not, true science has to erect itself against and in spite of
"permanent relations between organism and environment."

Science failing him, Mr. Sully turns to philosophy. And here there occurs a memor-
able sentence : " If philosophy finds that there is nothing real independently of mind,

Book Notices. 329

science will be satisfied, so long as it finds a meaning for its assumed entities, such as
space, external things, and physical causes." Alas ! " Philosophy is still a question
and not a solution," and Mr. Sully finds little more help here. His conclusion appears
to be that the hopefulness of science is, in tlie last resort, based on faith, implicit, in-
explicable— faith in reason, yet itself beyond reason, seeking no justification and finding
none. If it be said. There is no reality in consciousness, no truth for reason, we must
just say : " Illusion then be thou my reality." " Pro ratione stet voluntas."

Of course we may, if we choose, postulate an " objectively real," in the sense of a
universal permanent consciousness or conscious reason — a perfect experience which,
as " environment," is assimilating us to Himself And it may be said that this is our
framework in which it is possible for the ultimate optimistic hope and confidence to
embody itself when it would view itself represented and named.

But this is not ground and justification of the initial act of faith. It is ideal repre-
sentation and after-thought.

Implicitly, inexplicably, we must believe that whatever is in consciousness is real,
and that on this reality, and out of it as material, reason can build up Truth, and that,
taken at infinity, illusion is a vanishing quantity. But to take a thing at infinity is to
lay hold on an ideal. And to some it may appear that the Ideal of Truth has a twin
sister in the Ideal of Immortality. They would say that, if we must postulate or frame
the unattainable ideal of truth to enable us to get up and keep up fire and steam for
our journey of search, just so are we under an equally natural and inevitable compul-
sion to frame the ideal of endless active approximation of living reason to the unat-
tainable elimination of illusion.

Mr. Sully is not to blame if some of his readers see visions, and dream dreams like
these. It only shows how he sets one a thinking — how stimulating and pregnant his
book is. J. Bprns Gibson.

London, April. 1881.

Literary Art : a Conversation between a Painter, a Poet, and a Philosopher.
By John Albee. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1881.

" The scene oF the conversation," the author tells us in the preface, " is the mar-
gin of the Concord River; the time, a summer, not long past; and the speakers three :
a painter, a poet, and a philosopher. These three grew up in the country together, went
to the same school, academy, and, finally, college, maintaining their friendship then, and
subsequently, unbroken. For upon entering life they had followed different vocations —
painting, teaching, and farming — and no one of them had as yet become so celebrated
or prosperous as to make him forgetful of the other.

" Almost in their boyhood they had heard something, but indistinctly, of a new move-
ment in thought and philosophy, which at college they came to know more fully of
But never had they visited the seat of the new ideas until the present time, when,
in a summer vacation, they make together a pilgrimage to Concord ; and having seen
the famous men and monuments of the town, they come in the afternoon to the bank
of the river. There, near the old bridge, under the pleasant shady trees, they sat
down, and fell into the conversation which I — happening to be the guest of one of
them in his own home, whom it was awkward to leave behind, and scarcely less so to
take, having none of their associations or curiosity — listened to in silence, have remem-
bered for a long time, and now attempt to relate."

The author has placed in the mouth of each interlocutor such theories as he finds it
•convenient, in order to develop his views of literary art, and is not careful to make

330 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

each person present a well considered, systcmstic doctrine. He is all the more careful
to bring out the various sides of his theme with as much fairness and profundity of
treatment as he can command.

Mr. Albee is a master of a fine literary style, and is at the same time more than a
literary artist. lie is a man possessed of a wise experience, and has evidently been
through many of the saurian periods of development wliich gifted young American
poets arc likely to grow into. There are flashes of the negative wit of Byron, also of
Burns, also of Goethe, in this book. But the negations are matched by positive gener-
alizations and helpful insights.

We quote the following passages as specimens of style and treatment from different
parts of the book. The painter, it will be seen, is most of a philosopher.

Poet speaks. '• Others may prize us for more mature achievements ; we prize our-
selves most for finding the paths that led to them. I have tried to say the same thing
in verse. If you would like — "

Painter. " Of course ; I knew by your manner you were coming to what you sup-
posed was a good thing. What a pity artists cannot capture unawares a spectator!
But let us have it."
Poet. " In spring we wear a green and leafy suit.

If happily the Muse permit her light ;
Then flowers, and, last of all, for others, fruit ;
But most the leaf and flower ourselves delight."
Painter. " That is enough. It was just as good in prose, I think. Let us stick to
prose ; interjected poetry is an unfair advantage, is apt to put out every light, even
when a quotation."

Painter. "You know I am fond of the sea-shore in winter. Then the idlers are
gone where they can again be comfortable, and the sea and shore have all the lonely
grandeur which is their peculiar property on the New England coast. Walking there
every day I often see old footprints that look remarkably large and strange, as if some
of the ocean gods had been up and down the beach ; but, reflecting, I know they are
my own, enlarged, and the individual outlines a little obliterated by some chance eddy
of the tide. We are always rediscovering ourselves. Either we once lived and con-
versed with some whom we read, or they come back to think their thoughts in us."

Painter. "All we can do is to stop at some famous place, enlarge or particularize it,
and be humble interpreters to our masters ; holding a candle to the objects over which
their full sun has once passed.

" We are taught that man is the me isure of everything, and every man that measure ;
and all that is sensuous is frowned down as wanting the refined, ideal characteristic."

Poet. " Your grievance sounds suspiciously personal. Take care not to generalize
from anything you have yourself suffered. The world immediately detects the tone of
the unsuccessful ; and it stops to listen only to the more fortunate."

Philosopher. " There is nothing for us who speculate but to go forward in search of
pure reason and final causes. We know they are unattainable, but not unapproach-
able ; and we expect, with that mark, to come nearer than on those short lines that are
forever crossing each other, doubling back upon themselves, because they find some
pleasant shade whei'C it is easy and sweet to rest."

Booh Notices. 331

Philosopher. "Do not mistake our somewhat fixed and arbitrary nomenclature for
the circle in which you charge us with moving. We have too much neglected the pro-
prieties and elegancies of language, intent on what we thought more important."

Philosopher. "First, let us see if there be any such thing as literary art; next, if we
conclude that there is, let us examine what it consists in, and of how much impor-
tance." _______

Philosopher. " You would then accommodate your style and subjects to the level of
their capacities and interests ? "

Painter. " By all means ; how else will they hear ?

" I call that successful literary art which adapts itself so to the reader's conditions
that he knows all that is said ; or he has heard of others who know. Literary art
must follow the tone, the standards, the spirit of the time ; or else I hold it is no art,
but caprice, an idiosyncrasy."

Painter. "It is in vain to be cosmopolitan before we are even provincial, to obtain a
whole success before a half, or a quarter of one. What you long for, if you do not find
here, you will not find elsewhere. Europe does not make one cosmopolite, but an
inward creative faculty touches the walls of the world from its own centre without
locomotion."

Painter. " And you complain that there is no career, no public, and no actor ! All
that is left us is to sit down at the second table of some Greek banquet, or curse the
stars that did not allot our career in the French capital. Only yesterday I saw your
latest lament of this kind, in the weekly organ of all that is un-American. I suppose
you have the paper in your pocket."

Poet. " I ? no ; I have not even seen it, and do not care to. For I never print any-
thing but I wish to recall it ; not, however, on account of the matter, but the work-
manship."

Philosopher. " I think I can help you ; I was reading the paper this morning, and
when we started I wrapped up some fishing-lines in it." ....

Painter. " Will you hand the verses to the poet and let him fead ? "
Poet. "No; you shall read them yourself. I should like to hear if they sound
through your voice as tliey did once in my ears without a voice. Usually that is a.
mortifying test. But I am ready."
Painter {reads ) :

" Ages ago the larger, riper fruit
Which crowned the topmost boughs of those fair trees
That in Hesperides stood thick and tall,
Was plucked by elder poets in its prime,
And through tlie orchard rose majestic hymns.
Some windfalls here and there to us remain,
For which we slender men must stoop, not climb ;
Or shrivelled crab among the lower limbs,
The season's laggard, setting teeth on edge,
More fit for vinegar than Chian wine,
And puckering up the mouth in some shrill songJ'

332 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

Painter. " Yesterday was the invention of the regretful ; to-morrow of the indolent.
Who lives in either loses two days. The present is all that really is, and precisely the
spot where we are tlic only tan;:;ihlc point of the universe.

"In my next vacation I mean to complete my 'Poet's Almanic' .... I have
already received one contiibution. . . .

" Hear what this writer of mine has to say of his year in comparison with that of
other astronomical calculators.

" ' Poet's Almanac.

" ' The gods to man give months and years]
For forethought and the ward of ill ;
That, armed with active liopcs and fears,
lie learn to master fate by will.

" ' For him are fruitful clouds and suns,

From field to field, from plant to plant,
He as their friendly shadow runs,

And husbands well whate'er they grant.

" 'He sows and reaps the earth's broad fields,
Trusting to autumn, springtime's care ;
The season lost, no profit yields
The year, and profitless is prayer.

■" ' Let him be prudent then and wise.
Since for itself is not the day
Alone; and no to-morrows rise
On him who casts to-day away.

" ' May nature give him blest increase

Who trusts her aid and lends his own ;
And unto him who has no piece

Of earth, be still some bounty shown.

" ' The Muse gives only day and hour,
Blind to the future and the past ;
That poets, missing fortune's dower.
May hold the present moment fast.

" ' But other grace the Parcae show

The poet, doomed the world's wide steep ;
He reaps the fields he does not sow,
\ And sows where he will never reap.

■^' ' He counts that season's harvest good

When verse in heat or cold waxed strong;
When day and night forgetful stood.
And the whole year bore but one song.

■'" Write, Muse, for him, a calendar —
The poet's own creative week ;
When to his fiat is no bar,

And clay is taught Hweet words to speak.' "

Booh Notices. 333

Painter. " I think it is likely the good poet does invent his subjects, inasmuch as he
endeavors to find those so insignificant that his (reatment gives to them their only im-
portance ; for nothing in nature or life is of any value until it becomes the subject of
reflection or imagination; or else those already so famous in history or fable that he
must furnish out something so probable and apposite to their character that all men,
easily, and with delight, recognize it as what might have been justly the deed and the
word. Now this elevation of the unknown and trivial into something beautiful or in
teresting, and the clothing of the better known and always significant in appropriate
garments — these two efforts are probably what the poet means by inventing his sub-
jects."

Painter. " To determine the moment of chiefest expression for detachment and repre-
sentation, to detach it and give it an existence of its own — this is the aim of art. The
expression ought, however, to suggest all that belongs to the subject, both before and
after it has been preci;Jtated into a single moment or form. It has been attempted
successfully a few times: in the Laocoon, in the frescos of Michael Angelo, and in
several of the tragedies of the Greeks and of Shakespeare. It is this that, in a peculiar
manner, allows us to read into certain .creations so much of what we call the sugges-
tive. It is truly the characteristic of all works that have seized the transcendent mo-
ment, the central idea, and neglected trifles. . . . Art makes us free to every special
art. All the terms of each, all the aphorisms and axioms, are transferrible and usable
in every other. . . . The artist intervenes to represent the contact of man and nature.
The resemblance, if only realistic, is only vulgar — that which the uninitiated desire,
see, and wonder at ; sparrows that fly at the cherries in the picture ; sheep that are so
much like sheep, yet, after all, only sheep. Nature can make a better single thing
than the artist can represent, and it is vain to compete with her in her own province.
But let the artist arrange, discover, and bring together something inexpressible or only
accidental to nature. Then is he man, the artist ; a being not superior to nature, but
more universal and adaptive; as an individual capable of making permanent his way
of seeing objects, and of establishing a new relation of objects."

Painter. " Opportunity passes by the unprepared, and they wonder at their ill-luck.
. . . There may be those now standing aloof only forbidden by an erroneous opinion
of the severities of your studies, heightened by seeing the obscurities, the bizarre ter-
minology, and labyrinthine construction of your philosophical parlance. ... I will
not insist upon all the graces of style in your philosophy if you will compromise, by
clearness, neatness, and more illustration, an occasional figure, by way of bait for the
more frivolous, and such a vocabulary as is common to the best English prose. For,
after all, these are the foundation of literary art, which, I suppose, we all three agree
begins to be necessary only when one has a genuine message to deliver to his fellow-

Poet. " Consider how the conception of the devil has been transformed by being
taken up into literature as an actor without moral intention. It was long before Mil-
ton's characterization of him began to be noted. Readers read out, at first, what they
were in the habit of believing, a pure evil essence. It was a great step in tiie extirpa-
tion of the popular conception when a certain grand air was impressed upon his wicked
image."

334 Th^' Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

Poet. " What is this original power, genius, insight, which you repeat so often ? "
Painter. " It is not an easy matter to define them. Tiiey ever take some new form.
Wo ivnow tlieiii «hc>n wc see thoni, but cannot very well ilescribe them beforehand.
Some say they are a larger receptivity, observing ten things where others observe one,
and, by means of ideals in the mind, setting them in feigned relations, which become
symbols of truth and nature. Sometimes, on the contrary, they are a more concentra-
tive vision, seeing, not the ten things, but the one, with such intensity that it is resolved
into all and stands for all. And well it may, for there is nothing which is not related
and representative. There is a vision which can take in the complex and deliver the
simple, which can measure variety and detect unity."

Poet. " The Greeks had measure in everything, and propriety ; whether their minds
were unagitated by the complexities that overwhelm us, or because they had attained to
repose through the perfection of their arts of architecture and sculpture and literature,
I know not."

Paintei-. " Most that was painful, tragic, pathetic, they placed among their gods and
heroes, and it was softened by memory, elevated by the sublimity of the actions and
the majesty of the actors. There was no room for tears ; pity there was, mingled with
pride and reverence for destiny. Sophocles was a great critic as well as a great gen-
eral and dramatist. He said Jilschylus did right without knowing it. He said of him-
self that he was wont to describe men as they should be ; but that Euripides described
them as they are. Now, I suppose that ^Euripides's realism was the source of his
pathos and power over his audience. He alone, among mortals, has fairly succeeded
in elevating commonplace to sublimity."

Poet. " When literature loses faith in itself as the interpreter of man's being and all
we know of divine and of nature, its degradation is complete. It begins then to be
capricious, without dignity or motive, except emolument and amusement. Then men
put themselves in training to write a book, as the athlete to develop a particular muscle.
They study men and women and nature at strange and unfrequented points, and ran-
sack the world for novelties to write about. They make literature a profession and a
business, and follow it after professional and business principles. I deny the name of
literature, though obliged to use it, to their work."

Painter. " There has been a revelation in regard to environment, and we have discov-
ered the law of heredity, which relieves us of the necessity of considering our great
men at all remarkable ; distributing their gift along seven generations, one contribu-
tion from that, another from this, you see how neatly and unsuspected we can deprive
the latest representative of much credit for what he may have accomplished. That

there should be such a man as Mr. cannot be left unaccounted for. Twenty times a

year I read the ancestral explanation, which seems to me always to say : ' My dear sir,
you had a remarkable grandfather and a remarkable great-grandfather, and grand-
mothers are always remarkable, and it is not very, only a little, remarkable that you
are remarkable.' So, while we have this deep personal interest in the men who create
literature, I think there is hope for us."

Philosopher. " ' See thou nothing that is base ? ' was written by a poet of our day.
It was the practice of the most celebrated of ancient men. They lifted their eyes from

Book Notices. 335

the earth ; but benefited it more by what they saw and reported than do those who go
on all fours, mousing in every pestiferous recess. There are unquestionable maladies,
and the doctors are too plentiful, and the remedies."

Painter. "Philosophy assumes the self-evident, and employs itself in proving it,
picking up on the way many truths. I value it not so much for its noble intention as
for the freedom and light which have ever, unawares, accompanied its exercise."

The Bea0tiful and the Sublime : an Analysis of these Emotions and a Deter-
mination OF THE Objectivity of Beauty. By John Steinfort Kedney. New
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1880.

The object of the author of this treatise has been to discuss the fundamental ques-
tions underlying aesthetics", rather than to make a text-book on the subject. With this
in vieiv, he has been careful to avoid all applications of his results to particular ques-
tions in art criticism, except so far as is necessary for illustration. He has also avoided
the question of aesthetic culture, for the reason that it is a part of the question of cult-
ure in general, and its consideration belongs after the consideration of ethical culture.
Book I considers the subjective aspect of the sublime and beautiful, while Book II
treats of beauty as objective.

In Chapter I he defines certain terms : " The human soul is called a selj\ because in
its consciousness it distinguishes and relates the two realms, or materiel therefrom ;
and all of its states are determinations from both sources, amid which it determines
itself, and out of which it constructs its own world." The soul has " susceptibilities,"
or modes of passivity — namely, sensation, registration, memory, and emotion. It has
" faculties," or modes of activity — such as perception, recollection, fancy, insight,
understanding, judgment, reason, imagination. "Reason" is used by Dr. Kedney to
mean not only a faculty, but a light — as the sum of the special human elements super-
added to the animal soul. Consciousness is regarded as belonging to animals as such,
and to be distinguished from human self-consciousness, which exists because of reason.
He distinguishes a third form of consciousness (Chapter III), which arises when objects
are seen in their essential ideas. He finds a feeling of enjoyment connected with every
perception and with every recognition of an idea. " This consciousness of enjoyment,"
he says, "or of the deprivation of that once had, or of pain, is the first spring, and
always a chief spring, of all human activity ; nor can any concrete form of being, in-
volving self-consciousness, be conceived as without this accompaniment of feeling pene-
trating throughout."

This enjoyment he finds to be connected with reciprocity of some sort, and not to be
thought as belonging to an utterly solitary self-conscious being. The discovery of a
limitation to his being, and the further discovery that he can modify his environment,
leads him to an ideal of a possible or desirable life or state of conscious enjoyment,
which enlarges and enriches itself with his constantly growing knowledge.

" No ideal of life as desirable can be dwelt upon, or even formed, which does not
include this our relation to the physical universe. Any ideal of a perfect state must
extend beyond that of perpetual intuition of thoughts, and include the wealth that can
come from a possible environment between which and the soul's desire all contradic-
tion is removed. The ideal of a perfect life, even for the philosopher, is, then, still a
physical life."
. Dr. Kedney sees in the beautiful a suggestion of freedom to the spectator. Freedom

336 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

is the spiritual burden of the work of art, whether in sculpture, architecture, or paint-
ing or music :

" Nature, at lirst glance, and at the latest glance lor some, seems under the dominion
of necessity — to be fixed, inexorable, fateful ; but a second look, and, perhaps, the final
look, finds suggestions and tokens of freedom. The former impression is depressing
and mournful ; the latter elevating, inspiriting, joyous. Nature's most welcome use at
least, possibly its true use, is to furnish ?•< -flections of human freedom, wherein it helps
to convince the latter that it is real and not a delusion."

In an appendix our author discusses the doctrines of Kant, Schiller, Hegel, and Day,
n some of their testhctical bearings.

BOOKS EECEIVED.

The Three Americas Railway. An international and intercontinental enterprise,
outlined in numerous formal disquisitions and five elaborate essays, all strongly advo-
cating free and fast and full and friendly intercommunication between the sixteen
adjunctive and concordant republics of the New World. By various earnest and confi-
dent supporters of the scheme, among whom are Hinton Rowan Helper, Frank Freder-
ick Hilder, Frederick Anthony Beelen, William Wharton Archer, Frank Deyeaux
Carpenter, Francis Augustus Deekens. St. Louis : W. S. Bryan, publisher. 1881.

Jahresbericht ueber die koenigl. Studienanstalt in Speier fuer das Studienjahr.
1880-81. Mit einem Programm ueber Sprache und Kritik des lateinisehen Apollonius-
romanes von Dr. Ph. Thielmann. Nebst einem doppelten Anhange : (1) Verbesse-
rungen zum lateinisehen Konstantinroman von Dr. Ph. Thielmann ; (2) Die Vulgata
als sprachliches Vorbild des Konstantinromanes von Dr. Gustav Landgraf. Speier.
1881.

The Pathway of Angels. A Lecture by Spirit Emanuel Swedenborg, delivered
through the Mediumship of Mrs. Cora L. V. Richmond. Boston, 1881.

The Platonist. Edited and Published by Thomas M. Johnson, Osceola, St. Clair
County, Missouri. A monthly periodical devoted to the dissemination of the Platonic
philosophy in all its phases. Pp. l'7-32. $2 per annum. [Contents of No. II: (1)
Pearls of Wisdom gathered from Platonic Sources (consisting of short sentences) ; (2)
Editorials ; (3) Translation from Plotinus, from Enn. 5, Lib. 5: " That Intelligibles are
not External to Mind," and " Concerning the Good ; " (4) Platonic Demonstration of the
Immortality of the Soul, from the Gieek of Hermeias, by Thomas Taylor (reprint from
"The Classical Journal"); (5) Hymn to the Muses (from the Greek of Proklus, by
Edwin Arnold) ; (6) General Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Plato, by
Tiiomas Taylor ; (7) lamblichos : a Treatise on the Mysteries (new translation, by
Alexander Wilder) ; (8) Platonic Technology : a Glossary of Distinctive Terms used by
Plato and other Philosophers in an Arcane and Peculiar Sense, compiled by Alexander
Wilder, Professor of Psychological Science, etc., in the United States Medical College ;
(9) Book Reviews.]

THE JOURNAL

OF

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY

YoL. XV.] October, 1881. [No. 4.

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY m ITS RELATIONS TO
REALISM AND SENSATIONALISM.

READ AT THE CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, ATTaUST 3, 1881, Br JOHN WATSON.

A philosophy must not be regarded as less perfect than another
because it has less of consistency within itself. There is such a
thing as the weakness of one's strength. A man who is not af-
flicted with a strong and energetic nature will not very readily
leave the beaten track for devious courses, but, on the other hand,
he will as certainly not lead others into fresh fields and pastures
new. A man or a philosophy is to be judged by a standard other
than that of its mere external completeness. As time goes on the
world becomes for the thinker much more complicated, and there-
fore he who tries to make a conception, which was adequate enough
when the world was less complex, do under the altered condition of
things, will produce a system apparently adequate, because of its
very inadequacy. To Parmenides pure being seemed sufficient
as a formulation of the universe, but to whom does that notion
appear sufiicient now ? Not even to Mr. Spencer, prone as that
thinker is to rest satisfied with categories of exceeding simplicity.
We shall, then, judge unfairly of any philosophy, and especially
of the philosophy of Kant, if we endeavor to estimate it by the
somewhat external standard of self-consistency. No doubt such a
XY— 22

338 The Journal of S_peculative Philosoj)hy.

metliod of looking at a system has its own value; for a philosophy
which is hopelessly illogical — I mean one which is incoherent
within itself — is, in all probability, at the same time hopelessly
inadequate. But there is son:iething much higher than mere con-
sistency between parts; there is that noble sort of inconsistency —
the inconsistency of genius — which arises from the fierce struggle
between the Tiew and the old. Of want of development in the

• system of Kant there is enough and to spare; l)ut there is not less
evidence of an insight into the infinite complexity of the modern
world, which is only seen by the man of genius, or seen by others
when time has made it clear. To appreciate Kant we must there-
fore view him as the exponent of a new synthesis, and not siu)ply
as giving a new solution of the same old problem. The problem
given to Aristotle to solve, he solved for all time; but he did not
solve the problem of Kant, for Kant's problem implied the inter-
mediation of Christianity and the changed aspect of the modern
■world, which followed in the train of Christianity.

Kant, it has been said, is constantly asserting that metaphysics
are independent of the teaching of experience, and that they must
not call in exj^erience. That to a verbal critic of Kant this should
seem a fair representation of his teaching is intelligible enough,
but it is hard to believe that any one who has once clearly real-
ized what Kant's problem was, and how he tried to solve it, should
put the matter in this way. Idealism does not spin the universe

> out of the individual consciousness, or construct the world indepen-
dently of facts. Idealism, in any sense in which it is held outside
of a lunatic asylum, does not deny that we know real objects, nor
does it assert that objects are dependent on the individual con-
sciousness of any man, or of all men ; on the contrary, it aflirms
as emphatically as the realist that there is a real world, and that

^this world is not constructed by the individual mind. The ideal-
ist takes exception, not to the facts of experience, whether these
concern the world of nature or the world of mind, but to a realism
which assumes a world existing independently of intelligence, and
to a sensationalism which explains the world as the product of
association acting upon the particular and evanescent feelings of
the individual man. To the first idealism replies that a real world,

' existing independently of all intelligence, is a world that by defini
tion cannot be known, and therefore cannot be known to exist.

Critical Philosophy — Realism and Sensationalism. 339

SucTi a world, even granting it to be real, can only be thought of
as an unknown something mysteriously operating upon a mind
that is shut out from any direct relation to it. Realism, in fact,
leads to agnosticism. For, when we attempt to explain how a self-
dependent world comes to be known, we are compelled to acknowl-
edge that all that gives definiteness to it, all the properties by which
it is known, exist only in relation to a being that thinks, as dis-
tinguished from a being that simply feels. The world as known
being thus resolved into intelligible relations, the world as it isi^
supposed to exist beyond knowledge is necessarily deprived of all
motion, change, and life, and only survives as a ghostly thing in
itself, indistinguishable from the Spencerian Unknowable. Realism
can only save itself from this fate by becoming assumptive and
dogmatical ; it can but asseverate, as loudly as possible : " There is
a real world, and we all know it ! " Who denies the truism ? The
question is not, whether there is a real world — a fact which admits
of no dispute among sane people — but what the natiire of this
real world is. Is it independent of intelligence, or is it not ? This*^
is the question, and, until the necessity for putting it has been
clearly perceived, we may have a robust dogmatism, but we can-
not, properly speaking, have a philosophy.

Kant did not deny the facts of experience. Like all philoso-
phers, he began with the world of experience, as it exists for the
unphilosoi)hical man, and the problem he aimed to solve was :
What are the intellectual elements which must be presupposed in
order to a complete and adequate explanation of experience ? His
method was in essence identical with that of the scientific dis-
coverer when, assuming certain fiicts as given to him, he asks
what hypothesis will account for them in their completeness.
There is, in truth, more reason for objecting to Kant that he was
too ready to assume the facts of experience than for asserting that
he set up a theory independently of them. For Kant looks too
much at the world of experience as a ready-made material, which "^
must indeed be described and explained, but the several parts of
which do not admit of interconnection among themselves. The
world of experience means for him the world as it exists for the
reflective thinker of modern times, who has not only a practical
acquaintance with men and things, but is also tolerably familiar
with the results of scientific discovery. Before him lies this world

340 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

in its bold outlines ; objects spread out in space, and events fol-
lowing- on eacb other in time ; things as extensive and intensive
quanta ; substances as changing, as connected in the way of cause
and effect, and as acting and reacting upon eacli other. These
-elements lie takes up very much as they stand, and assumes, with-
out hesitation, that the broad distinctions that seem to divide them
from each other are absolute. Space and time belong to one
sphere, sensations as they occur in the individual mind to another
sphere, categories of quantity and quality, of relation and modal-
ity, to a third, and distinct from all is the one universal self-con-
sciousness. Moreover, even within these separate circles of exist-

^ence, Kant finds abstract separations. Space has no bond of con-
nection with Time, except that both belong to the one world of
fact; sensations form a single series within a separate individual
mind ; quantity is apart from quality, substance from cause, and
reciprocity from both. But, analytic or separative as Kant has a
tendency to be, he cannot be accused of neglecting the world of
experience in its broad and essential features. The world he
deals with is the real world, and he never dreams for a moment
of philosophizing without perpetual reference to it. If he fails to
explain it thoroughly, this was only what was to be expected of a
pioneer in a new and untrodden realm, and what, it may be added,
must, more or less, be true of any theory that attempts to formulate
the infinite variety of existence. To charge Kant with " over-
riding " or " mutilating the facts," is to talk at random. The facts
are simple enough. But " facts " do not constitute a philosophy.
No amount of ingenuity can extort from the command, '* Stick
to the facts," a single philosophical principle, and it is misleading
to talk as if there were some cabalistic virtue in the use of an
empty formula. " Certainly, we must keep to the facts," Kant
would have replied, " but the point is, how you are going to ex-
plain them. Here they are, and we are all pretty well agreed
about them ! There are objects in space and tinje, there are indi-
vidual feelings, there are things apparently, if not really, connected
together; now. How do you interpret these facts?'" "It is a
fact," remarks the realist, "that the world is independent of con-
sciousness." "Excuse me!" we can imagine Kant replying;

;>" you are now confusing individual and universal consciousness,
and, under disguise of that confusion, making the facts give a

Critical Philosophy — Realism and Sensationalism. 341

theory of themselves. What we actually know is a world of ob-
jects in space and time, not a world independent of thonght.
Now, the problem of philosophy is to explain how we come to
know that world,"

The source of the realist's mistake is not far to seek. No at-
tempt to account for experience can be made until experience has
been well developed, and then we are apt to substitute a mere
repetition of the facts for an explanation of them. Such a meth.-
od, besides explaining nothing, is incidentally a perversion. Com-i^
mon sense neither affirms that real objects are independent of in-
telligence, nor, on the contrary, that they are dependent on intel-
ligence ; it simply affirms nothing whatever about the matter. If
interrogated, and asked whether he believes the world to be inde-
pendent of the mind, no doubt the "plain" man, when he once
gets a glimpse of what is meant, will answer : " The world is cer-
tainly independent of the mind." But what he means to affirm is
merely that the world does not come into being when he awakes,
and is not annihilated when he goes to sleep. The realist,
having extracted a reply that has no proper bearing upon the
problem of philosophy, parades it as a " universal deliverance of
common sense," a " fact of consciousness," a " fundamental belief."
Now these, and many other high-sounding platitudes, well suited
to catch " the ears of the groundlings," really amount to nothing
bnt a misstatement of the point at issue. The realist gets the
suffrages of common sense by asking a question not worth asking,
and he triumphs over his idealistic opponent by the easy method
of asserting what is not denied, and neglecting what is asserted.
When it is affirmed that the world only exists in relation to intel-v
ligence, it is no answer to say that it exists independently of any
individual consciousness. The difference between these two views
is simply infinite, and, by confusing the one with the other, the
realist but fights with a phantom of his own creation. The truth
is, that to refer the matter to common sense at all is just as absurd
as for a scientific man to appeal from the judgment of his com-
peers to the mere layman in science. No valuable answer can
be obtained from those who have to be plied with leading ques-
tions before the answer desired is wrung from them. The idealist,
it should be remembered, was at one time a " plain " man himself,
and the " plain " man, if sufficiently instructed, might easily become

342 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

an idealist. It is surely time that this foolish appeal to the " vul-
gar " should be given up. But, if the question is to be referred to
the common sense of men at all, it ought to be put in a way to be
understood, and the only fair way to represent the issue is to ask :
.Does the world exist apart from an Infinite Intelligence? The
only real objection to this form of the question is that it antici-
pates the result of a speculative philosophy ; but, as the ordinary
man cares only for the results of speculation, not for speculation
itself, this mode of stating the problem is the fairest that, under
the circumstances, is available.

Kant's problem was: What are the essential conditions of any
knowledge whatever of real things? More particularly, How are
we to explain the fact of a world in space and time — a world whose
objects possess quantity and quality, and are connected together
by the real or apparent bonds of causality and reciprocity ? These
were his facts. Now, the difBculty attending the solution of this
problem was greatly lessened for Kant by the labors of his prede-
cessors, especially Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. The last espe-
cially had virtually proved that the true explanation cannot be
found in a theory that starts from the absolute opposition of thought
and nature. Locke, like Dr. Reid, began with this misinterpre-
tation of the facts. It seemed clear to him that the world was
independent of his individual consciousness, and this he interpreted
to mean that the world is an independent, self complete object.
The question of philosophy, as Locke figured it to himself, was :
How am I, an individual man, confined to the succession of my
own mental states, to get a knowledge of a world lying outside of
me? Put in this way, the question is insoluble. If the world is
a thing apart by itself, and I am shut up within my own individual
mind, I can never get a knowledge of the world at all. That this
was hidden from Locke, as it is still hidden trora his sensational-
istic followers, is due to the fact that the theory is not consistently
carried out to its last results. Locke was a man of great vigor of
mind, but he was very far from being a consistent thinker. Philo-
sophical consistency demands that a theory should not only har-
monize in all its parts, but should borrow nothing from the fact
to be explained. Locke's system satisfies neither the one require-
ment nor the other. In borrowing from the world of experience
to clothe the nakedness of his theory, Locke is a flagrant sinner..

Critical Philosophy — Realism and Sensationalism. 343

He pretends to prove that from " simple ideas " — in plain word?,
from unrelated, particular sensations — we can account for the
actual experience we undoubtedly possess. But nothing is plainer
than tliat, when we consistently exclude all that is not sensation
— when we do not allow ourselves to take advantage of relations
of thought — we cannot get beyond the passing states of our own
sentient nature. A consistent sensationalism may account for tlie
nnconscious sequence of sensations in the mere animal, but it
utterly fails to explain a world of objects as experienced by a self-
conscious being such as man. In bridging over the gulf between
the mere iSeries of feelings and the actual world as known, Locke
attributes to sensation what only exists for thought. Sensations
of toucli he identities with the conception of extended and solid
bodies, and space he explains as the interval between bodies. By
this conversion of sensation into its opposite, the difficulty of get-
ting beyond the fragmentary sensations in the individual mind is
concealed. I*Teed it be pointed out that the explanation is plausi-
ble only because it assumes what it has to account for? Keep to
a simple series of sensations, and you cannot get more than that
simple series. By no amount of intellectual contortion can a mere
sensation be identified with the quality of a real object, an aggre-
gate of sensations with an object having various properties, or any
association of such aggregates with a world of objects. Besides
being inconsistent in borrowing from experience what he supposes
himself to be explaining, Locke is also inconsistent in introducing
elements that are only in place in a philosoph}" that recognizes
the constitutive activity of intelligence. These elements, if devel-
oped, might, no doubt, lead to a true explanation of reality. But
in Locke they are not developed, but simply put side by side with
other elements inconsistent with them : and, if thev were devel-

7 7 <f

oped, the sensationalistic basis of his theory would have to go.

Hume was much more consistent than Locke, but even he,
endowed as he was with a philosophical capacity probably unsur-
passed, could not make bricks without straw. The ideal of sensa-
tionalism, which he rightly sees admits of nothing but feelings as
originally felt or as reproduced in a fainter form, he is compelled
quietly to abandon, from his inability to account even for the
fiction of a real world. No doubt, as Dr. Stirling points out,
Hume started from the facts of experience as they exist for us

344 The Journal of Sjpeculative nuloso])hy.

all ; a world of objects in space and time, with relations of quan-
tity and quality, and apparently connected by the bond of cause
and effect. But Dr. Stirling does not, as it seems to me, suffi-
ciently distinguish between Hume's theory and the unwarranted
assumptions he is led to make in trying to give it plausibility.
It is no doubt true that, in speaking of causality, Hume " did
mean a really necessary connection, though ... he 'philosophi-
cally could iind no origin for it but the customary experience of
constant conjunction." But it is under this very notion of "con-
stant conjunction " that Hume slips in one of tlie most unwarrant-
able assumptions in the whole of his theory. If we grant " con-
stant conjunction " to him, we allow him everything he needs.
The real difficulty goes farther back, leading us to ask how —
defining sensations as " perishable passions," and ostensibly al-
lowino- nothino; but transient feelings, felt for the first time or
repeated in a fainter form — Hume can get a " customary experi-
ence " or a " constant conjunction " at all. If the mind, as he
asserts, is not different from the series of feelings, and if the object
is to be resolved into that series, what is there to connect the feel-
ings in a uniform order, or, indeed, in any order whatever ? lin-
kable to explain the permanence and causal connection of things
from a number of scattered and unrelated feelings, Hume has
to adopt the tactics of Locke, and to borrow from experience
what he ought to explain. It is in this way that experience is
apparently resolved into a stream of feelings, in defiance of the
palpable fact that experience is not a stream of feelings. Still,
Hume had at last brought the method of Locke to a tolerably
clear consciousness of itself, and, in doing so, had indicated gen-
erally wherein its weakness lay. Kant was quick to perceive the
source of that weakness, and, because he did so, he found his great
problem : What are the elements necessary to account for real
experience? a soluble one.

The simplest point of view from which the world of experience
may be contemplated — and this is the fact to be explained — is
that of a number of objects existing side by side in space, and a
number of feelings in the individual mind following upon each
other in time. What is the relation of the objects to the feel-
ings? The first superficial answer naturally is, that the objects
exist apart from the feelings, and, by acting upon the mind, give

Critical Philosophy — Realism and Sensationalism,. 345

rise to them. But this brings up a new difficulty. If the object
exists in dependentl}^, how is it known to exist? "Through the
sensations it produces," it may be answered. "We do not, then,
know the object as it is in itself, but only as it is revealed in our
sensations ? " !No." But, if we are confined to our own sensations,
why should we assert the existence of anything distinct from them ?
" We cannot tell what the object is," answers the Spencerian, " but
we can tell that it is, since we know it as an effect." But you can
not know it to be an eifect, objects Hume, without bringing the
sensations under relations of thought, and, to do so, is to go be-
yond sensations. The relation of cause and effect cannot for us
mean a relation in independent objects, because these are not
known by us, upon your own showing ; cause and eff'ect, in fact,
can only be for us some sort of association of feelings. We must,
then, concludes Hume, discard the fiction of real objects and con-
fine ourselves to that series of feelings which alone is knowable
by us. Now, it is at this point that Kant joins issue with Hume.
The latter, discarding all reality except that implied in the im-
mediate consciousness of feelings, yet speaks of these as a series.
But, objects Kant, feelings do not of themselves form a series, for>
succession implies Time, and apart from the connection of feelings
there can be no consciousness of Time. And, even supposing
feelings to constitute a series, that would not account for the
coexistence of objects in Space, in which the parts do not follow
each other, but exist all at once. Sensations, as merely particular
or separate, cannot be formed into objects in space and time,
each of which is a combination of properties, while all exist to-
gether in one space and one time. We may regard sensations as
the unformed materials out of which objects are put together by
a power higher than themselves, but in themselves they are not
identical with objects, because in themselves they are not know-
able at all. A being who had only a number of disconnected feel-
ings could by no possibility have a consciousness of objects as
they exist in our intelligent experience. The supposition that by
sensation alone a knowledge of real objects is possible arises from
a confusion between sensible objects and pure sensation^. We
speak of "sensible things" and the "sensible world," and for
the ordinary purposes of every-day life our language is accurate
enough. But when, by a confusion of thought, we transfer what

346 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

is true of the sensible tluni>- to mere sensation, we fall into the
gross mistake of atlirming of unrelated feelings what is true only
of related feelings — i. e., of objects as they exist in our intelligent
experience ; we forget that the so-called " sensible " world is really
an intelligible world. But if we bold tenaciously by what Hume
has shown to be the character of sensation — viz. : a " perishable
passion " — we at once see that objects in space and time are not
resoluble into a mere multiplicity of sensations. It is because
sensationalism, while pretending to account for our actual experi-
ence of objects from sensations alone, yet introduces elements
foreign to sensation, that it is enabled to give a plausible explana-
tion of a real world of objects in space and time. We must there-
fore insist upon the fact that sensations in themselves are a mere
multiplicity, or, in other words, are not related to each other even
as successive, far less as permanent and coexistent.

Sensations being definable as a pure multiplicity, which can
only be i-educed to unity by something different from themselves,
it is absurd to suppose that they give a Iniowledge of real objects.
They form an ele7nent in knowledge, not a sepai'ate hind of
knowledge. The supposition that by pure sensations objects may
be known, is partly due to the false assumption that Space and
Time are independent objects immediately apprehensible by sense.
And, certainly, if we hold with the realist that the real world is
altogether independent of consciousness, we must suppose Space
and Time to be independent objects in which other objects are
arranged. Such a supposition, however, contradicts itself by de-
stroying the very thing it sets out to explain. If Space and Time
are real objects, existing apart from consciousness, how do we
come to know them at all ? It must be through our sensations,
which we judge to be produced by them. Then, we do not know
the real Space and the real Time, but only Space and Time as
they appear to us. Thus we are brought round once more to the
Spencerian point of view. But we cannot rest here. If we are
shut up within our separate consciousness, and directly know only
our own sensations, what right have we to assert that there is any
Space and Time except that which is given in our sensations ? We
have no right whatever, and are thus driven to the view of Hume,
that Space and Time are objects only in the sense of being some-
how the product of sensation. But a pure sensationalism, as Kant

Critical Philosophy — Realism and Sensationalism. 34T

shows, cannot account even for the apparent reality of Space and '
Time. A sensation cannot be determined as "here" without
being referred to somethino- other than itself, in contrast to which
its transience is perceived. To go beyond our immediate sensa-
tions, and refer them to objects in Space, is only possible to a being
that is much more than a thread of sensations. So we cannot be
conscious that "now" there is a sensation without going beyond
the mere " now," tlie passing feeling, and connecting it with other
feelings before and after. We suppose that sensations in them-
selves are located in space, and determined in time, because we
forget that, when we contrast our feelings as transient with objects
as permanent, we are already beyond mere feeling, and have
effected the transformation of particular states of consciousness
into real objects. And this just means that we are not selfless
animals, but self-conscious men. An animal, with its mere flux of
sensations, cannot locate objects in space, or place events in rela-
tion to each other in time, because it does not go beyond the dis-
connected impressions that serve it in lieu of intelligence ; or, at
any rate, if animals do arrange objects in space and time, they
must be conscious beings.

Space and Time, then, are not independent objects, lying beyondv/
intelligence, nor are they due to sensations. The only other hy-
pothesis conceivable is, that they are in some sense contributed by
the mind. Kant's view is that they belong to man as a perceptive
being ; in other words, that they are not abstract conceptions, but
definite individuals. There are not several distinct spaces and times
capable of being brought under an abstract conception different
from each of them ; there is only one Space, of which each space
is an integral part, and one Time, in which each time is a particu-
lar unit. It must be observed, however, that, considered in them-
selves. Space and Time are not capable of being known, and there-
fore are not capable of accounting for our experience of them.
Nor, even in conjunction with the material of sense — i. e., with
unrelated sensations — do they account for external objects as we
know them in our developed experience. Without them, there
could be no consciousness even of sensations, and therefore no con-
sciousness of objects, as in space and time ; but it does not follow
that even with them a knowledge of real objects is possible.
They are the perceptive conditions of such a knowledge, but they

348 The Journal of Speculatim Philosophy.

are no more. Hence we may call iheva forms of perception. By
"forms" wo must not nnderstand that Space and Time are pre-*
existent moulds in which objects are arranged, but simply that they
are the essential conditions, witliout which there conld be no per-
ception of objects as existing side by side, or of feelings as follow-
ing on each other. We are now entitled to say, then, that objects
as existing in space and time can not be explained without pre-
supposition of the multiplicity of sense, and of the perceptive
forms of Space and Time.

This view of Space and Time as not objects that can be directly
apprehended, or that exist apart from their relation to conscious-
ness, begins that transformation of current notions which is the
result of every earnest effort to explain the facts of experience.
To those who speak of objects as independent of intelligence,
Kant's reply is that they confuse externality in space with exter-
nality to thought. Real things are certainly "external" in the
sense of being arranged in I'elation to each other in space; our sen-
sations are certainly " internal " in so far. as they are arranged as
successive or coexistent events in time; but objects are not ex-

'ternal in the sense of being without intelligence, nor are feelings
internal because they alone are within intelligence. "External"
and "internal" conld have no meaning to a being destitute of in-
telligence, and hence to speak of objects that are external to in-
telligence is pure nonsense. I call a thing external either because
I perceive it to stand apart from another thing, or to stand apart
from my organism, and in both cases I am speaking of externality

>in the sense of position in space, not in the sense of independence
of consciousness. I say my feelings are internal, because they are
not made up of parts that stand out of each other, and because
two feelings do not stand apart from each other like two objects
in space ; in other words, my feelings are internal because they are
not in space, but only in time. But, although I distinguish in
consciousness objects as external from feelings as internal, the ob-
jects and the feelings alike exist only for me as a conscious being.

:?What Kant proves, then, is, that Space and Time exist only in
relation to intelligence ; or, otherwise, that the opposition of ex-
ternal objects to internal feelings is a logical distinction within
consciousness, not a real separation without consciousness.

It may serve to illustrate what has just been said if we con-

Critical Pkilosojphy — Realism and Sensationalism. Si^"

sider that the distinction of qualities of body as "primary" and
" secondary " in no way aifects the Kantian explanation of the
nature of space and time. A primary quality, according to
Locke, is a property of objects in themselves, a secondary quality
a property in us, or, more properly, an affection of our sensitive
organism. This distinction only seems to bear upon the question
of the relation of the inner to the outer world, because objects
with their properties are opposed, not merely to the organism with
its affections, but to consciousness itself. But this is to confuse
objects as existing in space with objects as independent of con-
sciousness. It is inferred that objects with their properties are
independent of intelligence — in Kantian language, are things in
themselves — because they stand apart from our bodies in space,
and that the affections of the organism are alone in consciousness,
because, as sensations, they are not in space, but only in time.
Now, here there is a double confusion. In the first place, it is sup-
posed that, because the primary properties belong to things exter-
nal to the body, they are therefore external to, or independent of,
consciousness ; and, on the other hand, it is assumed that, because
the affections of the organism are as sensations internal in the
sense of beins in time, thev alone are included within conscious-
ness. This opposition rests upon the confusion already pointed i^
out between objects without the body and objects without con-
sciousness. But these two meanings of externality, so far from
being identical, are diametrically opposed to each other. An ob-
ject in space is Ivnowable because special distinctions exist only in
relation to consciousness; an object beyond consciousness, as un-
knowable, is out of relation to consciousness. In other words, the
contrast of things in space is relative to the contrast of feelings
in time. A similar remark applies to the affections of the organ-
ism regarded as sensations of the subject. The fact that they are
internal in the sense of being in time does not make them inter-
nal in the other sense of being independent of real things. Feel-
ings as only in time are no more in consciousness than objects in
space, since the distinction of outer and inner is a distinction i^
within and not without consciousness. In the second place, the
primary qualities are not purely external, nor are the secondary
qualities purely internal. The propert}' of an object is not only
in space, but also in time, and an affection of the organism, viewed

550 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

on the outer side, is in space just as nuicli as tlie quality of an
extra-organic body. Tiie organism, in short, may be viewed as an
>object in space, and the bodies lying apart from the organism do
not exist out of time. This second njistake of Locke is, however,
of less importance than the first, and, in fact, is only wortli point-
ing out because it gives color to the view that consciousness is
eonfiued within the material organism, like a bird within the bars
of its cage. But this view is seen to rest upon a false analogy of
consciousness and niaterial things, when it is remembered that the
limits within which consciousness is supposed to be confined are
really limits constructed by consciousness itself in the logical sepa-
ration of internal and external existence.

Space and Time, we may now assume, are not objects inde-
pendent of intelligence, nor, indeed, are they objects in any sense;
they are simply the essential conditions of the perception of objects.
Without them there could be no experience of external and in-
ternal objects, but even with them there could be no real experi-
ence. The pure forms of Space and Time, together with the sepa-
rate sensations to be arranged under tliem, are but the perceptive
element implied in a full act of knowledge. The unconnected sen-
sations must be combined, and the blank forms differentiated, be-
fore real experience can possibly take place. A merely perceptive
being — a being having only unrelated feelings and undifferentiated
forms — cannot be conceived to be more than potentially intelli-
gent. For experience is a knowledge of objects each of which in
itself unites several properties, has parts both extensive and inten-
sive, and is capable of undergoing change without being destroyed ;
it is a knowledge of objects all of which are connected together
as cause and effect, and are in mutual action and reaction. What
is wanted to explain experience in its completeness evidently is
some combining or integrating principle that is capable of oper-
^ating in different ways, in accordance with the different kinds of
unity to be produced. This universal principle of synthesis is
Self-consciousness, and its several modes of activity are the Cate-
gories.

The Deduction of the Categories virtually contains all that is
essential in the philosophy of Kant, and in this sense its impor-
tance cannot be overrated. There is a tendency, however, in com-
mentators on the Critique, to employ it as a kind of bugbear to

Critical Philosophy — Realism and Sensationalism. 351

frighten the reader. No doubt the exposition, as it stands, is by
DO means a model of clearness, but it is capable of easy compre-
hension by any one who has once fairly put himself at the critical
point of view. It amounts, in brief, to this: that the world of ob-
jects is constituted by the synthetical activity of self-conscious In-
telligence, which, on the one hand, unites the scattered impressions
of sense, under the formal conditions of space and time, into ex-
tended and qualified objects, connecting them together as cause and
efiect and as in reciprocal action ; and, on the other hand, combines
subjective feelings under the unity of a single self, that exists only
in relation to the objects so constituted. Kant proves, therefore,v.
in the first place, that objects exist only in relation to consciousness ;
secondly, that the self is known as identical only in the process of
producing objects; and, thirdly, combining these inferences, that
the world of experience, in its two phases of outer and inner, is
constituted by Intelligence.

Sensations, let us repeat, are in themselves a mere multiplicity
of unconnected units ; in other words, there is in them no principle
of combination. But combination is essential, if we are to explain
the world of objects as known in our experience. Now, Thought
or Understanding is usually supposed to be, in the first instance
at least, only capable of analysis ; it breaks up the concrete object
presented to it in perception, and in this way forms abstract or
general conceptions. On this view. Thought may combine the
properties that have been presented to it by percej)tion into a new
unit, but it cannot combine, except on presupposition of a prior
analysis. It may manipulate what is supplied to it, but it can
supply nothing of itself. Now, if Thought is a purely analytical
faculty, or only secondarily synthetical, it evidently cannot con-
stitute objects as such, but can only analyze them if the}^ are given
to it by Perception to be analyzed. Synthesis presupposes a prior
analysis. It seems, therefore, as if we should not be able to account
for experience at all. If there is no capability of synthesis in sen-
sations, or even in sensation combined with the forms of space and
time, and if Thought is not synthetic either, how are we to account
for the fact that single objects, and objects in connection with each
other, alike manifest complexity in unity? Both Perception and
Thought being, to all appearance, merely analytic, where is the
synthesis to come from ? The answer is virtually implied in what

352 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

lias already been said. It has been shown that objects as in space
and time exist only in relation to intelligence, and that Perception
but snp])lies the disconnected materials ont of which a world of
such objects may be formed. But, as we have discovered Sense to
be only an element in knowledge, not a kind of knowledge, we
must alter our view of Thought correspondently. That Thought

'is purely analytic or separative, can be true only upon the presup-
position that Perception is synthetic, or, in other words, that indi-
vidual objects are known in the fulness of their attributes by
simple apprehension of a world existing independently of intelli-
gence. This presupposition, however, has been proved to be
absurd ; a world lying beyond consciousness could never be per-
ceived at all, much less perceived to be made up of individual
objects. We must, therefore, completely reverse our conception
of the nature of Thought. If Sense does not reveal to us individual
objects, but only unrelated perceptions. Thought must be synthetic.
Now we can get an intelligible explanation of how experience is
possible. The old notion that thinking consists in a mere analysis
of objects given in their completeness beforehand is no real expla-
nation, for it does not tell us how we come to know a world of

>real objects, but assumes that world to be already known. In
maintaining all thinking to be analysis or abstraction, it opposes
the process of knowing to the process of thinking, and this first leads
to sensationalism, and then by an easy descent to scepticism.
Thought must therefore be regarded as constituting objects by
combining the scattered perceptions given to it. In this way
alone can we explain the facts of experience. There can be no
possible doubt as to the absolute necessity of synthesis to the
existence and connection of real objects ; and synthesis, as has
been shown, it is vain to attribute to sensation, or to the forms of
space and time. The unity of individual objects, and of the whole
world of objects, is due to Thought, which puts together the sepa-
rate diiFerences of sense, and thus constitutes them into individual
things, and combinations of individual things. The mere act by
which separate objects are formed presupposes the synthetical
activity of thought, as operating upon the material of sense, in
conformit}^ with spatial and temporal conditions. The world of
experience is, however, not a collection of independent objects,
but a connected whole, in which each object, and each part of an

Critical Philosophy — Realism and Sensationalism. 353

object, has a definite place. We have tlierefore to explain not
only the combination of sensations into the unity of single objects,
but the connection of all objects of experience in the unity of
one world. The fact to be explained — the world of ordinary
experience — includes not only things in space and time as com-
plexes of qualities, but things that undergo change without losing
their reality, that are joined together by the bond of causality,
and that are in mutual action and reaction. And if this immense
variety in existence is yet compatible with unity, there must be
not only syntheses of Thought, but there must be a single principle
that connects together the different modes of synthesis in a perfect
unity. This supreme unity is self-conscious Intelligence. Apart
from a single identical self, to which by the synthetical activity
of Thought all differences may be referred, there could be no unity
in experience, and, therefore, no single world of real objects. The
unity of the real world of objects must be due to the unity of self-
conscious Intelligence.

Thus, it appears that without synthesis there could be no
known objects, without various modes of synthesis no world of
objects as we know it, and without a single identical Self no
unity in that world. Looking at experience from the other side,
we can see it to be equally true, and, in fact, already implied in
what has been said, that without synthetical acts there could be
no consciousness of Self. Isolate the Self, and conceive of it as
purely abstract, and it has no difference in it. Intelligence only^
becomes conscious of itself in the process by which it constitutes
objects. A purely perceptive being — a being who had but detached
states not connected by a synthesis of thought — would never be-
come conscious of itself. It is, therefore, no explanation to say
that we perceive the identity of consciousness by " looking into
our own minds," for we could never discover self to be identical if
it were merely given in successive perceptions. The recognition
of self as identical presupposes that self is identical in its own
nature, and this again implies that it is the sole source of the
various kinds of synthesis. A self that existed only in each sepa-
rate mental state would pass away with the transient state, and
Jience, as Kant puts it, would be as " many colored and ever
changing " as the several states in which it was present. Such a
Self would be no identical Self, and, therefore, no Self at all. The
XV- 23

354 The Journal of Speculative PMloaophy.

consciousness of self, as in time, is only explicable on presupposi-
-tion of a self which is not itself in time, but is yet the condition
of all synthesis in time ; and the consciousness of snch a self is
possible only in the actual process of couibining the manifold of
sense under the unity of the categories.

Putting together these two propositions — that real objects only
exist in relation to the " synthetical unity of self-consciousness," and
that the consciousness of self as identical is only given in the pro-
cess by which objects are combined — we reach the inference that
the Object is correlative to the Subject, or, as we may also say, that
* Nature exists only in relation to Intelligence. Thus, we have as
completely reversed the old method of explaining experience as
Copernicus altered the Ptolemaic conception of the material
universe. We have discovered that the world of experience
does not act upon a consciousness only fitted passively to receive
what is presented to it from without, but that, on the contrary,
consciousness is the condition of there being for us any world
at all.
^ In what has gone before there will be found, as I believe, all
;>that is realh' valuable in Kant's general theory of knowledge.
Tiie fundamental principle of the Critical Philosophy, that dis-
tinguishes it from all previous systems, is its interpretation of the
world of experience as the product of self-conscious intelligence ;
and if Kant himself was not perfectly true to this principle, there
is no doubt that he followed it out as consistently as he could. It
is quite true, as a matter of fact, that, after all, he held the world
of experience to be distinct from the world as it truly is behind
the veil; but the opposition of a noumenal and phenomenal world
is seen to be superfluous when it is considered that intelligence
cannot go out of itself and establish the existence of that which
by definition lies beyond it. The thing-in-itself is simply an illu-
<^sive fiction which survives for Kant only because he was untrue
to the central idea of his philosophy. Other imperfections in
Kant's exposition, intimately connected with the hypothesis of an
unknown thing-in-itself, will be immediately referred to. Mean-
time it will help to illustrate the Critical explanation of the facts
of experience, if we look at the application of the category of
^ causality to the world as known, and see how Kant endeavored to
meet the sceptical doctrine of Hume, that causal connection means

Critical Philosophy — Realism and Sensationalism. 355

a purely arbitrary sequence of perceptions, not a real connection
of objects.

In estimating the validity of Kant's reply to Hume's doctrine
of causality, it is essential to bring each into connection with the
system of which it forms a part. IS^ow, as has been already
pointed out, Hume, in his account of experience, ostensibly admits
of no principle of explanation except the immediate feelings of an
individual subject, as originally felt or as repeated in a less vivid
form. With such materials he cannot possibly build up even a
world of experience apparently stable, and hence he is compelled
to attribute to feelings more than properly belongs to them. A
succession of feelings has no principle of unity in it, and therefore
cannot give rise to the unity implied in the experience of a world
of objects, all of which are connected together. Hume endeavors
to show, not how things are actually connected together in a real
world — for on his theory there are no things to connect — but how
there seems to be a connected world of objects. Two things hap-
pen to be frequently perceived, the one directly after the other,
and, as a natural result, a subjective tendency to associate them
together in the order in which they are perceived is created, so
that the presence of either in sense or memory calls up the other.
Hence, when the one is felt or remembered, there is at the same
time a belief in the precedence or sequence of the other. This
belief arises from the transference of the vividness of the impres-
sion to the idea with which it is associated. The apparent con-
nection of objects or events is only a special sort of transition from
one feeling to another. " We remember to have had frequent in-
stances of one species of objects, and also remember that the indi-
viduals of another species of objects have always attended them,
and have existed in a regular order of contiguity and succession
wath regard to thein. Thus we remember to have seen that spe-
cies of object we call flame, and to have felt that species of sensa-
tion we call heat. We likewise call to mind their constant con-
junction in all past instances. Without any further ceremony, we
call the one cause, and the other effect, and infer the existence of
the one from the other." There is, then, according to Hume, no
real connection of objects or events, but only an apparent connec-
tion produced by custom. The official passage in which the coun-
ter-theory of Kant is set forth is the proof of the Second Analogy

356 The Journal of Speculative PJiilosophy.

- of Experience; l)ut as this proof, or, more properly, ex])laiiation,
of causality presupposes the First Analogy, and, above all, the De-
duction of the Categories, and likewise involves great difficulties
of interpretation, it seems better to show what reply may be given

^by an interpretation based upon the s})irit of the Critical Phi-
losophy.

It is important to see clearly what Kant has to prove in regard
to causality, and what he is entitled to assume. He is not called
upon to show, from a mere consideration of the nature of intelli-
gence, that we can determine beforehand when to apply the law
of causality. Should such an anticipaiio naturoB be attempted by
him, he would be justly chargeable with endeavoring to construct
the world independently of experience. Kant commits himself
to nothing so absurd. He starts with experience as it exists for
us all before the need for any metaphysical justification of it is
felt, and he endeavors to prove, from the nature of that experience,
what must be presupposed in explanation of it. In the present
case, the facts are that we actually believe certain events to be
bound together in an irreversible order, while other events are
viewed as not connected together in reality at all, or at least not
directly connected in the way of cause and effect. There is no
dispute whatever as to the fact that we ordinarily do distinguish
between a connected series of events and events that have no
apparent connection. On this point Eeid, Hume, and Kant are
perfectly at one. The issue raised does not concern the fact of

> our belief in causal connection, but the philosophical explanation
of the fact. The moment, however, the interpretation of the
apparent connection of events begins, a difference emerges. Reid,
starting from the misconception that externality in space is equiv-
alent to independence of consciousness, is unable to do more than
repeat the fact he ought to explain. We immediately perceive
that things are connected together by the bond of cause and effect,
and have an " intuitive conviction " that the future will resemble the
past. But this view can only maintain its ground so long as we
refuse to go beyond the fact of experience in search of an explana-
tion of it. When we try to realize to ourselves what it means,
we are straightway led by an inexorable logic to the denial of any
real connection in the w^ay of causality. The steps by which this
sceptical result is reached have been already indicated. Objects

Critical Philosophy — Realism and Sensationalism. 357

exist independently of consciousness, and are simply apprehended ;

> but this means that we only know them through our immediate
sensations, and hence in these sensations the asserted connection
must be found. Now, so long as reality is not sought for in the
nature of intelligence itself, while it cannot be explained from a
world that has uow^ disappeared, so far as our theory is concerned,
we must resolve what at first seemed to be a connection of real
events into a constant association of feelings. Hume's theory of
causality is but the legitimate result of the separation of reality
from intelligence. The reply of Kant must therefore consist in
showing that the belief in a real sequence of events is intelligible,
and alone intelligible, on the presupposition that reality is consti-
tuted by intelligence.

The apparent sequence of real events is, on Hume's theory, but
a customary sequence of feelings as they are for the individual
subject of them. In answer to this, Kant points out that to deny
a real connection of events is to deny all change. We never in
our ordinary experience suppose that there is before us an instance
of causality, unless when there are two events distinguishable
from each other. The mere difference of determination, however,
does not of itself involve causal connection, or, rather, we do not
suppose that a difference in what is presented to us necessarily
amounts to such a connection of one event with another as implies
that without the first there could not be the second. I can run
my eye up and down a house, and in each successive moment
have a different perception ; but I do not therefore conclude that
the parts perceived in succession are so connected that the one
"must go before and the other come after. Our ordinary notion of
real sequence thus implies more than a mere difference of percep-
tions. What more does it imply ? Evidently, for one thing, that
there is not only difference, but difference that exists in relation
to identity. There must not only be one determination and then
another, but each determination must be referred to that which
is constant. In other words, real sequence implies that that which

j> ehanges yet remains the same ; or, the category of causality pre-
supposes the category of substance. Change, however, involves
still more than this. Difference of determination and unity of
determination — a difference and a unity that mutually presuppose
fiach other — are implied in our ordinary conception of causalit}'' ;

358 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

but, in addition, time is evidently an essential part of the notion
Corresponding to the ditference of determination there is time as
a series of moments, and corresponding to the unity of determina-
tion there is time as one or undifferentiated. These two aspects
of time, like the two aspects of the reality, are strictly correlative ;
there is one time, because there are many moments of time. From
this analysis of the conception of causal sequence it is quite evi-
dent that it presupposes synthesis of a complex kind. There could
be no notion of change if there were no synthesis of separate
perceptions uniting them into unity. Such synthesis, as has been
shown in the Deduction of the Categories, is only possible upon the
presupposition that there is a special function of thought by which
the union is effected, and this again implies that there is a self-
identical intelligence, by which this and other functions of synthesis
are made possible. He who denies that there is a real connection
of events must virtually deny the possibility of experience. But,

> while the category of causality must be presupposed as a rule by
which separate determinations are capable of being united, it does
not follow that we have sufficiently explained a real sequence of
events when we have shown that without an intellectual synthesis
there could be no belief in an irreversible order in events. For,
as has been pointed out, by causal connection we mean a change
in time. There must, therefore, be a synthesis of the moments of
time, or rather a differentiation of the one time in its successive
moments. Time itself is not Knowable, any more than a category
is applicable without the presentation to it of a sensuous material ;
and hence the synthesis by intelligence of the separate determina-
tions of sensible perception, under the condition of time, and
secondarily of space, is the necessary presupposition of our ex-
perience of a real sequence of events. Any one, therefore, who

> denies the actual connection of events must show, first, how there
could be any conception of change without a synthesis by intelli-
gence of the detached perceptions of sense ; and, secondly, how,
apart from a constitutive intelligence, there could be even the
consciousness of a succession of feelings in time. That this is
impossible may be seen by simply pressing upon Hume the conse-
quences of his theory.

By a real or causal connection of events we do not mean a mere
succession of particular appearances in two objects that only exist

Critical Philosophy — Realism and Sensationalism. 359

in the succession ; on the contrary, we suppose that, despite the
alteration that takes place in the objects, the objects themselves
are permanent. " The sun warms the stone," but the change in
the sun and in the stone leaves each nnaffected, so far as its identity
and permanence are concerned. Hume attempts to explain away
the apparent connection of the two objects, but in doing so he
really assumes their permanent identity, and this, as has been
shown, means that he assumes real change while apparently dis-
proving it. Thus, in the passage above cited, he says: "We re-
member to have seen that species of objects we cv^W Jlame^ and to
have felt that species of sensation we call heatP ISTow, here
Hnme takes advantage of popular language to introduce the
notion of permanence, although his aim is to show that perma- ^
nence in any real sense is a fiction. It is natural to say that we
recognize an object to be permanent because we perceive it to
exist in successive moments of time. To this realistic view Kant
objects that it goes upon the supposition that objects lie ready-
made in a space and time independent of consciousness. But this
brings us back to the sensationalistic point of view, that objects
are known only as they are immediately perceived. We cannot,
then, say anything about their existence when they are not per-
ceived, and must, with Locke, limit ourselves to the judgment :
" I know this object to exist so long as I perceive it." But, hav-
ing gone so far, we are compelled to go still farther. If the object
can be known to exist only so long as it is perceived, and if for us
it exists only in our sensation, we not only cannot alRrm it to
exist when it is not felt, but we cannot affirm it to exist at all.
Hume sees this clearly enough, and expressly asserts, when it suits
him, that there is not, on the one hand, an object, and, on the other
hand, a sensation, but that the sensation is the object. In treating
of causality, however, he speaks as if the only point were whether
an object exists when it is not felt, whereas the only consistent
view for him to take is that no object is ever felt at all. He
assumes, first, that there is an object distinct from sensation, and,^
secondly, that this object persists so long as it is felt. Both assump-
tions are inconsistent with his exclusion of all relations of thought,
and his ostensible reduction of existence to a series of feelings.
He is only entitled to affirm that at a certain moment there is one
feeling, and at the next moment another feeling. Upon with-

360 The Journal of /Speculative Philosophy.

drawal of the notion of a permanent object, there is nothing left
but a sequence of feelings, and hence the permanent identity pre-
supposed in tlic conception of causality disappears. Time, how-
ever, the other element implied, seems still to survive. But it is
easy to see that, if there is nothing but a series of feelings, there
cannot even be a consciousness of these feelings as a series. A
self that is only present in each feeling as it arises could not be
conscious of feelings as successive, and therefore could never even
come to suppose that there are permanent ol)jects, or a series of
changes in permanent objects. Such a self, as Kant says, would
be as " many-colored " as the feelings ; in other words, it would
be no self at all, and could have no conscious experience. We are
thus brought back to the demonstration of the possibility of expe-
rience, as based upon the " synthetical unity of self-consciousness,"
a demonstration which need not be repeated. Kant's reply to^
Hume on the question of causality, therefore, amounts briefly to
this : causal sequence presupposes the permanent identity of ob-
jects ; permanent identit}'^ implies a sequence in time ; temporal
succession is possible only if there is a self-identical intelligence,
present to all feelings in turn, but identifiable with none of them.
Hume cannot deny one of these elements without virtually deny-
ing all the rest, and he can give plausibility to his denial of any
one of them only by assuming the others; hence, the belief in a
real sequence of events cannot be shown to be delusive.'

KANT'S KELATION TO MODEEN PHILOSOPHIC PRO-

GPtESS.

READ AT THE K'ANT CENTENNIAL, AT SARATOGA, JULY 6, 1881, BY JOSIAH ROYCE.

The general law of the progress of human thought is the Law
of Parsimony — ^. e., of the greatest adaptation of old methods,
principles, theories, dogmas, formnlse, terminology, to new needs
and to new facts, with the least possible change in the form of
these traditional possessions themselves. Even revolutions in

' On Hume's doctrine of causality, see Green's Hume, pp. 244 IT.

KanCs Relation to Modern PJdlosojphic Progress. 361

thought often turn out to be reactions in disguise, conservative
efforts to substitute for the traditions of the elders some more
ancient and authoritative law, not to destroy old truth, but to
f uliil it.

This general tendency leads us at present to the study of Kant,
with what justice or usefulness only the result can show. And
the study of Kant must imply some notion on our pai't of the
relation that his thought bears to our present progress in philo-
sophic investigation. The following paper undertakes to establish
certain theses concerning this matter. The method will consist
in the application to certain modern doctrines of tests suggested
by Kant's Kritih, and in the effort to find by what modification,
both of the doctrines now in favor, and of Kant's position itself,
we can hope to make the next step in advance in philosophy.
The occasion and our limits will confine our hasty sketch to a
study of a few purely theoretical questions, and will exclude all
direct consideration of the ethical aspect of modern philosophy.

I. — Kanfs Relation to Modern Attempts in Ontology.

The whole question of the significance of the Kritih for mod-
ern progress turns on the relation in which the critical philosophy
stands to the numerous modern efforts to formulate an Ontology.
If any one of these is a success, then the critical philosophy joins
the well-filled ranks of the ilherwundene Standpuiikte. If none of
the efforts can be accepted as good, then progress must consist in
a direct development of the Kantian thought. For the rest, in
beginning our discussion with the relation of the critical philoso-
phy to ontology, we are but following the bent of most philoso-
phers as well as of the intelligent public. To all such, ontology
is the chief philosophic concern. Of the theor}^ of knowledge the
general public will barely endure to hear so much as is darkly
outlined in an average text-book of logic ; but men listen to an
ontological speculation, when once they catch the drift of it, with
eager interest. There is something dramatic, or often perhaps
rather to be called romantic, in an ontology. A vast universe of
beings of various perfection, all striving after the highest develop-
ment, all mimicking more or less divinely the self-contained majesty
of the First Mover ; or a world of wondrous, fairy Monads, living
in a miraculous pre-established harmony ; or a tremendous all-

362 The Journal of Speculative J*/i(/osoj)/tf/.

embraeino- "VYorkl-Spii'it, growing from less to more, unfolding his
infinite possibilities, casting down in god-like and terrible irony
all he has once builded to build anew grander temples; or even
a wearv universal Will, dreaming amid the blind warfare of its
own existence about JSirvana and peace; such a doctrine appeals
to the iine myth-making spirit that never deserts us. If philosophy
has such things to offer us, then philosophy is a game worth play-
ing. But it has always stood in the way of the critical ])hilosopliy
that the little fragment of an ontology that was retained in it
could satisfy nobody's poetical instincts, and could furnish only a
cause for complaint to those who regarded it as inconsistent. To
quench some craving, Kant kept the Things-in-theraselves. But
these things-in-themselves pleased no one, appeared A^ery soon to
be, as the old Xenie ' very broadly hinted, useless lumber, fit to
be sold at auction, and at their best were not shapely enough to
be ornamental. If, then, we look at modern post-critical thought
in relation to tliis part of Kant's ITritik, we shall see in it a con-
stant effort to correct in Kant's shadowy ontology either the
shadowiness of the shades (viz., of the Dinge an sich), or else the
mistake of assuming them at all. Where are we to-day in this,
controversy ?

Leaving aside for the time the momentous question as to Kant's
own theory of the things in themselves, let us first ask ourselves
what we to-day have in the way of a philosophical ontology. If
our progress seems unsatisfactory, then, possibly, even the vague
struo;o;les of Kant in the transcendental darkness with those terri-
ble Noumena may not be uninstructive.

Among us, as among the thinkers of all ages, opposing ontologi-
cal hypotheses are warring together. But it is a characteristic of
our own time that the most important ontological hypotheses now
in favor agree in being monistic in tendency. Monism is, in fact,
often mentioned as if it were an invention of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Such is far from being the case, but there never were so
many intelligent and thoroughgoing Monists in the world as there
now are. Representative thinkers differ about what may be
known or knowable of the nature of this One ; but we hear, in

' " Da die Metaphysik vor Kurzem unbeerbt abging Werden die Dinge an sich

Morgen sub hasta verkauf't."

KanHs Relation to Modern Philosophic Progress. 363

almost wearisome repetition, of Matter and Spirit, of Force and
Intelligence, of Motion and Sensation, as being opposite aspects,
or faces, or manifestations of one ultimate Eeality, until we wonder
whether clear thinking is not in danger of losing itself altogether
in the contemplation of a mere empty form of words. From
whispers and low mutterings with bated breath about the in-
scrutable mystery of the ultimate unity of Being, one turns with
satisfaction to efforts towards some intelligible account of the sense
in which all things can be regarded as manifestations of one pow-
er or actual Existent. Yet even these efforts have thus far failed
to satisfy the demands of criticism. Where they are clearly stated
they are inadequate. Where they resort to figures of speech and
tell us about the two sides of the shield, or the convexity and con-
cavity of the same curve, as illustrations of the ultimate oneness
of nature amid the various manifestations of experience, there
these efforts merely sink back into the primitive incoherency so
dear to all dogmatic metaphysics. The same curve is, indeed,
convex and concave; but matter and spirit are simply not the
two faces of a curve, and the relevant circumstance on which this
metaphor turns will never be clear to us until we learn, quite
literally, wholly apart from fables about shields, just how, in what
sense, and by what evidence, matter and mind are known to be
of like substance. The failure of dogmatic Monism, if it should
take place, ought, indeed, not to throw us over into the arms of
an equally dogmatic Dualism ; but we must refuse to accept the
monistic hypothesis until it has been freed from all trace of
mysticism.

How shall this be done ? Let us begin with the attempts that
have been made to interpret the results of modern physical sci-
ence in a monistic sense, by regarding the ultimate physical or
chemical units as endowed with some form of actual or potential
consciousness. Organisms of the highest sort are combinations of
atoms. The whole is the sum of its parts. Why may not the
mental possessions of these highest organisms be tlie sum of the
indefinitely small mental powers of the atoms ? An atom in motion
may be a thought, or, if that be saying far too much of so simple
a thing, an atom in motion may be, or may be endowed with, an
infinitesimal consciousness. Billions of atoms in interaction may
have as their resultant quite a respectable little consciousness?.

364 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

Sufficiently complex groups of these atoms of Mind-Stuff (to use
Professor Clifforcrs ingenious terminology) might produce a great
man. One shudders to think of the base uses to which the noble
mind-stuff of Shakespeare might return; but the theory tries to
be an expression of natural phenomena, not merely an aesthetic
creation, and must not pause before such consequences.

Such is an outline that will suggest to the initiated thonghts
common to several modern theories of being. Are these theories
in a fair way to satisfy critical needs ? The writer is not satisfied
that they are. Time does not permit any lengthy discussion of
the matter here, but let us remind ourselves of the considerations
that a study of Kant will most readily suggest to any one that is
disposed for a moment to accept one of these modern forms of
monism.

Can consciousness be regarded as an aggregate of elementary
facts, such as sensations or as atoms of pleasure and pain ? If so,
what aggregate of sensations forms a judgment, such as, " This
man is my father ? " Evidently here is indeed an aggregate of
sensations represented, but also something more. What is this
more ? A product, it may be said, formed through association
from innumerable past experiences. Granted for the moment;
but the question is not as to the origin of this consciousness, but
as to its analysis. This act of consciousness, whereby a present
sensation is regarded as in definite relation to real past experi-
ences, as a symbol, not merely of actual sensations now remem-
bered, not merely of future sensations not yet experienced, but of
a reality wholly outside of the individual consciousness, this act
of acknowledging something not directly presented as nevertheless
real — is this act of judgment possibly to be regarded as a mere
aggregate of elementary mental states ? Surely, at best, the act
can be so regarded only in the sense in which a word is an aggre-
gate of letters. For and in the one simple momentary conscious-
ness, all these elements exist as an aggregate, but as an aggregate
formed into one whole, as the matter of a single act. But in
themselves, without the very act of unity in which they are one,
these elements would be merely an aggregate, or, in Mr. Gurney's
apt words,' "a rope of sand." Consciousness, then, as a continual

* Mind tor April, 1881, article, "Monism."

Kants Relation to Modern Philosojyhic Progress. 365

synthesis of innumerable elements into the unity of active judg-
ment, is more than an aggregate, and can never be explained as
an aggregate of elementary atoms of sensation.

Nor may we say that the ultimate atomic states of consciousness
may be, as it were, chemically united into a whole that is more
than an aggregate. Physical atoms in space, if endowed with suf-
ciently numerous affinities, may unite into what wholes you will ;•
but a mental fact is a mental fact, and no more. An ultimate in-
dependent unit of consciousness, conceived after the analogy of a
sensation, can have to another like unit only one of three rela-
tions. It may coexist with this other unit, or it may precede or
follow it in time. There is no other relation possible. Affinity,
or attraction, or approach of one pain or pleasure, of one sensation
of pressure or of motion to another, is a meaningless jingle of
words, unless, indeed, such an expression is used to name figura-
tively the relations that in and for a comparing, contrasting, unit-
ing and separating, active consciousness two sensation-units are
made to bear. Thus, then, this atomic monism brings us no nearer
than before to the relation between the data of consciousness and
the facts of physical nature. For the rest, how mechanical sci-
ence can be satisfied to regard its material points as nothing but
independently existing fragments of mind, whose whole being is
intensive ; how, out of these intensive units, space-relations are
to be constructed at all — these questions we may for the present
neglect. Atomic monism, a synthesis, or, rather, a jumble of
physiological psychology with doctrines that are incompatible
with any science whatever, has never answered these questions,
and doubtless never will. The memory of the Kritih is still pres-
ent to control modern progress, and to recall it, as we may hope,
from these most ingenious but most dangerous ventures into dog-
matism.

But let us not be over-hasty. There are other forms of monism
now extant. The purely materialistic monism, for which the hard
and extended atoms of naive realism are already and in themselves
potentially mind, the old-fashioned materialism of days when
Mind-Stuff" and physiological psychology were alike undreamed
of, may indeed be neglected. That doctrine needed not critical
philosophy, of more than a very undeveloped sort, to do away
with it once for all. Modern monism knows of supposed atoms

S6Q The Journal of Speculative Philosoplnj.

that are in their ultimate nature psycliical, and of supposed psy-
chical forces or agents that, when seen from without, behave much
like extended atoms. But the old frao-ment of matter that, beino;
no more than what every blacksmith knows as matter, was yet to
be with all its impenetrability and its inertia a piece of the soul,
has been banished from the talk of serious philosophers. There
remain, then, the numerous, eflbrts that see in the world the expres-
sion of psychical powers as such, not mere mind-stuff atoms, but
organized wholes, related in nature to what we know by internal
experience as mind, yet higher or lower, subtler or mightier, wiser
or more foolish, than the human intelligence. These views may
be divided into two classes — those that see in nature the manifesta-
tions of a logical or intelligent power, and those that see in it the
manifestations of an alogical or blind though still psychical power.
Each of these classes again may be subdivided according as the
power is conceived as conscious or as unconscious in its working.
How do these ontological efforts stand related to the critical
thought? Has any one of them escaped from the boundary that
Kant set for future thought?

The logical Monism necessarily tends towards the historical
method of explaining the world. I say tends, because logical
Monism, following Kant afar off, may look upon time as what
Dr. Stirling calls, in his criticism of Kant, a mirage, not belong-
ing to the truth of things. But, in fact, since human intelligence
is itself an activity, a working towards an end, and since the
logical Monist thinks the universe after the analogy of the human
reason, the constant tendency is for him to conceive the world as
a process whereby the world-spirit makes actual what was poten-
tial, and the world-history therefore as an Evolution. Modern
science, in fact, when viewed speculativel}', though it does not
confirm, yet lends itself easily to such efforts, and we can always,
if we choose, imagine the evolution of the organic kingdom as
possibl}^ the process of self-manifestation of one eternal reason.
Only in this way we are very far from a satisfactory ontology.
A world, the manifestation of the universal reason, developing
in time, how can any reflective mind be content with this ac-
count of things? The universal reason surely means something
by its process, surely lacks something when it seeks for higher
forms. 1^0 w, on a lower stage the universal reason has not

Kanfs Relation to Modern Philosophic Progress. 367

yet what it seeks, on the higher stage it attains what it had
not. Whence or liow does it obtain this something? What
hindered the possible from being forthwith actual at the out-
set? If there was any hindrance, was this of the same nature
with the universal reason, or was it other? If other, then we
are plunged into a Dualism, and the good and evil principles
appear once more. But if there was no external hindrance, no
illogical evil principle in existence, then the universal reason has
irrationally gone without the possible .perfection that it might
possess, until, after great labor, it has made actual what it never
ought to have lacked. The infinite Logos thus becomes no more
than the " child playing with bubbles " of the old philosopher.
Everything about the process of evolution becomes intelligible
and full of purpose — except the fact that there should be any
process at all where all was in, and of, and for the universal
reason at the outset. The infinite power has been playing with
perfection as a cat with a mouse, letting it run away a few seons
in time, that it might be caught once more in a little chase, in-
volving the history of some millions of worlds of life. Is this a
worthy conception? Nay, is it not a self-contradictory one?
Evolution and Keason — are they compatible? Yes, indeed, when
the evolution is ended, the hurly-burly done, the battle lost and
won ; but meanwhile — ? In short, either evolution is a necessity,
one of the twelve-labors of this Hercules- Absolute, or else it is
irrational. In the one case the Absolute must be conceived as in
bonds, in the other case the Logos must be conceived as blunder-
ing. Both conceptions are rank nonsense. This kind of Monism
will not satisfy critical demands.

And then there is the other objection, stated by Schopenhauer,
and by I know not how many before him, that every historical
conception of the world as a whole, every attempt to look upon
Being as a process in time, as a perpetual evolution from a lower
to a higher, is shattered upon this rock : that after an infinite
time the infinite process is still in a very early stage. Infinitely
progressing, always growing better, and yet reaching after all
this eternity of work, only the incoherent, troublous, blind imper-
fection that we feel in ourselves, and that we see in every dung-
heap and sick-room and government on the earth, in every scat-
tered mass of nebulous matter, in every train of meteor-fragments

368 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

in tlie lieavens — wliat is this but progress without a goal, blind
toil ? The world would be, one might think, after an infinity of
growth, intensively infinite at every point of its extent. We
mortals know of no one point in the universe where one might
lay his hand and say : Here the ideal is attained.

Yet I should be very far from dreaming of accepting the op-
posing dogmatic theorem, the antithesis of this sublime Antinomy,
viz. : " The world is the product of an irrational force. Tlie One
is blind." Schopenhauer undertook the defence of this antithesis,
and, in bad logic, as we all know, he somewhat surpassed even
that arch blunderer, the universal Will of his own system. This
Will, after all, desired a good deal of trouble, and got his wish.
But Schopenhauer desired a consistent statement, and, with all his
admirable ingenuity and learning, he produced a statement whose
inconsistences have been exposed too often to need much more
discussion. Schopenhauer is a sort of dealer in deadly weapons.
We go to him for a pistol or a knife when our intents are mur-
derous, for he often supplies the most efi'ective means for argu-
mentative success when we want a dialectic victory. He is a
literary gardener, too, and sells many very pretty thought-flowers.
But an ontology — no, to the defenders of the alogical hypothesis,
as a dogmatic doctrine, it has not yet been given to make out
more than the purely negative case that we have stated above.
Dogmatic panlogism can be assaulted, as I hold, with much show
of success. The opposite doctrine has not yet been dogmatically
maintained without even worse confusion.

Panlogism and Alogism are difficult enough in themselves, but
how much worse becomes their condition when, as in the Philoso-
phy of the Unconscious^ of Yon Hartmann, either one of them, or
a hybrid of the two, is burdened with yet another hypothesis, viz. ;
that the One Being is unconscious, and yet in nature psychical.
Founding himself on certain physiological facts, very doubtfully
interpreted, on a monstrous perversion of the mathematical theory
of probabilities, on an ingenious view of the history of philosophy,
on a like ingenious criticism of Kant, Yon Hartmann has expound-
ed an ontological doctrine of which, as I cannot but hold, serious
thought can make nothing. This unconscious being, existent not
for itself, for it knows nothing, nor for others, because all else is
a part of it (and, for the rest, nobody ever thought of it before

Kanfs Relation to Modern Phllo&ophic Progress. 369

Yon Hartmann), shall be the maker and npliolder of the universe.
When we regard this product of a fertile brain, we can, I think,
only say of it that a philosophy of round squares may be an en-
tertaining problem for a winter's evening, but cannot be taken
very seriously. This discussion of the Unconscious is no genuine
philosophical cookery ; only a kind of making of mud pies, useful,
no doubt, as a cultivation of industry.

Of course the previous criticism is absurdly inadequate to the
magnitude of the problems involved, and is intended only as the
merest sketch, dogmatically stated, of critical objections to on-
tology. Seeming irreverence, in this hasty style of doing battle,
must be pardoned. Only against dogmatic metaphysic as such
do I war. The critical philosophy holds no theoretical opinion
sacred, just as it regards no earnest, practical faith as other than
sacred. The question is here not what we are to believe, but
what we can in argument maintain, and what our method of
search ought to be. Absolute and Infinite, Logos and not Logos,
Mind-Stufi and Spirit — what are they all for critical philosophy
but, in the first place, mere ideas, conceptions of reason, to be
mercilessly analyzed without regard for consequences ?

One way remains whereby the panlogical monism can still
hope to reach a satisfactory statement of the world -problem.
Suppose that, once for all, the historical form of statement is aban-
doned. This may be done in either of two ways. The universal
reason may be conceived as manifesting itself in time, but not in
a series of events that are united as the parts of a single process.
The world-life may be conceived not as a single history, but as an
eternally repeated expression of the One reason, a process ever re-
newed as soon as finished, an infinite series of growing and decaying
worlds — worlds that are like the leaves of the forest, that spring
and wither through an eternity of changing seasons. The ration-
ality of the world-process is thus saved for our thought by the
hypothesis that, reason is not like a belated traveller, wandering
through the night of time, seeking for a self-realization that is
never reached, but, rather, like the sun that each day begins afresh
his old task, rejoicing as a giant in the fulness of his attained
power. Whoever regards the world as it now is as a suflicient
expression of infinite reason, is at liberty to accept this hypothe-
sis ; but he must not expect to convince those of his doctrine to
XV— 24

370 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

wlioiu reason means perfection, ;uid to whom the world will not^
appear as just at present more perfect than the world of Candide's
experiences. For every one but the blind optimist there is diffi-
culty in regarding this wind-swept battle-field of human action as
the fitting theatre for a drama of unhindered infinite reason, to
be repeated with unwearying tautology through an unending
future. Thus, then, we are tossed back and forth between the
possibilities suggested by our hypothesis. " The world is the mani-
festation of injinite reason ; " good, then, but how ? " The world
is a rational growth from lower to higher^ How, then, is this
possible if the infinite reason rules all and desires the higher ?
"Was it not always at the goal ? So, then : " The ivorld is not one
process merely^ hut an eternal repetition of the drama of infinite
reason^ which, as infinite, is thus always active and always at the
goaXP But this hypothesis is utterly overthrown by the appear-
ance of the least imperfection or irrationality in nature. The
first starving family, or singed moth, or broken troth, or wasted
efibrt. or wounded bird, is an indictment of the universal reason
that, always at the goal, has as goal this irrational wrong. The
other possible hypothesis leaves us, after all, in the same quan-
dary. Time may be a mere " mirage." For the eternal One
there is, then, no process ; only fact. This notion of a timeless
Being is, no doubt, very well worth study. It is the Prometheus
that steals fire from the critical philosophy itself. But, then, the
eternal One is thus always at the goal, just as in the other case.
The One cannot be infinite and rational and yet coexistent with
the least trace of wrong, absurdity, error, falsehood. Again our
Monism fails.

The one objection thus far urged against all these doctrines is,
not that they are pleasing or displeasing, but that they involve
contradiction. But if they did not involve inner contradiction,
what then ? Would any one of them be established % No, the
terrible passage through the gates of the Kantian Dialektik would
remain for each, and over the door of the critical philosophy is
written : " Abandon all hope, ye dogmatic theories of Being that
enter here." The great problems of the theory of knowledge
would demand solution. How the individual mind, shut up in a
world of sense, of momentary judgments, of dim memories and
expectations, of slowly-moving, discursive reasonings, can possibly

Karifs Relation to Modern Philosophic Progress. 3Y1

know and grasp this all-enfolding Unity of Being, can distinguish
the conception of it from any chance product of imagination, can
reach the heart of things, although by nature living, as Lotze has
remarked, in the uttermost branchings of reality — this is the great
■mystery that critical philosophy seeks to remove by denying the
premises upon which the belief in this mystery rests, viz. : the pos-
sibility of an Ontology, and the supposed nature of the ideal abso-
lute knowledge. Critical philosophy knows, as Mr. Shadworth
Hodgson says, nothing of an Ontology, but much of a Metaphysic.
Thus, then, modern thought, with all its labor, remains as far
from an Ontology as ever. "We need, in fact, only glance at the
eflPorts made in our own time to prove the existence of independent
things in themselves of any sort, in order to see how ill ontological
speculation fares. To assure us not what these things are, but
that they are, modern thought toils in vain. One admits that un-
critical consciousness accepts things in themselves ; but one fails
to learn how this uncritical consciousness is justified. Who can.
be content with Mr. Spencer's transfigured Kealism ? A more
critical writer. Professor Baumann, of Gottingen, in his Phi-
losophie als Orientirung uber die Welt, elaborately shows the im-
possibility of establishing the existence of an external reality, and
then assumes things after the fashion of the most downright and
simple every-day realism, simply because of the " unavoidable desire
for explanation " that dwells in us. Idealism cannot, as he thinks,
explain, but only describe, our inner experiences. Realism can
do something in the way of explanation. Explanation by means
of a myth is an old device of mankind ; but how about explana-
tion by means of a conscious myth ? Professor Riehl, in his book,
Der Philosojyhische Kriticismus, defends the realistic element
in Kant from all assaults, and seems to regard as a sufficient proof
of an independent reality the fact that we cannot trace the whole
of consciousness to the action of the subjective forms of sense and
understanding. And there be numerous thinkers whose realism
is founded on a verbal quibble about appearance implying some-
thing that appears (a quibble, by the way, to which Kant's own
words, in a few passages, have given countenance). But in all
this there is no argument for the existence of things in themselves
so strong as the loneliness that enters the minds of many people
when you take the things in themselves away.

372 The Journal of Specfiilative Philosophy.

Thus, then, Avitliout an ontoloi>-y, without proofs founded upon
solid i>Tound for even the first elements of an ontolog:y, modern
speculation turns back to Kant to see what hope there is that a
new edifice is possible on a Kantian basis. To be sure, in Kant
himself there was the old obscurity about the things in themselves
not yet removed, but mayhap in the Kritik the way lias been
shown whereby this, its own disease, can be remedied.

II. — The Needed Reform of the Critical Philosophy.

What modification of the elaborate system of the Kritik is
needed in order that we may substitute for these tumultuous as-
semblies of quarrelling ontologies, tliese famine-riots of hungry
Being-hunters, an orderly organization of critical doctrines, related
to one principle, and conscious both of their limits and of their
attainments ? To this question we must devote the brief remain-
der of our siietch.

The fundamental thought of the Ki'itik, the one that we all
take away from its study, however vague our notion of the details
of the system, is the thought that the forms and laws of the uni-
verse as knowai to us are conditioned by the nature of our own
knowing activity. But how conditioned ? Here begins the difii-
culty. Two main problems are thus suggested : First, if we ac-
cept the fundamental critical thought, w^hat can we say of the
relation of this knowino; activity to its matter ? How can and
does the knowing activity form or affect its matter ? Second,
what can be said of the matter upon which the knowing activity
operates, when we view this matter apart from the activity that
affects it ? Is the matter anything apart from the forming activ-
ity ? If so, what is it ? These two problems, themselves but
opposite faces of one problem, cannot be treated wholly apart,
and yet fall asunder when you try to combine them into one.
Let us begin with the first.

Given a crude conscious experience of sense, and given also, as
we may for mere argument's sake suppose, this experience as
already in the subjective forms of space and time, by what action
can this experience be transformed into a knowledge of a real
universe ? Or, in other words, what active element, added to sense,
makes of it knowledge? Modern science, following Locke, says
reflection, the noting and comparing of the data of this sense-

Kant'' 8 Relation to Modern Philosophic Progress. 373

experience. This reflection is somettiing foreign to the direct
experience, but follows after experience, noting with the devotion
of a Boswell the words that sense may utter. No, says Kant,
this cannot be ; a mere Boswell cannot introduce into sense more
necessity than its data already possess, and they possess none.
An active power, applying categories by means of the transcen-
dental Schema, making of sense for the first time true experience,
not merely sucking in like a sponge the pre-existent waters of
experience, introduces necessity into this confused manifold of
sense. But still we ask, How ? The transcendental deduction
and the system of principles are to furnish the answer. And this
answer of Kant's Kritih seems to have satisfied comparatively
few thinkers, even among those that accept the critical thought,
in its general statement, with readiness. One great class of ob-
jections we may find summed up in Dr. Stirling's late Kant arti-
cles in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy. Take these ob-
jections in concrete form as applied to one problem, that of causal
necessity.

The assertion of causal necessity is the assertion that there are
throughout experience cases of existences upon which certain
other existences must always follow whenever the first occur.
Now what is this conception of causal necessity if not applied to
experience ? By Kant's own confession it is nothing. But how
can it be applicable to experience ? Only in cas6 sense-experience
itself furnishes instances of uniform succession. But if sense-
experience furnishes these instances, what does the category of
causality, applied through its schema, add to them % The idea of
necessity ? But this idea is empty if sense does not justify it,
superfluous if sense does justify it by containing the desired uni-
formities. Experience either has regular sequence — and then why
the category ? — or has not regular sequence, and then the category
is as helpless as a hen with her brood of ducklings. The hen's
transcendental schema contains the idea of water as fatal to her
brood, and her sense-experience contains the perception of her
brood as thriving in water. Alas, poor category ! Sense and
understanding, thus regarded, are like fragments of rare but
broken china, which we in vain try to piece together.

A more or less clear notion of this objection has driven certain
eminent scientific men, who (as E. Diihring maliciously said) ein

374 The Journal of Sjyeculatwe Philosophy.

wenig philosoj)he/n, to a kind of luoditication of the Kantian
view, so plausible that to me, I confess, it once for a time seemed
the true Kant, and to others less ignorant it doubtless still seems
the last word of philosophy on the subject. According to this
yiew, the category of causality is applied to sense-data by active
intelligence merely as a " Postulate of Comprehensibility," a sort
of demand, or an humble petition, as it were, to his majesty expe-
rience, that he will be pleased to be uniform, since otherwise we
shall be unable to do anything with him or his data. An humble
petition of the before-mentioned hen, that the water will be gra-
ciously pleased to drown her ducklings, would be a fair instance
of the *' Postulate of the Comprehensibility of the World " as thus
stated. If this postulate means that we shall be delighted to iind
in the world what uniformity we can find, it is an innocent wish.
If it means that without uniformities experience can furnish no
laws, it is a tautology. If it means that by this 'postulate we
render one whit more probable (not to say necessary) the actual
existence of uniformities in future experience, then it is a manifest
error. There are the sense-data, here is the intelligence " postu-
lating " about them. Postulate me no postulates, says sense. I go
my own way unharmed by you. And sense does so. Nothing
can be clearer than that in this way the active incelligcnce does
not affect the sense-data at all, nor create the least show of a law
of nature. Yet, Kant said, the understanding is to give laws to
nature. How ?

Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, attacking this great problem, assumes
not an understanding affecting a sense-experience, but a primary
consciousness in time and space forms, subjected to a sort of re-
troversion called reflection, and to a sort of dissection called the
conceptual process, whereby the data of continuous direct con-
sciousness are distinguished, represented, separated, classified,
named, and so made into a complex thought-structure. This
theory regards necessity as having, after all, its foundation in the
simple data of primary consciousness, in which, if there were no
uniformity, active reflection could introduce none.. An effort is,
however, made to regard the stream of consciousness as neverthe-
less certainly subject to the law of uniformity of sequence ; but
readers of the Philosophy of Reflection may judge whether this
effort is successful. For my part, no account of the principle of

KanVs Relation to Modern Philosophic Progress. 375

causality wliicli sees in it only a particular instance of the princi-
ple of identity can satisfy my needs. The assertion, events of the
class A are followed hy events of the class ^, cannot possibly be
reduced to an identical assertion unless it is such at the outset.
[N^or can any reflective collection of data from a series of passively
given conscious states be warrant for this assertion if it is to apply
universally to all possible series of conscious states. Mr. Hodg-
son is doubtless one of the greatest living masters of metaphysic,
but we must suspect anything that looks like giving up the very
central citadel of the critical philosophy, the doctrine of the
spontaneity of intelligence. " We can think nothing as united in
the object that we have not ourselves united." Those are Kant's
golden words. By them we yet hold, though the mechanism of
this uniting still seems questionable.

Mr. Caird and Professor Watson (whose new book, Kant and
his English Critics, has come into my hands since I began to
write the present paper) have attempted to overcome this difficulty
by building beyond Kant's separation of sense and understanding
up to the point where sense and understanding are seen to unite
into one fact with two aspects. Sense, they say, is not given
apart from thought, to be conquered by thought from without.
The categories do not come to the sense-data as the water to the
woman. The fact given is a manifold of sense and category in-
dissolubly joined. Kant's discovery really is that sense apart
from thought-forms is impossible. Kant's mistake it is that he
speaks of sense and thought as if they were two separate streams.
We must reform him by making of the two one flesh, not through
the act of knowledge put already in it.

I have no doubt that these thinkers have properly suggested
the direction in which we must look for the solution of the prob-
lem, but I am not convinced that thought can so readily swallow
sense in the way that Professor Caird seems to suggest. Kant's
error lay, no doubt, in supposing sense to be a datum wholly apart
from the active setting of the house in order through the category.
Sense once thus given, how could the category rearrange its facts ?
Sense either would be in itself conformable to the category, and
would so need no rearrangement, or would be at variance with
the category, and then inexorable. But still the fact remains
that we are constantly bound to sense-facts, and that there is in

376 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

consciousness a contrast between the passive reception of sense-
data {e. f/., of locomotive-whistles, of toothaches, or of the sounds
of hand-organs) and the spontaneity of thought. How explain
this contrast and yet^give the spontaneity its rights? Let us
make one more attempt.

What is the ultimate fact of intelligent or knowing conscious-
ness? Is this consciousness wholly a receiving, or wholly a making,
of its own content? If wholly, neither is it yet in part each, and
so both at once? Both at once, answer many Kantian thinkers.
But how both, and in what sense each? First, then, something
is received, and by the word received I mean no implication about
a cause or source from which received ; I mean onl)' to point out
the fact that in every moment of knowing there is a sense of the
positive irresistible presence of some sense-content, a presence
wholly unquestionable, absolutely certain. A toothache, a blue
color, a loud sound, a vague feeling of weariness, explain them as
you will, in consciousness the data signified by these words are,
when present at all, in and for any instant of their actual presence
simply irresistible facts. There is in these facts, as facts, no con-
scious spontaneity of thought. The unconscious non fingo. In
the second place, if the sense-data of any moment have the form
of space, they have this form also as a simple irresistible fact, such
as Dr. William James has aptly called a spatial Quale. Geomet-
rical theorems, even geometrical axioms, in general the relations
of what Mr. Hodgson names Figured Space, are never such ulti-
mate data, but the mere fact of spatial higness (to follow Dr.
James once more) is a possible ultimate datum. Again, besides
these data of space-form, succession in its simplest form, not the
relation of past, present, and future, but the relation of instan-
taneous sequence, such as yoxi may observe in the ticks of a watch
or the beats of your pulse when you pay direct attention to them,
and perceive immediately, without the conscious use of memory,
the present fact of a succession of three or four distinct beats, this
is also an ultimate datum. But now, in the third place, besides
the sense-data and their ultimate forms of extensive and successive
magnitude, there is present in the moment of knowing an active
judgment. What does this do to the sense-data more than to be
conscious of them? The following thing I answer : the intelligent
act does, if no more. Take up the thread of knowing conscious-

KanVs Relation to Modern PhilosophiG Progress. 3TT

ness where you will, and you find in every moment when there
is knowledge a reference, more or less definite and significant, of
the content here given to something beyond this present moment.
But this something beyond need by no means be an external
cause of the present sense-datum. On the contrary, the notion
of an external cause seems to me a very complex product of
thought, impossible without an earlier, simpler, ultimate tendency
to refer the present datum to something beyond the present.
"What is this something ? First, and simplest of all of the forms
that are taken by the active judgment upon a present datum, is
the form of referring this present to a past datum. In every act
of reflection, in all definite memory, in clearly conscious recogni-
tion, in every assertion of a uniformity in experience, there is
present in consciousness, first, the sum of immediate data ; second,
the form of extensive or successive magnitude taken by these
present data ; third, the assertion that these data, or a part of
them, stand for, symbolize, recall, resemble, or otherwise relate to
data that were real in a past experience now no longer existent.
Plainly these present data are no proof of the existence of a past.
Plainly, as present, they are not the past that they symbolize.
Plainly, then, the past is no sense-datura. But notice, the whole
of experience, except the meagre little sense-datum of this mo-
ment, is past. Hence, experience is possible as an object of
knowledge only in and for the act by which the past is created,
as it were, out of the material of present data. This act of assert-
ing more than our data can possibly contain, by projecting from
the present moment the scheme 6f a well-filled actual past, no
longer existent or directly knowable, but simply made by the
judgment — this act I call the act of Achiowledgment of the
Past.

But acknowledgment of a reality beyond present data is not
confined to the assertion of a past. Reference of present data to
a future forms a second class of acts which may be called Antici-
pations. Reference of present data to external reality, in the
acknowledgment of other conscious beings besides ourselves as
real, and of other experience besides our own as possible, in brief,
Acknowledgment of a Universe of Truth, forms the third class
of conscious acts by which present sense-data are transcended
through a reference of them to a reality of which in themselves

378 The Journal of Speculative Pldlosophij.

they tjive, and can give, not tlie faintest evidence. And through
these three classes or forms of activity, experience as a whole is
created. Experience bej'ond this instant is for sense nothing, for
active thouu-ht everything. Thus, then, it is true both that sense
is heyond the control of judgment, and that in the activity of
judging Ave build upon the data of sense the whole universe of
reality. Thus, then, the objection that the category comes to the
sense-experience too late to give it any necessity is evaded alto-
gether by a new conception of experience. Sense-facts do not
follow in a given order, in a presented time, to be reflected upon
and rearranged later by an oflficious understanding. The true
fact is that sense is momentary, and fills no past at all ; so that
the whole of time i« made and filled up by an understanding that
gets its cue from present sense, but that acts in its own way,
actually constructing, body, bones, and soul, out of the little dry
dust of the puny present moment, that whole vast world of experi-
ence to which Kant had supposed that it was merely to give form.
This account differs from Kant's in some important respects,
although it is an effort merely to recast the Kantian doctrine.
Kant said that, in order for the succession of sense-impressions to
become an object of thought, the synthesis of apprehension and
the synthesis of recognition must take up the sense-data, and,
while uniting them, must make them appear in consciousness as
I'eal, and as members of the united experience. The view here
maintained is that the past data, instead of being picked up, as it
were, by the synthesis of apprehension and of recognition, and
carried bodily into present consciousness, are really projected out
of the present data, into a conceived past, by the momentary
activity of judgment. Kant made the unity of apperception, like
a S{ia-fog, enter, pervade, float through, and fill experience, so that
the categories could work, and so that a disunited experience
could become one. Our view would make all the world of reality
immediately subject to a unity implied in that present act by
which this world is projected from the present into a conceived
but not given infinite space and time. Like Kant, we should
regard activity that is not concerned with sense-data as emj)ty,
and the sense-data themselves as blind ; but we should maintain
that an utter divorce of sense and intelligence is not only mean-
ingless, but impossible.

KanVs Relation to Modern Philosophic Progress. 379

If this is the solution suggested for the problem of the relation
of form and matter in consciousness, the other question — that about
the nature of the matter when viewed apart from the form — will
detain us little. The three impostors of the Kantian Erltih (im-
postors because they so well deceived Kant himself), whose names
are Ding an sich, transcendentaler Gegenstand, and Noumenon^
vanish into thin air. The Ding an sich was what sense became
when jou left out the form first, and then the matter, and then put
a " selbstverstdndliehe Yoraussetzung" ' in the place to fill up the
empty space. The transcendentaler Gegenstand, or Ding uher-
haupt, was precisely what one thinks of when one thinks of noth-
ing. The Noumenon was what a being with a totally different
form of sense from our own would perceive if he turned his atten-
tion to the transcendental er Gegenstand. Peace to the ashes of
these noble objects of critical reverence. I hold the true critical
theory of Reality to be thus briefly summed up :

1. Keal is the sense-content of the present moment.

2. Eeal is the form of this content in the extensive or in the
successive order.

3. Heal is the act by which we acknowledge a past that is not
given, nor now existent as having been ; real is the act by which
we acknowledge the existence of other consciousness than the
individual consciousness, other possible experience in space and
time than the given experience ; real is the act by which we antici-
pate a future not yet given.

4. For the objects of these acts no possible theoretical evidence
can be given more nearly ultimate than the one great fact that
through acknowledgment and anticipation they are projected
from the present moment into the past, future, and possible world
of truth, conceived as in space and time, and as the object of
actual or possible consciousness.

5. No other reality is conceivable than that contained in these
data and in these acts of projection. For to conceive of a reality
is to perform an act of projection.

6. Apart from the act of projection, no reality is attributable to
the objects that are not data. For to attribute reality to them is

' V. Benno Erdmann, ^^ Kanfs Kriticisnais in der ersten u. in dei- zweiten Auflage der
Kritik" passim.

380 The Journal of Speculative Philosoj)hy.

to acknowlcdrje or to anticipate them — i. e., to perform an act of
wliat I liave called projection from the present moment.

7. At the same time no doubt can be entertained of the exist-
ence of the objects in question ; for doubt is inability to acknowl-
edge or to anticipate. But as a fact we do acknowledge and
anticipate just these objects.

8. Keal are, therefore, the objects of the intelligent activity
just in so far as they are products of this activity of projection.
For that is real for us whose existence is for us indubitable.

9. The great object of critical philosophy is, therefore, not to
toil in the vain hope of constructing an ontology, but to devote
itself to the study of the forms of intellectual activity, with a
view to separating in these the insigniiicant from the significant.
The concrete content of space and. time is the subject of special
science.

10. The goal of philosophy can be reached only in an Ethical
Doctrine. For since the ultimate fact of the knowing conscious-
ness is the active construction of a world of truth from the data
of sense, the ultimate justification of this activity must be found
in the significance — i. <?., in the moral worth — of this activity itself,
a matter only to be discussed in the light of Ethics.

Such is the modification that the writer would suggest as
bringing the Kantian thought more into harmony with the present
needs of philosophic progress. Only a very few problems have
been considered, but these are fundamental. I had wished in this
paper to discuss the relation of the Kantian thought to that other
problem of modern discussion,' whose roots are in the transcen-
dental aesthetic and its branches everywhere (even in spiritualistic
newspapers) ; I mean the great problem of the nature of space-
knowledge. Here one of our greatest steps forward is plainly
soon to be taken ; and Kant is the author of the whole contro-
versy, although, indeed, not responsible for the spiritualistic phase,
of which Slade and Professor Zollner are the sole begetters. I had
wished also to trace the Kantian influence in some of the discus-
sions of modern psychology, and even to point out how, as in the
physiological doctrine of " specific energies," Kant, half-under-
stood and quite misused, has often acted as an awakening force, a
source of suggestion, in sciences that lie far beyond the boundary
of his own chosen work. But all this wish was plainly foolish

Kant 's Antinomies in the Light of Modern Science. 381

for I have far exceeded proper limits already, witbout half treat-
ing the few fragments of doctrine that I have attempted to dis-
cuss. The one conclusion that this paper has in a very hasty way
tried to maintain, is that the critical philosophy, as a negative
assault upon all ontological dogmatism of the theoretical reason,
still stands fast, and that progress therefore lies in a reform of the
Kantian Kritik by means of a new and yet more critical defi-
nition of experience and of the work of thought.

KANT'S ANTINOMIES IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN

SCIENCE.

READ AT SARATOGA, JDLY 6, 1881, BY LESTER F. WARD.

It has become fashionable to regard all controversy as mere
logomachy, in which some mere word is the true "bone of conten-
tion."

" Aud for the word itself we fight
In bitterness of sou]."

This view finds strong support in the undeniable fact that the
intensity of sectarian antagonism increases in proportion as the
essential doctrines of sects approach each other, until, as well
stated by an able writer in " Macmillan's Magazine," " if you
want to see men fling away the very thought of reconciliation,
and close in internecine conflict, you should look at controversial-
ists who do not differ at all, but who have adopted dififerent words
to express the same opinion." Such views are strengthened not
only by facts of every-day observation, but by such memorable
events of history as the two greatest schisms in Christianity, the
first arising from the attempt to add a single letter to the Nicene
shibboleth, and the second growing out of the appending of a
word to the Latin creed.

But while admitting that a large amount of human controversy
is of this more or less verbal character, a deeper study of human
nature cannot fail to reveal glimpses of more general causes
which may even be found to underlie the apparently most base-

382 The Joui'nal of Speculative PMlompliy.

less disputations. Indeed, the existence of antithetical types of
mind, to a large extent incapable of interpreting ]>henouiena in
the same way, has been vaguely seen in all ages and by many
writers. The Phitonic and Epicurean schools of Greek philoso-
phy body forth this conception, and, in fact, seem to have exempli
fied it with almost as great clearness as any subsequent event. Be-
tween these schools nearly every philosopher since that day has, in
however vao;ue a manner, seemed to take sides, so that the general
cast of his mind upon the fundamental ])roblems involved in them
may be deduced from his writings. " Melius autem est naturam
secare quam abstrahere," said Lord Bacon ; and he adds, " Id quod
Democriti schola fecit, quae magis penetravit in naturam quam
reliqua?." This passage, besides its value in Hxing Lord Bacon's
position in this regard, serves well to suggest one of the chief dis-
tinctions between the schools. " Secare naturam " miffht be taken
as the first step in the Baconian method, and the one by which
science is specially characterized. Ernst Ilaeckel, speaking from
the point of view of the biologists, defines this constitutional anti-
thesis of the human mind as follows : " If you place all the forms
of cosmological conception of various peoples and times into com-
parative juxtaposition, yon can finally bring them all into two
squarely opposing groups — a causal or 'tnechanical^ and a teleolog-
ieal or vitalistie group."' lie further invents the terms "monis-
tic" and "dualistic" to distinguish these two conceptions, the
last of which refers to the recognition of a power outside of nature
acting upon it and in addition to it, while in the former nature is
conceived as acting alone.

This wide-spread intellectual polarity may perha^JS be in part
explained. All philosophy aims to account for phenomena. The
human mind is so constituted that no power can prevent it from
perpetually striving towards this end. All systems of thought
naturally fall under two general divisions. One of these explains
phenomena as the product of will and design. A rock, a tree, or
an animal is explained on the same principles as a watch ; it ex-
ists, therefore it has been made. This is the teleological explana-
tion. The other mode of thought claims to recognize a distinction
between these two classes of objects or phenomena, and while
admitting design in the latter denies it in the former. The rock,
tree, animal, are not made, but have become what they are. This

Kant's Antinomies in the Light of Modern Science. 383

conception let us call the genetic mode of explanation. The teleo-
logical and the genetic modes of explanation are therefore the
respective foundations of the two great schools of human thought
which severally embrace all men. The only system which ever
claimed to disavow both these bases is that of Auguste Corate,
and which, in so far, must be regarded rather as a revolt against
philosophy than as a system of philosophy.

Under both these general divisions there have grown up numer-
•ous more special doctrines which have, each in its turn, formed
nuclei for minor systems, to which, according to the special men-
tal proclivities of each individual, men have given in their adhe-
sion. To the teleological division, for example, properly belong
the doctrines of pure theology or divine free-will, of predestina-
tion, and of fatalism. To this also should in part be added that
modern truly dualistic school, who hold that all phenomena are
the result of unvarying laws once arbitrarily impressed upon the
universe. This school, on the other hand, however, except in so
far as the primal origin of these laws is concerned, may consist-
ently be classed in the genetic division.

This last-named general class, the genetic, does not possess the
number or variety of special sects found in the other, and in all
their essential tenets its adherents may be regarded as practically
at one. Though apparently of modern origin, the genetic school
of philosophy is as old as the fully-developed mind of man. As
already remarked, there have always existed the two antithetical
ways of looking at the world, and no age has been without adher-
ents to both of these systems. But there are reasons in the nature
of things why the teleological habit of thought should, down to
within a quite recent period, have maintained an overwhelming
supremacy over the genetic habit of thought.

The only philosopher who seems to have clearly perceived the
true nature of this fundamental antithesis, and to have attempted
a systematic analysis of the principles upon which it rests, was
Immanuel Kant, whose centennial anniversary we are here to cele-
brate. In his immortal " Antinomies," and the profound discus-
sion which follows them, he has laid the foundation in psychology
where it properly belongs, for a thorough understanding of this
most vital and practically important condition of human thought.
His Theses and xlntitheses differ only in the character of the

384 The Journal of ISpeculatlve Pliilosophy.

examples given from the primary postulates of the modern tele-
ologists and genetists respectively, which latter class are, strictlj
speaking, the modern evolutionists, and his choice of terms by
which to characterize the defenders of these propositions, while
they are not those which either party would now select, are per-
liaps as little objectionable to the one as to the other of these
classes of persons.

lie calls the one the dogmatic, and the other the empirical, view
of the universe, but in his time and country the former of these
terms had not yet acquired that stigma which has since been
graduall}'^ fastened upon it, and meant a very different thing from
that which Douglas Jerrold defined as " puppyism full-grown ; "
while as to the latter, the practice of opposing empiricism to quan-
titative scientific determination has also principally grown up
since Kant's day. Still, as if somewhat unsatisfied with this word,
he sometimes employs a substitute for it, and calls this the critical
or the sceptical method.

In using the term dogmatic as applicable to the teleological
school, Kant, doubtless, had in view the fact, so apparent to all,
that it was this school that assumed to teach philosophy, being
greatly in the ascendancy ; and in the words empirical, critical,
and sceptical, he, no doubt, recognized the tendency of a few
minds at all times to revolt against the prevailing conceptions,
examine their assumed principles, and subject them to logical,
mechanical, and numerical tests, and to rationalistic criticisms.
For he declares that in favor of accepting the former or dogmatic
view of things there exist three principal arguments : 1. That^
derived from practical interest, since upon it appear to rest the
claims of religion and morality; 2, that derived from a specula-
tive interest, since by its aid the entire field of speculation can be
compassed by the mind and the conditioned directly derived from
the unconditioned; and 3, that derived from popularity, since
he conceived that the great majority would always be found on
that side.

It is interesting and remarkable that so great a mind should be
able to find no higher motives than these upon which to base the
claims of dogmatism, which meant, and still means, the acceptance
of the main body of beliefs of the age. The first is of so low an
order that it would seem to be beneath the dignity of a philoso-

Kant^s Antinomies in the Light of Modern Science. 385

pher to entertain it. For what has a man's practical interest to
do with philosophy, with the attainment of truth in the domain
of abstract thought? The argument employed by Bishop Butler,
that a particular religion should be embraced on the sole ground,
if on no other, that there could be nothing to lose and might be
much to gain by so doing, while in the failure to do so there was
nothing to gain and might be much to lose, has been generally con-
demned as of a low order in appealing to practical interest where
a question of abstract truth was involved. But Bishop Butler
was avowedly a sectarian writer, defending his particular religion,
and such low appeals were to be expected. How, then, could
Kant justify an analogous argument? As a disinterested phi-
losopher, this would seem impossible. Yet Kant's justification,
from his own peculiar point of view, though somewhat amusing,
will appear to be quite satisfactory. It is this : Neither the thesis
nor the antithesis of any of his antinomies is capable of proof,
or rather both are capable of absolute demonstration ; and, being
contradictories, all argument becomes absurd. With him the
universe is a great dilemma, of which any one may take either
horn with exactly equal chances of reaching the truth. Of course,
therefore, if there is any difference in this respect, lie had better
choose the one which is most to his interest, and this, Kant thouerht.
was unquestionably the dogmatic.

Fully as much might be said of his third reason for preferring-
that side, viz. : the advantage to be derived from its greater popu-
larity. If possible, this claim possesses a still lower moral weight
than that of practical interest, of which it is, indeed, merely a
temporal form. Only politicians now urge it as a means of influ-
encing men's opinions. It certainly could never be decently urged
except in just such a case as Kant conceived this to be; a case in
which it would, otherwise, be absolutely immaterial which side
one took. The truth itself was hopelessly unattainable, and, if
any ulterior consequences were, as a matter of fact, to follow
either decision, one was as likely to escape them by the one course
as by the other. The only guide left, therefore, was simply pres-
ent advantage ; and, be that the least greater on the one than on
the other side, this should be sufficient to determine the decision.

Kant's second ground for accepting the thesis rather than the
antithesis of his antinomies — i. e., the dogmatic rather than the
XY— 25

386 The Journal of Speculative Philosophij.

empirical or sceptical view of tlie universe, viz, : that of specula-
tive interest — being liii;lilj pliilos()])!iical, deserves more attention.
And, logically enouo-li, we tiiul him enumerating among the ad-
vantages which the mind is to derive from this course that of ease
or convenience (Gemiicldichkeit). Nothing is truer than that tele-
ology is a relief to the overstrained intellect striving to build a
universe between two infinities. It is the philosophy of the in-
dolent brain, the ignava ratio, and is thus adapted both to the
chihlliood of the world and to all those who weary of intellectual
effort. These may be good reasons where all hope of arriving at
objective truth is renounced ; they could scarcely be admitted
under any other circumstances. That there is any greater intrin-
sic dignity or nobility in a universe created by design than in one
created by evolution, few men with scientific habits of thought
will probably be able to admit. These qualities are not objective,
but subjective. They do not belong to the world, but to those
who contemplate it, and thus so much of the supposed speculative
interest is carried back to the class of practical interest.

The empiricist of Kant loses all these advantages. In embrac-
ino; the antitheses he removes the foundations of reli2:ion and of
morality, the latter conceived as deriving all its sanction from
authority. "If there is no Primordial Being {Unoesen) distinct
from the universe, if the universe is without a beginning, and,
therefore, without a creator, our will not free, and the soul of the
same divisibility and perishability as matter, moral ideas and prin-
ciples lose all validity, and fall with the transcendental ideas which
formed their theoretical support." In this passage Kant evi-
dently fails to distinguish the fine shades on the strength of which
many modern scientists so stoutlj' reject the charge of material-
ism. Yet he has clearly in view the stern mechanical connec-
tion between phenomena which constitutes the basis of the causa-
tional philosophy of science.

Empiricism, as thus defined, is not, however, entirely without
its advantages. It, too, possesses a certain speculative interest, in
defining which the great philosopher still more clearly shows that
he had in mind that same universal antithesis in the constitution
of the human mind which we souo;ht to describe at the outset.

" Empiricism," he says, " affords advantages to the speculative
interest of the reason which are very fascinating, and tar exceed

Kanfs Antinomies in the Light of Modern Science. 387

those which the dogmatic teacher of rational ideas can promise.
In the former the intellect is always on its own peculiar ground,
viz. : the field of mere possible experiences, whose laws it can
trace back, and by means of which it can expand its own certain
and comprehensible knowledge without end. . . . The empiricist
will never allow any epoch of nature to be assumed as the ab-
solutely first, or any limit of his outlook into tlie surrounding-
world to be regarded as the outermost, or any of the objects of
nature, which he can resolve by mathematics or by observation
and bring synthetically under his contemplation {Anschauung) —
the extended — to pass over to those which neither sense nor imagi-
nation can ever represent in concreto — the simple — ." Surely, his
" empiricist " is here none other than a modern genetist, evolu-
tionist, or scientist.

Even admitting; all that Kant maintains for and against the two
opposing views, it may still be a question whether the manly in-
dependence of the empiricist would not be preferable to the idle
respectability of the dogmatist.

Still better to illustrate these two antagonistic phases of thought,
Kant asserts that they embody the contrast between Platonism
and Epicureanism. Whether the teleologists can fairly regard
Plato as the founder or first great representative of their views in
philosophy may, it is true, be open to some question ; but that
Epicurus foreshadowed, as faithfully as could be expected from
the state of knowledge in his time, the teachings of modern sci-
ence and the principles of the genetic causational or evolutionary
school, cannot be candidly denied. And, if his sect did nothing
else, they clearly proved that this apparent question of opinion
really has a psychological basis, and exists deep in the constitution
of the human mind, more or less independently of the condition
of human knowledge in the world. There always have existed a
few minds unwilling to accept the dogmatism of the mass. There
always crops out in society a more or less pronounced manifesta-
tion of rationalism as opposed to authority. While this class of
views finds few open advocates, it always finds many tacit adher-
ents, and, when uttered, a large, though usually irresponsible, fol-
lowing. Criticism of received beliefs is always sweet to a con-
siderable number who rejoice at the overthrow of the leaders of
opinion or the fall of paragons of morality. And this it is which

388 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

ot'teii renders the peace of society insecure. The established code
of morals is dimly felt by the lower classes to be in some respects
radically unsound, Tlio broad contrast between men's nominal
beliefs as spoken and their real beliefs as acted is apparent even
to childi-en. The standard of conduct is so much higher than
that which the controllers of conduct can themselves live up to,
resulting always in the punishment of the weak and the poor for
the same transgressions as are daily committed with impunity by
the rich and the powerful, that the lowest miscreant sees that
there is some fundamental wrong underlying the entire social
fabric, altliough he can not tell what it is.

All this must be regarded as the legitimate consequence of the
undue supremacy of dogmatic ideas and teleological conceptions
in society. So far from favoring morality, they are the direct
cause of the most dangerous form of immorality, viz, : a mutinous
revolt against too severe and unnatural moral restraints. Rules
of conduct based on these conceptions are necessarily arbitrary,
while the normal intellect naturally demands a reason for its
obedience.

While these truths are equally applicable to all classes of con-
duct, we will illustrate them here only in one. That the prevail-
ing sentiment of society on the question of the purity of actions
which spring from love is in large measure false, and in so far
injurious, is evident from many indications. The steady refusal
of the popular pulse to beat in unison with moral precept respect-
ing it may be counted among the most significant of these in-
dices. In fact, it is very curious, and suggests the demoralizing
tendency of too high moral standards, to observe to how great an
extent the moral code is upheld in word and violated in action.
Many persons, when questions of this class arise for discussion,
will defend the side of dogmatism who at the same time are
really in sympathy with the side of scepticism. The real popu-
larity of this side, when it finds an opportunity to express itself
through channels that are deemed respectable, and where its real
nature is likely to remain concealed, is well shown by the manner
in which works of fiction are demanded and the stage is supported.
These agencies are the natural defenders of the critical side of
this question, which constitutes almost their only mission and
raison d'etre. They usually aim to demonstrate the essential

Kanfs Antinomies in the Light of Modem Science. 389

purity of such acts, dictated by the sexual emotions, as the ethical
canons declare impure. A romance or a drama which should fail
to administer some such rebuke to the accepted tenets of orthodox
morality would be adjudged tame, and would prove a financial
failure. Every one knows with what avidity this class of critical
literature is devoured by the public and its dramatic representa-
tion is applauded. In fact, as already remarked, there exists
throughout society, and probably always has existed, not only
with respect to this class of acts, but with respect to many others,
a deep-seated rebellion against much that claims to call itself
Kar el^oxnv, moral or right — as it were, a vague consciousness,
which the average intellect cannot formulate, of the arbitrary and
factitious character of the moral and social codes, through the
shadowy form of which may be dimly seen the half-unconscious
recognition that human action is the product of fixed mechanical
laws, that there is no absolute good or bad, but that these quali-
ties are relative to the benefit or injury done to beings susceptible
to pleasure and pain, and that the arbitrary rules of society based
on the negation of these truths fall far short of their extravagant
claims in regulating the conduct of men.

But returning to the antinomies themselves, and considering the
problems presented by the thesis and the antithesis of each in the
light of what is now known, and by the aid of modern methods
of investigation, we shall see that it is not true that both sides
admit of equal proofs and disproofs. Disregarding Kant's logical
demonstrations as worthless at his own showing, since they reduce
the argument on either side to an absurdity, and appealing to
the inductive method, which, without claiming infallibility, has
wrought such mighty results for man, we may with safety main-
tain that the side of these questions which Kant calls the empiri-
cal has gained upon that which he calls the dogmatic in about the
same proportion as the knowledge of the nature of things has
increased in the world. The spirit of opposition to teleological
conceptions could make no headway as long as so little was known
of natural processes. Lucretius might write De Rerum Natura^
but what he could say that was true must go unsupported by
facts and be discredited, while much that he must say that was
false would be disproved and throw still greater discredit upon his
system. In a state of profound ignorance of the universe, teleo-

390 The Joitrnal of Specidati've Philosophy.

loi^ical explanations were the only ones the world would accept.
They could be understood ; genetic explanations could not. Ap-
pearances wciv ;ill on one side. The deeper truths could not be
comprehended. The greatest paradox which nature pi'esents is
that of adaptation. The word itself contains an ambiguity. It
possesses both an active and a middle or reflective sense. The
former is teleological, the latter genetic. Adaptation in a purely
passive sense is admitted by all. No one denies that there exists
a great amount of correspondence between apparently very dis-
tinct objects. It is evident that they have in some way been
made to correspond. The vital question is : IIow and by what
power have they been so made ? The teleologist says : ^y a
power from without ; by design. The genetist says : By a power
from within ; by adaptation. Just here is the grand schism.

It is easy to see, too, why the teleologists should at lirst and for
a long time enjoy a supremacy. The teleological answer to any
question requires comparatively little intellectual effort. It is the
easiest way of explaining things, the first explanation that sug-
gests itself. Not only is it intrinsically more simple, but it is
raore in accord with human experience and the natural habit of
thought. In other words, it is anthropomorphic. It is most natu-
ral to explain natural phenomena in the same way that artificial
phenomena are explained. A garment is adapted to the body
that is to wear it. A duck's foot is adapted to the water it swims
in. The explanation of the first of these facts is known ; that of
the second is unknown. Why not infer it from that of the first ?
There exists no other hnown explanation. To sit down and
evolve one of an entirely different kind is not only a laborious
task, but, when announced, it must remain unproved until a vast
amount of scientific investigation shall have established a broad
basis of induction. The sceptic, therefore, who in the infancy of
human thouglit had the temerity to suggest that things may have
worked out their observed relations of correspondence through
the inherent activities residing within themselves, was met, natu-
rally enough, with derision. Yet every step that science has
taken has been in the direction of disproving the popular and
confirming the unpopular view. It has been gradually but stead-
ily vindicating reason as against analogy, and establishing a causal
as against an arbitrary connection between related facts.

Kan^s Antinomies in the Light of Modern Science. 391

To sustain this statement, let us consider the principal antino-
mies somewhat more closely. For this purpose the first and third
may be selected. As regai'ds the second, it seems scarcely appli-
cable to this discussion. If there is any difference between its
two propositions, in this respect, the one Kant calls the antithesis
would seem to be the more dogmatic. So far as the facts of
science are concerned, they tend to sustain the view that matter is
a reality, and as such must possess a real ultimate unit— the atom
— ^not, indeed, of chemistry, but of a transcendental chemistry^
which is the domain of reason, as it reaches down below the sen-
sible world of phenomena. Those are usually regarded as the
dogmatists on this question who, like Boscovitch, and, we might
add, Herbert Spencer, seek to resolve matter into " centres of
force," and other ontological conceptions.

Let us examine, then, Kant's first antinomy: "The universe
has a beginning in time, and is also enclosed within limits in
space ; " the antithesis of which is : " The universe has no begin-
ning, and no limits in space, but is eternal in time and infinite in
space." Has science anything to say on this question, and, if so,
which side does it espouse? Undoubtedly science has to do with
it, and it also clearly takes sides upon it. Quantitative chemistry,
scarcely born in Kant's time, has practically demonstrated the
infinite duration of the universe in establishing the indestructi-
bility of matter. Astronomy, to which Kant's own immortal
" Theorie des Hhnmels " helped to give its rational impetus, has
now so expanded the conception of space that it has become
habitual to regard the universe as absolutely without limits. If
any one doubts this, let him make an eifort to go back to the old
dogmatic conception, and figure to his mind a beginning or end
to its duration, or bomidaries to its extent. He will find this im-
possible, and this impossibility is wholly due to the increased
knowledge of the universe which science has given to the world.
It was once possible, it is still possible to the ignorant, to set
bounds to time and space, but inductive science has swept away
such crude scaffoldings and opened up to the human mind a view
of the infinite.

It is no longer a transcendental question. It is a scientific
one, to be solved, like all other scientific questions, by the accu-
mulation of facts. Nothing in concrete science is demonstrated

392 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

a pi'iovi. The ju-actical tnitlis of tlic univense are established
a posteriori, by massing tlie evidence. In many of the qnestions
now regarded as settled the evidence has long been conflicting,
and ninch still remains in some to be removed. Yet these re-
sidnal facts are admitted by all to be overborne by the weight of
evidence opposed to them. Such is the character of the greater
part of the scientific truth of the world. But the questions in-
volved in Kant's antinomies differ from ordinary scientific prob-
lems in two respects. On the one hand, infinity must be proved,
which demands, of course, better evidence ; but, on the other
hand, there are no facts opposed to infinity, but all the evidence
is on one side. Not one circumstance can be named whicii points
to a beginning or end of either time or space, while every fact and
every law that human observation and reflection have brought
forth point to the boundlessness of both in all directions. Only
ignorance of these facts, and faikire to exercise the rational faculty,
can prevent the mind from conceding this truth.

The third antinomy has the following for its thesis : " Causality,
according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality from
which the phenomena of the universe may be derived. It is still
necessary to assume a causality through freedom for the explana-
tion of these phenomena." The antithesis is : " There is no free-
dom, but everything in the universe takes place according to the
laws of nature."

The great issue is here squarely stated, and here it is that
accumulating knowledge of the nature of things is working
steadily and uniformly against the dogmatic, and in favor of the
empirical side. Absolutely no facts are being discovered in favor
of freedom, while everything is ranging itself on the side of uni-
versal law. From one department of knowledge after another,
and in inverse proportion to the complexity of the phenomena,
and hence in direct ratio to the ease with which they are com-
prehended, science is eliminating all the facts Nvhicli require the
liypothesis of freedom for their explanation. From astronomy,
from geology, from physics and chemistry, these eons have been
successively expelled ; they are now being driven from their
fortifications in biology to their citadel in psychology. Even
here they are vigorously attacked by the school of Bain and
Spencer on the one hand, and that of Flourens and Ferrier on

Kanfs Antinomies in the Light of Modern Science. 393

the other. The very freedom of the luiman will is shown to he
a delusion, and the interval between morals and physics is spanned
by the heartless clinics of Mandsley.

We need not go further and state the fourth and last of Kant's
antinomies relatino; to the existence or non-existence of a " Neces-
sary Being." The first and third Antitheses, established, consti-
tute the premises for the establishment of the fourth. Eternal
matter, with its equally eternal activities, suffices to account for all
the phenomena of the universe, which are as infinite in causation
as in duration or extent. Again, all departments of science con-
firm this truth. When Laplace was asked how he could have
written so great a work as the Mecanique Celeste on the sub-
ject of the system of the universe, without once mentioning its
Author, he replied : " Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothese la."
All the more complex sciences are, one by one, and in the inverse
order of their complexity, also dispensing with this hypothesis.
Like many other once useful hypotheses, that of theo-teleology,
which, as already remarked, was suggested from analogy with the
fact of anthropo-teleology , has ceased to be useful, and where still
adhered to becomes a burden to the progress of truth. In astron-
omy the nebular hypothesis which Kant founded, and Laplace
demonstrated, has completely superseded it. In chemistry and
physics, the atomic theory, formulated as a philosophy by Democ-
Titus, and established as a science by Dalton, renders it redundant.
In biology the law of adaptation, clearly stated by Lamarck, and
that of selection, cumulatively demonstrated by Darwin, and the
inter- operation of these and that of heredity, thoroughly set forth
by Spencer and Haeckel, have freed this field from teleological
trammels almost as completely as those of the less complex
sciences have been freed from them. And thus is science march-
ing relentlessly forward, and reclaiming one field after another
that had been so long given over to dogmatic conceptions, until
there is now scarcely room to doubt that its conquest must ulti-
mately become complete.

But what is this that has thus been accomplished 1 It is nothing
less than the establishment of the Antithesis or empirical proposi-
tion of Kant's antinomies. They have been removed from the
domain of transcendental philosophy, subjected to scientific
methods, such as are applied to all other truths, and proved, as

394 The Journal of Sjyeculative Philosophij.

other propositions arc proved, by the accunuilatioii of legitimate
facts. The eteniity of matter and motion and the iniinity of
space liave passed into scientific postuhites, and the nninterrupted
and unlimited causal dependence of all phenomena in their rela-
tion of antecedents and consequents is the fundamental axiom
from which all scientitic investigation now proceeds.

Though these truths may seem clear to us to-day, though we
may have become so thoroughly imbued with the spirit of modern
scientitic thought that they are little more to us than truisms, we
must not forget that the mental atmosphere we now breathe has
been purified during the past century, and that what we are, as it
were, born in ])Ossession of, Kant could only gain by the pro-
foundest meditation. And, when we further contemplate that
great mind as constitutionally of a teleological or dogmatic cast,
we may realize the immense power it must have possessed to pene-
trate the mists of both the objective and subjective darkness in
which he lived, and formulate, even for his opponents, tlie argu-
ments by which they were to win their victories. It is the mis-
fortune of the teleological school of to-day that they are incom-
petent to contend with the genetic school on the same plane of
activity. The latter find no difficulty in transferring their base
of operations from a scientific to a dogmatic field, and giving bat-
tle on the enemy's own grounds. This is doubtless because they
are, for the most part, themselves converts from dogmatism, which
still constitutes the bulk of most men's early education, and they
know how temporarily to return to their old, familiar haunts;
but those who have never crossed this boundary are either unable
or unwilling to look over and see what is beyond. In their attacks
upon science, therefore, they confine themselves chiefly to the free
use of epithets which have a stigma only ibr dogmatists, and can-
not, of course, fail to display such a profound lack of acquaint-
ance, -not with science alone, but with the very ways in which
science carries conviction to the mind, that the eS'eet upon
the only ones they would influence is usually little more than
amusing.

The concluding thought of this paper is therefore to hold up
the great thinker, whose hundredth anniversary we are here to
commemorate, as an example to be followed, so far as that is pos-
sible, by all those who feel that ths empirical, the critical, the

God as the Eternally Begotten Son. 395

sceptical method is advancing too rapidly, and who would impose
upon it a wholesome restraint. For, just as in the field of battle
a thorough knowledge of the enemy's position, force, and move-
ments is of the highest possible value, so in the field of philoso-
phy, in its broad, practical developments, the secret of successful
logic lies in the power to impress the contestant with a complete
mastery of his side of the controversy as well as one's own. This
power, of all logicians, Kant most pre-eminently revealed, even
pointing out to his opponents elements of strength and grounds
of justification which they in their blind zeal had only intuitively
perceived, if at all. And there can be no doubt that science and
rational philosophy' would not only welcome a contest of this
enlightened kind, but would seek to profit by it, as they profit by
every means of advancing the cause of truth in the world.

GOD AS THE ETERNALLY BEGOTTEIs^ SOK

SOLDAN.

II. — The Eternal Idea of God in the Element of Consciousness
and Image- Concept, or, the Difference, the Realm of the Son.

This idea must here be considered as it steps from its universal-
ity and infinitude into the category of finiteness. God is present
everywhere ; the presence of God is this very truth which is in.
everything.

The idea was at first in the element of thinking. This is the'
basis, and we began with it. The universal, and, therefore, the
more abstract, element must precede in science. In the category
of science it is the first ; in [the category of] existence, it is a later
element; it is being-in-itself [potentiality], but it appears later in
cognition ; it arrives at consciousness and cognition, later.

The form of the idea attains phenomenal existence as a result,
which, however, is essentially being-in-itself. The content of the
idea is so constituted that what is last is first, and what is first
is last, and, in a like manner, that wdiich appears as a result is

396 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

[also] presupposition, being-in-itself [potentiality], and basis. This
idea must now be considered in its second element — in the ele-
ment of phenomenality. The absolute idea, as objectivity, or in
itself, is complete, but not so the subjective side ; neither in itself
as such, nor the subjectivity in the divine idea as for itself. We
can look upon this process from two sides.

The iirst is: The subject for which this idea has existence is
the thinking subject. The forms of image-conception do not alter
the nature of the fundamental form ; they do not prevent this
form from existing for man as a thinking being. The activity
of the subject is that of thinking ; it thinks this idea ; but the sub-
ject is [also] concrete self-consciousness, and hence this idea must
exist for the subject as concrete self-consciousness, as a real sub-
ject.

Or : This idea is the absolute trutli ; the latter is for [= is cognized
by] the thinking faculty ; but for the subject the idea must exist
not only as a truth, but the subject must also have the certitude of
the idea — i. e., the certainty which belongs to this subject as such;
that is to say, belongs to him as to a finite, empirically concrete,
sensuous subject.

The idea exists as certitude for the subject, and the subject is
certain of it only in so far as the idea is perceptible. The idea has
certainty as far as it is for the subject. That of which I can say :
This is, has certainty for myself, it is immediate cognition, it is
certitude. The further mediation consists in proving that that
which is, is at the same time necessary, and that that which is cer-
tain is true. Such proof forms the transition to the universal.

Having begun with the form of truth, we must now" proceed
to the phase in which this form receives certainty, or that it is
for myself.

The other mode of proceeding is to begin with the side of the
idea.

1. It is [the nature of] Being to be eternally in and for itself,
to unfold itself, to determine itself, to evolve subject and object,
and to posit itself as its own difference ; the difference, however,
is in the same process eternally cancelled ; the being that is in and
for itself [potential and actualized being] eternally returns into it-
self in this process, and only in so far as it does this it is spirit.

To the differentiated element attaches the determination, that

God as the Eternally Begotten Son. 39^

the difference lias vanished immediately, and that this [process] is
nought but a relation of God, or of the idea to itself. This dif-
ferentiation is but a movement ; it is love's play with itself, and
does not amount to serious alienation, to separation and diremption.

The alien or other is determined as Son. In the form of senti-
ment it is love, in a higher category it is spirit, in-itself and free.
Within the idea the category of difference is not yet completed
with this determination ; it is only the abstract difference in gen-
eral, and we have not yet reached the difference in its peculiarity ;
the difference is only one determination.

We may say, for this reason, that we have not yet arrived at
the difference. The differentiated things are posited as the same ;
the phase has not yet been reached in which the differentiated
ones have different predicates. On this side the diremption of
the idea should be so understood that the Son receives the predi-
cation of otherness [or alienation] as such, and that he is free, for
himself, that he appears [phenomenally] as a reality, outside and
without God, as something that is.

His ideality, his eternal return [ing] into that which is in-and-for-
itself, is posited as immediately identical in the first idea. In
order that the difference may be, and receive its due, alienation is
necessary ; the differentiated thing must be alienation which pos-
sesses Being.

The absolute idea alone determines itself, and, in determining
itself, is absolutely free and secure in itself ; it is this in determining
itself to send out this its determination as something free, so that
it be an independence, an independent object. What is free exists
only for what is free itself ; for the free man alone is another man
free.

It is the absolute freedom of the idea that in its determinations,
and in its diremption as subject and object, sends forth [its] other
as free and independent. This other sent forth as something
independent, is the world in general. The absolute diremption
into subject and object which gives independence to the side of
alienation, may be called Goodness ; it lends to this side, in its
alienation, the whole idea to the extent and in the manner in
which it can embody this idea in itself and can represent it.

2. The truth of the world is only its ideality ; it has no true
reality ; it is its nature to be, but it is only to be something ideal,,

398 The Journal of Speculative Philosojmy.

ami not to be soinetlniig eternal in itself; it is to be a created
thing; its being is posited being only.

The natnre of tlie being of tlie world is that it has an element
of being, but tliat it cancels this separation or alienation from
God and is nothing bnt there turn to its origin, and thns it enters
into the relation of spirit, and of love.

This is tlie process of the world, by which it passes over from
the fallen state, from separation, to reconciliation. The first ele-
ment in the idea is only the relation of father and son, but the
other receives also the predicate of alienation, or otherness ; that of
being.

It is in the Son, in the category of difference, that the further
determination proceeds to the next differentiation by which the
difference receives what is due to it — namely, the right of being
different. Jacob Boehme expressed this transition in the phase of
the Son thns : That the first only begotten one was Lucifer, the
bearer of light, the bright, clear principle, but that he " imagined "
himself into himself — /. t'., that he posited himself for himself, and
proceeded to being ; that he thus fell away, but that the eternally
only begotten one was immediately posited in his place.

From the first stand-point the nature of this relation is, that
God exists in his eternal truth, and that this state is thonght as
being before time, as the state in which it existed when the blessed
spirits, the stars of morning, and the angels. His children, praised
God. This relation is thus expressed as a state, bnt it is the eter-
nal relation of thinking to the object. Later, it is said a fall took
place ; this is the positing of the second stand-point ; on one side it
is the analysis of the Son, the sundering of the two phases con-
tained in him. The other side, however, is the subjective con-
sciousness— the finite spirit — [which knows] that this, as pure
thinking is in itself the process, that it started with the immediate
and elevated itself to truth. This is the second form.

Thus we enter the sphere of determination in space and the
woi'ld of finite spirit. This must now be expressed more particu-
larly as the positing of predications, as a momentarily held or sus-
tained difference ; it is God coming forth and becoming phenome-
nal in finiteness ; for finiteness is properly the sepai'ation of what
is identical in itself, but is conceived and apprehended in separa-
tion. On the other side, on that of subjective spirit, this is posited

God as the Eternally Begotten Son. 399

as pure thinking ; but in itself it is a result, and this must be
posited as it is in itself as this movement. The pure thinking has
to return into itself, and by this alone it posits itself as finite.

Considering it from this stand-point, the other or alien is not
conceived as the Son, but as the external world, as the finite world
which is outside of truth, which is the world of finiteness, and
where the Other has the form of Being, while, nevertheless, accord-
ing to its nature, it is only the erepov, determined, differentiated,
limited, and negative.

The relation of this second sphere to the first is thereby deter-
mined in this way, that it is the same idea in-itself, but in this
other category ; the absolute act of the first diremption is in itself
the same as the second one ; image-conception alone holds these
two apart as two totally different grounds and actus.

In fact, they ought to be distinguished and held apart ; and if it
has been said that they are the same in themselves, it must be
strictly defined how this is to be understood lest there might
arise the false meaning and erroneous conception as if the eternal
Son of the Father, the Son of the deity which is object to itself,
were the same as the world, and as if under the former we under-
stood the latter.

We have said, however, and, indeed, it is self-evident, that only
the idea of God, as explained above in what was called the first
sphere, is the eternal, true God ; and then, also, his realization and
manifestation in the explicit and full process of spirit, which will
be considered in the third sphere.

If the world, as it is immediately, should be taken as being in-
and-for-itself, if what is sensuous and temporal w^ere taken as
Being, either that false meaning would be attached to it [" that
the Son and the world be the same"], or it would be necessary to
assume two eternal ACTUS of God. God's activity, however, is
always purely one and the same, and not a variety of distinct
activities, not a Now and Then, a Separation, etc.

As it is, this distinction of independent being is nothing but the
phase, negative for itself, or otherness, or of extraneousness, which,
as such, has no truth, but is only a phase, and, according to time, it
is only a moment, and not even a moment, since it has this mode
of independence only for the finite spirit, because the latter itself
in its existence has only this manner and mode of independence.

400 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

In (unl liiinself this [quality of] being now and for-itself is
nought but tlic vanishing element of phenomenality.

It is true that this phase has the width, breadth, and depth of a
woi-ld. that it is heaven and earth, and is their organization infinite
within and without. If we say that this other is only a vanishing
phase, that it is only the flash of the lightning which in the phe-
nomenon disappeai's immediately, or that it is the sound of a word
which, in being spoken and heard, disappears as far as its external
existence is concerned : In these momentary phenomena we are
apt to see too much the transitory element of time with its before
and after, but it is neither in the one nor in the other. Every
predication of time must be kept out, be it that of duration or
of the Now [= present], and we must hold fast the simple
thought of the Other or Alien, the simple thought, for the Other
or Alien is an abstraction. That this abstraction is expanded
into a world in time and space, rests on this, that it is the simple
phase of the idea itself, and that it therefore receives the latter
entire in itself ; but, since it is the phase of otherness, it is the
immediate, sensuous expansion.

Questions like the one : Whether the world, or matter, is from
eternity, or has a beginning in time, belong to the empty meta-
physics of the understanding. In the phrase, " From eternity,"
eternity itself is only an image-perception of infinite time ; it is
represented as defective infinity ; it is nothing but the infinity of
reflection, and belongs to its category. The world is properly the
region of contradiction, and in it the idea is in a category that is
inadequate to it. Whenever the world is the object of the faculty
of image-conception, the element of time, and, by reflection, also
that [conception] of eternity arise, we must remember, however,
that this predication does not concern the idea itself.

There is another question, or, partly, another side of the former
question ; the world, since it is said to be from eternity, is un-
created, and is immediately for itself. The distinction which the
understanding makes between form and matter underlies this
question ; but matter and world are, on the contrary, according to
their fundamental determination, rather this Other, the negative
which is in itself but a phase of posited being. This is the oppo-
site of independence, and the nature of its existence is to cancel
itself and to be a phase of the process. The natural world is rela-

God as the Eternally Begotten Son. 401

tive, it is a phenomenon — /. e., it is so, not only for us, but it is so
in itself, and it is its quality to be in transition and to betake
itself back into the last idea. The various metaphysical deter-
minations of the vXt], which we find with the ancient as well as
the Christian philosophers, especially the Gnostics, have their
basis in the category of the independence of otherness.

It is by reason of the otherness of the world that it is simply
the created thing, and is not a world that has being in-and-for-it-
self. If the distinction is made of a Beginning, as the creation,
and the preservation of what exists, it is because image-conception
assumes that such a sensuous world really exists and has being.
It has, therefore, been stated very properly at all times, that since
being and self-existing independence are not attributes of the world,
preservation is creation. It might be said that creation is also
preservation ; this would be said for the reason that the phase of
otherness is itself a phase of the idea ; that is to say, the presup-
position would exist, as mentioned before, that being preceded
creation.

Since otherness is now determined and predicated as the totality
of phenomenality, it expresses in itself the idea, and this is in gen-
eral what has been designated as the wisdom of God. Wisdom,
however, is yet a general expression, and it is the province of
philosophic cognition to cognize this concept in nature, to com-
prehend it as a system in which the divine idea mirrors itself.
The latter, then, is manifested, but its content is the manifestation
itself, to distinguish itself as an Other and to take this back into
the former, so that this return is just as much a Without as a
Within. In nature these stages lie outside of each other as a sys-
tem of the kingdoms of nature, of which the highest is the king-
dom of living creatures.

It is, however, the nature of life, which is the highest represen-
tation of the idea in nature, to sacrifice itself (this is the nega
tivity of the idea turned against this, its existence), and to be-
come spirit. Spirit is [this progression] this stepping forth by
means of nature — i. e., it has in nature its antithesis, by whose
annulment it is for itself, and is spirit.

The finite world is the side of difference as distinguished from
the side which remains in its unity. Thus it divides itself into
the natural world and the world of the finite spirit. Nature does
XY— 2G

402 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

not enter for itself into relationship to God ; it enters into such
relationship only in its relation to man. For nature is not cogni-
tion ; God is spirit, and nature knows nothing of spirit.

It is created bj God, but it does not enter from itself into rela-
tionship to God, inasmuch as it is not a cognizing agent. It stands
in relation to man onl}', and in this relation to man it constitutes
what is called the side of his dependence.

Inasmuch as it is cognized by thinking, cognized as created by
God, and as containing reason, understanding, it is known by
thinking man. It is in so far placed into relationship to the
Divine as its truth is cognized.

The manifold forms of the relationship of the finite spirit to
nature can find no place here ; their scientific treatment belongs to
the phenomenology, or philosophy of spirit. Here w^e must con-
sider this relationship within the sphere of religion, so that nature
is for man not only this external, immediate world, but a world in
which man cognizes God ; nature is thus for man a revelation of
God. This relation of spirit to nature we have seen previously, in
the ethnic religions where we considered the forms through which
spirit ascended from the immediate — where nature is taken as con-
tingent—to the [form of] necessity, and to the form of an agency
which is wise, and acts conformably to a purpose. Thus, the finite
spirit's consciousness of God is mediated by nature. Man sees God
through nature ; nature remains but the investment and untrue
form.

That which is differentiated from God is here really another,
and has the form of an Other; it is nature which is for God and
for man. By this means the unity is to be consummated, and the
consciousness is to be brought about, that conciliation is the end,
aim, and category of religion. The first [stage] is the abstract con-
sciousness that there is a God, that man rises from nature to God ;
this we have seen in the proofs of the existence of God. To this
[stage] belong the pious contemplations. How magnificently God
has made everything ! how wisely he has arranged everything !
These elevating contemplations proceed directly to God, with
whatever point of the subject-matter they begin. Piety insti-
tutes such edifying contemplations ; it begins with the most par-
ticular and the lowest, and cognizes therein, in general, some-
thing higher. Yery frequently there is mingled with this the

God as the Eternally Begotten Son. 403

•distorted view that what occurs in nature is looked upon as
something higher than what is simply human. This contempla-
tion itself, since it begins with the singular or particular, is inade-
^jnate. Another consideration may be opposed to it. The cause
should correspond to the phenomenon ; it should itself contain
the limitation which the phenomenon has in it ; we demand the
special reason which has caused this particular. Tlie contem-
plation of any particular phenomenon contains always this inade-
quate element. These particular phenomena, besides, are natural
ones ; but God is to be comprehended as spirit, and, therefore,
that in which we cognize him must, therefore, be something spirit-
ual. " God thunders with his thunder, they say, and still he is
not known ; " spiritual man demands something higher than the
merely natural. In order to be known as spirit, God must do
more than thunder.

The higher contemplation of nature and the deeper relation to
God, in which it is to be placed, consists rather in that it is itself
conceived as something spiritual — i. e., as the naturalness of man.
Only when the subject is no more directed towards the immediate
being of the natural, but is posited as what it is in itself, namely,
AS movement, and only when it has gone into itself — then only
finiteness as such is posited. It is then posited as fiuiteness in the
process of that relation in which it feels the need and want of the
absolute idea, and in which the phenomenon of the latter arises.
Here the first is the need and want of truth, and the second the
manner and mode of the manifestation of truth.

The need and want, in the first place, presuppose that there
exists in the subjective spirit the demand to cognize the absolute
truth. This need implies immediately that the subject is in a state
of untruth but the subject, as spirit stands above this, its own un-
truth, and for this reason this untruth is an element which must
be conquered.

This state of untruth may be more explicitly stated as the sub-
ject in disunion with itself ; the need finds expression in the
demand that this disunion be cancelled in the subject, and this
demand implies that it be cancelled by truth. The demand means
that the subject be reconciled, and this can only be the reconcilia-
tion with truth.

This is the special form of the need ; the characteristic is this,

404 The Journal of ISpeculative Philosophy.

that the disunion or direniption is in the subject in general, and
that the subject is evil, that it is diremption in itself. The sub-
ject is contradiction ; not the contradiction which is merely dis-
connectint^, but that which also holds together ; and it is by this
means only that the subject is disunited as a contradiction within
itself.

FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE: KANT'S REFUTATION
OF THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF OF THE BELNG-
OF GOD.

By W. T. Harris.'

In the history of philosophy we have a record of the discovery
and exposition of a series of deep insip^hts. The mastsrv of these
insiirlits is a sort of ascent of the individual into the insight of
his race — and not the acciuirement of mere information regarding
the opinions of liis fellow-men.

The constant lesson of social science is the dependence of the
individual upon the aid of the community for the sup[)ly of his
wants of food, clothing, and shelter. The dependence of the in-
dividual upon the race in spiritual matters of knowledge and
wisdom is more wonderful. The science of nature and mind
rests upon a vast mass of ex[)erience made up of the collected
observations of mankind. Not merely the data of observation
are included in this mass of experience, but the results of reflec-
tion on tho=e data. Reflei'tion concentrates experience, reduces
it to uiiit_y. Each principle stands for many facts. The results
of reflection are stated in the form of generalized principles and
expressed in technical terms.

By availing one's self ot these results of reflection, he can traverse
the field of experience of the race in a very short time and arrive
at the view of the world which the individual could not reach
unaided, but the social Vv'hole of man has attained.

Without participating in the results of the reflection of liis
race, it would avail little that the individual could assist his own

' Read at the Concord School of Philosophy, August 3, 1881.

Faith and Knowledge. 405

observation of facts by participation in the fund of sense-percep-
tions of the total of mankind. These sense-perceptions, without
classification and generalization, would only confuse him all the
more. The individual, unaided by the reflection of iiis fellows,
already knows more facts than he can do anything with. He
stands in the presence of an infinitely multiple world — no limit to
the process of analysis which he may perform on the minutest
piece of the world before him, no limit to the process of synthesis
that he may make through discovering new realms to add to the
ones he has already inventoried. The being that cannot gen-
eralize, cannot, in fact, observe what we call "facts," although
we are in the habit of assuming that mere sense-perception can
perceive distinct facts. The unity which converts the series of
sense-impressions into a perception of one object, is generalization.
If we j'eflect on the form of a " fact," we discover that it involves
multiplicity, inner relations, to endless extent. It, moreover, be-
longs in a series, and has been severed from its connections to pre-
ceding and subsequent " facts " in the series. If one had taken a
more comprehensive view, the fact would have included preceding
elements or subsequent elements. The " fact," therefore, is an
arbitrary synthesis, grasping together these particular phases and
no others, when it might have united more elements, or fewer ele-
ments. The swine that saw the apple fall saw a fact of very
small scope, while Newton saw in the same fact the fact of nni-
■versal gravitation — a fact that included the whole physical uni-
verse. The perception of a fact presupposes that the mind has
cut off from the flow of events in time a portion and isolated it
from the rest by means of attention. It implies, moreover, that
the indefinite multiplicity within the limits cut off is united in
one thought. To unite many in one is to perceive identity in the
elements; it is to perceive a common relation. In an event we
include the objects related to the realization of one purpose, and
we include also the movements and activities that serve to deter-
mine in some way the same purpose. The perception of relations
is called an act of reflection ; it certainly is no act of direct per-
■ception, for it in some way pei'ceives one direct element in an-
other— reflected in that other, as it were. The relation involves
two termini — a from and to — and it is a synthesis of these two
"termini in one relation. When we think the relation, both termini

406 The Journal of Speculatwe Philosophy.

hover before tlie mind, in unity. Direct perception only sun-
der, the termini. But such sundering does violence to the true
nature of objectivity, for the latter is relative, even down to its
ultimates, as our reflection teaches us. An isolated object is no
terminus, is out of relation, and, therefore, possesses no common
element by -which it may be united witii another. Hence it is, to
all intents and purposes, a nothing; it cannot even occupy space
or time without involving community with others, and hence rela-
tivity of being.

Since, therefore, the correct knowing of the world is a knowing
of the relations of things, and since the knowing of the essential
nature of these relations is the perceiving that the relations con-
stitute the nature of the object, and these are the joint product of
the reflection of the race, it follows that the participation of
the individual in the results of reflection achieved by his fel-
low-men is essential to his arrival at the truth of things. Self-
activitj on his part, then, is necessary for the reception of the
generalizations of others. Reflection is self-activity, and its re-
sults can be communicated only to beings capable of self-activity.

The individual cannot receive the generalizations of the race
without making generalizations himself. The generalizations of
others assist him by stimulating his activity and guiding it to the
object. Without the demonstrated theorem in the geometry be-
fore ns to guide us to the problem, and to stimulate us to think it
out, we should have waited, perhaps, a lifetime for an occasion in
which we should have stood face to face with the problem clear
and distinct before us, eliminated from its complications and ob-
structing our progress as we undertake the accomplishment of
some deed. Moreover, Euclid indicates the course of his analysis,
the path of his thought from distinction to distinction, the syn-
thetic steps which he takes to get the result laid down as the
theorem. We follow, active in our minds, and it is our activity
alone that enables us to follow him. Euclid points out the steps,
bn<" we must take them by our own intellectual effort. We re-
ceive only what we can think over or verity within ourselves, so
that it seems as if we can receive no thought from another except
what we create anew within ourselves.

If we are forced to rely upon our fellow-men for the essential
part of what we accept as knowledge, it is evident that Faith is-

Faith and Knowledge. 407

the most important element in our spiritual life. It is necessary,
however, not to overlook the fact of our self-activit)\ We are
not passive recipients, and faith must not be taken in a narrow
sense. We depend upon our fellow-men for most of the data that
we possess regardinsj the world, and for most of the conclusions
that thought has produced as inferences from the data. Here is
the element of faith, but we must try to verify the data we receive
by our own perceptions or by cross-examination and comparison
with what we know throuo;h our own knowledo'e. Still more
independent is our activity which is necessary to receive the con-
clnsions which the reflection of others have reached regarding the
world. If we receive tliem for all that they meant to the original
thinkers, we shall see the internal necessity of thought as much as
they did, and have as deep insight. If we accept their results as
decisions of authority, without seeing their necessity for ourselves,
of course our insight will be very far inferior to the insight of the
original authority.

From this point of view we see the truth of the famous dictum
of Saint Anselm, " Credo ut intelligam^'' and it seems to have a
validity based on the nature of thought itself. Perhaps Anselm
himself had a glimpse of this meaning which may be given to
his paradox. " I believe [in the capacity of my fellow-men to see
and report correctly the data of sense-perception, and to draw
correct inferences from those data by means of reflection, and I
have faith in what they report to me], in order that I may under-
stand \i. e., accepting their results, I have something to verify for
myself, and may proceed, with that endowment of knowledge and
insight from the race, to understand the world]." Whatever he
may have meant, it is nevertheless true, that men do derive their
view-of-the-world from the consense of their fellow-men. If one
had to collect all his data for himself, and work out all his gen-
eralizations without aid, it is evident that he would get very little
way into a knowledge of the world.

Since our view of the world is given us primarily by the human
race, and is not first reached by independent observations, we may
say that the light of our seeing, and the lenses through which we
see things in nature and history, are borrowed from our fellow-
men, and are matters belonging to the social community of men.
The help that we get from our fellows is not a gift from mere

408 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

individuals, but is something generic. Ten men in combination
are not merely ten times as strong as one man, but a hundred or
a thousand times as strong. The united effort of a social wliole
is something incommensurable by the individual standard. Like
the process of involution, the social pi'ocess is a multiplication of
each factor by all the rest, and not a mere addition or aggregate
of parts. The individual is first reinforced by the total of society ;
next, in turn, he adds his mite to society — but not the elementary,
unaided mite of his primitive self — he adds his contribution
already reinforced by the social whole. Thus the social process
is essentially a process of involution, a process of investment of
talents and gifts to be returned with usury.

These reflections upon the utterance of Saint Anselm — " Credo
ut intelligam " — suggest the point of view wo should take in our
study of the history of ])hilosophy. The process of reading into
authors \\hat they have never thought is more likely to happen
on the part of those who find only shallow and crude views in
the systems of famous thitdvers, than on the part of those who
discover deep and still valid ideas.

Saint Anselm's famous proof of the being of God is an ex-
ample of a statement of deep insight which has had the fats of
being partially or wholly misunderstood by later thinkers, al-
though it has been reproduced under other forms not suspected as
identical with it.

One of the most famous of Kant's critical achievements is his
attack upon the validity of the ontological proof of the existence
of God, an attack upon the Cartesian form of Anselm's proof.

The dogma, as fixed by the Church, is accepted by Anselm as
absolute truth, to begin with. Taking "Faith" in the sense
already discussed, Anseltn has faith in the Church as the represent-
ative of the human race in its nf:ost authoritative expression. It
has the tiuth in the hio-hest form that has been revealed to man.
We, too, have a highest authority in the conviction of our time
against Vv'hich we do not venture to protest, but in whose name
we challenge any conclusion whatsoever that is set up as opposed
to it, though it claim logical justification. The " invisible Church,"
which includes the communion of all wise and good of whatever
age and clime, is at bottom the " consense " (as Cud worth calls it)
of leading minds as regards truth.

Faith and Knowledge. 409

The thinking of the individual in ])hilosophj, according to thi3
view, should conform to tliis authority found in the consense of
the Church. If it results in something contradictory, we must
reject it, or, at least, re-examine its foundations. If an evolution-
ist in our time finds that his discoveries are subversive of the
ethical prescripts of society, he rejects them or suppresses them.
If he does not do it himself, his fellow-evolutionists will do it for
liim.

Saint Anselm, while accepting the dogmas of faith from the
Church, holds that it is the business of the human intellect to try to
compreiiend them. He, therefore, takes up, in his " Proslogium," '
the idea of God, and seeks to find it among the presuppositions of
the intellect. If the intellect bases all of its processes uptni the
assumption of the existence of God, it will be true that the fool,
though he sajs in his heart that there is no God, at the same time
presupposes God in the very act of setting forth the denial of
him. Is God, then, the highest reality, presupposed as the neces-
sary ground of whatever reality ? This is the question that An-
selm investigates.

The ultimate presupposition of the intellect is, to use his
words, '■'■Id quo nihil majus cog itari potest " — or that, than which,
nothing greater can be conceived — not the thought of the greatest
-of existences (among other existences). It has been suggested
(by Gaunilo, in the lifetime of Saint Anselm, and later by Kant
and others) that the conception of a thing does not ini])!}' its
corresponding existence — as though this were somethino- that had
not occurred to Anselm (or to Descartes, who thinks that the idea
of a "most perfect being"'' implies its existence). This refuta-
tion, therefore, proceeds upon the assumption that the ontological
proof appealed to a suppressed major prenjise : "Whatever can
be conceived as an idea in the mind must have a corresponding
objective reality." This presupposition could not be in the mind
of any sane human bei::g for a moment, and certainly was not in
the mind of Anselm or in that of Descartes. It is claimed by
both that the thought of the existence of God is unique, and
a thought whose reality is presupposed by all other thoughts,
but that no other thoughts contain the ground of their real-

' See Appendix I to this article. ^ ggg Appendix II to this article.

410 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

ity in themselves but only as grounded through this thought of
God.

The form id wliich tin's thouglit retains its validity for us now
is the thouo-lit of tlie totality. We all recoo-nize at once the neces-
sity of the existence of a totality as a precedent condition to the
existence of a part. Whenever anything is posited as existent,
it is at once presupposed that this existent is eitlier in itself a
whole or a part of a wliole. The totality is an existent which
possesses a reality in a higher sense than the part, or limited exist-
ence. For the limited existence owes some of its properties to
the existences that are supposed to limit it — i. <?., to the environ-
ment. But both the limited existence and its environment are
included in the totality, and all their reality is in the total.

If there is a part, there is a whole in which it exists, and which
contains all of its reality and all of the reality of the other parts
which limit it. The thought of a part contains the thought that
it is transcended by a whole, a greater reality than it. No part
could possibly exist unless there were an existence that tran-
scended it; were it not so, then the part were incorrectly de-
fined as a part ; itself were the totality, and not a pai't.

Take the thinker who thinks the thought : if he knows himself
to be a part, it must be because he knows of other existence than
himself, and knows himself dependent. The thought presupposes
the thinker of the thought, and they presuppose a totality as the
basis of their existence, without saying as yet what this totality
must be, as reo-ards its nature. Whatever is found to be essen-
tially and necessarily implied as the nature of a totality, must be
pdsited as the essential presupposition of intellect or thought.

That, than which, there can be thought nothing greater, is the
totality. The thought of the totality is not a merely subjective
thought, but has a necessary reality corresponding to it. Any
possible objection to this will presuppose the thought of a totality
as the basis of its validity. Let it be objected by Gaunilo, or by
Kant, that any thought whatever is subjective only, and that there
can be no conclusion from it to the reality. The statement of
this objection, it will be seen, nay, its very conception, rests upon
the assumption that tliought or intellect, or the conceptive faculty,
is one side of an antithesis, standing over against an objective
somewhat called " reality " which is to be distinguished from any

Faith and Knowledge. 411

and all conceptions of it. This tlionght or conception, therefore^
transcends itself and thinks a totality of subjective and objective
opposed to it. All thought of quality or quiddity involves a limit
in which two factors appear — the limiting and the limited.

Gaunilo and Kant ' both attempt to refute the ontological argu-
ment, therefore, by presupposing it as the basis of their discrimi-
nation between conception and reality.

That a totality must necessarily exist is the basis of all thought,
whether it be dogmatic, or sceptical, or critical. No part can
exist by itself ; for then it were the all, the totality itself. If
there be an 62:0 which thinks, even if it be the ego of the fool
{insipiens)^ then there is a whole of existence. This does not as
yet say anything of the nature of this whole ; it may be the fool
himself, for aught that is yet affirmed. It is further examination
of the presuppositions of the thought of the totality which we
need to determine for us what kind of a being this necessary being
is, and whether it is worthy to be called God, or anything else.

The thought of " Quo majus cogitari neq^iiiV is not yet the
thouo;ht of God, althouo'h it is the foundation of it. Whatever
is implied as necessarily appertaining to the existence of the total-
ity must be thought as necessarily appertaining to the character
of the absolute existence, for the total is absolute, or by itself,
and not co-ordinated with any other existence. The thought of
the totality is the thought of an independent being. As regards
its attributes, or qualities, or its properties — all, in short, called
its determinations — tliese must be the product of its own activity,
for they cannot be produced upon it by its environment, simply
because it has no environment.

The answer to the question as to its nature, then, is that the
totality is sell-determined, so far as it has determinations or dis-
tinctions within it or belonging to it. Any totality that 'had a
nature impressed upon it from some other source than its own
energy would be dependent and presuppose a complement outside
itself, and thus it would not be the total, but an element of the
total. The nature of the total is Self-determination.

It is very important that the technical terms in which this
problem is stated be those implying dependence or independence,.

' See Appendix III to this article.

412 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

or determination and self-determination. Many eatetjjories of
tliono;lit have been used in the history of philosophy to express
these distinctions, and, by reason of some ambi2;uity of import,
liave lo5t their logical hold on the mind. The terms Finite,
Phenomei:al, Partial, Transient, and the like, have been nsed as
de-^ignations under wiiich one was supposed to think the depend-
ent. It was thonght that from these could b3 inferred as gronnd
their correlatives : The Intinite, or the Noumcnal, or the Total,
or the Eternal, in a sence that would be adequate as designations
of the Divine Being. But all of these, including that of the
Total, lack speculative content, or are ambiguous as regards it.
Even that of " the total " may be taken immediately as an aggre-
gate of iinitudes or as a " Tout ensemble,''^ a merely quantitative
collection. Within a quantitative whole the parts have no essen-
tial relation, but only in difference towards each other.

It may be asked why we are bound to consider the totality as
under the category of dependence or of independence rather than
as under that of finite or infinite, etc. ; and the answer is that the
category of dependence or independence is the category of essen-
tial relation, while the others are merely subjective distinctions as
ordinarily used, and carry no objective implication with them.
If something is dependent, it implies a greater reality than itself,
of necessity. If finite, or phenomenal, or part, or transient im-
ply a higher reality, it is because they contain the idea of depend-
ence in them." It is the latter category alone that is not ambigu-
ous and liable to be understood in a subjective import. It was the
use of the term " Majus " by Saint Anselm that made it possible
to misunderstand his argument and give it a quantitative inter-
pretation. It was the use of the term "Perfect "by Descartes
that made it possible to misinterpret it and to give to it a merely
subjective validity, as a discrimination implying no objective
com] dement of reality. It made it possible to regard those
thouo-hts as co-ordinate with other thouo;hts. Gaunilo instanced
the island " Atlantis," whose ideal conception did not in the least
prove its actual existence. Kant instanced the idea of a hundred
dollars, the conception of which as being in my pocket did not at
all enhance vay actual wealth. In neither case was the instance
an example of a dependent being whose actuality was the total
And independent being. On the contrary, their actuality itself

Faith and Knowledge. 413

would be only the protasis whose apodosis would be some inde-
pendent being.

The dependent being posits, as necessary ground of it, tlie inde-
pendent being. This is not to be thought as another dependent
being, which, again, depends upon anotlier dependent being, and
so on to inlinity. For the complement upon which the finite or de-
pendent is affirmed to depend, if itself dependent, belongs to the
dependent already posited, and with it constitutes the dependent
which demands the independent upon which it can repose. The
dependent cannot depend upon a dependent again, because the
dependent has nothing of its own to give to tlie dependent. All
that it gives is merely transmitted from the self-supportsd or in-
dependent. The series mu^t be thought as complete, or, if thought
as incomplete, we have the thought of the dependent by itself,
without its complement, and hentre as v»'ithout anything to depend
on, and consequently as NOT dependent, or as independent al-
ready. It is impossible to escape this necessity of thought by
any sophism or subterfuge — even under the respectable name
of "Antinomy of Pure Reason." We always find ourselves
f\ice to face with the dilemma : Either the dependent depends
upon that which can yield it support of its own (and is a final
term, for this reason, because self-supported), or else the depend-
ent depends upon nothing that can give it any support, and hence
it is not dependent upon anything, but is really independent so
far as it is at all. To think an infinite series does not help the
matter at all. The question always recurs : Does this being
really depend or not % To think a series of terms in the comple-
ment of the dependent term is a pnrely arbitrary matter, and is a
matter of division simply. You may think the complement as
made up of a quantum infinitely divisible if you choose — nothing
prevents — it is indifferent to the question. It is the same whether
we say it once or repeat it forever, says Simplicius in regard
to the sophism of the " Achilles," which depends upon the in-
finite division of space and time — Achilles being unable to over-
take the tortoise while you are engaged in completing yonr
divisicm of space into its ultimates ! The conception of a " ^<?-
gressus in Injinitum''^ is the alternative set up by Kant in his
antinomies in order to humble the intellect into admitting the in-
solubility of the problems of pure reason. All such forms of

414 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

Kogressus or Pi'ogressus already presuppose tlie actual solution of
the antinomy by the intelligence that can state such a Progressus
as necessary. A Progressus in Infinitum is set up only when the
intellect discovers a necessary connection between two terms and
then tries to think them as in succession. After A must be
thought ^y and after B must be thought A, again. Here is a
Pro(jressus in Infinitum : lor you cannot leave otf with either
term; each implies the other as its limit. In that case the thought
is that of self-determination, and self-determination is therefore
the solution of the antinomy. This will become evident if one
considers it as follows: {a) A implies B; (b) l)ut B implies
A; (c) hence, A implies itself (through the implication of
B) ; {d) and, likewise, B implies itself (through the implication
of A).

It reduces to the general formula : A determines B ; B deter-
mines A ; hence, A determines itself through B.

While the conception of a dependent being implies the concep-
tion of a corresi)onding including totality that is independent, the
conception of a dependent being by no means implies the exist-
ence of that dependent being. It may or may not exist, it is
entirely contingent. If the dependent being exists, then the
independent being exists which is its ground.

What else follows from the concept of an independent being ?
That is to say : what attributes if any must necessarily be predi-
cated of a being that is a total and independent being? Are its
attributes to resemble such as we attribute to a dependent being?
An answer to these questions ought to settle for us whether the
totality is divine or diabolical, or of an indifferent nature.

First, is the totality anything more than the aggregate of finite
existences? If not, it is merely a quantitative sum and no unity
in a qualitative sense. Such a totality, though it were the reality,
would be no concept of God, for it would be the sum of realities
and not the sum of reality. Each reality within the all would be
independent. But this would imply its limitation by the others,
and it would thus be qualitative instead of quantitative. Each
would have an environment. Each would be what it is because
of its environment, and then the All would determine each, and,
therefore, the All would be the source of the determination of
each, and would, therefore, destroy the independence of the sep-

Faith and Knowledge. 415

arate realities. The total, therefore, cannot be a quantitativ^e
aggregate of separate, independent realities.

In place of such indifferent realities, we should have a negative
^inity — that is to say, a unity in which the parts or particular
realities lose themselves and in which their reality is destroyed.
The unity would determine all the parts within it as a totality of
conditions is conceived to determine each thing, or necessitate its
nature.

This standpoint of necessity is a deeper reflection than that
which conceives the totality as an aggregate of independent reali-
ties. The latter view denies all validity to universals and makes
them a mere convenient artifice adopted by the mind for classifi-
cation. Each atomic thing is regarded by this theory as a plenum
of reality, and all else has only a conceptual existence. But such
a thouo-ht cannot bear the test of reflection. Such a world of
independent things loses its aspect of independence when we
think it more carefully, and is seen to be a world of relative
existences — each thing dependent on its environment. In the
place of independent, self-existent tilings, we have dependence
upon relation to others — external necessity. According to this
view, if you destroy a grain of sand you destroy the equilibrium
of the universe of matter.

If the totality of conditions determines or necessitates each
thing to be what it is and will not let it become other, there is no
freedom on the part of individual realities and no self activity.
But the totality, being a determining unity, and being itself the
all, cannot be co-ordinate to anything, and still less subordinate
to anything else. Its activity is accordingly self-activity — or
activity originating in itself and by itst;lf and for its own purpose.
This makes the totality a free activity.

The doctrine of Fate or necessity, therefore, presupposes freedom
as its ground, freedom as the form of the activity of the whole,
or totality. Necessity is conceived as the relation existing be-
tween the part and the whole — the part gets its determina-
tions from the whole. Any finite object like an atom or atomic
thing finds its limits derived from outside of it, and yet those
limits are its quality, its distinguishing characteristics, its indi-
viduality, in short. This makes the essential quality or quiddity
of a thing a relativity. But this is so only because the necessity

416 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

or tlie total is assumed as having all the energy or determining-
power.

The concL^pt of " Qito iriajus cogitari neqult^'' tlierefore, in-
volves the thought of a seh-determining being as the absohite.
With this thought firmly fixed in one's mind as the ultimate pre-
supposition, the idea of the totality is not an idea of a diabolic,
nor an imJifterent being, but the idea of a divine b«ing in the
sense taught in religion. A negative unity in which all things
lost their individuality, and which was itself devoid of all attrl-
bntesand relations, would be diabolical in its conduct towards the
existences of the world : for it would be unmerciful towards them
and destructive of them. Indifferent to all their distinctions, it
would serve the good the same treatment that it offered the bad.

o

" Shadow and sunlight are the same,
The vanished gods to me appear,
And ONE TO ME ARE SHAME AND FAME."

But a self-determining being as the Absoluts or total would be
a creative being ; for there is involved in the determination of
the self an activity, the determining; and likewise a passivity,
the determined. But the duality of determining and determined,
of active and passive, cannot be absolute or final, for the reason
that it is the self that is both. The self determines itself, there-
fore, not as passive — as determined — but as active as deternjining.
If this were not so there would be self-contradiction, nay, even
self-annihilation ; for the activity would act simply to produce the
extinguishment of activity.

This thought of the necessity of equality in the two phases
that appear in a self-determining being is the thought which de-
velops a concrete idea of the divine nature.

Only by the sameness of the second phase with the first phase
can the first have identity with itself : only by the identity of the
determined with the determining — the identity of the passive
with the active — can the self-determined being be and remain
itself. This necessity of thought is the ground of the proof that
the totality which all thought presupposes is God, and not pure
nought or Brahm. The self-deternjining, thereibi'e, determines
itself as self-determining; that is to say, the self-determined deter-
mines itself, and is thus identical with the first self-determining.

Faith and Knowledge. 417

In the second phase, the lirst reflects its independence, freedom,
and self-activity.

But there is another phase : the self-determined that makes
itself self-determining has its object or passivity to annul in order
to become identical with the first. This is a process of making
real its passivity and its activity as annulling that passivity.
Thus arises a world that contains both elements — fate or passivity
(determined-ness) and activity (determining-ness). It appears as
a Creation beginning with chaos or pure space and rising through
nature to man ; with man begins the realm of the manifestation
of freedom or the self-determining-ness. In the world of human-
ity, as developed throughout the cosmos in an infinity of worlds,
there is an ascent into the identity with the First. The First is
primordially self-active ; the Second is BECOME self-active, but
from eternity ; the third is BECOMIISTG self-active, and is in all
stages of progress, from the passivity of chaos, or pure space, up
to the most perfect humanity that has developed on any one of
the infinite number of worlds.

The relation of the First to the second is that of freedom, be-
cause it is created in the very act of freedom. The relation of
the second to the first is that of freedom ; for it has annulled its
derivativeness from eternity and is free activity ; the relation of
the third is that of ascent into freedom, having begun in passivity
or nature, and received energy or freedom from the second.'

Whatever one may find by investigation of the necessary pre-
suppositions of the absolute self-determined being will be also
ultimate data of consciousness even for the fool {insipiens). If
these conclusions from the logical presuppositions are not war-
ranted, it makes no difference so far as the validity of the argu-
ment of Anselm is concerned. Whatever does follow, is the idea
of the divine — and it is impossible to escape having some idea
of the divine.

The principle of ^^ Progressus in Infinitum'''' has been referred
to as used by Kant in establishing his antinomies.

It has been used in negative philosophy ever since the time of
the Sophists, and in our own time it has been adopted from Kant

' In an article on " The Personality of God " in the " North American Review " for
September, 1880, I have treated this subject further,

XY— 27

418 The Journal of Speculative Philosophij.

by Sir "William IlaniiUon and his disciples, and again by Herbert
Spencer. The inconceivability of an infinite progress is made a
sufficient ground for pronouncing the inconceivability of anything
that may involve an infinite progrei^s. Self Existence (by Herbert
Spencer), the infinitude of space (by Hamilton), and all notions
that relate to the divine, are made unthinkable because they im-
ply what is inconceivable. But, in the first ]>lace, there is nothing
in the universe that dt)es not involve an infinite progress in some
shape or other; in the second place, the infinite progress, so far
from being inconceivable, is the most conceivable of ideas. In
fact, it is an element in all that is conceivable.

Since any finite thing is divisible, and division does not change
the nature of that M'hich is divided, so as to make the parts
reached by division indivisible, it follows that the operation may
be repeated ad infinituin^ or, in other words, that things are
infinitely divisible. Hence nothing can be conceived at all if
involving an infinite progress prevents us conceiving it.

Moreover, since the conception of quantity is the basis of the
conception of thing in general, and quantity involves the unity
of the ideas of discreteness and continuity, it follows that infinite
divisibility is inseparable from the conception of thing, but that
it makes its thought possible through the fact that infinite divisi-
bility is another name for the union of discreteness and continuity
— the elements or factors of the idea of quantity. It will be seen
that this holds true not only of space but also of time, quantity
being constituent of both thoughts. Remove quantity and en-
deavor to think things or events : you will remove the ideas of
discreteness and continuity, and your object will become devoid
of succession and extension. It will then become devoid also of
all relation to others or to itself, and will then become in very fact
inconceivable — but inconceivable because it is a non-entity, and
a non-entity cannot be conceived without elevating it out of its
non-entity into at least a conceptual existence. All forms of
relativity involve infinite progress, because Relativity involves
Identity and Difi'erence in unity. If you undertake to think
identity and difference in succession, you have an infinite progress
— and this is only a result of trying to think the conceptual ele-
ments of Relativity singly. In thinking each, its other appears
as the attribute of it. Each "shines," as Hegel says, "in the

Faith and Knowledge. 419

other," or is reflected in it. Hence, in thinking relativity we
imagine, first, two terms, one of which depends upon the other ;
next we think dependence also in the second term, and it, too,
depends npon a third ; approaching the third, w^e apply, again, the
same category of dependence, and at once the depended- upon
{i. e., the complement of the dependent) flits away into a more
remote term. The basis of this thought-play is the necessity of
thinking diiference as well as identity, and of thinking them in
the same term. The naive intellect, unaware of its laws of re-
flection, fails to note the implied unity of the two elements in one
being. When it recognizes the necessity of the unity in one
being of both conceptual elements, it changes both into the higher
concept and finds no longer the progress or succession. The
thought of quantity is infinite as regards discreteness and con-
tinuity. The thought of Relativity is infinite as regards the
thoufrhts of diff"erence and identity. But the true idea of rela-
tivity is self-relation, for tliat is the union in one of difference
and identity. The inconceivability of the infinite regress of
causality — the effect presupposing a cause that is again an effect
and again posits a cause antecedent, etc. — is solved the moment
we think cause and eifect in one being and have causa sui.
Heo-el uses "Beo-rifi"" to mean this idea of causa sui. or the self-
determined being.

Tlie solution of the Infinite Progress is the solution of the difl&-
culty in the way of acceptance of Anselm's proof of the being of
God. We have all of the elements present in our mind, but do
not recognize them. We discriminate and yet unite the terms,
affirming, on the strength of our perception of the necessary
unity, that neither is a whole without the other, but separating
them in order to comply with our insight into the necessary dis-
tinction. We posit the subjective as incomplete and as implying
an objective which is different from the concept. This difference
from the concept is conceived *as independence of the concept —
" The concept of a hundred dollars does not add anything to my
possessions." But there is an objective, and hence the subjective
is characterized as defective. The objective is distinctly posited
as independent of the subjective, and as not conditioned by the
latter. Here is, therefore, the necessity of the objectivity of one of
our ideas made the basis of our discrimination between another

420 The Journal of Speculative Philosopliy.

idea and its object. We see the independence of the objectivey
and, never doubting the objectivity of this our idea of objectivity^
we proceed to discriminate between all concepts and their corre-
sponding reality. The totah'ty is the union of subjective and ob-
jective; this totality is presupposed as the basis of our critical
attitude when we side with Kant or Gaunilo. Let go the convic-
tion of the unity of thought and being in this, its last stronghold,
and at once all idea of the distinction Ijetwcen thought and being
vanishes, for the idea of objective being vanishes utterly, and
there is now no distinction possible between thoughts that are
adequate to the existing reality and those that are not. Hence
we have a dialectical procedure in Hegel's' meaning and not in
the Kantian import of the term dialectic. We find ourselves in
the dilemma that makes us affirm an objectivity corresponding to
our thought, and, if we take the horn of denial, we are like-
wise affirming the same thing as the basis of our denial. As
already shown, they attempt to refute the ontological argument
by denying necessary objectivity to Quo majus cogitari nequit, or
to the thought of a totality, but they presuppose in this all valid-
ity for their discrimination between a mere concept and its cor-
responding reality, and hence they parade their idea of reality as
of superior validity to the idea of the totality as expressed by
Anselm and Descartes. But it is onlv the same idea of totality,
after all, which is in the thought of Anselm and Kant. Anselm
calls this idea of totality Grod, and finds in it the ultimate pre-
supposition of all thought; Kant posits a reality which does not
correspond to the concept, and, therefore, posits the reality of the
totality as including both subjective and objective.

APPENDIX I.

Passages from "Saint Anselm's Proslogium.'' (From the translation in the Biblio-
thet-a Sacra, Volume viii., beginning at page 529 ; the refutation of Gaunilo and
Anselm's rejoinder begin at page 699 of the same volume. Translated by Rev. J. S.
Maginnis.)

From III. TJiat God cannot be conceived not to exist.

"Indeed, so truly does this exist, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For it is
possible to conceive of the existence of something which cannot be conceived not to
exist; and this is greater than that which can be conceived not to exist. Wherefore,

* See Appendix IV to this article.

Faith and Knowledge. 421

if that, than which a greater cannot be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, then
tliis something, than which a greater cannot be conceived, is something than which a
greater can be conceived ; which is a contradiction. So truh', therefore, does some-
thing exist, than which a greater cannot be conceived, that it is impossible to conceive
this not to exist. And this art Thou, 0 Lord our God ! so truly, therefore, dost thou
exist, 0 Lord my GoJ, that thou canst not be conceived not to exist. For this there
is the highest reason. For, if any mind could conceive of anything better than thou
art, then the creature could ascend above the Creator and become his judge ; wliich is
supremely absurd. Everything else, indeed, which exists besides thee, can be con-
ceived not to exist. Thou alone, therefore, of all things, hast being in the truest
■eense, and, consequently, in the highest degree ; for everything else that is, exists not so
truly, and has, consequently, being only in an inferior degree. Why, therefore, has
the fool said in his heart there is no God ? since it is so manifest to an intelligent
mind, that of all things thine existence is the highest reality. Why, unless because
he is a fool, and destitute of reason ? "

From XV. Tliat the greatness of God transcends conception.

"Therefore, 0 Lord, not only art thou that than which nothing greater can be con-
ceived, but thy greatness transcends all conception. For since it is possible to con-
ceive that there is something whose greatness transcends all conception, if thou art
not this very thing, then something greater than thou art can be conceived, which is
impossible."

From XX. TJiat God is before all things, and beyond {ultra) all things, even things
which are eternal.

" Therefore Thou dost fill and embrace all things ; Thou art before and beyond all
things. Before all things, because, before they were brought forth. Thou art. But
how art Thou beyond all things ? for, in what way art Thou beyond things which have
no end ? Is it that these things can in no wise exist without thee, but that Thou
wouldst nevertheless exist even if these should return to nothing ? for in this way
Thou art in a certain sense beyond these things. It is also that these things can be
conceived to have an end, but that no end can be conceived of Thee ? For in this
way they have an end in a certain sense, but in no sense can this be affirmed of Thee.
And surely that which, in no sense, has an end, is beyond that which has an end in
eome sense. Dost Thou transcend all things, even eternal things, in this sense also,
that Thine entire eternity and theirs is present before Thee ; while of their eternity
they see not as yet that which is to come, and behold no longer that whicii is
past? For, in this way Thou art always beyond these things ; since Thou art always
present at that point, or rather that point is always present to Thee, at which they
have not arrived" \i. e.. The esse of "Quo majus non cogitari potest" transcends any

From XXIII. That this supreme good is equally the leather and the Son and the Holy
.Spirit ; that he is the only necessary being; that he is the whole, the absolute, the only
tgood.

" Thou art this good, 0 God ; the Father ; and thy Word that is thy Son, is this good.
•For in the Word, by which thou dost declare thyself, there can be nothing else than what
thou art, nor anything either greater or less, since thy Word is as true as thou art vera-
cious. And therefore thy Word is, as thou art, truth itself, and not another truth
than thou art; and so simple art thou that nothing else than what thou art can spring
from thee. This same good is love identical with that which is common to thee and

422 The Journal of Speculative PhilosojyJuj.

to thy Son ; that is to say, it is the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the
Sou. For this same love is not inferior to thee nor to thy Son ; for, so far as thou lov-
est thyself and the Son, ami so far as the ?oii loves thee and himself, so great art thoU
and he; this cannot be anything dilferent from thyself and thy Son, which is not un-
equal to thyself and to him ; nor can anything proceed from absolute simplicity, but
that itself from which it proceeds. But that which each is, this the whole Trinity is,
at oue and the same time. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, since each is no other than
simple and absolute unity, and supreme, absolute simplicity, which can neither be
multiplied nor be now one thing and then another. Moreover, there is but one neces-
sary being ; and he in wliom is all good is this one necessary being ; nay, he is him-
self the whole, the one supreme and the only good."

The following passages from the original will convey an idea of Anselm's style and
use of technique :

From Chapter II. " Bonum, quo majus nihil cogitari potest, intelligit utique quod
audit, et quod intelligit uticiue in ejus intellectu est, ctiam si uon intelligit illud.
esse.

" Convincitur ergo insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid bonum quo majus cogitari
nequit, quia hoc quum audit intelligit, et quidquid intelligitur in intellectu est. Ad
certe id quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim quo
majus cogitari non potest, in solo intellectu foret, utique eo quo majus cogitari non
potest, majus cogitari potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari
non valet, et in intellectu et in re."

From Chapter III. "Hoc ipsum autem sic vere est, ut nee cogitari possit non esse.
Nam potest cogitari aliquid esse, quod non possit cogitari non esse, quod majus est
utique eo, quod non esse cogitari potest. Quare si id, quo majus nequit cogitari,
potest cogitari non esse, id ipsum quo majus cogitari nequit, non est id quo majus
cogitari nequit, quod conveuire non potest. Vere eigo est aliquid, quo majus cogitari
non potest, ut nee cogitari possit non esse, et hoc es tu, Domine Deus noster."

APPENDIX II.

Passages from Descartes' " Third Meditation." (Translated by W. R. Walker. Jour.

Spec. Phi!., vol. iv.)

"Now, it is a thing manifest by the natural light that there should be at least as
much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect : for whence can the effect
derive its reality, if not from its cause? and how can this cause communicate it, if it
has it not in itself? And tlience it follows, not only that nothing cannot produce any-
thing, but also that what is more perfect — that is, which contains in itself more reality
cannot be a consequence of and depend upon the less perfect ; and this truth is not
only clear and evident in the effects which have that reality which philosophers call
actual or formal, but also in the ideas in which are considered only the reality wh'ch
they call objective : for example, the stone which has not yet been, not only cannot
now begin to be if it is not produced by something possessing in itself formally and
eminently all that enters into the composition of the stone — that is, containing in itself
the very things, or others more excellent, which are in the stone ; and heat cannot be
produced in a subject which was before devoid of it, except by something of an order^.
of a degree, or of a kind, at least, as perfect as heat ; and so of other things.

"Now, among all those ideas within me, besides that which represents me to myself,
as to which there cannot here be any difBculty, there is another which represents too

Faith and Knowledge. 423

me a God ; others, things corporeal and inanimate ; others, angels ; others, animals
and others, finally, which represent to me men like myself. But as regards the ideas
which represent to me other men, or animals, or angels, I easily conceive that they
might be formed by the mixture and composition of other ideas which I have of things
corporeal and of God, although outside of me there should be no other men in the
world, neither any animals, nor any angels. And as regards the ideas of things cor-
poreal, I do not recognize in them anything so great or excellent, that might not, as it
seems to me, come from myself ; for if I consider them more closely and examine
them in the same fashion in which I yesterday examined the idea of the wax, I find that
there occur but very few things which I conceive clearly and distinctly — namely, magni-
tude, or rather extension in length, breadth, and depth, the figure which results from
the termination of this extension, the situation which variously shaped bodies main-
tain among themselves, and the movement or change of this situation, to which may
be added substance, duration, and number.

" There remains only the idea of God, as to which it is necessary to consider whether
there is anything in it which could come from myself. By the term " God," I under-
stand a substance infinite, eternal, immovable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful,
and by which myself and all other things that are (if it be true that there are any that
exist) were created and produced. But these prerogatives are so great and exalted,
that, the more attentively I consider them, the less am I persuaded that the idea I have
of them can derive its origin from myself alone. And, consequently, the necessary
conclusion from all that I have before said is that God exists: for although the idta of
substance is in me from the very fact that I am a substance, I, who am a finite being,
should not, however, have the idea of an infinite substance, if it had not been put
within me by some really infinite substance.

" And I ought not to imagine that I do not conceive the infinite by a real idea, but only
by the negation of what is finite, just as I comprehend rest and darkness by the nega-
tion of motion and light ; since, on the contrary, I see manifestly that there is more
reality in the infinite substance than in the finite, and, consequently, that.Ihave in some
fashion within me the notion of the infinite rather than of the finite — that is, of God
rather than of myself ; for how is it possible that I can know that I doubt and that I
desire — that is, that something is wanting to me, and that I am not altogether perfect —
if T had not in me any ide.i of a being more perfect than my own, by the comparison
with which I may know the defects of my nature?

" And it cannot be said that perhaps this idea of God is materially false, and, conse-
quently, that I could derive it from nothing ; that is, that it might be in me by reason
of my defect, as I have just said of the ideas of heat and cold and other like things ;
for, on the contrary, this idea being very clear and distinct, and containing in itself
more objective reality than any other, there is nothing which of itself is more true, or
which can be less suspected of error and falsity.

" This idea, I say, of a Being sovereignly perfect and infinite is very true ; for al-
though, perhaps, one might pretend that such a Being does not exist, it cannot, how-
ever, be pretended that the idea of him does not represent something real, as I have
just said of the idea of cold. It is also very clear and distinct, since all that my mind
conceives clearly and distinctly as real and true, and which contains in itself any per-
fection, is entirely contained and included in this idea. And this remains none the
less true because I do not comprehend the infinite, and there are in God an infinitude
of things which I cannot comprehend, or perhaps even reach by any stretch of the

424 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

mind ; for it is of tlie nature of the infinite that I, who am finite and limited, cannot
coinpioliend it ; and it is enough that I understand this, and judge that all the things
which I conceive clearly, and in which I know there is some perfection, and perliaps
also an infinitude of others of which I am ignorant, are in God formally or eminently,
in order that the idea which I have of them may be the most true, the most clear, and
the most distinct of all those that are in my mind.

" But it m.iy also be that I am something more than I imagine, and that all the per-
fections I attribute to the nature of a God are in some fashion potentially in me,
although they are not yet brought forth and are not made apparent by their actions.
Indeed, I already experience that by degrees my knowledge is increasing and being
perfected ; and I see nothing which could prevent its being thus more and more in-
creased to infinity ; or why, being thus increased and perfected, I should not be able to
acquire in this way all the other perfections of the divine nature ; or, finally, why the
power wliicii I have for the acquisition of these perfections, if it be true that this
power is now in me, should not be sufiicient to produce the ideas of them. However,
regarding the matter a little more closely, I discover that this cannot be ; for, in the
first place, althougli it were true that my knowledge every day acquires new degrees of
perfection, and that there were in my nature many things potentially which are not
actually there, yet all these advantages do not belong to or approach in any sort the
idea I have of the Divinity, in which there is nothing that is only potential, but every-
thing is there actually and in reality. And, indeed, is it not an infallible and very cer-
tain argument for the imperfection of ray knowledge, that it grows gradually and in-
creases by degrees ? Moreover, although my knowledge should grow from more to
more, yet I ought not, therefore, to conceive that it could be actually infinite, since it
■would never reach a point of perfection so high that it would not be still capable of
acquiring a much larger increase. But I conceive God actually infinite in so high a
degree that nothing can be added to the sovereign perfection which he possesses.
And, finally, I comprehend clearly that the objective being of an idea cannot be pro-
duced by a being which exists only potentially ; which, properly speaking, is nothing,
but only by a formal or actual being.

" But perhaps this being on whom I depend is not God, and I may have been pro-
duced either by my parent?, or by some other cause less perfect than he. Far from it
— that cannot be; for, as I have already said, it is very evident that there should be
at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect ; and, consequently, since I am a
thing that thinks and that has in itself some idea of God, whatever may be the cause
of my being, it must be admitted that this cause is also a thing that thinks, and that it
was in itself the idea of all the perfections that I attribute to God. Then we may in-
Testigate anew whether this cause derives its origin and existence from itself or from
anything. For, if it derives its origin from itself, it follows, from the reasons 1 have
before advanced, that this cause is God : since, having the virtue of being and of existing
by itself, it must unquestionably have the power of actually possessing all the perfec-
tions of which it has in itself the ideas ; that is to say, all those that I conceive to be
in God. But if it derives its existence from some other cause than itself, it will be
asked once more, for the same reason, as to this second cause, whether it exists of
itself or is from another cause, until, step by step, we arrive at length at a final cause,
which will be found to be God. And it is very manifest that in this there cannot be
progress to the infinite, since the question here is not so much as to the cause which
before produced me as to that which now preserves me."

Faith and Knowledge. 425

APPENDIX III.

Passages from " Kant's Critique of Pure Reason," " Transcendental Dialectic," Book
II., chap, iii., section 4 (translation of Meililejohn) " Of the Inopossibility of the
Ontological Proof of the Existence of God."

" If, in an identical judgment, I annihilate the predicate in thought and retain the
subject, a contradiction is the result ; and hence I say, the former belongs necessarily
to the latter. But if I suppress both subject and predicate in thought, no contradiction
arises ; for there is nothing at all, and therefore no means of forming a contradiction.
To suppose the existence of a triangle and not that of its three angles, is self-contradic-
tory ; but to suppose the non-existence of both triangle and angles is perfectly admissi-
ble. And so is it with the conception of an absolutely necessary being. Annihilate
its existence in thought, and you annihilate the thing itself with all its predicates;
how, then, can there be any room for contradiction ? Externally, there is nothing to
give rise to a contradiction, for a thing cannot be necessary externally ; nor internally,
for, by the annihilation or suppression of the thing itself, its internal properties are also
annihilated. God is omnipotent — that is a necessary judgment. Ilis onmipotence
cannot be denied if the existence of a Deity is posited — the existence, that is, of an
infinite being, the two conceptions being identical. But when you say, God does not
fixi^t, neither omnipotence nor any other predicate is affirmed ; they must all disappear
with the subject, and in this judgment there cannot exist the least self-contradiction.

" It is afiirmed that there is one, and only one, conception iu which the non-being or
annihilation of the object is self-contradictory, and this is the conception of an ens
realissimum. It possesses, you say, all reality, and you feel yourselves justified in ad-
mitting the possibility of such a being. (This I am willing to grant for the present,
although the existence of a conception which is not self-contradictory is far from being
sufiScient to prove the possibility of an object.) Now, the notion of all reality embraces
in it that of existence; the notion of existence lies, therefore, in the conception of tbia
possible thing. If this thing is aimihilated in thought, the internal possibility of the
thing is also annihilated, which is self-contradictory.

"I answer: It is absurd to introduce — under whatever term disguised — into the
conception of the thing, which is to be cogitated solely in reference to its possibility,
the conception of its existence. If this is admitted, you will have apparently gained
the day, but in reality have enounced nothing but a mere tautology. I ask, is the
proposition, this or that thing (which I am admitting to be possible) exists, an analyti-
cal or a synthetical proposition ? If the former, there is no addition made to the sub-
ject of your thought by the affirmation of its existence ; but either the conception in
your minds is identical with the thing itself, or you have supposed the existence of a
thing to be possible, and then inferred its existence from its internal possibility — which
is but a miserable tautology. The word reality in the conception of the thing, and the
word existence in the conception of the predicate, will not help you out of the difficulty.
For, supposing you were to term all positing of a thing reality, you have thereby
posited the thing with all its predicates in the conception of the subject and assumed
its actual existence, and this you merely repeat in the predicate. But if you confess,
as every reasonable person must, that every existential proposition is synthetical, how
can it be maintained that the predicate of existence cannot be denied with contradic-
ition — a property which is the characteristic of analytical propositions alone ?

" I should have a reasonable hope of putting an end forever to this sophistical mode

42(5 The Joui'nal of Speculative Philosophy.

of argumentation by a strict definition of tlie conception of existence, did not my own
experience teacli me that the illusion arising from our confounding a logical with a real
predicate (a predicate winch aids in tlio determination of a thinj^) resists almost all the
endeavors of explanation ami illustration. A logical predicate may be what you
please, even the subject may be predicated of itself; for logic pays no regard to the con.,
tent of a judgment. But the determination of a conception is a predicate, which adds
to and enlarges the conception. It must not, therefore, be contained in the concep-
ti.in.

" Being is evidently not a real predicate — that is, a conception of something which is
added to the conception of some other thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or
of certain determinations in it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The
proposition, God is omnipotent, contains two conceptions which have a certain object
or content ; the word is, is no additional predicate-^it merely indicates the relation ol
the predicate to the subject. Now, if I take the subject (God) with all its predicates
(omnipotence being one) and say God is, or, there is a God, I add no new predicate to
the conception of God; I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all its
predicates — I posit the object in relation to my conception. The content of both is the
same; and there is no addition made to the conception, which expresses merely the
possibility of the object, by my cogitating the object — in the expression, it is — as ab-
solutely given or existing. Thus the real contains no more than the possible. A hun-
dred real dollars contains no more than a hundred possible dollars, for, as the latter
indicate the conception, and the former the object, on the supposition that the content
of the former was greater than that of the latter, my conception would not be an ex-
pression of the whole object, and would consequently be an inadequate conception of it.
In another sense (in my possessions), however, it may be said that there is more in a
hundred real dollars than in a hundred possible dollars — that is, in the mere conception
of them. For the real object — the dollars — is not analytically contained in my concep-
tion, but forms a synthetical addition to my conception (which is merely a determina-
tion of my mental state), although this objective reality — this existence — apart from my
conception, does not in the least degree increase the aforesaid hundred dollars.

" By whatever, and by whatever number of, predicates — even to the complete deter-
mination of it — I may cogitate a thing, I do not in the least augment the object of my
conception by the addition of the statement, this thing exists. Otherwise, not exactly
the same, but something more than what was cogitated in my conception, would exist,
and I could not affirm tiiat the exact object of my conception had real existence. If I
cogitate a thing as containing all modes of reality except one, the mode of reality which
is absent is not added to the conception of the thing by the affirmation that the thing
exists ; on the contrary, the thing exists — if it exists at all — with the same defect as
that cogitated in its conception ; otherwise not that which was cogitated, but something
different, exists. Now, if I cogitate a being as the highest reality, without defect or
imperfection, the question still remains — whether this being exists or not? For, al-
though no element is wanting in the possible real content of my conception, here is a
defect in its relation to my mental state — that is, I am ignorant whether the cognition of
the object indicated by the conception is possible a posteriori. And here the cause of
the present difficulty becomes apparent. If the question regarded an object of sense
merely, it would be impossible for me to confound the conception with the existence
of a thing. For the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as according
with the general conditions of experience ; while the existence of the object permits

Faith and Knowledge. 42T

me to cogitate it as contained in the sphere of actual experience. At the same time,
this connection with the world of experience does not in the least augment the concep-
tion, although a possible perception has been added to the experience of the mind.
But if we cogitate existence by the pure category alone, it is not to be wondered at that
we should find ourselves unable to present any criterion sufficient to distinguish it from
mere possibiUty.

" Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is necessary to go
beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the object. In the case of sensuous
objects, this is attained by their connection according to empirical laws with some one
of my perceptions ; but there is no means of cognizing the existence of objects of pure
thought, because it must be cognized completely a jon'on. But all our knowledge of
existence (be it immediately by perception, or by inferences connecting some object
with a perception) belongs entirely to the sphere of experience — which is in perfect
unity with itself; and although an existence out of this sphere cannot be absolutely
declared to be impossible, it is a hypothesis, the truth of which we have no means of
ascertaining.

" The notion of a supreme being is, in many respects, a highly useful idea ; but, for
the very reason that it is an idea, it is incapable of enlarging our cognition with regard
to the existence of things. It is not even sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility
of a being which we do not know to exist. The analytical criterion of possibility,
which consists in the absence of contradiction in propositions, cannot be denied it.
But the connection of real properties in a thing is a synthesis of the possibility of
which an a priori judgment cannot be formed, because these realities are not presented
to us specifically ; and, even if this were to happen, a judgment would still be impossi-
ble, because the criterion of the possibility of synthetical cognitions must be sought
for in the world of experience, to which the object of an idea cannot belong. And
thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed in his attempt to establish, upon a priori
grounds, the possibility of this sublime ideal being.

" The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of a Supreme
Being is therefore insuflScient ; and we may as well hope to increase our stock of
knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as the merchant to augment his wealth by the
addition of noughts to his cash account."

APPENDIX IV.

Passages from " Hegel's Encyclopaedia," §§ 49, 50, 51, " the second attitude of thought
towards the objective world," treating of the Kantian philosophy. (Translation of
Wallace.)

" The third object of the Reason is God ; He also must be known and evaluated in
terms of thought. But, in compmison with an unalloyed identity, any evaluation in
precise terms seems to the understanding to be a limit, and a negation : so that all
reality must be invested with boundlessness or indeterminateness. Accordingly, God,
when he is defined to be the sum of all realities, the most real of beings, turns into a
mere abstraction. And the only head under which that most real of real things, or
abstract identity, can be brought into articulate form, is the equally abstract category
of Being. These are the. two elements, an abstract identity, on one hand, which is
spoken of in this place as the Notion ; and Being on the other, which Reason seeks to
reconcile into unitv. And their union is the ideal of Reason."

428 The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

" To carry out this union, two ways or two forms are admissible. Either we may
begin with Being and proceed to the abstraction called Thought ; or, the movement
may begin with the abstraction and end in Being."

"The other way of union, by which we seek to realize the Ideal of Reason, is to set
out from the abstractum of Thought and seek to characterize it; for which purpose
Being is the only available term. This is the method of the Ontological proof. The
oppo.-ition, which is here presented solely from the subjective side, lies between
Thought and Being; whereas, in the first way of junction, Being is common to the
two sides of the antitliesis, and the contrast lies between individualized and universal.
Understanding meets this second way with what is implicitly the same objection as it
met the first. As it denied that the empirical involves the specialization, which special-
ization in this instance is Being. In other words, it says : Being cannot be deduced
from the Notion by any analysis."

"The unexampled favor and acceptance which attended Kant's criticism of the
Ontological proof was undoubtedly due to the illustration which he made use of. To
mark the difference between Thought and Being, he took the instance of a hundred
sovereigns, which, for anything it matters to the Notion, are the same hundred whether
they are real or only possible, though the difiference of the two cnses is v?ry percepti-
ble in their effect on a man's purse. Nothing can be more obvious than that anything
we only think or fancy is not on that account actual ; and everybody is aware that a
conception, and even a notion, is no match for Being. Still, it may not unfairly be
styled a barbarism in language, when the name of Notion is given to things like a
hundred sovereigns. And, putting that mistake aside, those who like to taunt the
philosophic idea with the difference between Being and Thought might have admitted
that philosophers were not wholly ignorant of the fact. Can there be anything pettier
in knowledge than this? Above all, it is well to remember, when we speak of God,
that we have an object of another kind than any hundred sovereigns, and unlike any
particular notion, conceit, or whatever else it may be styled. The very nature of
everything finite is expressed by saying that it? Being in time and space is discrepant
from its Notion. God, on the contrary, ought to be what can only be ' thought as
existing;' His Notion involves Being. It is this unity of the Notion and Being that
•constitutes the notion of God."

Notes and Discussions. 429

NOTES AISTD DISCUSSION'S.

THE SADDEST OF THOUGHTS

[In printing these lines in our July number we made so many mistakes
that we reprint them entire in this place. — Editor.]

The saddest thought that ever found its way
Into the curious chamber of the mind,
Is, that to close the latest earthly day
Sums all of life ; that all is final blind
Dispose of elements, nor shall we find
Rest other than the dusty remnants have
Which were our bodies and the soul enshrined,
Then to be parted like th' unmeaning wave.
Unfriendly atoms all, forth wandering from the grave !

B. R. BuLKLEY.

PROFESSOR PREYER'S ARTICLE ON PSYCHO GENESIS-
CORRIGENDA.

[We are requested by Miss Talbot, whose translation of Dr. Preyer's
interesting paper on Psychogenesis appeared in our April number, to
print the following Corrigenda. — Editor.]

P. 162. "The muscles of the face relaxed," instead of "the muscles
of sight asleep."

Ibid. " First development of the will," instead of " first of all is the
development," etc.

P. 163. Read: "Children born brainless can scream precisely as
sound children, therefore the first scream cannot be derived from in-
digestion, anger," etc.

P. 166, 1. 3. "Brain," instead of "intellect."

P. 176. Read: "New-born animals, which astonish us by distin-
guishing diverse substances without having had any experience in tast-
ing."

P. 178, 1. 5. "Impressions," instead of " sensations."

430 Tlte Journal of Speculative PhiIosoj)/u/.

Ibid., 1. 9. Head : "The .auditory canal is not yet open — its epithelial
coatiniTs boinir pasted together."

Ibid., 2d parajyraph. Read : " But after the car is developed, through
no other sense-organ," etc.

r. 179, 1. 6 from bottom. Read: "Pigeons without the hemispheres
of the brain," for " deaf people without great intelligence."

P. 182. Read: "Vocal sound which can be fixed somewhere," for
"noise which can bo fixed somewhere."

P. 183. Read: "All the properties of the organism which continually
reappear periodically must finally be called hereditary. It may be said
that heredity is a form of the law of inertia or the power of inertness in
organic nature."

Ibid., 1. 10. Read: " Meaning of the word," for " understanding."

P. 188, 1. 10. Read : " Aphasia," for "an illness."

Ibid., 1. 5 from the bottom. Read : " Evolution," for " existence."

BOOKS EECEIVED.

The Philosophy of Carlyle. By Edwin D. Mead. Boston : Houghton, Mifflin & Co.,
Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1881.

The Science of Beauty : an Analytical Inquiry into the Laws of JUsthetics. By Avary
W. Holmes-Forbes, M. A., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister at Law. London : Truebner &
Co., Ludgate Hill. 1881.

History of Materialism, and Criticism of its Present Importance. By Frederick Albert
Lange, late Professor of Philosophy in the Universities of Zurich and Marburg. Au-
thorized Translation bT|E;nest Chester Thomas, late Scholar of Trinity College, Oxford.
In Three Volumes. Vol. Ill (being the third volume of Truebner's Euglish and Foreign
Philosophical Library). London: Truebner & Co., Ludgate Hill. 1881.

The Essence of Christianity. By Ludwig Feuerbach. Translated from the second
German edition by Marian Evans, translator of Strauss's "Life of Jesus."' Second
Edition (being the fifteenth volume of Tniebner's English and Foreign Philosophical
Library). London : Truebner & Co., Ludgate Hill. 1881.

Jerrold, Tennyson, and Macaulay. With other Critical Essays. By James Hutchi-
son Stirling, LL. D., author of " The Secret of Hegel," etc. Edinburgh : Edmonston &
Douglas. 1868.

Science and Philosophy. The Classification of Science. — Recent Progress in Science.
— The Dualistic Philosophy. — Harmony of Science and Religion, etc. By Rev. Samuel
Fleming, LL. D., Ph. D., Vice-President of the Ameiican Anthropological Association;
Member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, etc. Chicago :
Skeen & Stuart. 1880.

Books Received. 431

Fichte. " By Robert Adamson, M. A., Professor of Logic iu the Owens College, Vic-
toria Universit}', Manchester. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London.
1831. (Being a volume of the series of "Philosophical Classics for English Readers,"
edited bv William Knight, LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of St.
Andrews.)

Das Problem des Boesen. Eine Metaphysische Untersuchung. Von A. L. Kym.
Muenchen : Theodor Ackermann. 1878.

La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane; Rivista Bimestrale. Diretta da Terenzio Ma-
miani e Luigi Ferri. Anno XII, Vol. XXIII. Disp. 1, 2, and 3. Febbraio, April, and
June, 1881. Roma coi tipi del Salviucci. [Contents for February: (1) Concerning the
Ultiiiate Synthesis of Knowing and Being, a Letter to Professor Bertinaria, by T.
Mamiani ; (2) Roberto Ardigo's Morals of the Positivists, by Pasquale d'Ercole ; (3)
Aristotelian and Baconian Induction, by Tullio Ronconi ; (4) Two Words addressed
to the Civilta Cattolica, by Luigi Ferri; (5) Bibliography and Book Notices. Contents
for April: (1) Philosophy of History — History as the Educator of the Human Race, by
Franc. Bonatelli; (2) Sociology: The Precursor of Malthus, by G. Jandelli ; (3) Bibli-
ography ; The Course of Study in Philosophy in the Italian Universities ; The Course in
.Esthetics by Professor Tari ; Recent Publications. Contents for June: (1) Concerning
the Ultimate Synthesis of Knowing and Being, A second Letter to Professor Bertinaria,
by T. Mamiani; (2) The Philosophy of Kant: Phenomena and Noumena, by Felice
Tocco; (3) On the Philosophic Method of Socrates, by Giuseppe Zuccante; (4) Bibli-
ography Notices ; Philosophical Periodicals ; Recent Publications ; and Index to the
Volume.]

Mind : a Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy. London : 1881. [Con-
tents of the January number: (1) Illusions of Introspection, by James Sully; (2) Our
Control of Space and Time, by J. Venn; (3) M. Renouvier's Philosophy — Logic, by
Shadworth H. Hodgson; (4) The Summum Bonum, by Daniel Greenleaf Thompson ;
(5) Replies to Criticisms on the Data of Ethics, by Herbert Spencer ; (6) Notes and Dis-
cussions ; (7) Critical Notices; (8) New Books; (9) Miscellaneous. Contents of the
April number: (1) Monism, by Edmund Gurney; (2) M. Renouvier's Philosophy —
Psychology, by Shadworth H. Hodgson ; (3) The Logic of Dictionary-Defining, by Rev.
William L. Davidson ; (4) Buckle and the Economies of Knowledge, by Alfred W.
Benn; (5) Notes and Discussions; (6) Critical Notices; (7) New Books; (8) Miscel-
laneous.]

Zeitschrift fuer Philosophic und Philosophische Kritik, im Vereine mit Mehreren
Gelehrten Gegriindet von Dr. J. H. Fichte, Redigirt von Dr. Hermann Ulrici. [Contents
of Vol. LXXVIII, New Series, Part I: (1) Kantian Criticism and English Philosophy,
by Prof. Dr. Edmund Pfleiderer; (2) Johann Anton Roese of Luebeck: a Sketch of
his Life, by Dr. Emanuel Schaerer; (3) The System of the " Erkenntnisstheoretisclien
Logik" (or the logic which professes to expound the nature of theoretical cognition),
by Prof. Dr. Schuppc ; (4) Schopenhauer's Critique of the Kantian Doctrine of the
Categories, by Eugene Westerburg ; (5) On the Memory, with Remarks on its Pathol-
og.^) t*}' J- L. A. Koch, M. D. ; (6) Reviews of Books, Notices, and Bibliography.]

Philosophische Monatshefte. Unter Mitwirkung von Dr. F. Ascherson, Sowie Meh-
rerer Namhaften Fachgelehrten, Redigirt und Herausgegeben von C. Schaarschmidt.
XVII Band. [Contents of the first number: (1) On Plato's Parmenides, by Praes. von
Kirehmann; (2) The Problem of Cognition and Wundt's Logic, by Dr. Th. Lipps; (3)

432 The Journal of Speciilative Philosophy.

Schcllin5;;-0kcn Redivivus, The Heliocentric Standpoint of Considerins; the World, by S.
A. Bilh.irz, reviewed by L. \Veis ; (4) On Force anfi Movement, by M. Drossbach (Re-
view) ; (5) The Logic of Hypothesis, by E. Naville (Ueview) ; (6) The Realism of Modern
Natural Science, by J. Kroyenbuehl (reviewed); (7) The Basis of Human Ethics, by H.
Hoeffding (reviewed) ; (8) On Intellectual Character, by R. Falckcnberg (Review); (9)
On the Religions of the Rudest Savages, by G. Roskoff (Review); (10) Notices of Chr.
A. Tliilo's "Short Pragmatical History of Philosophy; of K. Fischer's History of Mod-
ern Pliilosophy ; of C.J. Gerhardt's edition of Leibnitz's Philosophical Writings; of
M. Joel's Gl.inces into the Religious History at the beginning of the Second Century,
A. D. ; (11) Reports on New Publications; (12) Controversy between Prof. Michelct
and Prof. Weis ; etc. Contents of second number: (1) On the Logical Difficulties ia
the Simplest Form of Idea-formation, by Prof. J. Folkelt, of Jena ; (2) Review of Dr. A.
Diiring's Outlines of General Logic; (3) Review of P. Knoodt's Biography of Anton
Guenther; (4) Review of J. Witte's Philosophy of our Heroes of Poetry; (5) Reports
of Recent Philosophic Literature; (6) Bibliography, Notices of Periodicals, etc.]

Revue Philosophique de la France et de L'Etranger, Paraissant tons les mois,
Dirig6e par Th. Ribot. [Contents of January number, 1881 : (1) A. Fouillee on Neo-
Kantianism in France, a. The Criticism of Morals; (2) E. Naville on the Philosophical
Consequences of Modern Physics ; (3) Herbert Spencer, Article No. 3 on Political In-
tegration ; (4) Notes and Documents, Descartes and the National Convention; (5)
Book Notices and Reviews; (6) Notices of Philosophical Periodicals.]

Rivista di Filosofia Scientifica diretta da E. Morselli, R. Ardigo, G. Boccardo, G.
Canestrini, G. Sergi. Redattore: G. Buccola. Anno I. LugHo, 1881. Num. 1. Fra-
telli Dumolard, editori. Torino, direzione della rivista, via dtlla scuole, 5. Milano,
Amministrazione della rivista, Corso Vittorio Em., 21. Contents (translated): (1) By
Morselli — Philosophy and Science ; (2) Ardigo — Individuality in positive Philosophy ;
(3) By Sergi — The color-sense in perception ; (4) By Buccola — Studies in experimental
psychology : The duration of the sensations in the elementary psychic acts (with plates
illustrating the apparatus for measuring the limits of sensation by means of electric
currents); (5) By Delpino — Elements of the biology of plants — 1, Introduction; (6)
By Canestrini — On heredity in individual characteristics; (7) By Cantoni — Galileo's
method in the study of natural law ; (8) By Siciliani — On Scientific pedagogy in Italy.
Analyses (of books) : De La Calle's La Glossologie ; book notices and notices of period
icals.

La Sapienza. Rivista di Filosofia e di Lettere diretta da Vincenzo Papa. Anno
III. — Volume IV. Torino. Tipografia Giulio Speiraui e Figli. 1881. This is a
monthly periodical, devoted to the interests of the Rosminian Philosophy, and very ably
conducted. lu the contents of the first number of the fourth volume (there are two
volumes a year) the first article contains letters of Rosmini hitherto unpublished ; the
third, a letter from P. Perez, on Rosmini's doctrine of conscience ; in the seventh
article, Agostino Taghaferri discusses Rosmini's Theosophy; in the ninth article, G.
Buroni discusses the relation of the Theosophy of Rosmini to that of Thomas Aquinas,
and in the book notices there is a review of a work by P. Maria Ferre, on the Rosminian
doctrine of TJiiiversals.

nAPNA2202. SrrrPAMMA nEPIOAIKON KATA MHNA EKAIAOMENON [Vol. V,
No. 8, September 30, 1881. Published at Athens, at the Parnassean Printing-house,
1881.]

INDEX

TO THE

JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

VOLUMES I-XV.

INDEX.

JOURNAL OF SPSCULATIVE PHILOSOPHY. ^VOLUMES I-XV.

Art. The Philosophy of, George S. Morris, lo, 1.

Atomic Collision and Non-Collision, Payton Spence,
14. 2S6.

Authority in the State, Foundation of, H. H. Mor-
gan, 7, Jan., 42. ^

Baader, F. TToffmann on the Philosophy of ftr),
A. Strotholte, i, 190; Differenci' of, 'from He-
gel. Eosenkranz on (tr.), T. Davidson, 2, .5.5.

Baldwin, Asnss W , Report of II. K. Jones on
Persoiialitv and Individuality, g. 4-^S.

Bartol, C. A., Radical Problems (noticed by A. 0.
Brackett), 6, 2sT; The Rising Faith (noticed),
8. 9(5.

Barzellotti. Giacomo, notice of some of his works,
5, 90; La Morale nella Filosofia Positiva
("noticed \ 6, 191.

Bascom, John, A Philosophy of Religion (noticed),

12, 441 ; Comparative Psychology (noticed),
12.441.

Bayrho.ffer, Karl Theodor, Das Wesen df>s ITni-
versums, etc. (noticed), g. 224; On the Idea
of Matter (TvndalFs problem solved), 10, 69;
On the Idea of Mind. 10, 3S2.

Beers, Henry A., The Ideas of the Pure Reason,
14. 244.

Beethoven. L. von, his Fifth Symphony and
Moonllffht Sonata, i, 120; Seventh Symphony,
by C. W. Chapman. 2, 37; Sinfonia Eroica, by
C. L. Bernays, 2, 241 ; Beethoven's Sonata in
F Minor, by C. Marx. 4, 274; Sonata Appas-
sionata, by C. W. Chapman, q. fil.

Benard, Charles, Analytical and Critical Essay on
Hegel s Jisthetics. translated by James A.
Martling (see Hegel> ; TEsthetique de Hegel,

13, 224 (noticed by W. M. Bryant).
Beneke's Educational Psychology, Karl Schmidt

(ti-.), F. L. Soldan, lo', Sfil.

Benson. Lawrsnce S., My Visit to the Sun (no-
ticed), 9, 111 ; Philosophic Reviews (and proof
of the equ-ality of the circle with its inscribed
hexagon) (noticet'). 9, 111.

Bentham. Jeremy, Introduction to the Principles
of Morals and Legislation (noticed 1, 1.5, 103.

Berkeley (Bishop>. Doctrine on the Nature of
Matter. T. Ooilyns Simon. 3. 336 ; Eraser's
edition of, reviewed by Stirling, 7, Jan., 1;
Berkeley's Idealism. Essay on. by C. W.
Bradley. 15, 67 ; On Berkeley, Materialism,
diminution of Light, by T. 0. Simon, 15, 77.

Bernays. Charles L.. Schopenhauer's Dialogue on
Immortality (tr ), 1, 61 ; Schopenhauer's Doc
trine of the Will (tr), i, 232; Beethoven'-
Sinfonia Eroica, 2, 241; Pi-actic.al Effects os
Modern Philosophy (tr.), from Schelling, 3f

Abbot, F. E.. Professor Tvndall's Address at Bel-
fast, 8. 372.

Abbott, George N., Personal Relation of Christ to
the Human Race, 8. 3.51.

Absolute. Cousin's Doctrine of the, F. A. Ilenrv,

2. 82.
Agnosticism, Thoughts on the Basis of, W. T.

Han-is, 15. 1 13.

Albee. John, Bettine, 4, 192; The Reieoted
Lover, 7, Apr. 19; Recognition, 8. 260; Ura-
nia, 9, 311 ; Polycrates sends .\nacreon Five
Talents. 12, 33J: Weeds. 13, 42 i; \rs Poeticv
ct Ilumana, 14. 20t; Notice of Snider's Del-
phic D.ays, 14, 251; At Thore.iu's Oiirn, 14,
83S; Archimedes. 15, 198; Roman Lovers. 15,
822; Literary Art— a Conversation (^noticed),
15. :-!2X

Alchemis's, The, by E. A. Hitchcock (noticed),
W. r. Harris. I'.l'Hi

Alcott, A. E., Genesis, 1, 165: Pantheon, 2, 46;
Tablets (noticed). 2, 192; The Qu.arrel. .s. 37.3;
Concord Days (noticerlK 6. 376; I'hiloso-
phemes, 7, Jan.. 40; Philosophemes 9. 1. 190,
215; Table Talk (noticed^, 11, 332; Philoso-
phenies. i";, S4.

Algorith r.ic Division in Logic, George Bruce Hal-
sted. 13, 107.

Allen. Robert D., An Effort to analyze the Moral
Idea inoiiced), 9, 444.

Ames. 0. H., Does Correlation of Forces imply
Personality? 11. 416.

Amson, Arthur, Philosophy in Europe (tr.), 7,
Apr., S-<.

Anderson. Joseph G., Logic, 8, 85; What Is Logic?
o, 417.

Anderson. R. B., Norse Mythology (noticed by T.
Davidson). 10, 210; his Translation of the
Edda (noti-:ed), 11, 109.

Andrews, S. P., Itevisal of Kant's Categories, 8,
•-'68.

Ange^.o (see Michael Angelo).

Angolus Silesius (tr.), 4, 31 ; Spiritual Epigrams
from. 12, 331.

Ar.thropoloiv (see Kant).

Anti-M.ateriaiism. G S. Hall. 6, 216.

Apollo Belvedere, Winckelmann's Description of,

3. 94.
Appleton. C. E.. Obituary. 13, 320.
Aquinas, Thomas. Letter on the Philosophy of,

Thomas Davidson. 13. 87: Darwin and. g, 327.

Aristotle, Ilegel on the Philosophv of (tr.). W. T.
Harris. 5. 61. ISO. 251 ; Conditions of Immor-
tality, according to, 8. 143.

Arnold, Alfred, Science, The Unification of, 15,
121.

Index.

435

190 ; Lvidwicr Tieck's Remarks on the Sistine
Madorna (tr.), 7, Oct., 27.

Bernays, Jacob, Lucian und die Kvniker (noticed),
13. 'IS-i.

Bhagavad Gita. The, translated by J. Cockburn
Thompson (noticed), 9, 336.

Bierbower, Austin, Ila^'Ta pei, 8, 2?4.

Bigelow. Lioratio B., Hamlet's Insanity (noticed),
9, 1( 5.

Bion's Ode on the Death of Adonis, Anna C.
Brackett, 5, 360.

Blackwell, Antoinette Brown, The Physical Basis
of Immortality (noticed). 10, 21S.

Blanc's Grammar of Fainting and Engraving
(noticed), g, 107.

Block, Lewis J., on the Interpretability of Music,
o, 4'23; on the Restoration of the Venus of
Melos (tr.), 5, iY\.

Blood, Benjamin P.iul. Anaesthetic Revelation
(noticed), 8, '2S8; Strictures on Mr. Kroeger's
M hat is Truth? 10, S9.

Boehme, Jacob, Hegel on, 13, 179, 2C9.

Book Cla^^siflcation, W. T. Harris, 4, 114.

Boole's Logical Method, George Bruce Ilalsted,
12, 81.

Bowev, George Spencer, The Philosophical Ele-
ment in bhelley, 14, 4il.

Brackett, Anna C., Seed Life, i, 60; Xotes on
Milton's Lycidas. i. 87 : In the Quarry, i,
112; A Thought on Shakespeare, i. 'J40; O'om-
prehensioa, 2, 126; The Ideal, 2, 189; Analy-
sis of J. E. Cabot's article on Hegel. 5, 38;
Goethe's Story of the Snake (tr.), Rosenkrani;,
5, 219; Bion's Ode on the Death of Adonis, 5,
b60 ; notice of Bartol's Radical Problems, 6,
287; notice of Channing's Wanderer, 6, 95;
translation of ledagogics as a System, by
Rosenkranz (tr.), 6, '..9J; 7, Jan.. 49; 7, Apr.,
40; 7, July, 1 ; 7, Oct., 1 ; 8, 49 ; On the Kdu-
cation of American Girls, 8, 191 ; translation
of A. Vera's Criticism of Trendelenburg, 8,
275; Rosenkranz on Goethe's Faust (tr.), 9,
48, '225, 4(11 ; Rosenkranz on Faust and Mar-
garet (tr.), 10, 37; second part of 1-aust, K.
Rosenkranz (tr.). 11, 113; Raphael's Hours,
by Karl Clauss (tr.), 11, 210; Rosenkranz's
Pedagogics, paraphrased, 12, 67, 297; 14, 191 ;
15, 36.

Braden, Clark, The Problem of Problems (no-
ticed), II, 2-.'l.

Bradley, Charles Wesley, on Berkeley's Idealism,
15, «T.

Brain Tissue, Transmigration of, 15, 2C0.

Braluschek, E., Prospectus for the new volume
ot the Philosophische Monatshefte, 7, Apr.,
8S.

Braubart, W., Fundamental Organon, etc. (no-
ticed), 12, 109.
Brinton, D. (} , Metaphysics of Matei ialism, i,
176 ; On the Causal Nexus, 7, Oct., 85 ; On Life,
Force, and Soul, 8, 375; On Thought as a
Function of the Hrain, 9. 2)2; On the Defini-
tion of Natural Law. g, 213 ; On ( orlical Brain-
substance, g, 214; The Religious Sentiment,
its Source and Aim (noticed), 10, 324; on
Pleasure and Pain, 10, 431.
Brockmeyer. H. C, Letters on Faust, i, 178; 2,
114 ; Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (tr.), 2,
94, 165, 229.
Brooke, Stopford, Faith and Freedom (noticed),

15. 224.
Brute and Human Intellect, WUliam James, 12,

236
Bryant, William M., Translation of Hegel on Sym-
bolic Art, II, 337; 12, 18; Hegel on Classic
Art, 12, 145, 277 ; Hegel on Romantic Art, 12,
403 ; 13, 113. 24J, :-,51 ; notice of Benard'a
translation of Hegel's ^Esthetics, 13, 402.
Buckle and the Autklarimg, J. Hutchison Stir-
Ung, 9, 337.

Buddhistic Nihilism, Max Mueller on (noticed), 9,

1(14.
Bulkley, B. R., The Saddest of Thoughts, 15, 325,

42,t.
Bushnell, J. E., Mind versus Matter, 14, 249.

Cabot, J. Elliot, Analysis of Article on Kegel, 5,
38 ; some Considerations on the Notion of
Space, 12, 225 ; Spatial Quale — An Answer,

13. 19 '■ ■ ,
Caird, Kdwrrd, A Critical Account of the Philoso-
phy of Kant noticed), 12, 219 ; A Reply
to "J. 11. Stirling, 13, 214; On Kiint, by J.
Hutchison Stirling. 14, 49 ; On Kant's Deduc-
tion ot the Categories, with Special Relation
to the Views of Dr. Stirling. 14, 110.

Caird, John. An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Religion (noticed). 15, 216. ,,-_ '

Calderwood, Henry, The Relations of Mind and
Brain (noticed by John Watson), 13, US.

Castelar. Repub ican Movement m Europe (no-
ticed), 7, Oct., 88.

Channing, William Ellery, The Wanderer, 6. 95
(niiticed by .\.0. Brackett); Speculum Poe-
sis, g, J 86, 800 ; A Quatern on, 10, 41 ; Tur-
ner, 10, 141 ; Wigelia, 11, 390; Sentences iu
Prose and Verse, 12, 103; 12. 327; 14, 240 ;

14, S.39 ; 15, 189 ; In Memoriam, 12, 214; Cot-
tage Hymns, 13. 346.

Chapman, (;harles Wesley, Beethoven's Seventh
Symphony, 2. 37; Beethoven's Sonata Ap-
passionata, o. CI.

Cheney. KdnahD., N'ichael .ingelo's Poem on the
Death of his H'ather and Brother (tr.), 10. 435.

'Cherubinic Wanderer. (See Angtlus Sile.sius.)

Chesley, E. M.. Does the Mind Ever Sleep ? 11, 72.

Chicago, The Philosophical Society of, 15, 195.

Child, B. G., Swedenborg on the question : Does
the mind ever sleep? 11, 203.

Christianity and the Clearing-up, Francis A. Hen-
ry. 12. 171, 337.

Christianity, Scheiling on (he Historical Construc-
tion of (tr.), Ella S. Morgan, 12, 2ti5.

Christ, Personal Relation of to the Human Race,
(JeorgeN. Abbott, 8,351.

Clauss. Karl, Raphael's Hours (tr.), 11, 210.

Cla_v, William, Letter on Hescartes. etc., 2, 247.

Cognition, Zeller on the Theory of (tr.). Max Eb-
erhardt, o, 38.

Cohn, M. M., 'Spencer's Evolution and Dissolution,
10, 1' 2; Dr. IToah Porter on Final Cause, an
Inteihgent Power, 11, t.24.

Coleridge s Ancient Mariner, Gertrude Garrigues'B
E.-say on, 14, 327.

Color, Music of, 8. 216.

Color and Tone .A.^sociations, 13, 4C4.

Collier, Hobert Laird, Meditations on the Essence
of Christianity (noticed), 15. 102.

Concord Summer School of Philf sophy. The, 14,
135 ; 14, 251 ; 15, 75; Kant Centennial at, ic,
303.

Concrete and Abstract, The, W. T Harris, 5, 1.

Conta, B., Thecrie du Katalisme i noticed 1, 15. 104.

Cook, Martha Walker, Transkation ot The Undi-
vine Comedy fioiu Krasinsky. Pohsh Poetry
of ihe Nineteenth Centuryby Klaczko (.no-
ticed), c, 335.

Correlatlonists, Do they Believe in Self-move-
ment? W. T. Harris, 6. 289.

Cousin. Victor. Doctrine of the Absolute. 7, 82.

CroU, James, What Determines Molecular Motion T
8, 379.

Cunningham. William, The Influence of Descartes
on Metaphysical Speculation in England (no-
ticed by D. J. snider), lo, 112.

D'Arcy, Henry I., Von Tlartmonn, on the True and
False in IJarwinlsm (tr.), 11, 214, 392 ; 12, 138 ;

13. 139-
Darwinism, Von Hartmann en the True and False

436

Index.

in(ti-), noniv I. DArov, ii, 244,892; 13, 138;

13. 1H9.

Darwin's Oesccnt of Man, .1. II. IVpper, 10, 134.

Darwin, Cliurlos, Letter on Infant Kdiication, 15,
•JOli.

Daviilsiin, Thomas, Schellinu's Introflnotion to
MoalisiiMtr.'), i, ITiSi; Sohollinvr's Introiluetion
to the I'hilosophy of Nature ;tr,). i, lii;-! ; Ko-
senkranz on DitlVrenoe of BaadiT from llepel
Itr.V a, fio; Leibnitz on tlie Nature of the
foul (lr.>, 2,1)2; Hosenkranzon Uoothe's So-
cial luimanees (tr.), 2, 12(1, 215; Winckel-
nianii's Remarks on the Torso of Hercules
(Ir), 2. K-T ; Sentences of I'orpliyrv the Phi-
losopher ^tr.), 3, 40 ; Leibnitz on I'hitonie ICn-
thusiusm (tr. I. 3, ^S ; Fr.iKments of I'arnieni-
des, 4, 1; Uosenkranz on (ioethe's Wilhelm
Meister(tr), 4, 14o; Introduction to Hegel's
Encyelopirdia (tr.l, by Kosenkranz, 5, 284;
Trendeienburfron Hegel's System itr.), 5,H49 ;
Notice of Morris's tr. of Ueberweg, 6,95;
Trendelenburg, on Hegel's System (tr.i 6, ^2,
Ifr.i, .')(!() ; Conditions of Ininiortality according
to Aristotle. 8. US; Letter about A. Vera's
Keview of Strauss's Ancient an.l New Faith,
8, 2S1 ; Grammar of Dionvsius Thr.a.x (tr.), 8,
826; Address of Professor Tyndall, 8, 361;
Tr. of Rosenkranz's Summary of Logic, g, 98 ;
The Niobe tiroup, 9, 142; Keply to A. Vera's
Strictures on his Critique. 9, 4.34; Notice of
Anderson's Norse Mythology, 10. 216; Letter
on the I'hilosopliy of Thomas .\quinas, 13, 87.

Da Vinci's •• Last Supper " (Goethe's Essay), (tr.),
D.J. Snider. 1, 243.

Davis, O. P., Letter on the Freedom of the Will,

8, 2S(\

Delflf, H. K. Hugo, Works reviewed, 6. 93 (by A.

E. Kroeger); Welt und Weltzeiten (rev. by

A. E. Kroeger). 7, Jan., 88 ; Prometheus,

Dionysius, Socrates, Christ (noticed by A. E.

Kroeger), 11, 438; Writings on Dante, 13,

221.
Descartes, Meditations of (tr.), William R. Walker,

4. l(i. 129, 210. 8114; Introduction to the (tr.),

William R Walker, 5. 97.
Determined, What is meant bj', W. T. Harris and

Ch.irles S. Peirce, 2, liUl.
Dialectic and Synthetic Methods, Diflference be-
tween the. A. E. Kroeger. 6. L84.
Dialectic. Two kinds of, L. P, Hickok, 10, 15S.
Di.ilectic, See 2, 176: 4. 153; 6, 883; 8, 35 ; 9, 70,

32S; 10, 97; 11, 220; 13, 426.
Dlni, F., Discorso (11 Filosofla di Francesco della

Scala (noticed), 13, 482.
Dionysius Thra.v (see Grammar of).
Doggett, Kate Newell. The Grammar of Painting

and Engraving, tr. from Blanc (noticed), 9,

107.
Dorse V, Sarah A., Basis of Induction, J. Lachelier

(tr.), 10. 307, 837; 11, 1.
Dreams, The Psychology of, Julia H. Gulliver,

14, 20+.

Dschelaleddin Eumi, Essay on, by Mrs. Mitchell,
14, 245.

Eberhardt, Ma.x, Lotze on the Ideal and Real (tr.),
6, 4 ; Zeller on the Theory of Cognition (tr.),

9, 33.

Edmunds, James, Kant's Ethics, 5, 27, 108, 2S9 ;

8,339; 10, 41 6; Kant's Ethics : The Clavis to

an Index (noticed 1, 13, 42S.
Education, see Pedagogics as a System (trans, and

paraphrase).
Education of American Girls, The, by Anna C.

Brackett (noticed). 8. 191.
Education. Science of. The (paraphrase of Rosen-
kranz's Pedagogics), Anna C. Brackett, 12, 67,

297: 14, 191 ; 15, 35.
Education, Science of — Analysis of Rosenkranz's

Pedagogics, W. T. Harris, 13, 205; 15, 52.

Educational Psychology (outlines), W. T. Harris,

14, 225.
Eliot, Ida M., Hermann Grimm on Raphael and

_ Michael Angelo, 13. 51, 2S1) ; 14, 169, 30.'>.

Ellis. G. II., On a Foundation for Religion (no-
ticed), 13. 480.

Elmendoif, J. J., Outlines of Lectures on the
History of Pbilosojjhy (noticed), 13. 222.

Emery, S;i"inuel 11.. Jr.,' Pariiienides of Plato, 6,
279; Letter on Immortality of the Individual,

7, July, 90; Does Formal Logic exjilain a<!tive
Processes? 11, 410; Lucretius on the Nature
ofThirjgs. 15. l;)8.

Emi)irical Certilude, System of, John C. Thomp-
son. 6, 142.

Eminricism and Common Logic, John Watson,
10, 17.

Eucken, Rudolf, Geschichte und Kritik der Grund-
begritfe der Gegenwart, 12, 441 (noticed by J.
B. Stallo).

Europe, Philosophy in, W. T. Harris, 5, 283, 374.

Everett, C. (J., Science of Thought (reviewed by
F. P. Stearns), 7, Oct., 42.

Facts of Consciousness, Fichte's (tr.), A. E. Kroe-
ger, 5, .53, 130, 226, 38S; 6, 42, 120, 3S2; 7,
Jan., 36.

Faculties Claimed for Man, Questions concerning
certain, C. S. Peirce, 2, 1U3.

Fairfield, F. G., Goethe and German Fiction, g,
303.

Fate, II, 265.

Fechner, Professor, Table of Tone and Color Asso-
ciations, 13. 404.

Fichte, J. G. (all translations of. by A. E. Kroe-
ger), Introduction to the Science of Knowl-
edge I, 23; A Criticism of Philosophical Sys-
tems, I, 80 ; Sun-Clear Statement, 2, 8, 65, l'J9 ;
The Science of Knowledge, trans, by A. E.
Kroeger (noticed), 2, 61; New Exposition of
the Science of Knowledge, 3, 1, 97, 193, 289 ;
Eacts of Consciousness (tr.), 5, 53, 180, 226,
338; 6, 42, 120, 882: 7, Jan., 86; Criticism of
Schelling (tr.), 12, 160, 316; (tr.), 13, 225.

Fichte and Kant, Historical .and Logical Relations
of, R. C. Ware, 11, 145.

Fichte, Immanuel Hermann von, Obituary, 13,
403.

Figuier. Louis, The To-morrow of Death, tr. by
S. R. (rocker (noticed), 6, 192.

Filosofla delle Scuole (see La Filosofla delle Scuole,
etc.).

Finite and the Infinite, The, F. A. Henry, 4, 193,
289.

Flagg, Isaac, Analysis of Schiller's Braut von
Messina, 8, 96.

Flint, Robert, The Philosophy of History (noticed),

8, 287; Thei.sm, 13, 822 (notice by R. A. Hol-
land); Auti-theistic Theories (noticed by
same), 13, 425.

Force, World as the. John Watson, 12, 113.

Fraser, A. C, His edition of Berkeley (Review),
by J. H. Stirling, 7, Jan., 1.

Fredericks, F., On Berkeley's Idealism, 6, 189.

Friese, Philip C., A Fragment of the Semitic
Philosophy, 12, 332.

Frohsohiimmer, J., Die Phantasie als Grundprin-
cip des Weltprocesses (noticed). 12. 221 ; Die
Phantasie als Grundprincip des Weltprocesses
(Analysis of), 13, 825 ; LTeber die Bedeutung
der Einbildungskraftin der Philosophic Kant's
und Spinoza's (noticed), 13, 480.

Frothingham. Octavius Brooks. Theodore Parker;
a Biography (noticed), g, 386; Transcendental-
ism in New England (noticed), 10, 881.

Gariigucs, Gertrude, Coleridge's Ancient Mariner,
14, 327 ; Raphael's School of Athens. 13, 406.
Gedanke, Der, Contents of Volume 7, 5, 287.
Genesis, A. B. Alcott, i, 165.

Index.

437

Gibson, J. Burns, Notice of Sully's Illusions, 15,

825.
Gill, Win. I , Analytical Processes (noticed), 11,

111.
Giornale del Museo D'Istruzione e di Educazione.

Collegio Romano (noticed), 10, 222.
Goeschel, C. F., Immortality of the Soul (tr. byjT.

R. Vickroy), 11. 65. 177, 372.
Goethe, J. W. von. Theory of Colors Xby W. T.
Harris), i, 63.
" Faust, Letters on, by II. C. Brockmeyer, i,
178; 2,114; Rosenkranz on (tr.), Anna C.
Brackett, 9, 4S, 225, 401.
" Faust, Second Part of, K. Rosenkranz (tr.),
Anna C. Brackett, 11, 113; tr. by D. J.
Snider, i, 65.
" Faust and Margaret, Karl Rosenkranz, 10, 37.
" Social Romances, Rosenkranz on (tr.), T.
Davidson, 2, 120, 215 ; tr. by D. J. Snider,
4. 26S.
" Wllhelm Meister (tr.), Thos. Davidson, 4, 145.
" Story of the Snake, Rosenkranz (tr.), Anna

C. "Brackett, 5, 219.
" Essay on Da Vinci's Last Supper, i, 243.
" Essay on the Laokoon (tr.), 2, 208.
" And German Fiction, F. G. Fairfield, 9, 303.
" Song of the Spirit Over the Water, F. R.
Marvin, 10, 215.
Government, Science In, W. H. Kimball, 10, 290.
Grammar of Dionysius Thrax (tr.), Thos. David-
son, 8, 326.
Grand Man, The, "W. H. Kimball, 8, 73.
Gray, Theron (see W. H. Kimball).
Greene, W. B.,The Blazing Star (noticed), 7, Apr.,

95.
Griggs, S. C. & Co., Gennan Philosophical Class-
ics (noticed), 15, -323.
Grimm, Hermann, The Venus of Milo, 5, 78 ; On
Raphael and Michael Angelo, 13, 51,289; 14,
169, 305.
Gryzanowski, E., On Environment ts. Self-deter-
mination, 15, 90.
Guernsey, R. S , Municipal Law (noticed), 12, 108.
Gulliver, Julia H., The Psychology of Dreams, 14,
204.

Haanel, H., Herbart's Rational Psychology (tr.),
8, 261 ; Herbart's Ideas on Education, 10, 166 ;
Application of Mathematics in Psychology,
J. F. Herbart (tr.), 11, 251.

Hagenbach, K. R., German Rationalism (tr.), by
W\ L. Gage and J. H. W. Stuckenberg (no-
ticed), 9, 221.

Hall, G. Stanley, Hegel as National Philosopher of
Germany, by Karl Rosenkranz (tr.) : («), Ro-
senkranz on Hegel's Phenomenology, 6, 53;
(6) Rosenkranz on Hegel's Logic, 6, 97 ; (c)
Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 6, 258 ; (rf) He-
gel's Philosophy of History, 6,340; \e) He-
gel's Psychology, 7, Jan., 17; (/) Hegel's Jis-
thetics, 7, July, 44 ; (cj) Hegel's Philosophy of
Religion, 7, Oct., 57; (K) Hegel's History of
Philosophy, 8, 1 ; (i) Hegel and his Contem-
poraries, "11, 399; Notes on Hegel and his
Critics, 12, 93 ; Ludwig Weis, Anti-Mateiial-
ism, 6, 216.

Halsted, George Bruce, Boole's Logical Method,

12, 81 ; Statement and Reduction of Syllogism,
12, 418; Algorithmic Division in Logic, 13, 107.

Hamilton College, Method of Instruction in Phi-
losophv in, 11, 331.

Hamilton, Sir William, 4, 279 (W. T. Harris).

Hammond, George Nevison, A Logic of the Im-
agination, II, 413.

Harms, Friedrich, On Schopenhauer's Philosophy,
9, 113; On the Forms of Ethical Systems (tr,),

IS. '201 •
Harris, Mary J. (tr.), Contents of La Filosofla
dclle Scuole Italiane, 10, 102, 335, 439; 11, 446;

13, 442.

Harris, William T. (Editor), To the Reader, i, 1 ;
The Speculative, i, 2; Herbert Spencer, i, 6;
Raphael's Transfiguration, i, 53 ; Goethe's
Theory of Colors, i. 63; Introduction to Phi-
losophy, I, 57, 114, 187. 230; 2, 51, 176: Music
as a Form of Art, i, 12U ; The Alchemists, i,
126; Janet and Hegel, i, 2.5U; On Style and
Originality, 1, 127 ; Statement of the Problem,

2, 1; NcpminaUsm rs. Realism, 2, 'j7 ; Analysis
of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, 2, 99,
181; What is Meant by Determined, 2, 190;
Intuition vs. Contemplation, 2, 191 ; Notice of
A. B, Alcotfs Tablets, 2, 192 ; Commentary
on the Contents of Volume II, in the Preface
— Feehng. Thought, Phantasy, Rehgion, Scep-
ticism ; Michael Angelo's Last (Judgment, 3,
73; A National Institute, 3, 93; Outlines of
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (tr.), 3, 166;
Elementary School Education, 3, 181 : Outlines
of Hegel's Logic (tr.), 3, 257 ; The True First
Principle, 3, 287; Hegel's First Principle (tr.),

3, 344; Preface to Volume III— On Induc-
tion, Deduction, Dialectic ; Hegel's Science of
Rights, Morals, and Religion (tr.), 4, 38, 155;
Freedom of the Will, 4, 94 ; Immortahty of
the Soul, 4, 97; Book Classification, 4, 114;
Philosophemes, 4, 153 ; Hegel on the Philoso-
phy of Plato (tr.). 4, 225, 320 ; Contributions
to Philosophy, 4, 279 ; The Concrete and Ab-
stract, 5, 1 ; Hegel on the Philosophy of Aris-
totle (tr,l, 5, 61, ISO, 261 ; Speculative Philoso-
phy in Italj', 5, 94; Philosophy of Nature, 5,
274 ; Philosophy in Europe, 5, 283, 374 ; Pref-
ace to Volume V— On Aristotle; Metaphysical
Calculus, 6, 1 ; Is Positive Science Nominal-
ism or Realism ? 6, 193 ; Do the Correlation-
ists believe in Self-movement ? 6, 289 ; Notice
of A, B, Alcott's Concord Days, 6, 376 ; No-
tice of L. P. Hickok's Creator and Creation,

6, 383 ; Notice of Dr. Porter's Sciences of
Nature, etc., 6, 294 ; Notice of Dr, C, A.
Werther's works, 6, 189 ; Notice of Die Neue
Zeit, 7, Jan., 93; Notice of Johnson's Lucre-
tius, 7, Apr., 94; The Proof of Immortality,

7, July, 92 ; Reflection as the Basis of Logical
Knowing, 7, Oct., 87 ; On Castelar and Hegel,

7. Oct., 88; On J. B. Stallo's Primary Con-
cepts of Modern Physical Science, 7, Oct., 90 ;
Notice of Ulrici's Praktischen Philosophic,
and the True Classification of the American
Republic in the Philosophy of Right, 7, Oct.,
90; Hegel's Philosophic Method, 8, 35; Notice
of Morris's Translation of Ueberweg, 2d vol.,

8, 94; Notice of Bartol's Rising Faith. 8. 96;
Notice of Hill's Liberty and Law — Discussion
of the Function of Nurture in the Stiite, and
the Nature of Paper Money, 8, 186; Notice of
Vera on Strauss, 8, 192 ; Discussion of the
Freedom of the Will, 8, 281; On Tyndall's
Address, Spencer's First Principles, Freedom
of Thinking, etc., 8, 372; On the Immortality
of the Historic Individual, 8, 373 ; Trendelen-
burg and Hegel, 9, 70 ; Notice of Mrs. Dog-
gett's Translation of Blanc's Grammar of
Painting and Engraving, 9, 107; The World
the Object of God's Consciousness, 9, 106;
Notice of Krauth's Berkeley, 9, lOi ; Thomas
Aquinas, 9, 327; PoUsh Aspiration, its Phi-
losophy, 9, 335; Defence of Hegel against the
Charge of Pantheism as made in Hickok's
Logic of Reason, 9, 328 ; Causality rersus
Freedom, 9, 440 ; Dr. Hickok's Definition of
Transcendental Logic, and a Statement of the
Contents of Hegel's Logic, 10, 97: Relation of
Reliaion to Art, 10, 204 ; Notice of A. B.
Blackwell's Physical Basis of Immortality, 10,
218; The History of Philosophy in Outline.
10, '225; Notice of Dr. Brinton's Religious
Sentiment, 10, 324 ; Notice of O. B. Frothing-
ham's Transcendentalism in New England,

438

Index.

10, 831; On the Dialectic, ii, 220; Michael
Anpelo's Kates, ii, '2()5; Notice of Alcotfs
Table Talk (On Methods of l.itei-.iiy < riti-
cisni). II, •«'- ; Notice of J. H. Stirliiitr's Burns
In Drama, ij, 4.S7; Notice iif Snider's System
of Shakcsi)e.nre's Dramas, ii. 441 ; Notice of
Mill's Buddhism— a Comiiarison of Cliristinn-
ity with Buddhism, ii, 4,'.'; The Multiplicity
of Conscious Beings, 12, *^.'>; Correlation of
Korci-s presupposes Conscious Beinjis, 11,
4S8 ; Notice of Bascom's I'hilosopliy of Ke-
lijrion, 12. 441 ; Science of Kducation — .\nily-
Bis of Pedafroyics, 13, '.05 ; 15, 52 ; Koreknowl-
edpe and i-reedcui, 13, 8!4; Notice of Flint's
Antitheistic 'I henries, the Dialectic Mothod
ot Hej.'el Hetrogrcssive (Three Kinds of Ne-
cessity), 13, -J'iO ; Outlines of Kducational
Psychoiojry, 14, 'i'i.'j; Agnosticism. Thouf^hts
on" the Basis of, 15, 118; (tr.) K. Harms on
Ktliical Systems, 15, '2(11 ; t)n the Philosophy
of Reliu'io'n, 15. jOT ; Notice of Cand's Philos-
ophy of Keligion, 15. 'iiti; Notice of Mulford's
KepuWic of Uod, 15. "218 ; Kant and Hegel in
the History of Philosophy, 15. '241 ; Kant's
EefutJitioii'of the Outological Proof of God,
15. 404.

Tlartmann, Edward von, Problems of Philosophy
at the Present Time (tr.), 3, 872 ; Phi'osophy
of the Unconscious, reviewed by Ernst Kapp,
4. S4 ; Philosophic des Unbewussten (noticed),

4, S4; The Dialectic Method (tr.), F. Louis
Soldan, 6. 15!( ; Hartmaun on the Dialectic,
Keview of, by Michelet (tr.), K. Louis Soldan,

5, 819 ; E. von Hartmann and t'. L. Michelet,

6, ISl ; Die Se bstzersetzung des Christen-
thums (noticed), 8, 8S0; Shakespeare's Romeo
and Juliet, xo, '220: Zur Reform des Iloeheren
Schiilwesens. ic, "221 ; Von Hartmann and
Schopenhauer (by W. R. Morse), ir, 152; On
the True and False in Darwinism (tr.), 11. L
D"Arcy. 11, '244, 3..2; 12, 18S; 13. 18j; Aphor-
isms concerning the Drama. Explanations of
the Metaphy.'^ics of the Unconscious, Von
Kir"hmann"s Erkenntnisstheorelisi her Eeal-
ismus. and the Critical Foun'latinn of Tran-
scendental Realism (noticed by A. E. Kroeger),

11. 44C-448.

Haskell, Benjamin, Is Inorganic Matter Dynam-
ical? 8. 2S2; Mind and Force, 9, 217; 'I he
Definition of Life, g, 218 ; Mind and Organism,
9, 32G.

Hazard, Rowland G., Letters on Causation and
Freedom in Willing, addressed to John Stuart
Mill (noticed), 4, 94; Zwei Briefen ueber Ve-
rursachung und Freiheit im Wollen, etc., 12,
110.

Hebberd. S. S., OrientaUsm of Plato, 11, 122.

Hedonism and Utilitarianism, John Watson, 10,
271.

Hedge. F. II., Leibnitz's Monadology (tr.), i, 129 ;
Notice ot his Labors. 11, 107.

Hegel, Georg W. F., ^Esthetics, Benard's Essay
on (tr.j. J. A. Martling, i, 30, ',12, l(i9. 221 ; 2,
3.t, l.=>7; 3. 31. 147, 23], 317; Phenomenology
of Spirit (tr. by H. C. Brockmeyer). 2. 04, 163,
229; Phenomenology of Spirit, Analysis of,
W. T. Harris. 2. 9!», Ibl; Phenomenology of
Spirit, Outlines of (tr.), W. T. Harris, 3, l6(5;
Logic. Outhnes of (tr.), W. T. Harris. 3. 257;
Hegel's First Principle (tr.), W. T. Harris, 3,
344 ; Scien<;e of Rights, Morals, and Religion
(tr), W. I' Harris. 4, 3>, 155; On the Philoso-
phy of Plato, 4. 225, 320; llegel, Analysis of,
Article on, by Cabot. A. C. Brackett, 5, 83 ; On
the i'hilosophy of Aristotle (tr. by W. T. Har-
ris). 5. (51. IsO, 251; Encyclopadia, Introdue-
lion to, Rosenkranz (tr.), T. Davidson, 5. 234;
Trendelenburg on Hegel's System (tr.), T.
David.son. 5. 849; 6, S'2, 163, 850; Hegel's
Philosophy of Art— Chivalry (tr.), Sue A.

Longwoll, 5, 808; 6, 125. 252; 7, Jan., 88
Hegel's Logic, Rosenkranz on (tr.), G. S. Hall,
6,97; Hegel's Phenomenology, Rosenkranz
on (tr.), G. S. Hall. 6, 58; Hegel's Philosophy •
of Right, Rosenkranz on (tr.*, G. S. Hall, 6,
2r8; llegel's Philosophy of Historv, Rosen-
kranz on (tr ), G. S. Hall, 6, 341)"; HegePs
Psychology, Rosenkranz on (tr.), G. S. llall,
7, Jan., 17 ; Hegel's yEsthctics, Rosenkranz on
(tr), 7, July. 44; Hegel's Philo.-ophy of Re-
ligion. Rosenkranz on (tr.), G. S. Hall", % Oct.,
57; Hegel's History of Philosophy, Rosen-
kranz (tr.), G. S. Hall, 8,1; Hegel, his Logic
translated by Wallace (noticed), 8, 191 ; He-el
and his Contemporaries, K. Rosenkranz (tr.).
G. S. Hall, II, 899; Hegel, his Philosophic
Method, by W. T. Harris, 8, 8:1; Hegel. De-
fence against, Charge of Pantheism by W. T.
Harris, 9, 82S; Symbolic Art (tr.), W. M.
Bryant, 11, 337: 12, 18; Classic Art (tr.), W.
M. Bryant, 12, 14% 277; Romantic An (tr.),
W. M'. Bryant, 12, 408; 13, 118, 244, 3.31;
J.acob Boehme (tr ), Edwin D. Mead, 13, 179,
269; On the Absolute Religion (tr.), F. Louis
Soldan, 15, 9; 15, 132, 395; On Hegel and
Kant in the History of Philosophy, 15. 241.

IleUenbach, Lazar B., 1. Vorurtheile der Mensch-
hcit; II. Philosophic des Gesunden Men-
schenverstandes; III. Der Individualismus im
Lichto der Biologic und Philosophie der Gc-
genvvart (noticed), 13, 429.

Henderson, Charles E., Causahty m. Freedom, g,
410.

Henkle, W. D., Eemarkable Cases of Memory,

5,6-

Henry, Francis A., Cousin s Doctrine of the Ab-
solute. 2. 82; Finite and the Infinite, 4, 193,
289; Spiritual Principle in Morals, 5, 18;
Christianity and the Clearing Up, 12, 171,
337.

Herbart's Rational Ps3-cho!ogy (tr), H. Haanel, 8,
261; Ideas on Education" (tr.), Hugo Haanel,
10, 166; Mathematics in Psychology (tr.), 11,
251.

Herder. J. G., Book of Job considered as a Work
of Art, 4, 284.

Hickok, Laurens P., Creator and Creation. 6, 888 ;
The Logic of Reason, 9, 222; Pantheism vs.
the Logic of Keason, 9, 430 ; his Definition
of Transcendental Logic discussed by W. T.
llarris, 10, 97 ; Two Kinds of Dialectic, 10,
158.

Hill, Britton A., Absolute Money, 9, 442 ; Liberty
and Law under Federative Government, 8,
186.

Hitchcock. Ethan A., Bemnrks on Alchemy and
the Alchemists (noticed), i, 126; Notes on the
Vita Nuova, and Minor Poems of Dante (no-
ticed), 2, 64.

Hodgson, Shadworth H., Letter from and Quota-
tion from his work on Reflection, 15. 320.

Hoffmann, Franz, Letter on the Philosophy of
Baader, i, 190; On Theism and Pantheism,
5, 86; Letter from. 6. 176; Die Philosophie
des Bewusstseins in Bezug auf das Boese und
das Uebel, von Dr. Bicking, 9, 11:6 ; Philoso-
phische Schriften, Volume 0, 13, 427; Fhiio-
sophische Schriften, Vierter Band, 15, 103.

Holland Henry W.. Notice of Jevons' Principles
of Science, 13. 4'.'2.

Holland, R. A., Notice of Vera's translation of
Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, 12, 221 ; No-
ticj of Flint's Theism, 13, 822; Notice of
Physicus on Theism, 13. 823.

Holmes, N. L., Letter on the Dialectic, 11, 214.

Holmes, Nathaniel, The Geological and Geograph-
ical Distribution of the Human Eace (noticed),
13, 429.

Howison, George H., The Mutual Relations of the
Departments of Mathematics, 5, 144 ; Philos-

Index.

439

ophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-

nolof,'}', II. 1C3.
Howe. .Tulia Ward, Kantian Philosophy, The Ee-

sults of the, 15, 'iT4.
Hualffreu, Emanuel, His Theocosmic System, 8,

285 ; His System of Theosophy, 12, 'J'2.

Ideal and Real, Lotze on the (tr.), Max Eberhardt,

6.4.
Idea within Itself and -vvithout Itself, W. H. Kim-
ball, q. 13S.
Immortality of the Soul, 10, 218; 8, 8T8; 7. July

li); 5. 274; 4, ii7; i. 61.
Immortalit}', Conditions of Aceordingr to Aristotle,

Thomas Davidson, 8, 143
Immortality of the Soul, H. K. Jones, 9, 27.
Incapaci ies. Some Consequences of Four, C. S.

i'eirce, 2, 140,
Induciion. Ba^is of, J. Lachelier (tr), Sarah A.

Dorsey. 10, 307. 3:!7 ; 11, 1.
Intuition is. Contemplation, W. T. Harris, 2, 191.
Invitation to Insiitutions to report their course of

study in Philosophy, 11, 101.
Iowa Colle;re, Philosoiihv at, 11, 216.
Itiiliane, and Italian Philosophy, see La Filosofla

delle Scuole Italiane.

Jacobi and the Philosophy of Faith, Eobert H.
Worthinjiton, 12, 3,)3.

James, William, Spencer's Definition of Mind, 12,
1; Brute and Human Intellect, 12, 236; Spa-
tial Quale, 13, 04 ; On Great Men and Great
Thouirhts i-*. Knvironment. 15, t8.

Janet and Hefiei, W. T. Harris, i. 2"l).

Jardine, Robert, The Elements of the Psychology
of Co^'nitioD (noticed), 9. 22i.

Jevoiis, W. Stanley, The rrincir>Ies of Science (no-
liced), 8, 2S0; (second notice by H. W. Hol-
land), 13, -122.

Job, Book of. Considered as a Work of Art, by J.
G. Herder (tr.) j, 2b4.

Johns Hopkins University. Phibsophy at. 13. 398.

Johnson, (.Charles Y.. Lucretius on the Nature of
Things (tr), with notfs (noticed). 7, A^r., i,'4.

Jones. H. K.. On the Inmiortality of the Soul, g,
27; Shakespeare's Tempest, g, 293 ; Conversa-
tion on Per;on;iUty and Individuality, 9, 43S;
Idea of the Venus, 10, 4s; Philosophic Out-
hnes, Id, 399.

Jos6fe, C, Thoughts on Philosophy and its Meth-
ods (tr.), from Schopenhauer. 5, 193 ; Thoughts
on the Logic and Dialectic (tr.), from Schop-
enhauer, 5, 3()T; Schopenhauer on the Intel-
lect, 8, 243, 816.

Journal of Psychological Medicine, The (see Medi-
cine).

Jowett, B., The Dialogues of Plato (noticed), 6, 187.

Kant, Immanuel, His System of Transcendental-
ism, \. E. Kroeger, 3, 133, 241.

" Ethics, James Edmunds, 5, 27, 108, 289; 8,
3)0; 10, 416; Clavis to an Index of Kant's
Ethics, by James Edmunds (noticed), 13,
42S.

" Critic of Pure Reason, Interpretation of,
Simon S. Laurie 6, 2i2; 8, 30.'.

" Concerning a Pretended Right to Lie from
Motives of Humanity, 7, Apr., 14,

" Categories, Kevisal of, S. P. Andrews, 8, 265.

" Anthropology (tr.), 9, 16, 23i». 406; 11, 310,
:-;53; 10, 319; 13. 281 ; 14, 154; 15, 62.

" Reply to Hume. .lohn Watson. 10, U3 ;

" and Fichte (K. C. Ware), 11, U.j.

" Transcendental iEstlietic, David Warren
Fhipps. II, 299.

" In Relation to Schopenhauer (J. H. Stirling),

i3i 1-
" Critic of Pure Reason, Criticised and Ex-
plained by Himself (tr.), A. E. Kroeger,
14> 1-

I Kant, Deduction of the Categories, with Special Re-
lation to the Views of Dr. Stirhng, Edward
Caird, 14, 110.
" Main 1 rinciples. Criticism of, J. H. Stirling,

14. 257, 853.
" Principles of Judgment, John Watson, 14,

37t!.
" Kritik, The Centennial of (Dr. J. W. Mears

on). 15, !I2.
" Critique of Pnre Reason and Chronology of

Kant's Writings. 15, i)5.
" Centennial. The. John W. Mears. 15, 255.
" And Hegel in the History of Philosophy, W.

T. Harris, 15,241.
" Transcendental Deduction of Categories,

George Morris, 15, 25;^.
" Kritik. Centennial at Saratoga, 15, 293.
" Ihilosophy, '1 he Results ot the, Julia Ward

Howe. 15, 274.
" Ccn:ennial at Conord. 15, 303.
" Philosophy in its Relations to Realism and

Sensationalism, by John Watson. 15, :'37.
" Relation to Modern Philosophic Progress, by

Josiah Royce. 15. 360.
" Antinomies in the Light of Modern Science,

by Lester F. Word, 15, 381.
" Refutation of Anselm's Pro.if of God. by W.
T. Harris, 15. 404.
Kapila, Sankhya Karika (reprinted from Cole-

brooke), 2, 225.
Kapp. Ernst, Review of Hartmann's Philosophy

of the Unconscious, 4, 81.
Kennedy. W. S.. Ahnung, 14. 250.
Kernot, Henry, Bibliotueca Diabolica (noticed), 8,

3S0.
Kerr, J. M., An Essay on Science and Theology

(noticed), 12, 10^.
Kidney, John Steint'ort, Philosophy at Seabury
Divinity School. 11. 21C; The Beautiful and
the Sublime (noticed). 15, -^35.
Kimbnil, W. H. (Theron Gray), The Grand Man,

8, 73 ; Idea within Itself and without Itself. 9,
135; Exposition of the Human Form in its
Three Degrees. 10, 95; Science in Govern-
ment. 10, 2^0; What is Truth? 11, 101 ; The
Nation and the Commune, 12. 44 ; Laws of
Cc-eation — Ultimate Science, 14. 219.

King, Thomas D., Bacon fs. Shakespeare (no-
ticed 1. 15. II 2.

Kipp. Mary Christine, An Old Picture, 10. 101.

Kiichmann, J. II, von, Uebcr das Princip des
Realismus (notice by A. E. Kroeger). 10, 222 ;
Hume's Inquiry, Tr. into German (noticed),
II. 218.

Ktause's Philosophy (noticed by A. E. Kroeger),

9, 103.

Krauth, Charles P., Berkeley's Treatise concern-
ing the Principles of Human Knowledge, with
Prolegomena and Notes. 9, 108 ; Tr. of Ulrici's
Stiauss as a Fhilos^ijhical Thinker, 0, 111 ; A
Vocabulary of the Philosophical Sciences, 12,
436.

Kroeger, A. E , Fiohte's Introduction to the Sci-
ence of Knowie Ige (tr.), i, 23; Fichte's Criti-
cism of Philoscphicul Systems, i, lO, 137;
Fichte's Sun-Clear Statement, 2, 3. (i.5, 129;
New E.xposition of the S'-ience of Knowledge,
by Fichte (tr.), 3. 1. 97. 193, 2b9; Kant's Sys-
tem of I'ranscenJentalism, 3, 133. 24 i ; Hook
of Job Considered as a Work of Art (tr.i. 4,
2?4 ; Cherublnic Wanderer (tr.), 4, 31 ; Settle-
ment for all Philosophical Disputes, 4, 111 ; A.
B. Marx on Beethoven's F Minor Sonata (tr.),

4, 274 ; Fichte's Facts of Consciousness (tr ),

5. 5:^, i3), 'r26, 338; 6. 42, 120, 332; 7, Jan.,
30; Leibnir-z on the Doctrine of a Universal
Spirit (tr.). 5. 118; New Svstem of Nature, by
Leibnitz (tr.) 5.209; Notice of H. K. Hugo
DelflTs Works. 6. 93; Difference between the
Dialectic and Synthetic Methods, 6, 184 ; No-

440

Index,

tico of Dolffs Welt iind Weltzoiten, 7, Jan. I
8S; and of Die None Zeit, 7, Jan , ilO; C'on-
cernini: 11 I'rcttnileil Hiirlit to Lie from Mo-
tives of llunmnity (tr \ from Kant, 7, Ai)r., i
14; Letter on the Proofs of Immortality, 7,
July, 90; Leibnitz. Abridfiment of Ilia The- |
odiey (tr.K 7. Oct., 811; Notiee ot Castolar's Ko-
pnblicnn >loveinent in I'.uroiie, 7, Oct., SS;
Can Matter I'rodueo MlMd? 8, '2S5; Immor-
tality. 8, ;->T4; Antliro;.ol ijrv bv Immanuel \
Kant (tr.\ 9, Iti, '^8.1, 400; io, «I9; n, 310,
8S3; 13, '-;S1 ; 14, l.'i4; 15, <i'2 ; Krause's Phi-
losophy, 9. 10:1; Spinoza, 9, 'JtiS; What is
Truth"? 9, 437; Notices ot von Hartmann's
Writintrs. 10, 2-0, '221; Notice of von Hart-
mann's Ajihorisms Concerning the Drama,
etc.. II, 41(); Book Notices, 12. 108-111; Crit-
ique of Adolf Lasson on Teleology, 12, 112;
Notices of Books. 12. 217--'2I ; Fichte's Criti-
cism of Sehelling ttr ), 12. lliO, SKi; 13, 225;
Obituary of 1. H. von Kichte, 13, 408 ; Kant's
Critic of Pure Rea.<ion, Criticised and Ex-
plained by Himself (tr.), 14, 1.
Kvm, A. L., Metaphysiscbe Untersuchungen (no-
ticed), II, 219.

Lach'^licr, J., The Basis of Induction (tr.), S. A.
Dorsey, 10, 307. y37 ; 11, 1.

Lackland, C. E., Tr. from Kueckert, 9, 828; Bay-
ard Taylor's Invocation of Goethe (tr.), 15,
98.

La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane, Contents of vol-
umes 1 and 2, 5. 94; volumes 3 and 4, 6, 1S9;
contents of volumes 4, .% 0. 7, 8 (tr,), 10, 102 ;
volumes 9 and 10, contents translated, 10, 335;
volume 11, 10, 489; contents of volumes 12,
13, 14, II, 446; contents of volumes 15, 16, 17,
and IS, 13. 442 ; volume 23, 15. 48.'j.

Landor. Walter Savage, Imaginary Conversations,
First and I'hird Series (noticed), 13, 223.

Laokoon, Goethe's Essav on the (tr. ), K. S. Mor-
gan, 2, 2oS ; Winckelmann's Essay on the,
2. 218.

La Sapienza Rivista di Filosofi.i, 15. 432.

La Science Pohtique (Par Einile Acollat), contents
tr., 14. 142.

Laurie, Simon S., Kant's Critic of Pure Reason,
Interpretation of, 6, 222 ; 8, 305 ; Inaugural Ad-
dress. 12, 219.

Laws of Creation — Ultimate Science, W. H. Kim-
ball. 14. 219.

Law. Lectures on the Philosophy of, J. H. Stir-
ling. 6, 313: 7. Apr., 20; 7, -hily, 24; 8, 123.

Leibnitz. G. W. von. The Monadologv itr ), by F.
H. Hedge, i, 129 : On the Nature of the Soul,
2, 62 ; On Platonic Enthusiasm, 3, SS; On the
Doctrine of a I'niversal Spirit (tr.), A. E.
Kroeger, 5, IIS; New System of Na-ure (tr.).
A. E. Kroeger, 5. 209; Abridgment of his The-
odicy (tr.), A. E, Kroeger, 7, Oct., cO.

Lessing's Centennial Birtliday, 14, 1:^8.

Lewins. Robert, Life and Mind (noticed). 12, 108.

Ligbtseeker asks Mr. Kroeger If Man is a Finite
Being? 9, 221.

Literary Table, Notice of, 11, 218.

Logic, Grounds ol Validity of the Laws of, C. S.
Peirce, 2. 193.

Logic. Old and New Systems of, F. P. Stearns, 7,
Oct., 42.

Logic, Joseph G. Anderson, 8, 85.

Logic, V\ hat is. Jos. G. Anderson, 9, 417.

Logic, see Boole. Jevons, and Venn.

Longweil, S. A., Hegel's Philosoj)hv of Art, Chiv-
alry (tr ). 5, 36?: 6. 12.^, 252; 7; Jan., 33.

Loos, Alexander (tr.), Ma.t Mueller on Buddhistic
NihiUsm (noticed), g. 104.

Lotze. Hermann. On the Ideal and Real (tr.). Max
Eberhardt, 6, 4.

Luetzow, Carl von. On Wittig's Restoration of the
Venus of Melos (tr.), 5, 231.

McCabe, L. D., The Foreknowledge of God (no-
ticed), 13, ;i33.

Macfarlane, AU-xinder, Piinciples of the Algebra
of Logic (notici^d). 13, 43i).

Magoun, George F., Recent Enghsh Thought in
ICtliics, II, 19S.

Mamiani, (Umiit Ti'renzio, Editor La Filosofia dello
Seuole Italiane, which see.

Mariano, liatfaele. Introduzione alia Filosofia della
Sloria <li \. N'era (noticed 1, 6. 191.

Martliiig, James A., Beiiard's Essay on Hegel's

yKsthetics, I, "'

147, 2,>l, 817,

yKsthetics, i, 86, 92, 169, 221

tt.ssay (

; 2, 39,

157 ; 3, 31,

Martin, Beiij. N., The Natural Theology of the
Doctrine of Forces (noticed), 12, 109.

Marvin, Frederick R., The Philosophy of Spirit-
ualism, etc. (noticed ', 9, 110 ; The Soul, 9, 421 ;
(ioethe's Sontr of the Si)irit over the Water, 10,
215; ]?rabiiKi's Cup. 11, 1(13; Apotheosis, 11,
412 ; Sjiirilual Epigrams from Angelus Sile-
sius, 12, 381.

Marx, A. B.. On Beethoven's Sonata in F Minor,

4, 274, and other works of Beethoven.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Philoso-
phy at. II, li'3.

Materialism, Metaphysics of, D. G. Brinton, i, 176.
Mathematics, The Philosophy of, Rich'd Randolph,

5, S3.

Mathematics, Departments of, Their Mutual Rela-
tions. Geo. H. Howison, 5. 144.

Mathematics, American Journal of (noticed), 12,
448.

Matter, The Idea of (Tyndall's Problem Solved),
K. Th. Bavrhoflfer. 10. 69.

Matter and Method of Thought, Meeds Tuthill, 13,
372.

May, Samuel Joseph. Memoir of (noticed), 8, 879.

Mead, Edwin D.. Hegel on Jacob Boebme (tr.),
13, 179, 269; His Translation of Hegel s His-
tory of Philosophy, etc, 14, 134; On Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason, 15, 95; Notice of
Michelet's Philosophic der Geschichte, 15. 228;
Introduction to Brooke's Faith and Freedom
(noticed), 15, 224.

Mears, J. W.. Ihe ( entcnnial of Kant's Kritik, 15,
92; Kant Centennial, The, 15, 225.

Medicine, The Journal of Psychological (noticed),

6, 1S8.

Memories, A Story of German Love (noticed), 9,

112.
Memory, Remarkable Cases of, W. D. Henkle,

Mendelssohn, E. Sobolewski, 7, Oct.. 51.

Mental Genesis, Theories of, John Weiss, 6, 197.

Merlin's Disciple, D. J. Snider, 9. 429.

Merten, O., Elements de Philosophie Populaire
(noticed), 12, 21!).

Metaphysical Calculus. W. T. Harris, 6, 1,

Method; Hegel's, W. T. Harris, 8, 85.

Method of Tnought. Meeds Tuthill, 14, 18.

Method of Univer.sitr Study, Schelling (tr.), Ella
8. Morgan. 11. 92. 160, 225,363; 12, 206; 13,
190, 310; 14, 145. 343 ; 15, 1, 152.

Michael AuL'elo and Raphael, Hermann Grimm
on (see Grimm); Michael Angelo's Last Judg-
ment, W. T. Harris, 3, 78; Michael Angelo's
Birthday For, T. W. Parsons, 9, 209 ; Michael
Angelo. Poem on the Death of his Father and
Brother, Tr. by Mrs. Cheney, 10, 487 ; Michael
Angelo's Fates. W. T. Harris, 11. 265.

Michelet, C. L.. Review of von Hartmann on the
Dialectic Method, 5, 319 ; Letter from, 6, 181 ;
Die Philosophie der Geschichte (noticed), 15,
223.

Millard, Alice S.. The Venus of Milo, by Her-
mann Grimm (ir), 5, 78.

Miller, John. Metaphysics, or the Science of Per-
Cv^ption (noticed), 10. 110.

Mills, Charles D. B., The Indian Saint, or Buddha
and Buddhism (noticed), 11, 442.

Index.

441

Milton's Lycidas, Notes on, Anna C. Brackett, i,

ST.

Mind, A Quarterly Ke%iew of Psychology and
Philosophy. No. 1 (noticed). lo, 1U7 ; Notice of
volumes 1. 2. and 3, by W. M. Bryant, 13,
43S; contents for Jan. and Apr., ISSl, 15, 431.

Mind, The Idea of. K. Th. Bayrhoffer, 10, 3S2.

Mind, Does it Ever Sleep "? E. M. C'hesley, 11, 72.

Minnesota, Philosophy at the University of, 11,
109.

Mitchell, Ellen M., Dschelaleddin Rumi. 14, 245.

Mocadolosy, Leibnitz's (tr.\ F. H. Hedge. 1. 129.

Morals, Spiritual Principle in the, F. A. Henry, 5,
48.

Morg-an, E. S., Goethe's Essay on the Laokoon
(tr.), 2. 20s ; Winckelmann's Essay on the
Laokoon (tr.), 2, 213: 'Winckelniann"s Descrip-
tion of the Apollo Belvedere (tr.), 3, 94 ; Harms
on Schopenhauer's Philosophy (tr.\ 9. 113;
Method of Universitv Studv. Schellinc (tr.). 11,
92. 161). 225, 3(33 ; i2,"205 ; 13. 190. 310 : 14, 145,
343; IS, 1, 152; On the Relationship of Po-
liteness. -Justice, and Relifirion, 11. 31 S.

Morgan. H. H., The Speculative r.s. The Visionary,
3. 1T5; Foundation of Authority in the State,
7, Jan.. 42 ; Representative Naroes in the His-
tory of English Literature, 9, 444.

Morris, George S , Notes on Trendelenburg and
Vera, 8, 92 ; Final Cause as Principle of Cog-
nition and Principle in Nature ^noticed), 8,
2SS; g, 442; Philosophy of Art, 10, 1 : Notice
of A. G. Pease's Philosophy of Trinitarian
Doctrine, 10, 111 ; Life and Teacbings of Spi-
noza. II, 278 ; Lectures at Johns Hopkins
University, 13, 398 ; Kant's Transcendental
Deductions of Categories, 15, 253 ; German
Philosophical Classics, 15, 823. (See Ueber-
weg- )

Morse, William R., Schopenhauer and von Hart-
mann, 11, 152.

Moses. Bernard. George Stjernh.ielm, 12, 110.

Mueller. F. Ma.x, Lecture on Buddhistic Nihilism,
9. 1114.

Mueller. Mcr'tz, Im Lande der Denker, 7, July, 95.

MuLford, Ehsha, Frederick Denison Maurice
(Seribner's Wonthlv). (noticed), 8, 378; The
Republic of God (noticed), 15, 218.

Music as a Form of Art. W. T. Harris, i. 120.

Music, Dialogue on, E. Sobolewski, i, 224 ; Music,
New School of by the same author, 2, 171.

Aiusic of Color. C. E. Seth Smith. 8, 216.

Music, Lnterpretability of, Lewis J. Block, 9, 422.

Nation and the. Commune, The, W. H. Kimball, i

12.44.
Natural Science In General, Schelling on (tr.), Ella

5. Morgan. 14. 145.

Nature. Philosophy of, W. T. Harris, 5, 274.

Neue Zeit, Die, volume 2 (noticed by A. E. Kroe-
ger and the Editor), 7, Jan., 90; volume 3
(noticed by A. E. Kroeger). 8, 2S5. '

Niobe Group, The, Thomas Davidson. 9, 142.

Nominalism f.«. Realism, W. T. Harris and C. S.
Peirce, 2, 57.

Nominalism or Realism, Which is Positive Sci-
ence '! W. T. Harris, 6, 193.

O Positivlsmo, Kevista de Philosophia, Numbers
1 to 5 (contents translated), 13, 440.

Pantheon, A. B. Alcott. 2, 46.

Parmenides, Fragments of. Thomas Davidson, 4, 1.

Parmenides of Plato, S. II. Emery. Jr.. 6. 279.

Parnassos, The Atlienian Monthly Journal, 15.
431.

Parsons, James, A Series of Essays on Legal Top-
ics. 12, 218.

Parsons, Theophilus, The Finite and the Infinite,

6, 192; Outlines of the Rehgion and Philoso-
phy of Swedenborg, 12, 110.

Parsons, T. W.. Michael Angelo's Birthday, 9, 209;
Turning from Darwin to Thomas Aquinas, g,
327 ; Tr. of Dante's Purgatory (noticed), 12,
4;34.

Parton. James, Life of Thomas Jefferson (noticed),
9. 224.

Paterson. John, Theory and Calculus of Operations
(noticed), 8, 287; Supplement to the Calculus
of 0])eniti(ins (noticeil), 9, 109 ; The Universe
(noticed), 12, 108.

Pease, A. G., Philosophy of Trinitarian Doctrine
(notice by G. S. Morris), 10, 111.

Peck, Joseph E., Soul Problems (noticed), 12,
21s.

Pedagogics as a System, by Karl Rosenkranz (tr.),
Anna C Brackett. 6, 290; 7. Jan.. 49; 7. Apr.,
40 ; 7, July. 1 ; 7, Oct., 1 ; 8, 49 ; Parai hrase
of same, 12. 67, 297; 14, 291 ; 15, 35; Analysis
of same (W. T. Harris). 13. 2t)5; 15, 52.

Peirce, C. S.. Questions Concerning Certain Facul-
ties Claimed for Man, 2, lii3 ; Nominalism
anl Realism, 2, 57; On the Meaning of •' De-
termined." 2, 190; Some Consequences of Four
Incapacities, 2. 140 ; Grounds of the Validity
of the Laws of Logic. 2, IS 3.

Pepper, J. H., Dai-win's Descent of Man, 10, 134.

Periodicals, Philosophical : (1) La Filos"fla delle
Scuole Italiane; (2) Zeitschrift fuer Fhiloso-
phie und Philosophische Kritik (which see);
(8) Der Gedanke (see Gedanke, Der'' ; (4) Phi-
losophische Monatshefte (see the same) ; (5)
Die Neue Zeit (see Neue Zeit); (t) Revue
Philosophique (which see); (7) .Mind (which
see); (8' The Platonist (see Platonist); (9) O
Positivismo (whi<h see); (10) La Sapienza
(which see) ; (11) Parnassos (which seei; (12)
Verhandlungen der Philosophischen Gesell-
schaft zu Berlin (which see); (13) Vierteljahrs-
schrift fuer Wissenschaftliche Philosophie
(which see) ; (14) Rivista di Filosofia Scienti-
flca (which see); (15) La Science Politique
(which see).

Pfleiderer, Otto, Notice of Philosophy of Religion,
12, 334; Religionsphilosophie. 12, 439.

Philology, American Journal of (noticed), 13, 321.

Philosopbemes, W. T. Harris, 4, 153.

Philosophemes, A. Bronson Alcott, 7, Jan., 46; g,
1. 190. 2J5: 15. 84.

Philosophical Disputes, Settlement for all, A. E.
Kroeger. 4, 111.

Philosophical Society of Chicago, 15, 195.

Philosophical Svstems, Fichte"s Criticism of (tr.),
A. E. Kroeger, i, 80, 137.

Philosophic Outlines, H. K. Jones. 14. .999.

Philosophische Monatshefte. contents of volume 1,
5, 28S ; 2, 3, and 4. 5, 374 ; 5, 6, and 7. 7, Jan.,
94; 8, 9, 335; 9 and 10. 9. 412; 11, 10. 106;
12, 12, 111 ; 13. 12, -220; 14, 13. 43!i ; changes
in, 6, 183; contents of Nos. 1 and 2, 1881, 15,
432.

Philcsophv. Introduction to, "W. T. Harris, i, 57,
114, 187, 236; 2, 61. 176.

Philosophy in Outline, The History of, W. T.
Harris, 10, 225.

Philosophy, Problems of, at the Present Time, E.
V. Hartmann. 3. 372.

Phipps. David Warren, Kant's Transcendental
Esthetic, II. 299.

Physicus : A Candid Examination of Theism
Cnotice by R. A. Holland), 13, 323.

Platonic Enthusiasm, Leibnitz on (tr.), T. David-
son, 3, 88.

Plato. Hegel on the Philosophy of (tr.), W. T.
Harris, 4. 225, 320.

Plato, OrientaHsm of, S. S. Hebberd. 11, 122.

Platonist, The, edited by Thomas M. Johnson,
contents noticed, 15, 1 8, 336.

Podbielski, I.. Trentowski's Introduction to the
Logic (tr.). 4, 62.

Polarity in Character, E. Rando'ph, 11, 820, 417.

442

Index.

Porphyry the rhilosopher, Sentences of (tr.'>, T. ]

Davidson. 3, -lli.
PortiM-. Noah. Tho t^i-ioiuws of Nature rcr.iim the

Seienco of Man ' notici-.h, 6, '2'-4; Analysis of

his Hoclrine i>f litial Cause bv M. U. Cohn,

II. ?24.
Prever. W.. On Psydiojjenesis, 15, ITiO (translated

"by Marion Talboti; Corrifri'iula t<), 15. l-!'.*.
Princeton Keview, The, Kotice of, lor IbTS, la,

•''J '
Prindi ie. Ilecrel's First (tr.>. W. T Harris. 3. 844.
Principle. The True First, W. T. Harris, 3, Lh7.
P'obleni. Statement of the, W. 'I'. Harris, 2, 1.
Psveliosrenesis, Dr. Freyer on {tv ), Marion Talbot,

15, i&y.
Psyeholojiv, Application of ilatheinatics in, J. F.

liCrbaVt (tr. I, H. Haanel, 11, 251.
Psychology, Educational, W. T. Harris, 14, 225.

Randolph, Richard. Thilosopny of Mathematics, 5,
S3; Subject and Object, or I'niversal (-"olarity,
8. ".'T; Polarity in Character, 11. ;i'2(l, 417.

Raphaels Transfi'fjuration, W. T. Harris, i. 58;
The Hours translated from Karl Clauss by A.
C. Brackelt. 11, '21ii; The School of Athens
(Certrude tJarrigues's essay), 13, 4u6; The
Sistiue Madonna (I'ieck's remarks), 7, Oct.,
27.

Raphael and Michael Angelo, Hermann Grimm
on (tr.l Ida M. Eliot. 13. ;>1. 2f9; 14, 109. auo.

Relativity of Knowledge. John Watson, 11, li).

Relij^ion'to Art, The Relation of, W. T. Harris, 10,

•JOi.

Relipion. The Philosophy of, by W. T. Harris, 15,
2..7.

Rehgicn. The Absolute, Hegel on, translated by F.
L. Soldan. 15, 9, i32, S'.Id.

Renton, Wil.iam, 'Ihe Logic of Style (noticed), g.
■i.y.

Revue PhilosopLique, de la France ct de Tetranprer
(noticed), A'o. 1, 10, 108 : volumes 1-7, 13, 44j;
volume I-', No. 1, 15. 432.

Ribol. Th., La Psychologic Allemande Contempo-
raine noticed by J. Watson), lij, 140.

Ribot, Th., Editor of the Revue rhilosophique,
10. 11 9.

Robertson, George Croom, Editor of Mind, lo,
1 7.

Eosenkranz. JohannKarl Fricdri h On theSe''ond
PartcftJcethe's Faust, i. (35; Difference of Bal-
der (rom Hegel, 2, 5j; On Goethe's Social Ro-
mances, ;, 120, 215; On Goethe's Wilhelm
Meister,4. 14.">; Composition ol Goethe's i^ociai
liomances, 4, '. 6: ; Goethe's Story ol the Snake,
5, 219; Introduction to Hegel's Encyclopaedia,
f, 2;-4 ; 1 edagogics as a t-ysiem iiranslated by
Anna C. llr.ackett). 6, 29(1; 7. 'an.. 49, Apr.,
4 ', .luly, 1. Oct., 1 ; 8,49 ; Paraphrase of same,
12, 07, 2,7: lij, 291 : 15, 35; Analysis, 13,2 5;
15, 5- ; Hegel as German N:itional Philoso-
pber (translated by G. S. Hall): (a) Hegel's
) sychology (tr.i, 7, Jan., 17; (I'/l Hegel's I'hi-
lotoi)hy of Religion, 7, Oct.. 57; (c) Hegel's
Esthetics, 7, July, 44; ((')0n Hegel's Phe-
nomenology, 6, i'i: (e) On Hegel's Logic, 6,
97; (,j ) On Hegel's Phi osophy of Right, 6,
'ibi: (' ) On Hegel's Philosophy of History, 6,
340; t/i) On Hegel's [H story of Phi,o.<cphy, 8,
1 : {,!) Hegel and his Contemporaries, 11. 399 ;
L'fer from, 6, i77; Von Magdeburg bis Koe-
n ijEberg 1 noticed). 8, 11/2; Goethe's Faust, g,
4~, 225. -.01; ummary of Logic, translated
by T. Davidson, c, 9.^ ; Faust and Maigaret,
10. -7 ; Second J art of Goethe's Faust, 11, Hi- ;
Obiiu: ry, 13, 32o.
Eoyce Josiah. Scniller" s Ethical Studies. 12, 373 ;
" Kant's Relation to Modern Philosophic Prog-
ress, 15. i.60.
Eueckert. I'r., Recognition, translated by C. E.
Lacklund, 5, 32S.

Saint Louis, Missouri, Philosophy in, 11, 109.

Sankhva Karika, Kapila (reprinted from Colo-
brook e\ 2. 225.

Science of Knowledge, F"ichte"s Introduction to ■
the (tr ), A. E. Kioeger, i, 23 ; New Exposi-
tion of, 3. 1, 97. 193, 2s9.

Science, Unitleation of, Alfred .Arn Id. 15. 121.

Schcliing, V. W. J. von. Introduction lo hbalism,
(tr.), T. Davidson, i. 15.1; Inticduetion to the
Philo.sophy of Nature (tr.), T. 1 avidson, i,
19: ; I radical Etiects of Modern Philcsophy,
3, 19(1; Fichte's Criticism of Schelling (tr.). A,
E. Kroeger. 12, Kid. 3i(i; 13, 225; On the
• Method ot University Study : Ui) '1 he Abso-
lute Idea of S<icnce. II, 92; (/O On the Scien-
tiflc and Ethical Fimcticns of Universities, 11,
l(iO: (< ) On the First Presuppositions of a
Vniversity Coi.rse of Study. 11, IVu; ((/) On
the St.idy of the Pure Sciences of Reason —
Mathematics and Hiilosoiihy in general, ii,
225 : (( ) The Ordinary Objections to the Study
of Philosophy, 11, 'zbl : (/ ) On the Study of
Philosoiihy in particular, 11, 237; (,(/) On
Eou;e of the Departments which are to be dis-
criniinated frcm Pliilo?ophy. parliculaily the
Positive Sciences, 11. ::(i3; (A) The Hittorical
Construction of Christianity. 12, 105 ; (i)On
the Study of Theology, is^ 11,0; (,?) On the
Study of "History and Jiirisprodence, 13, 310;
(k) On Natural Science in general, 14, 1-15; (I)
On the Study of 1 hysics and < 'hemistry, 14,
84'J; (ill) (in Medicine and the Theory of Or-
ganic Nature, 15, I ; (?(i On the Science of the
Fine Arts, 15. 11:2. ^F>oiu {a) to (./() tr. by
Mrs. i:ila S. Morgan.)
j Schiller's Ethical Studies, Josiah Royce, 12. 873.

School Education, Elementary, W. T. Harris, 3,
181

Schopenhauer, Arthur, his Doctrine of the Will
(tr). C. L. ieinays, i, 2:'2 ; his Dialogue on
Immortality itr), C. L. Rernays. i. 61;
Thoughts on Philosophy and its Methods. 5,
113 : On T^ogic and Dialectic. 5, 807 ; On the In-
tellect (tr.), Charles Josjfc, 8, 2-)3, 310; P.
Harms on hie Philosophy (tr.). Ella S. Mor-
gan, g, li3; Schopenhauer and von Hart-
mann^ William R. .Niorse, 11, 152; in Relation
to Kant, J. Hutchison Stiriirg, 13, 1 , his Se-
lect Essays, translated by C. A. P. Daehsel
and Garritt Droppers, 15. 3'3.

Schumann, Robert E. Soboleivski, 8, 254.

Scuole Italiane. (See La Filosofla delle Scuole. etc.)

Seabury Divinity School, Philosophy at, by J. S.
Kidney.

Seaman, E'zra C, Views of Nature and of the Ele-
ments (noticed), 12, 109.

Shakespeare, A 1 bought on, Anna C. Brackett, i,
2-io.

Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice, D. J. Snider,
6. 130, 361 ; Tragedv of Julius Caesar, D. J.
Snider, 6. 2:W : Hsrnlet, D. J. Snider, 7, Jan.,
71; 7, Apr., (17; 7, July, 78; As You Like
It, D. J. Snider, 7, Oct., 74; Midsummer
Night's Dream, U. J. Snider, 8, ]r5; Tempest,
D. J. Snider. 8, 193 ; Winter's 'lale, D. J. Sni-
der, 9. 80; Cymbsline, D. J. Snider, 9, 172;
'tempest, H. K. Jones, 9, 293; Measure for
Measure, D. J Snider, 9, 312; Antony and
Cleoijatra, D. J. Snider, '10, 52; Trodus and
Cressida, D J. Snider, ic, £95; Two Gentle-
men of Veror.a. I). J. Snider, 10. 184; Histor-
ical Plays, D, J, snider, 11, 79; System of
his Dramas. D. J. Snider (noticed), 11. 441.

Shelley. '1 he I hilosophical Element In, by G. S.
Bower, 14, 42j.

Sidgwick, Henry, The Methods of Ethics, c, 224.

Simon. T. Collyns, Berkeley's Doctrine on the Na-
ture of Matter. 3, oof ; Is Thought the Think-
er, 3, 371' ; Beikeley in the I hilosophical Jour-
nals of Europe, 5, 2i:8 ; On Berkeley, the New

Index.

443

Materialism and the Diminution of Light by

Distance, 15, 77.
Bittenlehri; fuer Schule und Haus (noticed), 13,

22+.
Smith. B. C, Letter on Immortality, 8, 2TS.
Smith, B. K., Sonnet to the Venus of Milo, 12, 92.
Smith, C. E. Seth. Music of Color. 8, 2:6.
Snider. D. .1., Second Part of Goethe's Faust (tr X

I, 65; Di Vinci's "Last Supper" (tr.t. i, 24S ;
Composition of Goethe's Social Komances
(tr.), 4, 268; Theism and Pantheism (tr.). by
Dr. Hoffmann. 5. 86; Shakespeare's Merchant
of Venice. 6, 13m, 361 ; Shakespeare's Tra-redy
of Julius CiBsar, 6, 234; Shakespeare's Ham-
let. 7, Jan., 71; 7. Apr., 67; 7. -luiy. 7S ;
Shakespeare's Comedy " As You Like It," 7,
Oct., 74: Shakespeare's Midsummer Night's
Dream. 8, 165; Shakespeare's Tempest. 8, 19-3;
Shakespeare's 'Winter's Tale, g, tO; Shake-
speare's Cymbeline. g, 172; Shakespeare's
Measure for Measure, 9, 312; Shakespeare's
Antony and Cleopatra. 10. 52 ; Shakespeare's
Two Gentlemen of Verona, 10. 19 ; 'TroihiR
and Cressida, 10, 395; Shakespeare's Historical
Plays. II, 79; System of Shakespeare's Dramas
f noticed), II, 441; Merlin's Di-'-cif^le, g, 4i9;
Notice of W. Cunninsham's The Influence of
Descartes, etc, 10, 112; Notic.^ of the Shake-
speare Lexicon of Dr Alexander Schmidt, 10,
112; Delphic Days (noticed by John Albee),
14, 254; The Soul's Journey, 11, 4;», 129.

Social Science, American Association of, Pro-
gramme for 1S81, 15, 9:).

Sobolewski, E., Dialogue on Music, i, 224; New
School of Music. 2. 171 ; Mendelssohn, 7, Oct.,
51 ; Robert Schumann. 8, 254.

Soldan, F. Louis, lleview of llartmaim on the Di-
alecti't. by Michelet, 5, 319 ; On the Dialectic
Method (tr.), 6, 159; Beneke's Educational
Psychology. Karl Schmidt (tr.), 10, 361 ; Hegel
on the Absolute Rehgion (tr.). 15, 9, 1S2, 39o.

Sotheran, Charles. Percy Bys^he Shelley as Phi-
losopher and Reformer (noticed), 12, 219.

Soul, Immortality of the, W. T. Harri«, 4, 97.

Soul, Immortalitv of the. C. F. Goeschel (tr.), T.
R. Vickroy. II, 6", 177.372.

Soul's Journey, The, D. J. Snider. 11, 49, 129.

Soul, Leibnitz on the Mature of the (tr.), T. Da-
vidson. 2, 62.

Soul, The. F. R. Marvin, g. 421.

Space, Some Considerations on the Notion of, J. E.
Cabot, 12, 225.

"Spatial Quale, 'William James. 13. 64.

Spatial Quale, .'in Answer. J. E. Cabot, 13, 199.

Speculative, The, 'W. T. Hams, i, 2.

Speculafve r.s. the Visionary, The, H. H. Morgan,
3, r.5.

Speculative Philosophy in Italy, 'W. T. Harris. 5. 94,

Speculative Logic and Philcsophv, Introduction to,
A. Vera, 7, Apr., 1 : 7, July, 60 ; 8, 13, 107, 22S.

Spence, Payton, On Volunt.ary Motion (noticed),
13. 2.0 ; Time and Space t'on^idired as Nega-
tions, 13, 337 ; Atomic Collision and Non-col-
lision. 14, 286.

Spencer, Herbert CW. T. H.arris"). i, 6.

Spencer's Definition of Mind, William James, 12, 1.

Spinoza, A. E. Kroeger, g, 265.

Spinoza, Life and Teachings o^ George S. Morris,

II, 27S.

Stearns, F. P., Two Sonnets (E. 'W. E. and J. G.
'W.'), 13, 221 ; Old and New Systems of Logic,
7. Oct.. 42.

Stirling. James Hutchison, Letter from, 6, T^3 ;
Professor Fr.aser's Berkeley, 7, Jan.. 1 ; Henry
Thomas Buckle (noticed). (N. A. Rev.). 8, 37S;
Buckle and the .Aufkliirung. 9, 337 ; I am that I
am, II, 371 ; Burns in Drama, 12, 4.7; Schop-
enhauer in rel.ation to Kant, 13, 1 ; Caird on
Kant, 14,49; Criticism of Kant's Main Prin-

ciples, 14, 257, 353 ; Philosophy of Law, 6,
313; 7, Apr, 20; 7, Julv, 24; 8. 123.

Strothotte, A., Tr. of Dr. floffmann on the Phi-
losophy of Baader, i, 190

Syllogism, Stat?ment and Reduction of, George
Bruce Halsted, 12, 41S.

Subject and Object, or Universal Polarity, Richard
'Randolph. 8. 97.

Sully, James, Illusions: a Psychological Study
(noticed), 15, 325.

Swedenboig and Speculative Philosophy, R. L.
Tafel, 2, IS.

Swedenborg, Emanuel, Heaven and its Wonders,
and Hell (noticed), 12, tt8.

Tafel, R. L., Swedenborg and Speculative Philoso-
phy. 2, IS.

Talbot. ICmily, Register of Infant Development,
15. 99.

Talbot. Marion, Psychogenesis, Dr. Preveron (tr.),
15. 159.

Taylor, Bayard, Invocation of Goethe (tr.\ 15. 98.

Thanet. Octave, The Moral Purpose of Tourgue-
netf, 12. 427.

Theism and Pantheism, by Dr. Hoffmann (tr.), D.
J. Snider. 5, 86.

Thinker, Is Thought the, T. Tollyns Simon, 3, 376.

Thomas. W. C.ive, Symmetrical Education (no-
ticed). 13, 335.

Thomson. John C, System of Empirical Certi-
tude. 6, 142.

Thomiison, J. t;ockburn. The Bhagavad Gita (no-
ticed), 9, 336.

Thrax Diimysiuo ('•'ee Grammar of).

Tieck's Remarks on the Sistine Madonna (tr.), C.
L. Bernays, 7, Oct., 27.

Time and Space t onsidered as Negations. Payton
Spence. 13, :337.

Tourgueneff. The Moral Purpose of, 12, 427.

Trendelenburg, Adolf, On the Logical Question in
Hegel's Sy.-.tem, 5, 319; 6,82,16.3,300; as Op-
ponent of' Hegel, A. Vera, 7, Jan., 2() ; Expo-
sition of, by G. S. Morris. 8, 92 ; and Hegel,
"W. T. Harris, g, 70.

Trentowski's Introduction to Logic (tr.), I. Pod-
bielski, 4, 62.

Turner, W. E. Channins:, 10, 141.

Tuthill, Meeds, Matter and Method of Thought.
13. 372; 14, 13.

Tyler, Samuel, The Theory of the Beautiful, g. 444.

TyDd:drs Address, Professor, Ttog. Davidson, 8,
361.

Ueberweg, Friedrich, History of Philosophy (tr.
by G. S. Morris), voluuie 1 (noticed by T.
Davidson). 6, 95; volume 2 (noticed), 8, 94.

Ulrici, Hermann. Compendium derLogik(no':'ced),
6, li.2; Grundzuege der Praktisch'n Philaso-
phie (noticed), 7, Oct., 90 ; Strauss as a Philo-
sophical Thinker. Tr. by C. P. Krauth (no-
ticed), g, 111. (See also" Zeitschrift fuer Phi-
losophic, etc.).

Ultimate Generali-ation, The (noticed). 13, 222.

Upton, G. P., Tr. of Memories : A story of Ger-
man Love (noticed), 9, 112.

Vaihinger, Hans, on Hartmann, Duehring. und
Lange (noticed), 12, 110; Kant-<.onimentar,

Venn. John, The Logic of Chance (noticed), 15,
102.

Venus of Milo, The, by Hermann Grimm (tr. \ Alice
S. Mil'ard. 5, 78.

Venus of Melos, Restoration of the (tr.), L. J.
Block. 5, '.41.

Venus, Idea of the, H. K. Jones. 10, 48.

Vera. A., Letter from, 6, 182; II Cavour e Libera
Chiesa in Libero Stato. Also, his writings on
Ihilosophy of History, etc., 6. 94; Trendel-
enburg as Opponent of Hegel. 7, Jan., 26;

444

Index.

Probloinn doll' Assoluto. 7, Aiir., fG; Intro-
duction to Speculiitivi' Lofric i»nil Philosojiliv,

7, Apr. 1: 7."Jiily, (iO ; 8. l:f. 107, ■-"JS. '2si(;
Stniiiss : I'Ancioniu' ot la NouvoUo Koi, 8. 1'.''2;
Criticism ot'TriMidclenbur'; (tr ). 8, •-'"•>; Li'ttor
on T |)nvids_on's (.ritiqiU' of his l?0(:k, g, 100 ;
Cavour ct TEp-l'sc libriMlims llitat litirc (no-
ticed), 9, 10.1; l'liiIoso|iliic do la Kolijiiou do
lU'jrcl, tradiiitc, ct,'. u'oticcd). 12, 'ii\.

Verhanilliniu'cn dcr I'liilosophisclicn (iosollschaft
zu IJerlin. I'arts 1 and '2, 10, IHO; Parts l->"), 12,
111 ; Parts 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. 12, 18. and 14, 14.
142,

Vickroy. T. K.. Immortality of the Soul, C. F.
Gol'schel (tr.V 11. ti"), 177", S7l'.

Viertcljahrsschrilt I'licr \Vis!.c'nscliaftliclic Philoso-
pbie (K. Avonarius, Kcdactcur), 14. :i51.

Walkor. Wra. K., Meditations of Descartes ^tr.">. 4,
16. I'.'O. '210. S04; Introduction to the Medi-
tations of Descartes, 5, !I7.

Wallace, William, The Lo^'ic of Hegel (from the
Encvclopffidia), with Prolegomena (noticed),

8. 191.

Walton. Jean Emmanuel, ou la Discipline de
TF-sprit (noticed). 15. lOo.

Ward. Lester F.. Kant's Antinomies in the Light
of Modern -Science, 15, :isl.

Ware. K. «1, Historical and Logical Relations of
Fichte and Kant, 11. 14.").

Wassou, D. A., Correspondence, 2, 245.

Watson, John, Empiricism and t'ommon Logic,
10, 17 I Kant's Keply to Hume, 10, IIM; Hed-
onism and Utilitarianism, 10, 271 ; Relativivy
of Knowledge. 11. lit; The Relation of Phi-
losophy to Scieni'e, 12, lOit; 'Ibe World ns
For.e. 12. 113; Science and Rehgion, 12. 21S;
World as Force, 13, I.tI ; Notice of Calder-
wood's Relations of Mind and Brain, 13, 4J8;
Notice of Ribot's German Psychology, 14,
140; His work on Kant (noticed), 14, 3J9;

Kant's Principles of Jndgmont, 14, 87(i; Kant
and his Entrlish Critics (noticed), 15, 221 ; The
Critical Philosophy in i:s Itelations to Ideal-
ism and Sensationalism, 15, .'W7.

Wecden, William H.. The Morality of Prohibitory
Liquor Laws (noticed), 9, 414.

Weis. Ludwig. .\nti-materialism, Reviewed by G.
S. Hall, 6, 2I(i.

Weiss, John, lie is not Far, 3, 177; Theories of
Mental Gene>is, 6, VXl.

Werther. C. A,. Works Noticed, 6, ISO.

Winckelniann, John, Remarks on the Torso of
Hercules (tr). 'I'. Davidson, 2, IS"; Remarks
on the Laokoon, 2, 213; The Apollo Belve-
dere, 3, 94.

Will. Freedom of the, W. T. Harris, 4, 94.

Will (see Schopenhauer), i, 2:!2.

Wisconsin .\cademy of Sciences, Transactions of
(noticed). 6, I^S; 8, iSO.

Wisconsin I'niversity, Philosoi)hy at, 11. 217.

Woerner, J. (}., The Jurisdiction of Probate Courts
(in South, Law Itev.) (noticed), 12, 109.

World as Force, The, -lohn Wat.son, 13, I.1I,

World's Progress, The: A Dictionary of Dates
(noticed), 13, 431.

Worthington, Robert H,, Jaoobi and the Philoso-
phy of Faith, 12. 303,

Wright, R, J.. Principia or Basis of Social Sci-
ence (noticed). 12, 21S,

Wundt, W,, Ueber die Aufgabc der Philosophie in
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